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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Motivation  
Forty years ago, the Thai government had a big development campaign on “Nam Lai, 
Fai Sawang, Tang Dee” (Water flow, Electric lighting, Good Road). Therefore, 
electricity and all power plants were always the symbol of national progress. 
However, thirty years later, local protests against the new power plants spread all over 
Thailand. Power plants are no longer welcomed any more by local communities, 
while electricity demand continues to increase. Today, power plants are no longer 
perceived as a national pride. This is, in fact, a dilemma in Thai society at this 
moment. 
Concerns about human health impacts constitute the basis for local protests against 
power plant projects. Since the 1990s, there is more and more evidence to show the 
negative impacts of power plants on human health, especially from lignite-fired and 
large hydropower power plants. In case of the Mae Moh lignite-fired power plant, 
estimates suggest that 300 villagers have lost their lives as a direct result of pollution 
from the power plants, thousands suffer from respiratory problems and more than 
30,000 people have been displaced as a direct result of the pollution from the power 
plant (Figure 1.1)1. In the case of Pak Mun Dam, thousands families have lost their 
fishery resources, local jobs, and food security, after the dam obstruct the natural fish 
migration and change river ecosystem (Figure 1.2)2. 
 
Figure 1.1 Life at Mae Moh 
Mr. Sributr Wongchana, the villager of 
Ban Hua Fai, Mae Moh district, is 
hooked up to an oxygen tank and 
breathes purified air to soothe the 
asthmatic irritation, as an essential 
part of everyday life, after long-term 
exposure to air pollution from the Mae 
Moh lignite power plant and its mining 
activities. 
Source: Yvan Cohen, 2006. 
Figure 1.2 Pray for Lives 
In 2002, local people in Ban Hua Heav 
prayed for the government decision to 
continue opening the dam gate, which 
allows fish to migrate naturally and 
allows people to fish again. Finally, the 
Thai government decided to open Pak 
Mun’s dam gate for four months a year 
to mitigate the impacts on local 
communities 
Source: SEARIN  
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As mentioned by the World Energy Assessment, although energy is an essential part 
of human well-being, the existing ways of energy production, transformation and 
consumption, which are based on large-scale fossil fuel technologies, can cause 
several severe impacts on human health and society 3. 
“What should be the better power for health?” is the main inspiration for this 
research. 
The concept of healthy public policy, introduced by the World Health Organization in 
1986, aims to address the problem of health impacts relating to development policies 
and projects in non-health sectors, including the question above. This is because, 
based on the fact that to promote the “health for all”, the creation of supportive 
environments for healthy living is crucial and cannot be achieved without moving 
beyond the borders of the health sector. The key ideas of healthy public policy are to 
put health on the agenda of all policy-making at all levels, to develop and promote 
choices that are conducive to health, and to make sure that a healthier choice is an 
easier choice to make in the policy-making process4. 
The concept of healthy public policy was introduced in Thailand in 2000 through the 
national health system reform5. Like other countries, Thailand has faced several 
negative health impacts of development processes and activities. Certainly, the health 
impacts of power generation are one of the most evident cases presented in the reform 
process. This leads to stronger need to implement a healthy public policy concept in 
the Thai power sector, i.e. to develop the better power for health (detail in Chapter 2). 
In fact, apart from human health impacts, Thai society still has several good reasons 
to be concerned about the future of the energy sector in general and its power plant 
investment projects in particular. Annual greenhouse gas emission from power 
generation has been increased rapidly 6. The energy import burden has also increased. 
At the same time, the energy intensity in Thailand has increased showing the lower 
energy efficiency in the overall energy management7. Obviously, these general 
concerns raise questions about the future of power plants, i.e., “should we invest in the 
project that will increase greenhouse gas emission, import burden, possibly lead to 
the lower energy efficiency of the country and also cause the negative impacts on 
health?” 
Evidently, sustainable energy development, e.g. renewable energy and energy 
efficiency improvement, are the most prominent solutions to reduce negative health 
impacts. The life cycle assessment of different power generation technology has 
proved that, in general, renewable energy has much lower negative impacts on the 
environment compared to fossil-based and other large-scale technologies8. At the 
same time, the studies of the Extern-E project have shown that renewable energy also 
has much lower negative impacts on human health9. Moreover, both renewable energy 
and energy efficiency can increase jobs and reduce the import burden of the 
economy10. Therefore, sustainable energy development is more likely to be one of the 
healthier solutions in the power sector.  
Thailand is a rich country in terms of renewable resources. The modest estimation 
from the Ministry of Energy (MoEn) indicates that the country has a renewable power 
potential of more than 15,000 MW of renewable power potentials in this country11. 
However, only around 1,000 MW, or less than 10% of its potential (or only around 
2% of the total energy generation), has been utilized in the Thai power sector (detail 
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in Chapter 3). MoEn has referred to this situation as a situation of “high potential but 
low development” 12.  
The situation of high potential but low development urges us to discover what makes 
this healthier choice a difficult choice in Thai energy policy. Hvelplund and Lund 
suggest that, due to unequal power structures both financially and politically, it is less 
likely that the new radical and sustainable technological changes will take place by 
the old regimes of technologies13. Especially when renewable energy will reduce the 
value-added share of the fossil fuel suppliers and power plants, it is certainly not 
economically attractive for them to invest in renewable energy. Therefore, sustainable 
or healthier options cannot develop without supportive institutional frameworks14. 
These analyses are quite relevant to the situation in Thailand, where power utilities, 
like Electricity Generation of Thailand (EGAT) and natural gas supplier, like 
Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) have monopolized power on the electricity 
and natural gas market and have a strong influence on policy processes15. It is quite 
clear that renewable energy never has chance to be recognized as an alternative in the 
EGAT’s long-term investment planning or the power development plan (PDP)16. In 
this sense, healthier choice is not considered a choice at all, if it cannot be put in the 
agenda of the decision-making process. 
Certainly, the utilities and gas suppliers have some explanations for doing so. These 
explanations normally come from the set of ideas, beliefs, and information, or the so-
called policy discourse, which states that the reliable power system must be 
centralized, both power generation and transmission sub-systems. More importantly, 
electricity must be cheap and the utilities believe that the larger the power plants are, 
the cheaper electricity will be17. Therefore, several policy instruments, like power 
pricing, have been set on the criteria of reliability and centralized power plants, which 
is certainly less preferable for distributed power, like renewable energy alternatives18. 
Perhaps, the most obvious and recent example of how renewable energy has been 
wiped out from the formal policy and planning process is the Ministry of Energy’s 
Newspaper Advertisement on July 31st 2006, see Box 1.1. 
It is quite obvious that in the Ministry’s advertisement as presented in Box 1.1, Cheap 
electricity is the aim for considering choices in power planning. The way in which 
information is presented is really biased against renewable energy. While, in the table, 
fossil fuel based technology includes only fuel costs, the costs of renewable energy 
include both capital and operation and maintenance costs. Moreover, the information 
on biomass and biogas energy, which are highly competitive choices in terms of costs 
is hidden to the public. With these biased planning criteria and information, it is not 
surprising that coal and lignite will be concluded as the cheapest and, consequently, 
the most appropriate choice in the Ministry’s perspective. Certainly, in this 
perspective, the suffered lives of Mr. Sributr Wongchana (in Figure 1.1) and people in 
Ban Hua Heav (in Figure 1.2) are out of the calculation and planning scope.  
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Box 1.1 Ministry of Energy Newspaper Advertisement on  
“Appropriate Energy Options for Thailand..?” 
Source: Matichon Daily Newspaper, July 31st 2006 
 
 
 
Table The Fuel Costs of Power Generation  
from Different Fuels (Estimated in July 2006) 
Fuel Type Fuel Costs  
(THB/Kwh) 
Solar Cell 20.20 
Wind energy 6.90 
Diesel 6.75 
Fuel oil 4.00 
Natural Gas 1.50 
Imported Coal 1.00 
Lignite 0.53 
Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office 
 
 
Not including  
capital cost, O&M and 
environmental costs 
Including 
capital and 
O&M cost 
Not providing the information 
on generation cost of biomass 
and biogas energy, which are 
highly competitive in Thailand 
Conclusion:  renewable 
energy is very expensive 
Main aimis  to allow Thai people 
to buy cheap electricity 
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In this unfavorable institutional framework and policy discourse, the situation of 
renewable energy and the heath aspect are quite marginalized in the planning process. 
The question is, according to the concept of healthy public policy, how we can make 
this healthier choice become an easier choice to make in the Thai power sector’s 
policy process.  
Therefore, if healthy public policy should be a meaningful concept to Thai society, it 
should aim to analyze and, more importantly, promote healthier options in the Thai 
power sector. In doing so, several questions must be raised, for example: 
• Is a healthier policy option possible for the Thai power sector? 
• How have different policy options been analyzed in the existing policy 
and planning process?  
• Who controls and influences policy and planning process? And how 
can they do that? 
• What kinds of assumptions, options, and targets are used in the policy 
and planning process? What kinds of policy discourse are used for 
rationalizing or legitimizing their assumptions, options, and decisions 
made? 
• What kinds of other ideas and movement  challenges this mainstream 
policy discourse? How they challenge the dominant one? What kind of 
alternative policy discourses  can support the healthier policy changes? 
• How can different policy options lead to different impacts in terms of 
environmental, health, social, and economic aspects 
• What should be an appropriate and healthier policy option for Thai 
society? 
• How will the healthier options be implemented in the existing 
institutional structure? What should be a supportive institutional 
framework and an important policy discourse for the development of a 
healthier option in the Thai power sector? 
• Last but not least, how can we make this happen in the real political 
world? 
This research aims to address all these questions. In other words, it tries to test and 
reflect on how the concept of healthy public policy can be operationalized in the Thai 
power sector and how it can contribute to the actual policy changes in this sector. 
With the experiences and reflections of this study in mind, hopefully, it is possible to 
shed the light to sustainable energy policy changes in the Thai power sector and, at 
the same time, pave the way for introducing a healthy public policy in other sectors of 
Thai society. 
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1.2 Research Questions 
To fulfil the objectives of this research, this project has four main sets of research 
questions in this project, as explained below: 
1. Policy Analysis: How have policy directions and structures been evolved in 
the Thai power sector? How are policy discourses and discourse coalitions 
developed? What are the main differences among policy discourses? How do 
they interact with each other? What are the main implications of these 
different discourses on the strategic impact assessment and policymaking in 
the Thai power sector?  
2. Strategic Impact Assessment: What will be the different impacts of different 
policy options? Which policy options can lead to better impacts in 
environmental, social, economic, and health perspectives? Which policy 
options will provide society with the capacity and flexibility need when 
dealing with a possible uncertain future?  
3. Institutional Framework: What is the supportive institutional framework, 
including public regulations required to promote more sustainable and 
healthier policy option and why? What are the main similarities and 
differences among policy discourses in terms of institutional framework? 
What kinds of actions or strategic areas should be developed in order to 
facilitate policy directions toward healthier solutions? 
4. Policy as a Social Learning Process: How do the policy analysis, impact 
assessment, and institutional analysis contribute to actual policy changes 
during the three years of research study? How can the Thai public gain a broad 
and deep access to policy processes and assess the options of different policy 
discourses? What are the main consequences of a deliberative policy analysis 
on the policy process in Thai power sector? How can we learn from this 
experience? 
1.3 Conceptual Framework 
As earlier mentioned, health impacts of power generation give rise to concerns of 
Thai society. As presented on the first page, power generation does is not only 
affecting human health through the exposure of polluted environments (like the case 
of Mae Moh lignite-fired power plant), but also through the changes of living 
conditions (as seen in the Pak Mun hydro power plant). The result of these well-
known affected cases creates oppositions in the local communities, surrounding the 
new power plants projects.  
One of the most relevant explanations for the dilemma in the Thai power sector is the 
concept of risk society. According to the risk society, our society is now facing new 
kinds of risks that are manufactured within human society. These manufactured risks 
have paradoxically emerged from the conventional ways of protecting human being 
from traditional risks19. The energy sector is one of the good examples of 
manufactured risks which generate from the local to the global scales. These 
manufactured risks are normally characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and 
inequality20. Obviously, the conventional ways of public decision-making and 
planning with an economic expansion target and technocratic domination have great 
difficulties in dealing with these complex problems of uncertainty and inequality21. 
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Concurrently, it is also obvious that political space and policy arenas are now more 
open. The active citizens have participated meaningfully in the policy-making 
process. Consequently, the policy process becomes more complicated with different 
interpretations, problem definitions, visions, rationalities and policy options, so-called 
different policy discourses 22, as also seen in the Thai power sector (discussed later in 
Chapter 4). This requires the development of a new public policy process, which can 
allow the differences to play constructive roles in the process. Otherwise policy-
making will certainly turn into social conflicts. In other words, the active and 
constructive participation within deliberative discussion and interactive policy 
process is certainly required to deal with these emerging complexities23  
Healthy Public Policy is one of the attempts to improve the policy-making process 
with the special focus on the human health impacts from development policies and 
projects outside the health sector. The core ideas are to put health on the agenda in all 
policymaking and promote healthier choice in decision-making and planning process. 
In pursuing these core ideas, the systematic assessment of future health impacts of 
different policy options is highly recommended. However, since health highly 
depends on different aspects of life, this systematic assessment of health impacts 
cannot be done without analyzing the policy impacts on environment and society. 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is one of the approaches of environmental 
management that tries to facilitate policy discussions by providing better insights on 
future impacts, derived from the implementation of different policy options. With the 
aim to support sustainable development, several aspects of future impacts, including 
environmental, social, and human health, must be consider within the SEA process24. 
Therefore, SEA is one of the possible ways of integrating health and other important 
dimensions into the sustainable planning process. 
In the energy sector, Hvelplund and Lund have developed the new approach of 
feasibility studies for innovation and public regulation with the clear insight that with 
unequal power structures, the new radical sustainable technologies are hardly 
developed in the old regimes of assessments, institutions and public regulations25. 
First and foremost, the new ways of policy assessment and feasibility studies need to 
consider various aspects of national development goals, rather than targeting only 
narrow economic indicators, such as utilities’ cost minimization. Moreover, they have 
to be fully aware of long-term environmental and economic impacts, the distributional 
effects within and between nations and the unbalanced economic and political power 
structures. The institutional rearrangements are also very crucial for the success of 
technological development for sustainability26. 
All these important concepts can significantly help to explain the energy problems 
and conflicts in the Thai power sector. Evidently, the expansion of Thai power 
involves a number of manufactured risks, especially human health impacts27. The 
policymaking and planning process in the Thai power sector is still centralized and 
has very limited opportunities for public participation, though some policy discourse 
coalitions have been gradually formed and play their roles28 29. The information 
provided to the Thai public has easily been distorted and disguised, as already shown 
in Box 1.1.  
Furthermore, the objective of energy planning is always closely related to utilities’ 
cost minimization, though several national development goals may better be achieved 
through sustainable energy development, including environmental improvement and 
reduction of income inequality30. Recently, the Thai government has announced the 
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new policy and target for renewable energy development31. However, the great 
difficulty in achieving this target is highly expected due to unfavorable institutional 
structures within the Thai power sector32.  
This leads to the hypothetical idea that the policy and planning process in the Thai 
power sector is perhaps the most important “cause of the cause” for serious negative 
health impacts derived from Thai power generation. Therefore, if this hypothetical 
idea has been confirmed, the policy and planning process must be improved by 
facilitating democratic discussion and a continuous social learning process towards 
healthy public policy and sustainable energy development. The new policy process 
has to consider carefully a) future risks and uncertainties, b) human health 
consequences and c) the different policy discourses and options.  
Based on these concepts, this research project is an attempt to analyze the existing 
policy and planning process and pave the way for sustainable policy and planning 
practices. To reach this aim, this research will be divided into four main connected 
parts.  
First, the historical policy changes will be analyzed in order to achieve a better 
understanding on policy processes, different policy discourses, and the relationship 
between power and rationality behind different policy discourses. The main 
methodology for this part is the historical and policy discourse analysis (discussed in 
Chapter 2). The outcomes of the first part will frame policy options and impact 
indicators for strategic impact assessment in the second part as well as the insights 
into the foundation of institutional frameworks in the third part. 
In the second part, the impacts from different policy options will be analyzed. The 
main methodology for this part will be the strategic environmental assessment (SEA), 
with the focus on human health impacts. Therefore, on one hand, this research 
provides an additional insight into human health impacts compared to other 
sustainable energy planning. On the other hand, this research also adds the 
environmental, social, resource, economic, and environmental impacts on the healthy 
policy considerations. This is due to the fact that, according to the concept of healthy 
public policy, the inextricable links between health and other supportive aspects must 
be highlighted in pursuing healthier policy changes. Moreover, to facilitate a 
deliberative policy discussion, the results of SEA must be reviewed and discussed in 
several policy workshops, organized by this research.  
Then, an existing institutional framework and a supportive institutional framework for 
healthy policy option will be analyzed in the third part. The analysis will be conducted 
in the connection with cognitive and normative dimensions of different policy 
discourses, which always lead to different suggestions in terms of public regulations. 
The main methodology will be the institutional analysis, as explained in Scott and 
Hvelplund (discussed in Chapter 2 and 3). Certainly, this part aims to show the 
practical ways of moving from policy discourses and impact assessment into social 
reality.  
Last, the research aims to form critical reflections on how the attempts in this research 
study can be translated into actual social learning processes and healthier policy 
changes. Therefore, apart from the analysis of policy discourses, strategic impact 
assessment and institutional framework, this study also involves several means of 
policy communication, especially public forums at regional and national levels.  
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The aims of the public forums are a) to facilitate the discussions among different 
policy discourses, b) to get public feedback on this impact analysis and its policy 
recommendations, c) to achieve a better understanding of the potentials and practical 
issues of sustainable energy development in Thailand, and d) to stimulate public 
discussion about the strategic directions of the Thai power sector and their 
consequences. 
During the three years of study period (September 2003 –August 2006), the public 
forums have been organized in several forms, as chronologically shown in Table 1.1. 
First, together with sustainable energy trips within the region, three regional public 
forums have been organized to discuss the potentials, experiences, and strategic 
directions and impacts of power generations and sustainable energy development in 
Thailand and in each region. In the northern region, the sustainable energy fair was 
also incorporated into the public forums in order to provide a better public 
understanding for participating in this policy discussion (see Figure 1.3).  
Second, in July 2005, three policy workshops have been set up in Bangkok for more a 
detailed analysis of policy discussions at the national level. In order to gain better 
insight into several aspects of policy issues, each policy workshop has its own special 
focus, including Thailand’s power planning system, supportive policy framework for 
renewable energy development, and good governance in renewable energy 
development.  
Third, the public forums were also taking place at other occasional events, which are 
related to the policy discussions in the Thai power sector and healthy public policy 
formulation, including No Coal Forum in Lampang, Sustainable Energy Festival in 
Nakorn Ratchasima, National Health Assembly in Bangkok, etc.  
Most of these public forums and policy workshops have been publicly reported by 
several mass media and journalists in Thailand as part of the policy communication, 
in order to facilitate policy discussion at a wider level and more influential impacts. 
The examples of media coverage are presented in Figure 1.4.    
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Table 1.1 Public Forums in Discussing Policy Directions and Strategic Impact 
Analyses   
Policy Workshop Date and 
Place 
No. of 
Persons 
Key Points of Discussion 
1. Evaluation of Government Energy 
Policy (Occasional event) 
8 December 
04 Bangkok 
60 Strengths and weaknesses in existing 
energy policy  
2. Future of Thai Electricity (Preliminary 
policy workshop) 
11 January 
05 
Bangkok 
30 Present energy problems, an impact 
analysis of 3 policy options 
3. No Coal Forum 
(Occasional event) 
23 January 
05 
Lampang 
500 Health impacts from coal, Energy 
future without coal 
4. Alternative energy for the North-
eastern Thailand (Regional Forum) 
22 Feb. 05 
Surin 
80 Energy problems, potential of 
renewable energy of the region.  
5. The Risk of Privatization: Case of the 
Thai power system (Occasional event) 
30 March 05
Bangkok 
30 EGAT Privatization and the impacts on 
sustainable energy development 
6. Lessons Learnt from Local Energy 
Planning (Occasional event) 
2 April 05 
Ratchasima 
150 Potential and future of local energy 
planning  
7. Out of the Crisis Through the 
Renewable Way (Regional Forum) 
4 June 05 
Chiang Mai 
129 The crisis of the energy system and the 
alternative energy solution scenarios, 
the exchange of experiences among 
energy producers 
8. Good Governance and Tri-party 
Mechanism in Energy Project 
Management.  (Occasional event) 
7 June 05 
Bangkok 
35 Good governance and its implication 
on the energy system, especially for 
renewable energy 
9. The Future of Thai Energy as a 
Healthy Public Policy in National Health 
Assembly (Occasional event)  
8 July 05 
Bangkok 
200 Present energy problems, an impact 
analysis of 3 policy options 
10. The Energy Strategies for the 
Southern Thailand (Regional Forum) 
9 July 05 
Songkhla 
40 The analysis of energy strategies in the 
regions and RE potentials 
11. RE Policy Workshop I : The Energy 
Crisis and Energy Planning in Thailand  
(National Policy Workshop)  
12 July 05 
Bangkok 
29 Flaw institutional structure and 
assumptions in energy planning and 
suggestions for better planning   
12. Electricity Governance in Thailand: 
The Launching Workshop  
(Occasional Events) 
13-14 July 
05 Bangkok 
25 Evolution on privatization policy and 
the assessment of good governance in 
the power policy processes  
13. RE Policy Workshop II: 
RE from Strategy to Reality 
(National Policy Workshop)  
19 July 05 
Bangkok 
22 Concluding session and policy 
recommendations for RE development 
14. RE Policy Workshop III: 
Good Governance in RE Development 
(National Policy Workshop)  
26 July 05 
Bangkok 
21 Policy recommendations for good 
governance for the RE development 
15. Reforming the Power Sector 
Through Democratic Process, 
(Public Lecture at Midnight University) 
30 July 06 
Chiang Mai. 
20 The need and possibility of reforming 
the power sector by democratic 
movement. 
16. Reforming Energy Policy, Regional 
Forum for National Economic and Social 
Development Advisory Council  
31 July 06 
Songkhla. 
120 The reason for reforming energy policy 
due to monopoly power and conflict of 
interests.  
17. Reporting “An Assessment of 
Electricity Governance in Thailand” to 
the Electricity Regulator 
3 August 06 
Bangkok. 
15 The results of governance assessment, 
the areas of improvement in the coming 
years. 
18. Press conference on “The Hidden 
Agendas of Thai Energy Businesses in 
Power Planning Process 
27 August 
06 Bangkok 
40 The political economy analysis of 
electricity planning process and policy 
suggestions. 
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Figure 1.4 Examples of media coverage and journalist reports on policy workshops 
and sustainable energy trips. 
1.4 Structure of the Research 
To answer these four sets of research questions, the research will be divided into nine 
chapters. Each chapter is connected to each other as presented in Figure 1.5 
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After this introduction chapter, the concept of healthy public policy analysis will be 
reviewed in Chapter 2. In this chapter, the core ideas of healthy public policy and the 
introduction to Thai society under the health system reform will be elaborated. This 
will show that the needs for healthy public policy in Thailand in general and in the 
Thai power sector in particular are closely inked to the concept of new modernity, 
which includes the emergence of the risk society, network society and the demand for 
deliberative democracy. With these new emerging conditions, the conventional or 
linear policy analysis, which assumes a complete rationality in policy-making, is less 
likely to be effective. The new way of policy analysis is needed in order to understand 
the interplay between different stakeholders, between different policy discourses, and 
between power and rationality. This chapter will introduce the concept of deliberative 
policy analysis, which will be used for answering the research question 1 in Chapter 
4. 
In Chapter 3, the main focus is sustainable energy as a possible and healthier 
alternative. This chapter will begin by providing the background concepts and 
information about energy and health linkages. From these linkages, it is clear that 
renewable energy is a healthier technological choice. However, as already mentioned, 
this health benefit and also other societal benefits are not sufficiently recognized in 
the old regimes of technology. The new concepts, institutions, and practices for 
sustainable energy planning must be introduced. In this chapter, the concepts of 
institutional analysis, feasibility study and strategic environmental assessment will be 
reviewed. The concept of strategic environmental assessment will be further 
elaborated, as a main analytical framework of this research in Chapter 5, while the 
concepts of institutional analysis will be applied in Chapter 7. Last but not least, 
sustainable energy potentials in Thailand and their present conditions will be reviewed 
in order to ensure that Thai society really has a possible option for better power for 
health.  
From the conceptual framework in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 provides a deliberative policy 
analysis, i.e. answers to research question No. 1, based on a long-term historical 
analysis and policy discourse analysis. In the historical analysis, different driving 
forces, influences, and historical events will be reviewed, in order to show how 
different policy discourses have interacted and why some policy discourses become 
dominant in a specific period of time in the nearly half-century history of the Thai 
power sector. With these insights, four influential policy discourses; namely state 
monopoly discourse, power pool discourse, private monopoly discourse, and 
decentralization discourse, will be identified and elaborated. The comparison of these 
policy discourses will show the similarities and differences between them, which have 
determined policy options or directions for future investment in the power sector, as 
in the Thai context, referred to the power development plan (PDP). These three policy 
options, or three PDP options, will be used as alternatives in the impact assessment 
analysis in Chapter 5 with the aim to find the healthier solution for the Thai power 
sector in Chapter 6. 
As earlier mentioned, Chapter 5 is an analytical framework for strategic impact 
assessment. In other words, this chapter is a blueprint for answering the second set of 
research questions. To provide the framework of analysis, this chapter will begin with 
the operational strategy to apply strategic environmental assessment (SEA) to this 
research. In short, the strategic environmental assessment will focus on the three PDP 
options, as long-term investment options in the Thai power sector. These three PDP 
options provide different investment strategies in terms of demand prediction, as well 
 14
as fuels and generation technologies used. These three PDP options include PDP-Gas 
(of which 81% of power generation will rely on natural gas), PDP-Coal (of which half 
of the new power plants will be switched to coal), and PDP-Renewables (of which 
10% of power generation in 2011 will be converted into renewable energy and 
replaced by a more realistic demand prediction). 
According to national development objectives, SEA in this research will mainly focus 
on the environmental, health, social, resources, and economic impacts of these three 
PDP options. Like other SEA studies, the impact analyses are mainly based on a 
number of assumptions about the linkages between technologies and their 
consequences. In this Chapter, the review of different information and viewpoints on 
these linkages will be reviewed and discussed in all aspects of the impact assessment 
above mentioned. Finally, the set of assumptions for impact analysis has been made. 
Because these assumptions are highly contestable and, in many cases, uncertain, the 
sensitivity analysis is necessary to provide the insights into how these three PDP 
options will respond or lead to different impacts on different assumptions and 
situations. 
The outcome of the analysis framed in Chapter 5 will be presented in Chapter 6. In 
Chapter 6, the second set of research questions will be answered. The chapter will 
begin by describing the environmental impacts of the three PDP options. Then, health 
impacts of three PDP options will be presented. Later, the different impacts on social, 
resources, and economic aspects will be provided. It is clear from the results that 
PDP-Renewables is a cleaner and healthier option and, at the same time, an attractive 
option for economy and society, too. In economic terms, PDP-Renewables will not 
lead to an increase in total generation costs. On the contrary, it can reduce the import 
burden and provide more GDP contribution to the economy. The results of the 
sensitivity analyses also confirm that the advantage of PDP-Renewables can be 
maintained in different situations and assumptions, which indicate the higher 
flexibility for society to readjust with uncertain future situations. In sum, this chapter 
provides a clear answer that a healthier choice is feasible for the Thai power sector. 
With the healthier option, the analysis in Chapter 7 will move to an institutional 
analysis in order to understand how this healthier option can be developed in the 
present institutional framework. The analysis of the institutional framework will begin 
with market and governance structures, succeed by to pricing structure and 
interconnection issues. Unfortunately, the analysis shows that the existing institutional 
framework is not favorable to the development of PDP-Renewables in various 
aspects. This is mostly, because the existing institutional framework has been set by 
different normative and cognitive pillars of institution. Therefore, the changes towards  
a more supportive institutional framework, as suggested in this chapter, highly depend 
on the outcomes of the normative and cognitive battlefields. However, the concrete 
analysis of different public regulations, the good reference cases, and the expanded 
social learning process will significantly help in contesting in these decisive 
battlefields. 
Chapter 8 consideres all the suggestions developed in Chapter 6 and 7 in relation to 
the actual policy changes in the three-year study period (September 2003-August 
2006), with the aim to provide reflections on the concepts of healthy public policy and 
deliberative policy analysis in Chapter 2. The chapter will begin by highlighting the 
interactions between the research works and policy process through different ways of 
public communication. Obviously, some desirable policy changes have taken place 
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within the three years of study. However, these desirable changes do not occur mainly 
because of the study findings, but rather because the government cannot avoid an 
inevitable fact (such as lower demand growth), strong public and academic demand 
for changes, and the legal decision by other independent organization in Thai society 
(like the Supreme Administrative Court on canceling the EGAT privatization 
process). This means that, apart from analyzing policy processes and impacts, the 
stimulations and supports to the social learning process is essential to the healthier 
policy changes. Therefore, the future of healthy public policy and sustainable energy 
in the Thai power sector is more likely to depend on the continuous works to support 
the social learning process as suggested in this chapter rather than academic finding in 
itself. 
Overall, analytical conclusions, reflections, and perspectives developed in this 
research study will be summarized in Chapter 9. To end the study and to initiate the 
new story of the Thai power sector, “the better power for health” must be developed 
in three dimensions of power; namely sustainable power in physical term, balanced 
people’s power in political terms, and societal wisdom power in philosophical terms. 
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Figure 1.5  Structure and Outline of the Research  
Research Question 1 
Policy Analysis 
- Historical Analysis 
    - Historical eventse 
    - Influential factors 
    - Policy Discourses 
- Discourse Analysis 
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(Chapter 4) 
Research Question 2 
Impact Assessment 
- Strategic Assessment of 
three PDP Options 
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    - Human health 
    - Economic 
    - socio-political   
- Policy Communications 
(Chapter 5 for Analytical 
Framework and  
Chapter 6 for the results) 
Policy Options 
PDP Options 
Policy Targets
Research Question 4 
Policy as Social Learning Process 
- Policy Results (actual policy changes) 
- Reflections from actual policy changes 
- Perspective on Better power for health 
(Chapter 8 and Chapter 9) 
Research Question 3 
Institutional Framework 
- Institutional Analysis 
- Regulation Analysis 
- Normative and cognitive 
battlefields 
(Chapter 7) 
Review of Healthy Public 
Policy and Deliberative 
Policy Analysis 
(Chapter 2) 
Review of  
- Energy and Health Linkages 
- Sustainable Energy Potentials 
- Strategic environmental 
assessment and Sustainable energy 
planning 
(Chapter 3) 
Actual Policy Changes Public Forums and 
Academic Review 
 17
1.5 Scope of the Research 
This research will focus mainly on the policy process of Thai power sector, not energy 
policy in general. Furthermore, in order to make it relevant to actual policy debates, 
the analysis in this research, especially the part about strategic impact assessment or 
the second part, will emphasize the process of the power development plan 2004 (or 
PDP) which determine the choices of power generation and investment for the next 12 
years (2004-2015). Although EGAT considers PDP as its long-term development 
plan, these 12 years may be not an adequate time perspective for more radical changes 
in power technologies, as earlier suggested by Hvelplund and Lund. Therefore, the 
healthier policy changes that can be suggested from this study are still more likely to 
be initial or transitional changes within this coming decade, rather than an absolute 
long-term solution. 
It is very important to mention that, in the strategic environmental assessment, the 
impacts of three PDP-options will be analyzed. This means that a healthier solution is 
developed through the comparison of these three policy choices. Moreover, since 
these three policy options are developed on the basis of their policy discourses and not 
by any optimization techniques, the healthier solution resulting from this research is 
more likely to be one of the better solution, rather than the best or healthiest option 
that can be found in the Thai power sector. This is why the research title is called 
“better” power for health rather than “the best” power or the healthiest. 
As earlier mentioned, this research would like to see the actual policy change and 
provide the reflections from actual policy changes within the three years of the study. 
However, as generally known, policy changes may incrementally or radically take 
place over a longer period of time. The study cannot include all policy changes that 
take place after the closing of the research; that is August 2006. 
Apart from these above-mentioned limitations, there are still number of technical 
limitations can still be found in the analysis, especially in terms of strategic impact 
assessment. In this matter, all technical limitations and assumption used in strategic 
impact assessment will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
1.6 Ethical Considerations in this Research 
There are two critical points for ethical consideration in this research. The first 
consideration is linked to the health impact analysis and the second one to the close 
interaction between research and policy process.  
Firstly, the study of human health impact is an ethical issue in itself. Since human 
health impacts are complicated phenomena, assessing future health impacts from 
power generation and investment usually face several limitations and uncertainties in 
its methodology. For example, the impacts of greenhouse gas emission on the climate 
change and, consequently, the impacts of climate change on human health are still 
under debate and need more detailed studies, especially for the application to 
Thailand. Moreover, the health impacts of multi-pollutant interactions (from power 
plant emissions) are not yet fully understood and measured. Since recent and on-going 
epidemiological studies continuously provide new information about the health 
impacts of power generation and, at the same time, new cleaner technologies are 
continuously introduced on the energy market, this also implies that assessing 
tomorrow’s impacts by today’s knowledge certainly involves limitations and 
uncertainties. 
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However, avoiding of assessing the future impacts is also facing a serious ethical 
question. Once the policy decision is made either now or the near future, the health 
impacts, including the negative ones, are more likely to occur and to affect the Thai 
people. Therefore, in my view, conducting this research is necessary and, to face 
ethical challenge, careful ethical consideration is needed in all research process. 
This also links to the second ethical consideration in this research. Conventionally, to 
be objective, the research (and researcher) is expected to separate from the policy or 
decision-making process. Moreover, in some related disciplines, like economics, they 
also require to be a “value-free” analysis.  
However, the main aim of the healthy public policy, introduced by the World Health 
Organization, is to promote health and healthier policy options in non-health sectors. 
Therefore, with the clear aim to raise value of health higher in the agenda on policy-
making, healthy public policy research cannot be value-free research. Furthermore, 
with the idea to make a healthier choice an easier choice, healthy public policy, in my 
view, is an action-oriented research rather than just pure academic analysis. 
Specifically, this research aims to test the social validity of the healthy public policy 
concept by participating in actual policy changes and reflecting on this attempt. 
Hence, research and policy are not totally separable; they have several intentional 
interactions as have been explained and will be explained in detail in Chapter 8. 
The main question is how to cope with these ethical considerations in this research. A 
good analysis without the attempts to “contribute” to desirable changes may also lead 
to questions about the social responsibility of the academic society. Moreover, if the 
goal of science is to discover the reality, how could we blind our eyes from the policy 
or decision-making processes, which, in several cases, determine the future realities. 
Is it also an important social responsibility for the science community to discover 
about how the realities have been made and discuss with the society about what can 
be alternative future realities? Therefore, in this view, the social responsibility is the 
central point of ethical consideration in this research. 
However, to fulfil the social responsibility principle, honesty, carefulness, and 
openness within the research process are highly required. Moreover, to pursue the 
idea of healthy public policy, public education in the policy process is also an 
essential part of ethical consideration in this research. In order to follow and achieve 
these ethical principles in science, several processes form part of this research have 
been made in these following ways; 
• Literature review on health impacts of power generation, which try to 
ensure the carefulness and honesty about potential impacts of different 
policy options by looking for different results from several previous 
studies and showing them clearly in the analytical framework of Chapter 5.  
• Clear presentation of methodology and data used both in order to 
ensure the openness for all sources used in my assessment and analysis. 
This will allow and facilitate other researchers or people to examine and 
challenge the assumptions and consequently the results of this research. 
• Declaration of all limitations and uncertainties, which is very essential 
to gain honesty, carefulness, and openness. Concurrently, it is also very 
important for the social responsibility and the public education within the 
decision-making process. 
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• Sensitivity Analysis is one of the best ways to analyze the reliability and 
flexibility of research finding in uncertain future conditions, which 
hopefully can contribute to a higher degree of openness, carefulness, and, 
thus, social responsibility in this research study. 
• Review processes are also useful for pursuing the openness and 
carefulness within the research process, which, in this case, it has been 
done in two main ways, including; 
o Academic review process which refers to the formal university 
process of a PhD study at Aalborg University and the peer review 
in the Journal and conference,  
o Public review process in Thailand, to ensure that this research is 
properly incorporating all relevant societal concerns in Thai society 
and also include the responses of the different stakeholders in the 
analysis.  
• Deliberative policy recommendation is necessary at the end of the 
research process. Although the clear policy positions is needed in the 
political decision, but the limitations, uncertainties, and the results from 
sensitivity analysis should also be explicit and meaningfully addressed. 
However, all the above-mentioned attempts have some certain limits. For example, 
the reviewers may provide the comments within their scope of expertise and policy 
positions. At the same time, the sensitivity analysis is still based on today’s 
knowledge of tomorrow’s uncertainties (which in several cases go further beyond 
today understandings). Therefore, it is not possible to claim that all ethical questions 
are totally solved in this research. 
At the last stage of this research process, this research project still needsto be 
“humble” and “honest” about its results its recommendations, and its policy 
contributions. Although the research aims to present its findings in a meaningful way 
for policy decision, it must not aim to provide the “final answer” to society. 
Oppositely, it should encourage and facilitate Thai society to discuss about 
“questions”, other “possibilities”, and perhaps “the answer” in more deliberative and 
constructive ways.  
Perhaps, the best possible solution for Thai society is to consider policy as a 
continuous social learning process, which always requires further questions and 
possibilities, rather than focusing on specific one-shot political decision-making. By 
this way, it may encourage society, politicians, and scientists, to learn more closely 
from each other in protecting and promoting human health. Certainly, this may seem 
like a dream today, but, at least, it is a good ethical dream for our healthier future.  
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Chapter 2 
Healthy Public Policy and Policy Analysis 
 
As earlier mentioned in Chapter 1, healthy public policy is a core concept, which 
initiated the research questions of this research. Therefore, it is essential to take the 
concept of healthy public policy as a point of departure, including the development of 
health impact assessment (HIA) as one of the main tools for promoting a healthy 
public policy. After that, it will be explained how the concepts of healthy public 
policy and HIA appear in the dynamics of Thailand’s health system reform taking 
place in 2000. This part will provide an important notion on how “health” has been 
interpreted in Thai society and how it links to the policy directions outside the health 
sector.  
From this point of departure, it is clear that the emergence of Thai movements in the 
healthy system reform in general and healthy public policy in particular is quite 
related to the concepts of risk society, network society, and deliberative democracy. 
Therefore, these concepts of new modernity will be reviewed and provide insights to 
be used in the policy analysis, which is based on the first set of research question. 
Three theoretical frameworks of policy analysis will be discussed in this Chapter, 
beginning with a conventional policy analysis and succeeded by a policy negotiation 
analysis and a deliberative analysis. From these theoretical backgrounds, the 
conceptual framework for analyzing public policy in the Thai power sector will be 
identified. Last, the cases of healthy public policy movement in the power sector, both 
internationally and domestically, will be presented in order to build up a common 
understanding and the link the analysis to the areas of sustainable energy and health in 
the next chapter.  
2.1 Healthy Public Policy 
Since the 1st International Conference for Health Promotion in 1986, the World Health 
Community has asserted the importance of inter-sectoral commitment and action to 
improve the health determinants of the population, or the “all for health” principle, to 
fulfill the ultimate goal of “health for all”. 
The commitment refers to the notion of healthy public policy, introduced in the 
Ottawa Charter as the outcome of the 1st International Conference for Health 
Promotion. Since political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, behavioral, and 
biological factors can all favor health or be harmful to it, the healthy public policy 
aims to create a supportive socio-environment to enable people to lead healthy lives.  
The main idea of the healthy public policy is to put health on the agenda of policy-
makers in all sectors and at all levels, to direct their attention to the health 
consequences of their decisions and to make them accept their responsibilities for 
health. Healthy public policy “combines diverse but complementary approaches 
including legislation, fiscal measures, taxation and organization changes”. It is also 
very important to identify obstacles to the adoption of healthy public policies in non-
health sectors, and the ways to remove them. Therefore, healthy public policy efforts 
should also aim “to make the healthier the easier choices for policy-makers as well”1. 
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In the pursuit of a healthy public policy, the government must be responsible for 
taking into account health as an essential factor when formulating policy in non-health 
sectors. These sectors, especially agriculture, trade, education, energy, transportation, 
etc., should be accountable for the health consequences of their policy decisions2. 
Therefore, as suggested by the Ottawa charter, “the systematic assessment of the 
impact of rapidly changing environment- particularly in areas of technology, work, 
energy production and urbanization- is essential and must be followed by action to 
ensure positive benefits to the health of the public”3.   
Besides the government responsibilities, the Ottawa charter also stresses that, “health 
promotion is the process of enabling people to control and to improve their health”. 
According to the Charter, “people cannot achieve their fullest health potential unless 
they are able to take control of those things which determine their health”.4 This 
means that the empowerment of communities – their ownership and control of their 
own endeavors and destinies – should be at the heart of the healthy public policy 
strategy. In doing so, the healthy public policy must also increase the options 
available to people to exercise more control over their own health and over their 
environments, and to make choices conducive to health5. 
Since “our societies are complex and interrelated, health cannot separate from other 
goals” 6. As elaborated more in the Adelaide Recommendations on the Healthy Public 
Policy in 1988, “a basic principle of social justice is to ensure that people have access 
to the essentials for a healthy and satisfying life. At the same time, this raises overall 
societal productivity in both social and economic terms”7. Therefore, healthy public 
policy must combine economic, social, ecological, and health issues in integrated 
development strategies and actions8. 
Moreover, since “inequalities in health are rooted in inequality in society”, healthy 
public policy should give high priority to underprivileged and vulnerable groups and 
“recognize the unique culture of indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, and 
immigrants”9.  
According to its concept, the introduction of healthy public policy has led to major 
shifts in health paradigms and policy initiatives, including; 
• The realization of the importance of health impacts (both positive and 
negative) of non-health sectors, which leads to a need for more 
proactive inter-sectoral policy initiatives and actions to tackle health 
risks and promote health at more upstream levels. 
• The integration of health into the general concepts of sustainable 
development, human rights, and social justice. Under these concepts, 
health becomes both means and ends of a desirable future and has 
inextricable links with other development goals.  
• The introduction of more holistic views of health, which later 
influences the development of several useful analytical frameworks, 
including the  ecosystem health approach and the social determinants 
of health, as presented in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
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• The strong recognition of community and civic roles in health 
promotions, not only through the participation in development 
processes, but also through the control over those things which affect 
their health and lives. 
Therefore, the introduction of the healthy public policy in the Ottawa Charter has 
given rise to new languages and new practices in health promotion as well as in the 
policy processes of other sectors. In the 1990s and 2000s, several international 
commitments and practices, including the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU directive on 
environmental assessment of plans and programs10, healthy cities, and etc., have been 
adopted and developed with the clear statement that human health should be seriously 
considered in all relating policy formulation, as suggested in the Ottawa Charter. 
Concurrently, healthy public policy has later been adopted and further developed in 
various countries and in various policy areas, as later shown in this chapter.  
2.2 The Development of Health Impact Assessment 
A commitment to healthy public policy means that governments, at national and local 
levels, must measure the health impacts of their policies, and communicate these 
findings to communities and societies. In doing so, the systematic assessment of the 
health impact of a rapidly changing environment is also essential and must be 
followed by action to ensure a positive benefit to the health of the public11.  
Following this idea, Health Impact Assessment (HIA) was sooner developed as a 
main tool to make health consequences a part of the consideration of all policy-
makings. HIA has been defined by WHO as “a combination of procedures, methods, 
and tools by which a policy, program, or project may be judged as to its potential 
effects on the health of population, and the distribution of those effects within the 
population”12. In UK, HIA gateway has described HIA as “a developing process that 
uses a range of methods and approaches to help identify and consider the potential – 
or actual – health and equity impacts of a proposal on a given population”13. 
Although HIA can be defined in a number of ways, it is clear that its primary output is 
“a set of evidence-based recommendations geared to informing decision-making 
process”14. More importantly, the fundamental goal of HIA goes beyond just 
providing information; “the aim of HIA is to achieve changes in policies and 
proposals so that they support better health and reduce health inequalities15. In other 
words, HIA tries not only to project the impacts of policies, programs, and projects, 
but also to influence the political decision-making process on the basis of its findings 
and processes16. 
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Figure 2.1 The Ecosystem Health Approach
Source: Jean Lebel, 2003,7.
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Figure 2.2 Framework for Social 
Determinants of Health
Source: Dahlgren G, Whitehead M. Policies and Strategies to Promote Social 
Equity in Health. Stockholm: Institute of Futures Studies, 1991; 
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HIA, therefore, has its own specific role, compared to other tools in health promotion. 
HIA aims to provide a mechanism to achieve the engagement of other sectors in 
health promotion through the assessment of inter-sectoral actions and 
recommendations for the future development of those. In pursuing this goal, HIA 
needs to address changes in health determinants “upstream” in the planning process, 
in order to identify health opportunities in the development processes. 
Since HIA is directed at non-health sectors, HIA cannot only serve as a technical tool 
for public health specialists. It has to be a tool which is accessible and reliable to 
different stakeholders within societies. In this sense, HIA should be recognized as the 
bridge which integrates health dimensions and development processes, and at the 
same time, as the window which allows the health sector to participate more 
proactively and meaningfully in other parts of the wider public sphere. 
2.2.1 HIA Development in the Recent Years 
The development of HIA in these recent years can be seen in two different streams or 
approaches. The first stream is the natural development of environmental impact 
assessment (EIA)17. This approach, usually called environmental health impact 
assessment (EHIA), was initially promoted by the WHO in the 1980s to address 
neglected health considerations in conventional EIA18. In practice, EIA seldom 
address health considerations, despite the fact that legal frameworks for EIA in many 
countries already include health impacts as a compulsory element19. 
EHIA is basically based on the bio-medical model of health, and assesses the changes 
of mortality, morbidity, and injuries20. Thus, EHIA mainly applies epidemiology and 
toxicology to its studies. Due to its focus on a specific cause-effect relationship, this 
approach is sometimes called the “tight perspective”21. 
This approach was first applied to large infrastructure projects in developing 
countries. At present, EHIA is practiced in developed countries such as Australia, 
New Zealand, and Canada22. Several regional offices of the WHO have funded a 
number of projects involving workshops and guidelines on EHIA in some countries23. 
Additionally, some international donor agencies and financial institutes have also paid 
interest in integrating health into their project appraisal processes24. 
The second stream of HIA has evolved from the concept of “healthy public policy”. 
Although the idea of a policy impact assessment of the population’s health is not new, 
the emphasis on the relation between impact assessment and decision-making is of 
recent date25. In 2000, at the 5th Global Conference on Health Promotion, HIA was 
proposed as to be “a device for forcing the relevant bodies to take action in favor of 
healthy public policy” and “a potential catalyst for inter-sectoral action for health”26. 
This approach is based on the socio-environmental model of health, which considers 
wider determinants of health including individual, social, economic, and institutional 
factors27. Some researchers refer to this approach as the “broad perspective”28.  
This approach is now popular in developed countries, such as Canada, the UK, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands29. Concurrently, some developing countries, like 
Thailand, have also played an active role in developing HIA in their health system 
reform30, which will be discussed later. Recently, this HIA approach was also applied 
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to raise the awareness of health inequalities, called equity-focused health impact 
assessment (EFHIA)31. Within recent years, HIA in this approach has been applied to 
various inter-sectoral policy developments, like housing, transportation, agriculture, 
energy, urban planning, etc., from the local and national levels to the international 
level32.  
HIA applies a wide variety of tools and methods; for example, literature reviews, 
epidemiological modeling of risk, key informant interviews and focus groups to elicit 
community views and perceptions. Because HIA is a relatively new and developing 
approach, it is very difficult to determine its most appropriate methodological 
approach.  
Although the main goal of HIA is to provide evidence-based recommendation, in 
reality, appraising evidence can also be complex because of the interrelationship 
between different health determinants and their causal pathways. Moreover, it is also 
difficult to isolate the influences of particular policy interventions on complex and 
dynamic social systems. Therefore, when predicting health impacts in complex 
situations, it needs to be understood as “the prediction of tendencies and types of 
impacts” rather than absolute measures33. In the Netherlands, for several policy 
assessments, the focus of HIA is more on the effects of policy on health determinants 
than on “health” itself34. 
2.2.2 HIA and Policy-making  
Although HIA has a clear aim to influence policy-making35, the early version of HIA 
assumed a linear process with a direct link between impact assessment and decision-
making processes. For example in Australia36, the links between policy development 
and the usefulness of HIA were not explicitly defined in many HIA studies. In other 
words, in these studies, HIA has developed “without real consideration of the political 
and administrative frameworks within which it has to operate37. Therefore, many 
HIAs have failed to communicate their message to the decision-makers or to be 
policy-relevant, or they arrived too late to influence decision-making38. 
Fortunately, the later versions of HIA have tended to put more emphasis on decision-
making structures and political processes39. This requires an HIA process which is 
compatible with decision-making rules and procedures, including time frame40 41. 
Some studies and guidelines also suggest that HIA studies are most likely to influence 
decision-making, if the decision-maker owns the assessment and is closely involved 
in all stages of the HIA. However, on the other hand, it is also difficult to reconcile to 
the principle of openness and transparency42. Moreover, entrusting HIA to a policy-
maker could also be dangerous, especially in developing countries43.  
The review from UK experiences shows that several HIA studies can successfully 
influence policy-making, for instance in the formulation of mayoral strategies for 
London44 or in urban development projects45. The key of success can be seen in the 
strong political commitment, the participatory processes of different stakeholders, and 
the effective ways in which a non-statutory assessment is adapted to the statutory 
planning framework. The importance of enabling institutional infrastructure can also 
be seen in other HIA reviews46, including cases in developing countries47 48. 
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Since policy-making, in reality, is subjected to a very wide range of influences, it can 
certainly be difficult to establish a cause & effect relationship between HIA processes 
and subsequent policy decisions49. As mentioned by Bartlett, “impact assessment does 
not influence through some magic inherent in its techniques or procedures. More than 
methodology and substantive focus, what determines the success of impact 
assessment is the appropriateness and effectiveness in particular circumstances of its 
implicit policy strategy”. Therefore, the success of HIA should not necessarily be 
evaluated in terms of a one-off event, but more as “a continual effect that brings 
change in organizational thinking about health and subsequent decision-making”50. 
This viewpoint asserts the importance of long-term involvement in the development 
of a healthy public policy51. 
2.3 Thailand’s Health System Reform 
The concepts of healthy public policy and HIA were first introduced to the Thai 
public during the process of the National health system reform, beginning in 2000. 
This reform provides important spaces and processes for several changes in Thai 
society, including the expansion and deep-rooting of a healthy public policy concept. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the evolution of this concept in Thai society 
through the health system reform process. 
 2.3.1 Driving Forces of the National Health Systems Reform 
Although, the general health status in Thailand has improved satisfactorily in the last 
two decades, some evidence of failure in the health system’s performance has 
gradually unfolded52. With the success in economic modernization, Thailand is now 
facing new forms of health risks, including HIV/AIDS, traffic injuries, mental stress, 
and environmental hazards. Thailand’s mortality rate (per 1,000 population), which 
had declined from 20 in 1975 to 4.1 in 1986, climbed up to 5.0 in 1997 and 5.1 in 
199853.  
The average health expenditure rose nearly nine-fold from 12.1 to 103.6 USD during 
the period of 1980 to 1998. The increasing rate was 9.1% per annum in real terms, 
which was higher than the 7.0% annual growth rate of GDP per capita during the 
same period. Moreover, national statistics show that, in 1992, in comparison, the poor 
part of the population spent a higher percentage of their household income (8.17% of 
their income) on health care than the rich (1.27%). The difference is approximately 
6.4 times higher for the poor. The infant mortality rate in non-municipal areas is 1.85 
higher than that in municipal areas, with the trend of a widening gap54.    
Combined with drastic changes in social and political conditions during the 1980s and 
1990s, the national health system was increasingly forced to reform. The climax was 
reached in 1997, when the new constitution was adopted and implemented, with the 
massive supports from civic movement. Under the new constitution, health becomes a 
matter of human rights, not just public welfare. Consequently, government is required 
to provide public health services of the same standards to all parts of the population. 
All development programs and projects that have adverse impacts on health are now 
required to conduct environmental impact assessment with a public scrutiny process. 
The civic roles in policy formulations and public decision-makings, as well as in the 
implementation of the decisions made, have been asserted in this constitution. Last, 
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the new constitution requires a decentralization of government services, including 
health services55. 
With all these facing crises and new societal directions, the Thai government 
announced the process of National Health Systems Reform in 2000. Under the 
regulation of this announcement, the national health system reform is defined as “a 
process that leads a transitional management of the national health system to a capable 
system aimed at physical, mental, social, and spiritual well-being of the people, as 
well as people’s accessibility to health services that are of good quality, efficient and 
equitable”56.   
 2.3.2 Strategic Process of the National Health Systems Reform 
The tangible outcome of the reform is to develop the “National Health Act” as a 
constitutional framework of the national health system. However, unlike other 
legislations in Thailand, the reform aimed to use a drafting process as the opportunity 
for mutual learning in Thai society. Based on the concept of “the triangle moves the 
mountain”, the creation of relevant knowledge, political involvement and social 
movement must join hand and strengthen one another in carrying out the transitional 
management towards a better health system. Therefore, the active discourses and 
public hearing formed an integral part of the reform process, bringing knowledge and 
innovative ideas with a visionary perspective to the desirable health system57. 
The process was initiated with a national and six regional seminars on “The Desirable 
Health System in Thailand” in 2000. The results of these seminars were put into the 
background paper prepared for the development of the framework of the health 
system reform. In January 2001, the principle framework for the national health 
system reform was developed and followed by the public hearing and feedback 
process. During the period of April-August 2001, 35,000 people from more than 
1,800 organizations joined the public hearings held in every province of the country 
and more than 100,000 approaches of public feedback were sent to the Health System 
Reform Office (HSRO). Both the framework, feedback, and other ideas were 
discussed and summed up in the first National Health Assembly in September 2001, 
attended by 1,500 representatives from all provincial forums of previous public 
hearing58.  
Based on the results of the first National Health Assembly, the first draft of the 
National Health Act was developed and again succeeded by an extensive public 
review process with a) general public hearings in 500 districts in Thailand joined by 
more than 400,000 people, b) 20 public hearings on specific issues (e.g., disability, 
traditional medical wisdoms, health impacts of development projects, etc.) and c) the 
provincial health assemblies in 76 provinces attended by more than 40,000 
participants. The results of all three processes were summarized and developed into 
the final draft of the National Health Act in July 2002. This final draft was submitted 
for endorsement to the National Health Assembly in August 2002 (with 4,000 
participants). After the endorsement, the draft was submitted to the Prime Minister at 
the closing ceremony of the assembly, demonstrating the political commitment to 
pursue this reform and the formal legislative process59. 
The formal legislative process of the National Health Act has lasted for a longer 
period than anyone in the reform movement could expect (up to now, it is still in the 
 
 31
parliamentary process) due to detailed technical discussions and debates in the 
governmental legislative process and the uncertainty of previous political 
commitments. However, instead of just waiting for the law enforcement, several 
suggestions and mechanisms made during the drafting process have been 
continuously developed both within governmental and civil sectors. This includes the 
continuation of the annual National Health Assembly and provincial health 
assemblies, which has now become the main public forum for deliberating the 
important issues of the national health system. Also several research programs were 
set up by the Health Systems Research Institute to prepare the detailed designs of the 
expected health systems together with the related government organizations and civic 
groups, including a research program on healthy public policy and health impact 
assessment.   
2.3.3 Health in New Dimensions 
Through this reform process, several new ideas for the health system were introduced, 
demonstrated, deliberatively discussed, and developed on an on-going basis, which 
led/have led to significant changes in the dimensions of health within Thai society. 
The new dimensions begin with the definition of health. In the draft, health is defined 
as “the complete status holistically interrelated in the physical, mental, social, and 
intellectual (or spiritual) balances”60 (see Figure 2.3). Therefore, health is no longer 
an issue of illness. It becomes an issue of complete well-being, both for individuals 
and society as a whole, and both in physical and more social and spiritual senses. 
Following the new definition of health, health systems are now referred to as “all of 
the interconnected management that enhances healthiness and factors relevant to 
health aspects, such as individual factors; economic, social, political, educational, 
legal, religious, cultural and traditional factors; scientific and technology factors; as 
well as the factors on public health and public health service”61. In other words, now 
the health system is moving beyond the previously termed “health sector” (see Figure 
2.4).   
Moreover, it is stressed clearly in the draft that “healthiness is the human dignity”62 
and “healthiness is the ultimate goal of the community and society”63. In this view, 
healthiness is becoming “the national ideology and the coverage insurance of 
security”. The draft also asserts the right of a person “to participate with the state and 
the community in generating the environmental conditions which are appropriate, 
balanced, safe, of high quality, and meet the standard of continuous normal living in 
good health with good quality of life”64. Hence, health is no longer the responsibility 
of health professionals alone. It is now becoming the challenge and responsibility of 
each individual and society as a whole.   
Therefore, the new health systems “should aim at creating health for all and all 
sectoral participation should be enhanced for therein health promotion with the 
continual potential building process of persons, families, communities, and socio-
environmental conditions for reciprocal benefits of living together”65. 
In pursuit to this goal, apart from several specific mechanisms, national and provincial 
health assemblies were established. The assemblies are defined by the draft as “the 
sitting process in which all sectors could intellectually and harmoniously participate 
 
 32
and exchange their knowledge and experiences, through a systematic and 
participatory management, to reach a state of well-being”66. 
Within five years’ time (from 2001-2005), all these new dimensions and forums 
provide a great opportunity for several health issues and practices to be broadly 
demonstrated and deliberatively discussed in Thai society. This includes the issues of 
traditional health practices, health manpower management by locality, holistic health 
care, health-oriented agricultural policy, healthy public policy and health impact 
assessment (see Figure 2.5). Some of these issues, for example health-oriented 
agricultural policy, have led to the governmental policy changes of the target of 50% 
pesticide reduction in the Thai farming sector67. 
As concluded by Wiput Phoolcharoen, “just as a drop of water on a tropical plant 
induces the sudden spread of seeds, the health reform process is pushing the evolving 
health system forward at a rate never seen before”68.  
 2.3.4 Healthy Public Policy and HIA in Thailand 
The issues of healthy public policy and HIA were first raised at the national seminar 
on “The Desirable Health System in Thailand” in 2000 and echoed during the public 
hearings at the provincial level in 2001. This issue has become more important to Thai 
society, mainly because of the increasing occurrence of health problems caused by 
environmental hazards; such as air pollution, pesticide contaminations, improper 
waste treatments etc., as well as the evidence and concerns of health impacts of 
development projects; such as large dams, coal-fired power plants, trans-national gas 
pipelines, highways, etc.  
After the issue was raised in the reform process, the Health Systems Research 
Institute (HSRI) has set up the academic review process in 2001, which, consequently, 
reinforced the concept of “healthy public policy”, introduced 10 years earlier in the 
Ottawa Charter. The notion of healthy public policy received good public response in 
combating the problems faced by Thai society and was put into the framework of the 
national health system reform69. 
Later, in 2001, the issue of healthy public policy became the first topic of discussion 
in the first National Health Assembly, showing its relevance and importance in the 
context of the Thai health reform. In the assembly discussion, two HIA studies on 
industrial development and agricultural policy were presented, showing clear negative 
health impacts of well-known governmental policies and projects. As a result of the 
first assembly, the concepts of healthy public policy and HIA were included in the 
first draft of the National Health Act, paving the way for HSRI to develop a research 
program on healthy public policy, and health impact assessment began in 2002 to 
support further development in healthy public policy and HIA in Thailand70.  
In the draft, healthy public policy refers to “the progressive guideline that intends to 
establish a socio-physical environment facilitating health and enabling people to 
approach choices which are conducive to health”71. The draft stresses that the 
expected health systems shall have “guidelines and measures to establish the healthy 
public policy and the process of HIA from the public policy, aimed at joint learning of 
all sectors in the society, through the sufficient academic utilization, with the 
transparent and accountable mechanism”72. The draft also asserts the right of the Thai 
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people to “participate in accessing the information, suggesting, performing, using the 
assessment outputs and making decision on the approval and permission of the policy 
implementation and crucial projects that may have an impact on health”73. 
After the long process of public hearing, including special hearings for those who had 
been affected by development projects, the special session on healthy public policy 
and health hazards was organized in the second National Health Assembly in 2002 to 
scrutinize and later endorse the draft of the National Health Act in August 2002, as 
earlier mentioned. 
The evolution of a healthy public policy in Thailand has been closely linked to the 
development of health impact assessment (HIA). This phenomenon was influenced by 
the intense conflicts related to public decision-making on several development 
projects and the ineffectiveness of the EIA system in the country.  
From 2002, the HIA guidelines and capacity-strengthening activities were carried out 
for both the academic community and active citizens in general. Under the HSRI 
research program, more than 50 HIA case studies were conducted of several policy 
issues, both at the national and local levels. Although, all the cases aimed at 
implementing desirable policy changes, only some of them will be able to reach the 
expected policy outcomes, highlighting the importance of policy contexts in healthy 
public policy developments. To foster desirable policy changes, five policy networks, 
including one for energy and industrial policies, were set up with the role to seek 
opportunities and formulate strategies for healthier policy changes74. Later, the recent 
lessons from these policy networks were summed up and further developed into an 
operational framework for healthy public policy formulation in Thailand, as discussed 
later in this chapter. 
After the five years of introduction, the concepts of healthy public policy and HIA 
were further elaborated and developed by several actors and in several sectors in Thai 
society. In the civil sector, several HIA were conducted by the grassroots 
organizations and were taking crucial part in their policy arguments. At the same time, 
the healthy public policy becomes part of their policy languages, especially in 
agricultural policy. In 2005, the policy recommendations from the National Health 
Assembly on health-oriented agricultural policy were acknowledged by the Thai 
cabinet. Moreover, several local administrative organizations and civil groups apply 
this concept to change their own policy direction towards a safer food system and a 
healthier agricultural production, which confirms that the healthy public policy is not 
only a matter of governmental authority, but also a question of social responsibility75.  
In the government sector, the Ministry of Public Health established the HIA division 
in 2002 to support regional and provincial health offices in HIA works. The Ministry 
of Natural Resource and Environment also incorporated HIA as a main component of 
the on-going EIA reform. Later, in 2005, the National Economic and Social Advisory 
Council (NESAC) also recommended the Thai government to implement and support 
the development of healthy public policy and HIA, in the country. This 
recommendation was also acknowledged by the Cabinet later in the same year76.  
Apart from what has been written in the draft of the National Health Act, all of these 
further attempts have paved the way for broadening the concept of healthy public 
policy in Thai society, deepening this concept into the culture of public decision-
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making, and uplifting the concept into the process of public policy-making in the 
country. 
2.3.5 Health System Reform and New Policy Phenomena 
The process of health system reform and the development of healthy public policy in 
Thailand as described earlier have presented the significant shifts in the characteristics 
of Thai politics and the public policy process. At least, three significant phenomena 
can be identified and will be further discussed in this study as follows; 
a) The Increasing Awareness of the Risk Society 
During the process of reform, the increase in new environmental and social health 
risks becomes one of the most concerning issues in the Thai health system, along with 
the issue of universal coverage and quality in health care, traditional medical 
wisdoms, and health governance. The evidence of negative health impacts of 
development projects and wrong policy directions is pervasive in the country, as 
presented in the public hearing and health assemblies. 
Overall, the statistics on health status have shown that while Thailand can control and 
reduce the so-called traditional health risks, like malnutrition, infectious diseases, and 
infant mortality, we are now facing an increased number of illnesses related to new 
health risks, including traffic accidents, mental disorder, cancer, cardiovascular 
diseases, and allergies. Moreover, within recent years, due to poor environmental 
quality in some areas and poor social conditions for some population groups, some 
infectious diseases like dengue, malaria, tuberculosis, which were previously 
somehow under control, have also  re-emerged and now threaten the Thai health 
system77. 
This may refer to the concept of transitional risk, as introduced by the WHO78. 
According to this concept, the general development process in each country can bring 
down the occurrence of traditional health risks. However, at the same time, this 
development process also causes the expansion of so-called modern health risks, such 
as air pollutions, obesity, accidents, and chemical contaminations. Thus, at one point 
of time within the long process, society needs to change its development direction or 
mechanism to tackle these increasingly threatening risks. Otherwise, these risks will 
be out of control. Moreover, if the social inequality is rooted in society, it is highly 
expected that the traditional risk will re-emerge, as some groups of the society cannot 
sufficiently enjoy or gain access to the benefits of this development process. 
It is also very important to note that the characteristics of the illnesses caused by 
modern health risks are quite different from the previous ones. First, it is hard to 
precisely determine specific causes of the illness, since most of them to a large extent 
are multi-causes and at the same time multi-effects. Second, most of these health risks 
are highly intertwined in the everyday life of modern society from dietary patterns to 
transportation choices, from working conditions to community relationships. Third, 
these everyday practices leading to health risks are not controlled by each individual, 
since they are always linked to availability and quality of goods and services, rooted 
into cultural practices and social conditions, guided by existing institutions, or 
determined and controlled by government authorities. Thus, most of them cannot be 
controlled through previous health protection methods, like vaccination, or even 
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conventional sanitation systems. Lastly, in many cases, those who take the risks are 
often not those who make the decisions that create the risks. Hence, the issue of social 
justice is always a part of the discussions on managing these health risks.  
This is why, when the forums were opened, the concerns were echoed. Instead of 
being forced to take risks, the Thai people are now struggling to take part of the 
decision process, which may influence their health in a negative way. They have also 
learnt that, due to uncertainties in analyzing risks and impact pathways, the decision-
making process can easily turn out to be non-transparent, dominated by some values 
and authorities, and unaccountable for them, as seen in several EIA cases. This is also 
why the participatory and accountable approach of HIA was stressed in the draft of 
the National Health Act. 
Since, Thailand, as a modern society and fast growing economy, is now rooting into 
the nature of risk society, where the manufactured risks become more important, the 
traditional ways of managing risks are now ineffective; mistrust and conflicts are 
spread over society, and social justice concerning risk management is now in 
question. 
b) The Expansion of Network Society 
Another political phenomenon, which can also be seen in the development of a 
healthy public policy, is the development of civic movement. During the reform 
process, thousands of grassroots and professional organizations have joined hands in 
presenting their demands and ideas for the country’s new health system. The civic 
movement comprises several patient associations, NGOs, academics, spiritual leaders, 
and health professionals. Some civic movements, like in healthy public policy issues, 
have emerged as a protest against government projects which cause severe 
environmental and health impacts. Other movements, like traditional medical wisdom, 
fight for the recognition of their practices and identities. But they join hands in their 
search for a healthier society and the wish to improve the health system with this 
reform. 
For the healthy public policy issue, affected local communities and academics have 
taken the lead in establishing the new concept, which places the health item higher on 
the development agenda. Presently, besides opposing government policy and projects, 
the movement also fights for a more participatory, transparent, and accountable 
decision-making process within several policy issues, together with the introduction 
of alternative policy initiatives in Thai society. Moreover, they do not only try to push 
the government to do so, they themselves also invest and take the lead in developing 
these policy directions and mechanisms and put them into practice. Several forums 
and sessions were arranged within the reform process for exchanges of ideas and 
experiences in the practical implementation of their policy initiatives.   
In other words, Thai civic movements do no longer consider themselves as customers 
of the health system or public policy. They now become active policy-makers in 
several political arenas. In pursuing these policy changes, they do not only focus on 
what government should do or should not do; but they are also looking for what they 
can do themselves. They do not only fight for the expected policy outcomes, but also 
for policy spaces and recognitions. In this view, public policy is not only the 
pressuring for government decisions, but also the self-determination of their own 
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destinies. Last, they do not fight individually; they join hands around the bigger 
notion of healthy society and create or further develop their initiatives around more 
specific areas, including healthy public policy.    
c) The Stronger Demand for Deliberative Democracy  
It is quite clear from the draft of the National Health Act that the demand for 
deliberative democracy was echoed within the health system reform. As seen from the 
healthy public policy and HIA issue, the draft stresses the importance of “joint 
learning of all sectors in the society, through the sufficient academic utilization, with 
the transparent and accountable mechanism” in the decision-making process. It also 
asserts the rights of Thai people to participate in policy issues that may have an 
impact on health.  
To operationalize this right, national and provincial health assemblies have been 
established to provide forums for the Thai people to exchange their knowledge and 
experiences. The draft also provides an opportunity for people to propose or organize 
the health assemblies around the specific health issues, including the formulation of a 
healthy public policy. 
After 5 years of implementation, the evaluation of health assemblies shows that the 
Thai people have actively utilized the health assemblies for identifying or 
reformulating their problems, watching and warning of policy changes and 
implementations, consulting and exchanging of best practices, deliberating the 
discussions on several policy directions, mechanisms and implementations, and for 
policy networking79. 
In short, under the health system reform, policy and public decision-making are no 
longer processes of choosing, but rather processes of understanding. Policy is not only 
a matter of negotiation but also an opportunity for recognition and learning how to see 
and do the things differently. Certainly, within a diverse and dynamic society like 
Thailand, mutual respect and understanding cannot always be pre-assumed, but must 
essentially build upon appropriate policy processes and cultures in order to cope with 
the unequal distribution of risks and conflicts in the decision-making process within 
the country.   
2.4 The Concept of New Modernity 
The concept of new modernity has been presented in different versions with the main 
idea that the traditional concepts of modernity are no longer sufficient when 
explaining today’s social phenomenon. There are three concepts of the new 
modernity, which are relevant to the recent development in Thai health system, 
namely the concept of risk society, the concept of network society and the concept of 
deliberative democracy. This section will elaborate on the theoretical explanations and 
insights of these three concepts. 
2.4.1 The Risk Society  
It is quite clear that development does not only bring new opportunities to Thai 
society, it also creates various risks for society. The unequal distribution of risks has 
stimulated social conflicts and mistrust towards development projects and planning 
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within this society. In various cases, including several power plant projects, the result 
has often been a degree of political deadlock. 
The situation in Thailand can be described by use of the concepts of “risk society”. As 
Gidden has pointed out, “risk society is where we switch the focus of our anxieties 
from what the nature can do to us to what we have done to nature”80. Beck has 
explained that “a central paradox of risk society is that these internal risks are 
generated by the processes of modernization, which try to control them”81. 
Furthermore, another paradox of the risk society is that “the more we try to colonize 
the future, the more likely it is to spring surprises on us”. In other words, these future 
uncertainties are the “consequences of scientific and political efforts to control or to 
minimize them” or so-called ‘manufactured uncertainties’82.  
In the risk society, “risk has become an inescapable part of our lives and everybody is 
facing unknown and barely calculable risks”83. More importantly, in reality, “there is 
the big difference between those who take risks and those who are victimized by risks 
other take”84.  These manufactured uncertainties and risks “are being produced by 
industry, externalized by economics, individualized by the legal system, legitimized 
by the sciences, and made to appear harmless by politics”85. Therefore, once the risk 
conflicts occur, the traditional scientific knowledge, technical practices and political 
institutions are certainly in a crisis as they try to cope with the upcoming risks and 
uncertainties and provide ultimate solutions for society. 
It is quite obvious that, due to the incompleteness of scientific knowledge and 
profound uncertainty, today’s situation forces us to “make hard decision with the only 
soft evidence”86. In practice, “the gap between knowledge and impact can be 
exploited” and “counter-arguments can be mobilized”, in order to maintain traditional 
modernized ways of development87.  
Therefore, the growing public mistrust, cynicism, and the perception of declining 
legitimacy regarding professional and scientific expertise are inevitable outcomes, 
especially in countries “where the lack of trust in government institutions is associated 
with the growing link between state and scientific expertise in policy making”88. This 
creates a situation in which “politics has to be made under conditions of ‘radical 
uncertainty’ while social protest cannot be controlled with a traditional politics of 
expertise”89. 
While “those orthodox theories and politics remain tied to the belief that the risks we 
face can still be captured by nineteenth-century scientific models of hazard 
assessment, industrial notions of hazard and safety”90, the theory of risk has called for 
reconstruction of “epistemological and cultural status of science and the constitution 
of politics”91. As stressed by Wollacott, “risks are not just moments of danger as we 
forge forward: they are the process itself”. To engage with this process, we need a 
new public policy, which emphasizes92  
(a) Direct and continuous dialogue between the public, experts and 
politicians about the decisions which lead to risks being taken,  
(b) An effective use of the precautionary principle, so that we can all 
engage creatively with risk, 
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(c) A positive understanding of the changing nature of personal and 
institutional relationships and a direct connection between policy 
initiatives and the reality of people’s lives, and 
(d) Policy initiatives, which give space to a new politics, are taken into 
consideration in the context of democratic debate.  
Therefore, the politics of risk society is more demanding compared to the traditional 
ones. It “demands active participation through all layers of social, political and 
economic activity”93. As concluded by Beck “corporate economic decisions, scientific 
research agendas, plan for the development and deployment of new technologies must 
all be opened up to a generalized process of discussion, and a legal and institutional 
framework for their democratic legitimation must be developed”94.  
2.4.2 The Network Society 
In coping with manufactured risks and uncertainties, Thai people have organized their 
policy network. They gradually expand their actions from questioning and opposing 
the traditional way of acting to developing and advocating for more sustainable ways. 
The interactions between them and other actors in Thai society have certainly 
expanded in order to shape and strengthen policy argument and network.    
This phenomenon should refer to the concept of “network society”.  In the network 
society, “people are no longer viewed as mere users and choosers of policies and 
technologies; they become active ‘makers and shapers’ of the realities that affect their 
lives”95.Therefore, policymaking meets the new dynamics of political activity. 
Elaborating on Gidden’s ‘life politics’ or Beck’s notion of ‘subpolitics’, this become 
“a new style of political involvement in which people combine individual lifestyle 
choices” with “the capacity for very sharp and focused but at the same time 
discontinuous political activity”96.  
Previous studies show that, in the network society, the confrontation with a particular 
public program is likely first to provide the shared basis for discussion and then bring 
together the range of individuals in a particular area or region97, as also seen in 
Thailand. While previously policies were viewed as the outcome of political battles 
among political parties, “we nowadays see how citizens themselves get worked up 
about various policy initiatives (or the lack thereof) and become politically active for 
the very first time”98. 
In the network society, “politics is a process in which different actors from various 
backgrounds form specific coalitions around specific story lines” or so-called ‘policy 
discourse’99. According to Hajer, “once a new discourse is formulated, it will produce 
story lines on the specific problems, employing the conceptual machinery of the new 
discourse (e.g. sustainable development). A discourse coalition is thus the ensemble 
of a set of story lines, the actors that utter these story lines, and the practices that 
conform to these story lines, all organized around the discourses”100.  
In his viewpoint, “policy discourse then is constitutive of political community”101, 
since there is no pre-given community to resist the plans (or policies); rather it is the 
policy program that aptly stimulates political community, which shares an ensemble 
of ideas, concepts, and categories, and can be described as a “community of fate”102. 
In other words, “policymaking creates a community of fate composed of people that 
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might never have perceived themselves to be part of the same community before”. 
Since communities do not pre-date politics but rather politics leads to the creation of 
communities, “this, of course, turns the theories of politics upside down”103. 
The more profound idea of the network society is that “we can discern shifts in 
networks: new networks eroding the power of previously powerful ones”. In this 
sense, “society should be conceived of as made up of open or unstable structures that 
expand, readjust, shift and evaporate; that create new chances but new risk too, of 
practices that mobilize some problems, leaving another aside”104.   
Principally, “politics in the network society is characterized by a search for multi-
level governance, regimes or transnational policy discourses”105. The emergence of 
networks is certainly not the end of state authority “but the redefinition of it, 
characterized by a much more open mind allowing for much more diversity and 
experimentation”106.  
Therefore, the quality of public policy practices as a public domain, as a stage for 
joint reflection and deliberation, should receive an explicit and serious attention. Both 
in the risk society and the network society, politics and policymaking should not 
simply be viewed as a process of finding solutions; “it is as much about finding 
formats that generate trust among mutually interdependent actors”107. As concluded 
by Hajer and Wagenaar108, “the significance of this new understanding of political 
process as potential generator of trust sheds new lights on the range of ‘interactive’, 
‘consensus building’, and ‘roundtable’ practices that have emerged in the context of 
the network society”. 
Practically, as cautioned by Beck109, “the failure to recognize the significance of these 
processes of policy-induced deliberation will erode the legitimacy of politics, whereas 
the active attempt to seek to incorporate these processes might precisely enhance the 
legitimacy of politics”. 
Therefore, analytically, it is important to understand the tensions and conflicts 
generated by the impact of the newer ‘networked’ forms of policymaking and political 
mobilization, and also to examine the potential of these new practices to search for 
more democratic governance and change the rule and character of the political game 
in the context of the risk society and the network society110.  
2.4.3 Deliberative Democracy 
“Democracy works poorly when individuals hold preferences and 
judgment in isolation from one another, as they often do in today’s 
liberal democracies. When individuals lack the opportunities, 
incentives, and necessities to test, articulate, defend, and ultimately act 
on their judgments, they will also be lacking in empathy for others, 
poor information, and unlikely to have the critical skill necessary to 
articulate, defend, and revise their views.” 
Warren, 1996111  
As Warren warned us, in the context of risk society and network society, the 
representative democracy is now ineffective to provide ultimate solutions for societal 
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serious facing problems. Society must develop and establish ‘deliberative democracy’, 
based on, at least, three indispensable characteristics of democracy; namely expansive 
democracy, inclusionary democracy and deliberative democracy. 
First, ‘expansive democracy’ is “characterized by increased participation, either by 
means of small-scale direct democracy or through strong linkage between citizens and 
broad-scale institutions, by pushing democracy beyond traditional politics spheres and 
by relating decision-making to the persons who are affected”112.  
Second, the inclusion refers to ‘the action of involving others’. Therefore, an 
inclusionary democratic decision-making process is ‘based on the active involvement 
of multiple social actors and usually emphasizes the participation of previously 
excluded citizens’113.  
Last, deliberation is defined as “careful consideration” or “the discussion of reasons 
for and against”.114 According to Pimbert and Wakefort, “a deliberative process 
assumes that, at least initially, there are different positions held by the participants and 
that these views should be respected”. Principally, deliberative process should be 
designed to “enable participants to evaluate and reevaluate their positions in the light 
of different perspectives and new evidence”. Therefore, “while the goal is usually to 
reach decisions or at least positions upon which decisions can subsequently be taken, 
an unhurried, reflective and reasonably open-end discussion is required”115. 
According to Warren116, “democracy has intrinsic value for those who engage in 
deliberative processes, value that is tied to an immanent potential for transformation 
and the development of capacities for citizenship that enable individuals and groups to 
respond directly and effectively to uncertainty and social conflict”. In other words, 
“deliberative participation serves two potential functions: the ‘education’ of citizens 
and the ‘transformation’ of views through discussion”117. Therefore, “deliberation is a 
common, if not inherent, component of all decision-making and democratic 
societies”118.  
In the context of network society, public decision-making transcends the formal 
institutions of government to more comfortably rest within the sphere of 
governance119, which Healey has aptly defined as ‘the management of the common 
affairs of political communities’120. Governance is a process of participation, which 
depends on networks of engagement. It attempts to embrace diversity in contemporary 
society and promotes greater responsibility and, in doing so, seeks to reshape 
accountable relationships121.  
Presently, when value pluralism, social inequality and future uncertainty is 
inescapable, a variety of institutional mechanisms need to be in place to develop some 
degree of social cohesion, as well as address some fundamental problems of social 
polarization and inequality122. In the context of risk society and network society, 
where resources and opportunities to influence the decision-making process are not 
the same for everyone and, additionally, those who take the decisions may not be 
those who end up being negatively affected by decision-making123, the processes and 
their rules of game in dealing with uncertainty and inequality in public policy are 
certainly crucial.   
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Therefore, today, politics is not simply concerned with policy outcomes, we now 
quarrel about the rules of the game themselves124. Any credible theory of democratic 
practice must thus devote attention to the possibility of building new policy 
institutions that permit the public to engage in a much wider range of discourse and 
democratize the mechanisms that integrate scientific expertise and political 
discourse125.  
As argued by Weeks126, “if deliberative democracy aspired only to the narrow goal of 
informing policy makers of the judgment of citizens, participation could minimize to a 
small statistically representative sample. Its ambitions are, however, much grander 
and encompass the revitalization of civic culture, improving the nature of public 
discourses and generating ‘the political will to take effective action on pressing 
problems”.  
This awareness seems to facilitate a new creativity in thinking about new modes of 
conflict resolution. It suggests that the essence of dealing with policy conflicts might 
be a more substantial process of deliberation, shared problem solving and developing 
regimes of joint responsibility, than merely interest-based bargaining. In short, 
“whereas in the past we used to think of policymaking as the consequence of political 
will formation, it now is often policymaking that leads to political will formation” 127. 
However, it is vital for those entering any arena of negotiated policy-making to 
understand that real difficulties can lie ahead, linked to professional resistance 
towards the adjustment of long established institutional competencies, the competing 
and different values of participants, hostile follower, unequal relationship of power, 
controlled participation and suffocation by comfortable association. Therefore, the 
interactive public decision-making process, as deliberative democratic culture, is 
certainly not free of risks, which clearly highlights the importance of a reflective 
participatory practice128. 
2.5 Conventional Policy Analysis  
Before explaining deliberative policy analysis, it is useful to understand the main 
ideas and limitations of the conventional policy analysis. In general, conventional 
policy analysis has two main characteristics; representative democratic decision-
making and rational (or scientific) decision-making. Conventionally, “classical-
modernist political institutions seek to involve people in politics via a choice of 
elected officials, who are subsequently supposed to represent the interest of their 
voters, initiate policy and oversee its implementation”129.  
In relation to rational decision-making, many policy-makers and scientists still assume 
that “there is a linear relationship between policy and knowledge, a 1:1 
relationship”130. According to the conventional view, “the world of science is 
separated from the world of politics and policy”. In this view, “science is pure, 
interest-free and impartial and therefore takes place in a world that is separated from 
the circles in which results of scientific activity are applied”. In short, the relationship 
between science and politics is rather one-sided: “science is there to tell politicians 
and policy-makers the truth”131. 
This leads to the ‘theory of technocracy’, which, according to Fischer, is “a variant of 
elite theory, which refers to a governance process dominated by technically trained 
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knowledge elites”. The function of the technocratic elite is to “replace or control 
democratic deliberation and decision-making processes (based on conflicting 
interests) with a more technically informed discourse (based on scientific decision-
making techniques)”, resulting in “the transformation of political issues into 
technically defined ends than can be pursued through administrative means”132. 
This conventional methodology and epistemology, or so-called positivist policy 
analysis, tacitly assumes – and requires – “a certain hierarchical societal ordering”. A 
‘scientistic’ policy analysis has become “part of a particular institutional order in 
which political and economic elites effectively insulated from the citizens’ voice, 
sought to design economically efficient and technologically efficacious solutions to 
what they perceived as society’s problems”133. 
However, Veld 134has argued that “it has already been known for a long time in the 
science of administration and the philosophy of science that this rational model of the 
relationship between knowledge and policy is not adequate”. In the context of risk 
society, people in industrialized and post-industrialized societies no longer view 
science as “representing certain knowledge”135. Citizens feel themselves ‘at risk’ from 
science-based social and technological development and are skeptical about scientific 
solutions, especially when ‘experts’ have indeed contributed to creating public health, 
social and environmental crisis in the first place136. Lovan et al137 also observed that, 
“there has emerged a deficit of trust in the ability of public officials to effectively deal 
with the wicked problems of society and in this context citizens today are more ready 
to challenge perceived technocratic hegemonies built on the foundations of 
professional and expertise”. 
As concluded by Hajer and Wagenaar138, “whereas within the old regulatory regime 
the idea prevailed that one could still employ the ‘knowledge for policy’ practice 
(‘first get the fact right’) the new political reality is no longer a credible policymaking 
strategy”.  
In an alternative viewpoint, “Science is not an activity that takes place in a social 
vacuum, but is constructed socially just like all other social activities. And therefore, 
scientific activity, in particular scientific activity that serves to support social 
processes of decision-making, is also subject to influence of power and (self) 
interests”139.  
Based on Veld and Verhey140, “sometimes high-running conflicts are created there 
where it is ‘discovered’ that research is not free of values, but can be associated with 
political-social values of specific interested parties in the policy. Certainly, in this 
situation, “the parties involved tend in particular to trust that knowledge, that fits 
one’s own position in the debate”141.  
From the observation of policy-making and public decision-making in the 
Netherlands, it was found that the dominant policy players succeed in transferring 
their conception of a problem to the political arena. Usually, the problems are mainly 
approached as problems that can be solved in a technical way, which certainly 
manipulates the demand for knowledge. This is why the fact that these developments 
can or must occur in a different way is usually not a subject for official policy 
discussion. In other words, “the reflexive capacity of society is not an item and is 
therefore not included in the official definition of the problem and the solution”. 
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Consequently, the orientation leads to the fact that some research questions are not 
posed, that problems are not fully placed in the social context, that choices are not 
made explicitly and that alternatives are sometimes excluded without any apparent 
reason for this being given”142.  
This leads to the conclusion that “the articulation of the demand for knowledge and 
the use of knowledge in the policy arena are strongly influenced by the values that 
play a role in policy”143. In other words, “knowledge and values exercise mutual 
influence, in which, however, the relationship is asymmetrical. Values have a stronger 
influence on knowledge than knowledge on values”144. 
This can also be seen as the relationship between knowledge and power. Based on the 
same observations, it also found that “the attention is highly concentrated on formal 
knowledge that is particular in the possession of policy-makers and researchers”145. 
The knowledge of other groups is not used actively. Observably, “the policy fields 
and research institutions, too, are closely interwoven” therefore “knowledge and 
policy infrastructures show many similarities”146. More seriously, in practice, there 
are many taboos that limit public discussion, especially if it links to “radical 
alternatives of the opponent of proposed solution”147. As shown by Veld and 
Verhej148, “policy makers will ignore and reject knowledge that shows that the present 
economy forms a threat for us and our environment and cannot continue as such”. 
This observation turns the conventional theories upside down. This is not only a 
perception of knowledge being power, “but more important, power is knowledge”. 
This is because “power determines what counts as knowledge, what kind of 
interpretation attains authority as the dominant interpretation”. Certainly, in politics, 
“power procures the knowledge which supports its purposes, while it ignores or 
suppresses that knowledge which does not serve it”149.  
Flyvbjerg concluded, “while power produces rationality and rationality produces 
power, their relationship is asymmetrical”, since “power has a clear tendency to 
dominate rationality in the dynamic and overlapping relationship between these two”. 
In other words, “power has rationality that rationality does not know”. Based on his 
conclusion, the first step to overcome this conventional weakness is “to understand 
power, and when we understand the power we see that we cannot rely solely on 
democracy based on rationality to solve our problems” 150.  
Therefore, in recently developed views, “knowledge is seen as a social construction 
and the way in which knowledge is used in complex questions can better be expressed 
in terms of a political struggle, or at least in terms of differences in the perception of 
problems, the conducting of negotiations, the forming of alliances and such”151. In 
other words, both the problem itself and the knowledge to encounter the problem “are 
considered to be a social construction of multi-actor model”152.  
The development of this viewpoint links up with discussions of a post-normal science, 
Trans-science and interactive policy-making153. According to Habermas, “scientific 
rationality must not be limited to an analysis of empirical data, but the interpretation 
of socially constructed values and meanings and the political criticism from society 
must also form part of the concept of rationality”154.  
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Veld and Verhej suggest that “one of the more recent approaches of science has as its 
motto ‘let the people decide’ (democratic approach of science): not only is it 
recognized that science never is free of values, but it is also deemed desirable that 
values are used and made explicit in the scientific activity”155.   
In this view, “science and values must be linked up together by having the actors in 
the policy arena discuss and also determine research questions, research methods and 
assumptions, so that negotiated knowledge may be arrived at, that is not free of 
values, but have been negotiated in an open debate about choices that influence the 
production of knowledge”156. 
In politics, policy process should “take as their point of departure an integral problem 
analysis instead of very selective and solution-oriented analysis”. “Early openness and 
interaction about a problem and solution formulation” by different problem owners is 
also essential. Within the context of risks society, “the uncertainties and dilemmas 
could be made more explicit so that discussions on usefulness and necessity can also 
deal with them”. This suggestion implies “more qualitative and interdisciplinary 
research, more research aimed at the social and environmental effects of policy and 
more use of practical and intuitive knowledge”157.  
This has also led to the formulation of the concept of ‘citizen science’, according to 
which “citizens are involved in the formulation of problems as well as in the 
formulation of solutions”. Therefore, it requires “the upgrading of lay-knowledge side 
to side with the traditional expert knowledge as a source for wisdom in policy”158. In 
this view, policymaking becomes the open-end social learning process, “which is not 
necessarily considered to lead to new consensus among actors holding different views 
and interests, but at least to explore the horizon of possible alternatives and the room 
where future consensus and disagreement may evolve”159.  
2.6 Policy Negotiation Analysis 
The unrealistic assumption of the linear model forced policy analysts to search for a 
more practical-oriented framework. The second approach, the so-called policy 
negotiation model, focuses on policy as courses of action, within ongoing processes of 
negotiation between multiple actors over time. As famously described by Lindblom, 
policy process in this approach is recognized as “the science of muddling through” 
rather than a well-defined rationalized process160. 
The policy negotiation analysis can expand the scope of policy analysis to cover the 
issues of policy network, policy window, policy entrepreneurs, and policy-oriented 
learning. Within the negotiation analysis, two main analytical frameworks can be 
differently applied to the healthy public policy in Thailand; namely Multiple Stream 
Theory and Advocacy Coalition Framework. 
 a) Multiple Streams Framework:  
The multiple streams framework was developed by John Kingdon (1984)161. It views 
the policy process as the composition of three streams of actors and processes: a 
problem stream, consisting of information about various problems and the proponents 
of various problem definitions and significance; a policy stream involving the 
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proponents of solution to policy problems; and a political stream consisting of 
politicians and elected officials.  
In Kingdon’s view, the streams normally operate independently of one another and do 
not lead to any significant changes, except when a “window of opportunity” permits 
policy entrepreneurs to couple various streams. If the entrepreneur’s attempt is 
successful, the result is major policy change. However, normally the policy window is 
opened and closed very rapidly, therefore, timing and policy entrepreneurs’ strategy is 
certainly crucial for policy changes162. 
This framework provides very useful insights for a policy analysis. Unlike the linear 
model, the multiple streams framework has recognized the fact that full rationalization 
cannot be applied, which, in fact, is a normal situation in the political world. In this 
situation, the timing is crucial. Analyzing three policy streams and policy windows 
can help us to understand why policy changes happen in some cases and not in others. 
In practice, some policy changes do not occur due to the forces of the problem stream, 
but mainly because of the initiatives in policy streams (answer before problem). In 
some case, the policy and political streams are just waiting for the problem to appear. 
Therefore, these three policy streams can be used as both analytical and operational 
frameworks. The focus on policy entrepreneurs is also very important in order to 
understand the roles of change agents at the policy arena. Last, based on this 
framework, the success in policy advocacy depends on chances as much as on skills 
and capacity163.  
However, the multiple streams framework seems to focus on policy process as each 
decision-making snapshot within the overall policy dynamics, which consequently 
make policy works become tactical rather than strategic. It also omits an overview 
insight on long-term changes including historical influences within a policy arena. 
Last, the independence of three streams may not be true in many cases, especially 
when the strong relationship of different actors operating in different streams is 
established 164. 
 b) The Advocacy Coalition Framework: 
The advocacy coalition framework was developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith165. 
Unlike the multiple streams, this framework views policy changes as a continuous 
process of changing ways of thinking in the longer term. Thus, this framework 
focuses on the interaction of advocacy coalitions - each consisting of actors from a 
variety of organizations and institutions who share a set of policy beliefs, who are 
actively concerned with a policy problem or issue and who regularly seek to influence 
public policy – within a policy subsystem166. 
In this approach, policy change is a function of competition and policy-oriented 
learning within the subsystem and related to events and conditions outsides the policy 
subsystem. This advocacy coalition framework asserts the importance of policy 
network as one of the main mechanisms for policy changes. In more complex policy 
subsystems, individual policy entrepreneurs are hardly successful. Co-operation and 
co-ordination among different actors as a process of sharing capacities, expertise and 
opportunities is necessary for policy works in the longer term. In this way, a powerful 
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policy network can effectively push policy into their directions and block the effort 
and policy window of other networks167.  
According to this framework, the policy belief is very important and persistent. 
Therefore, “the line up of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods 
of a decade or so”168. In this situation, major socio-economic changes, such as 
economic dislocations or the rise of social movement have played a crucial role in 
policy changes. This is because a severe reality shock can jolt policy-makers into 
examining and rethinking the basic policy belief that guides their policy action169.   
Alternatively, policy-oriented learning within and across the policy networks may also 
provide another way to change policy over time. However, this policy learning 
normally does not occur automatically, since coalition members will resist 
information, suggesting that their deep core or policy core beliefs may be invalid 
and/or unattainable. Policy learning is only likely to happen, if very solid empirical 
evidence is presented with accepted quantitative data and consensual theories, 
especially in the natural sciences rather than in the social sciences. Moreover, this 
framework suggests that policy learning is most likely to develop in the professional 
forums with professional norms170.   
Main benefits of the policy coalition framework are a) to look beyond formal policy 
authorities and understand the interactions of policy networks within the policy 
subsystem, b) to involve more participants than traditional policy-making, c) to 
provide longer views of policy changes as an outcome of changing attitudes and 
surrounding situations, rather snap-shot decision-making as usually taking place in 
conventional and multiple streams approach, d) to recognize real-life aspects of bound 
rationality and value pluralism within the policy process, and e) to highlight 
opportunities and potentials of policy learning within the policy process. 
Although the advocacy coalition framework provides a more realistic and interesting 
approach to policy analysis, it is still incomplete in explaining and guiding the public 
policy process in the era of new modernity. Firstly, it over-emphasizes the importance 
of external shock, which make the policy process become passive to external 
situations. Consequently, this means that the role of policy strategies, as a way to 
provide better (or alternative) policy understandings and explanations to society, is 
implicitly overlooked. Therefore, it fails to explain why and how changes come about. 
In many cases, what lead to the expected policy changes are new persuasive policy 
explanations with a set of fact and normative orientations (or so-called policy 
storyline), rather than external factors or policy belief alone. At the same time, 
compared to policy belief, common and contested policy explanations may provide 
broader opportunities for joining policy networks and also sharing the deliberative 
discussions within the policy process171. Lastly, the technocratic mode of policy 
learning overlooks the rising of social concerns and increasing roles of social 
movements in policy processes around the world, including in Thailand’s national 
health system reform.      
2.7 Deliberative Policy Analysis 
Unlike conventional theories, deliberative policy analysis needs to draw its 
assumptions on contemporary situations, when we have to develop democratic 
systems on dispersed power, diminishing trust, ambiguous institutions, profound 
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uncertainty and inequality, powerful transnational influences and active but highly 
differentiated citizens. Deliberative policy analysis does not view policymaking as the 
outcome of formal politics, as seen in conventional approach. On the contrary, it is 
policymaking itself “that provides the practices in which people start to deliberate and 
become politically active”172. 
In the viewpoint of deliberative policy analysis, “public policy often creates and 
functions as a public domain, a space in which people of various origins deliberate on 
their future as well as their mutual interrelationships and their relationship to the 
government”173. In this view, “policymaking is a constant discursive struggle over the 
criteria of social classification, the boundaries of problem categories, the inter-
subjective interpretation of common experiences, the conceptual framing of problems 
and the definition of ideas that guide the ways people create the shared meaning 
which motivate them to act”174. Therefore, “policy analysis and planning are practical 
processes of argumentation”175.  
The main task of deliberative policy analysis is to understand “interactive and 
deliberative processes of discovering ends, recognizing other parties, marshalling the 
evidence and giving reasons, exploring the implications of various value positions and 
developing joint responsibility in concrete situations”176. 
Taking all these main characteristics into account, conducting deliberative policy 
analysis in the new context has to be developed from the five pillars of policy analysis 
which are presented below.  
2.7.1 Interpretative Process 
This interactive public policy process assumes “the preexistence of individuals 
engaged with others in a diverse, fluid, and overlapping “discourse community”, each 
with its own meaning systems and hence knowledge forms and ways of reasoning and 
valuing”177. In other words, it presupposes that we live in a social world with the 
possibilities of multiple interpretations178. Therefore, it is quite important not only to 
raise the question of costs and impacts of policy, but also the different meanings of 
policy to different actors179. 
The central question for interpretative policy analysts is “how are the policy issues 
being framed by various parties to the debate?”180. The words ‘fluid’ and 
‘overlapping’, as mentioned earlier by Healey, suggest that deliberative analysis 
should not take individual and public preferences as ‘given’, as usually done in 
conventional economic analysis, but ‘would instead have to account for where people 
get their images of the world and how those images shape their desires and 
visions”181.  
Through communication in this interactive process, the role of language is certainly 
crucial in policymaking. As aptly cautioned by Majone, “as politicians know only too 
well but social scientists too often forget, public policy is made of language. Whether 
in written or oral form, argument is central at all stages of policy process”182. In this 
context, “interpretative modes of policy analysis seek to identify both the specific 
meanings, intended and made, of specific policies and those meanings are 
communicated and variously interpreted”183. In other words, deliberative policy 
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analysis should “be able to understand the complex ways in which meaning is hidden 
in policymaking discourse and thus be able to anticipate political controversies”184.  
Therefore, deliberative policy analysis must go “beyond the investigation of 
differences of opinion about technical facts alone”185. Besides seeking to explain a 
given reality, deliberative policy analysis “must also attempt to explain how social 
groups construct their own understanding of that reality”. This notion is very 
important for policy analysis, since one of the basic goals of politics is ‘to change an 
existing reality’186. At the same time, “policy politics is itself about establishing 
definitions of and assign meaning to social problem”187.  
Fischer asserted that “recognizing reality to be a social construction, the focus 
necessarily shifts to nature of situational context and to discursive processes which 
shape the construction” 188. However, this post-positivist approach does not mean the 
rejection of empirical study. On the contrary, deliberative policy analysis must include 
empirical investigation, but needs to situate it ‘in a larger set of normative concerns 
that give its findings meaning’189. As mentioned by Majone, “the structure of a policy 
argument is typically a complex blend of factual statements, interpretations, opinion 
and evaluation”190.  
Hence, the task of deliberative analysis is to understand “a matter of establishing 
interconnections among the empirical data, normative assumptions (that structure our 
understanding of the social world), the interpretative judgments involved in the data 
collection process, the particular circumstances of situational context (in which the 
findings are generated and/or to which the conclusion apply), and specific 
conclusions”191. 
Concurrently, the task of deliberative analysis is “to tease out the normative conflict 
lurking behind often equally plausible interpretations of the same abstract goals or 
values”. Furthermore, it should ensure that “various modes of defining policy 
problems have to be recognized as competing languages in which people offer and 
defend conflicting interpretations”192. Certainly, the fundamental goal of this policy 
analysis is to discover ways of ‘living together differently but respectfully’193. 
2.7.2 Communicative Process 
Since one of the objectives of deliberative democracy is to enable participants to learn 
and transform their views in the light of different perspectives and new evidence 
along the interactive process, the roles of communication are very important. 
As mentioned by Healey, “within the argumentation of these communicative 
processes, all dimensions of knowing, understanding, appreciating, experiencing, and 
judging may be brought into play”. In deliberative democratic society, “the struggles 
of engaging in inter-discursive communicative action is to grasp these diverse 
viewpoints and find ways of reasoning among the competing claims for action, 
without dismissing or devaluating any one until it has been explored”194. 
While “some conceptions of democratic dialogue may be too narrowly restricted to a 
particularly rigid form and style of rational argumentation: ‘polite, orderly, 
dispassionate, gentlemanly argument’ ”, which implicitly devaluates “the perspectives 
of those who are less skilled in such forms of argument”, deliberative democracy must 
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apply a richer and broader concept of democratic communication, including greeting, 
rhetoric, narrative stile and story telling195. 
As stressed by Smith, “this broadening of what is understood as a legitimate form of 
communication is important, especially if all voices are to be heard and 
considered”196. Healey also asserted that policy-making and planning processes 
“should be enriched by discussion of moral dilemmas and aesthetic experience using a 
range of presentation forms, from telling stories to aesthetic illustrations of 
experiences”197. 
In the context of value pluralism, the ultimate goal of the communicative process 
should not always be unanimity or consensus, which sometimes may force 
participants to accept others’ view (mainly dominant discourse); the deliberative 
communication should rather aim for ‘mutual understanding’. Disagreement does not 
undermine deliberation, “as long as participants accept the conditions under which 
collective decision and judgments are reached”198. As explained by Baynes, “an 
emphasis on mutual understanding highlights the requirement on participants to 
confront the variety of points of view on particular issues and to be open to the 
possibility of the transformation of preferences after reflection on, and consideration 
of, their own and others’ perspectives”199. 
To reach mutual understanding, intercommunicative policy-making and planning 
must “involve respectful discussion within and between discursive communities, 
‘respect’ implying recognizing, valuing, listening to, and searching for translative 
possibilities between different discourse communities”200. The translation possibilities 
and capabilities are very important in the context of the interpretative process, as 
described before. 
In doing so, policy-making and planning should involve “invention not only through 
programs of actions but in the construction of the arenas within which these programs 
are formulated and conflicts are identified and mediated”. Certainly, it needs “to be 
reflective of its own processes” 201. 
As concluded by Healey, “communicative planning is not only innovative, it has the 
potential to change, to transform material conditions and established power relations 
through the continuous effort to “critique” and “demystify”; through increasing 
understanding among participants hence highlighting oppressions and “dominatory” 
forces; and through creating well-grounded arguments for alternative analyses and 
perception – through actively constructing new understanding”202.  
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2.7.3 Contestation Process 
Since different participants have different worldviews, values and interpretations, 
interactive policy-making practices are certainly contested terrain. The contestation 
can be seen in problem identification, agenda setting, definition of processes and rules 
of game, policy contents, and policy outcomes and practices. Hence, the policy-
making practices “should be analyzed and indeed appreciated at sites for the 
articulation of conflict and difference, as a place for social and cultural 
contestation”203.  
One approach to the analysis of these policy practices is the concept of discourse 
coalition. According to Hajer, “a discourse coalition is basically a group of actors who 
share a social construct”, which can be seen as “a way to give meaning to ambiguous 
social circumstances”204.  
Discourse is here defined by Hajer “as an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories 
through which meaning is given to phenomenon”. This discourse coalition approach 
suggests that “once a new discourse is formulated, it will produce story lines on the 
specific problems, employing the conceptual machinery of the new discourse (e.g. 
sustainable development)”. A discourse coalition is thus the “ensemble of a set of 
story lines, the actors that utter these story lines, and the practices that conform to 
these story lines, all organized around the discourses”205. 
The discourse coalition approach suggests that “politics is a process in which different 
actors from various backgrounds form specific coalitions around specific story lines”. 
Since different discourses frame certain problems in different ways, they provide 
different solutions to society. Their story lines become “the medium through which 
actors try to impose their view of reality on others, suggest certain social positions and 
practices, and criticize alternative social arrangements”206. 
In the contestation process, new story lines can become a popular way of 
conceptualizing the world (such as sustainable development), but a discourse coalition 
can be viewed as “the dominant discourse” in a given political realm only if it fulfills 
two conditions207; 
1. “it dominates the discursive space; that is the central actors are persuaded 
by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical power of a new discourse” (so-called 
‘condition of discourse structuration’), 
2. “this is reflected in the institutional practices of that political domain; that 
is, the actual policy process is conducted according to the ideas of a given 
discourse” (so-called ‘condition of discourse institutionalization’). 
The implication of Hajer’s idea is to emphasize the significance of policy ‘practices’. 
Although some discourse coalition might work well at conceptual levels, at the end, 
what determine the social reality are still the practical ones. Therefore, deliberative 
policy analysis must go beyond the reference to interests, by “analyzing how interests 
are played in the contexts of specific discourses and organizational practices”208.  
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2.7.4 Practice-oriented Process 
Machiavelli warned us a long time ago, “a man who neglects what is actually done for 
what should be done learns the ways to self-destruction”209. However, the focus of 
conventional approach has always been on “what should be done”, while Flyvbjerg 
recently argued for a reorientation towards “what is actually done”210. Hajer and 
Wagenaar also argue that “one of the main reasons for the often observed 
ineffectiveness and irrelevance of the traditional policy science is precisely this 
Cartesian bias; the gap between the theoretical rationality of the policy sciences and 
the practical rationality of the practitioner”211. 
The promise of traditional, rational policy analysis is precisely to sanitize political 
decision-making from irrational politics. However, as we know very well, “politics is 
‘messy’, ‘unpredictable’, and an ‘obstacle course’ for policy and ‘a hostile 
environment’ for policy analysis212”. There is “an uneasy relationship between social 
scientists and public officials, because one group provides ‘disciplined research’ while 
the other has ‘undisciplined problems’”213. In the real world, where existing 
knowledge is incomplete and imprecise, society is full of inequality and uncertainty, 
and where policymakers have to act to cope with facing situations at hand within 
present organizational limits, the formal logic does not seem to work well, neither in 
theory nor in practice. Obviously, policy-makers must apply their practical rationality 
or practical judgment to determine their actions in such context.   
This can refer to the Aristotelian conception of phronesis of the informal logic of 
practical reasons214. Informal logic “emphasizes an assessment of the problem in the 
particular context, seeking to decide which approaches are most relevant to the 
inquiry at hand”. Fischer explains that “practical reason distinguishes contextually 
between the world of theory, the mastery of techniques and the experiential wisdom 
needed to put techniques to work in concrete cases”215. Hence, in their view, “practice 
is an attempt to develop unified account for knowing and doing. It expresses the 
insight that knowledge, knowledge application and knowledge creation cannot be 
separated from action; that acting is the high road to knowing”216. 
Practical deliberation thus seeks to bring a wider range of evidence and arguments to 
bear on a particular problem, situation, or position under the investigation of policy 
analysts217. Since, in everyday politics, actors articulate value in appreciating the 
possibilities and limitations of the situation at hand, the practical deliberation also 
focuses its attention on value. Along this view, the real challenge of the deliberative 
policy analysis is to “find ways of combining the analysis of the discursive production 
of reality with the analysis of the (extra-discursive) social practices from which social 
constructs emerge and in which the actors that make these statement engage”218. 
As stressed by Fischer and Forester219, “to see policy analysis and planning as 
argumentative practices is to attend closely to the day-to-day work analysts do as they 
construct working accounts of problems and possibilities. Recognizing these accounts 
as politically constrained, organizational accomplishments in the face of little time 
and poor data, we can evaluate the analysts’ arguments not only for their truth and 
falsity but also for their partiality, their selective framing of the issues at hand, their 
elegance and crudeness of presentation, their political timeliness, their symbolic 
significance, and more”.  
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2.7.5 Learning Process 
In recent years it has become common wisdom in the policy sciences to appreciate 
social movements and individual citizens as a valuable source of ‘local knowledge’ 
that enhances the knowledge produced by formalized policy-making practices220. 
Jamison also shows the importance of social movements as ‘cognitive praxis’ in the 
development of critical environmental knowledge221.   
Fischer and Forester also argue that “through thoughtful, passionate, and informed 
argumentative processes, which Benjamin Barner calls ‘democratic talk’, citizen can 
learn, and policy and planning analysts can promote that learning”222. In policy 
politics, “people learn about the world in public, share processes in which they test 
what they have learned. The way they test the relevance and validity of their 
knowledge in a particular situation is through public discourse”223.   
However, in order to learn from such a contested protest, a reflexive and critical 
capacity should be kept alive in the processes of argumentation224. In other words, 
“before the rationality of choices come the prior practical rationality of careful 
attention, critical listening, setting out issues, and exploring working relationships as 
pragmatic aspects of problem construction”225. 
Therefore, the role of policy analysts has changed radically. Rather than providing 
technical answers designed to bring political discussion to an end, the task of the 
policy analysts as facilitators is to “assist citizens in their efforts to examine their own 
interests and to make their own decisions”226. The facilitation of citizen learning can 
be understood as “enlarging the citizens/clients abilities to pose the problems and 
questioned that interest or concern them and to help connect them into the kinds of 
information and resources needed to help them”227.  
The assignment of the deliberative policy analysts is thus “to understand the 
conditions for citizen learning and to design and enable the setting within which 
citizens develop their own policy positions”. With this goal, “professional experts 
must become specialists in how clients learn, clarify, and decide”. Concurrently, it is 
very important to create “the institutional conditions with which citizens draw on their 
own abilities and resources to solve their own problems” and “institutional and 
intellectual conditions that help people to pose questions in their own ordinary (or 
everyday) language and to decide the issues important to themselves”228.    
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2.8 Analyzing Public Policy in the Thai Power Sector 
As the objective of the research is to analyze present public policy process in the Thai 
energy sector as well as to propose new policies for a healthier power system, the 
concept of deliberative policy analysis can be very useful. To follow the deliberative 
policy analysis into the research, it certainly has to base the research strategy on the 
analysis of the five pillars of deliberative policy analysis, as previously mentioned. In 
applying deliberative policy analysis to this project, the research strategy will be 
divided into three main connecting parts.  
 2.8.1 Policy Discourse Analysis 
The first part of the research will concentrate on the analysis of ‘the policy discourse 
coalition’ within the Thai power policy arena. This part will mainly analyze (a) 
different interpretations of energy problems and policy directions of different actors 
(b) the formation of the policy discourse, discourse coalition, and policy practices 
around the power policy arena, (c) the dynamics of communicative and argumentative 
processes between different discourse coalitions, and (d) the recent outcomes of 
policy and political changes in the Thai power sector, both in terms of content, 
process, languages, and actual practices. 
The main objective of this part is to gain a better understanding of public process in 
the context of Thai society, which is important for an appropriate and meaningful 
participation in the policy process. This understanding is also very important for the 
development of theoretical and analytical frameworks for policy analysis and healthy 
public policy development in Thai society. 
The main expected outcomes of this part are; 
(a) the recognition of different problem definitions, discourse framing, 
and future visions and directions by different coalitions and actors 
including their argumentation, which will certainly define the 
indicators for the policy assessment analysis in the next step, 
(b) the understanding of communication processes and cultures within 
and between coalitions within the power policy arena, which is 
crucial for designing communication strategy in policy assessment, 
and  
(c) the understanding of the practices of different actors and coalitions 
(including their knowledge) and the situation at hand that force, 
inhibit, or stimulate them to develop their practices.  
Based on the insights from the previous discussions on conventional policy 
negotiation, and deliberative policy analysis, we can see that policy-making is an 
outcome of the interaction between three main policy layers; namely formal policy 
process and decisions, policy sector, and public domain. Therefore, the deliberative 
policy analysis of the Thai power sector in this study will be done through the analysis 
in three main layers. 
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a) Formal Policy Process and Decision 
Formal policy processes and decisions refer to authorized policy-making processes 
and decisions in the power sector, which are normally operated and controlled by the 
government institutions. Since, the authorized decisions in terms of planning and 
regulations are always crucial for the directions of the power sector, understanding 
formal policy process and policy decision is certainly essential. Especially, when the 
government institutions still dominate the policy process and public deliberation is 
still not well-grounded in the policy process and culture, as is the case of the Thai 
power sector, analyzing formal policy process and decision is important to understand 
the driving forces and their reaction or interaction forces within the policy arena. 
As it becomes more obvious that formal policy process is not the complete 
rationalized process but full of power and different societal values interplaying with 
expected policy directions and decisions, this study will not look at the formal policy 
process and decision in the rationalized model, as assumed in conventional analysis. 
Rather the formal policy process will be analyzed in order to see and show a) the 
domination of (or balance between) specific societal values, b) the pre-assumptions of 
formal policy process and planning, c) the main and competitive rationales in policy-
making, d) the influences of internal and external forces in decision-making, e) the 
openness of and the interaction within this policy process, and e) the limitations of the 
formal policy process in terms of cognitive, normative, and regulative dimensions.  
Understanding the formal policy process is also useful in terms of identifying policy 
strategy and action, since it allows us to understand a) the rationality used by the 
government institutions, b) internal and external influential forces, and c) timing and 
policy windows within the policy process. This understanding can shape the effective 
communication strategy for public deliberation, including alternative arguments, 
different interpretation, appropriate timing, etc.  
b) Policy Sector or Policy Network 
Since, in reality, the formal policy process does not occur in an authorized vacuum 
but is located in a policy domain or policy subsystem, which consists of a number of 
competing policy coalitions or networks, it is better to make an explicit understanding 
of these networks. In the Thai power sector, it is also obvious that policy networks 
have played crucial roles in policy-making, especially in the issues of privatization 
and the structure of the power market, as later shown in Chapter 4. They have 
employed different strategies in pursuing their policy directions within dynamic 
socio-economic and political situations, which are partly (or mainly) out of their 
control. On one hand, they always look for timing and tactics to push their ideas and 
block the others’ idea. On the other hand, they also learn how the others develop and 
persuade different ideas and, thus, they adjust and develop their new idea over time. 
This study will elaborate a) how different policy networks have been formed and have 
played roles in the Thai power sector, b) what are the main differences of 
interpretation in policy directions, c) what are their policy strategies in different socio-
economic and political situations, d) how they interact and learn from each other, and 
e) how they shape or facilitate the policy interpretations (or framing the policy issue) 
in Thai society.   
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Therefore, the understanding of policy network is not only to identify active 
stakeholders, but also to understand their policy interpretations, the different 
rationalities they use and the different policy framings applied in communicating with 
others, both in the policy domain and at the societal level. Analyzing policy network 
also helps in understanding power relations both within and among the policy 
networks, which, in some ways, influence the rationalities that have been used and 
claimed in the formal policy process and in the societal domain. 
c) Public Domain or Societal Level 
Although the policy network analysis broadens our scope of understanding beyond the 
authorized decision-making, the focus is still limited on the number of policy actors 
and networks. Normally, in gaining social and political supports, each actor and 
policy network always communicates with the public outside the policy sector (or 
domain). Therefore, the analysis of policy process has to go beyond policy domain, in 
order to see the actions that have been taken in society and the actions (or responses) 
that society takes in order to shape the policy sector and the formal policy process and 
decision.   
In moving into the societal level analysis, the focus should be on how policy issue has 
been interpreted and framed by various groups within the society, which may depend 
on historical and cultural influences, public perception and mood, socio-economic and 
political situations, and the communicative strategies of policy networks. Since the 
public may interpret and frame policy issue differently, thus, it is important to 
understand how the public will analyze and interpret the different evidence, 
information and story-lines regarding specific policy issues and situations. Moreover, 
since the public is not always certain to transform their ideas or opinions into policy 
actions, hence, it is necessary to understand how, when and why the public actions 
would take place and how the public actions affect or shape the previous two policy 
layers. 
The objective of this understanding on policy interpretation framing should not only 
be limited to the persuasion of a specific policy proposal. According to deliberative 
policy analysis, policy-making can be viewed as a long-term social learning process. 
Thus, focusing too much on each decision-making may overlook the actual benefits of 
policy deliberation. Successful policy analyses and actions may lead to better social 
understanding and respectfulness rather than to expected policy changes. In this view, 
an unsuccessful attempt, in terms of present policy change, may become another 
accumulated opportunity or pressure for opening to desirable and more sustainable 
outcomes in the future. Therefore, this study will pay serious attention to the 
communication with and between policy actors in the policy sector and in the public 
domain. 
Although the previous paragraphs seem to explain these policy layers, layer by layer, 
in reality, they are much more interconnected. As layers, they are located in the same 
specific policy situation. Hence, they can hardly be separated. Moreover, the concept 
of healthy public policy in Thailand’s health system reform also aims to facilitate the 
discussions and deliberations across the three layers.  
To understand the interactions between different actors, across three policy layers, by 
different interpretation of problems and policy directions, and the policy changes in 
 
 56
the Thai power sector, the historical analysis of the sector and its policy movements 
and changes will be presented in Chapter 4. Concluding Chapter 4, four policy 
discourse coalitions will be summarized with the explanation in terms of their policy 
interpretation, policy languages and communication, and also actual practices.    
 2.8.2 Impact Assessment of Policy Options  
The second part of the research will apply the concept of strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) with HIA as the main analytical framework in order to (a) 
conceptualize different policy discourses in terms of future policy directions and their 
consequences or impacts, (b) communicate between different policy discourse 
coalitions for the creation of mutual understanding and the possibilities of agreement 
and disagreement in future policy directions and impacts, (c) identify the further 
analyses and the developments of policy practices, which are necessary for 
deliberative policy discussion and to facilitate the development of a healthy public 
policy in the Thai power sector. 
The concepts of SEA will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  In principle, the 
analyses in this part require (a) energy modeling exercises in connection with 
different policy directions, (b) impact assessment of the consequences of different 
policy directions and practices, (c) an interactive communication process through 
policy analysis documents, discussion in policy workshops and (d) reflections or 
reinterpretations during the communication process.  
Although, at the end of Chapter 6, the most desirable policy option in health and other 
perspectives will be identified as an outcome of the impact analyses, it is very 
important to note that this is not the final answer to Thai society. In many cases, SEA 
has been used for ‘settling’ the discussion and ‘providing’ the definite answers to the 
societies or policymakers, but in this study, it will certainly be used for ‘stimulating’ 
the further policy discussions and argumentation in order to pursue the development 
of deliberative democracy in the Thai power policy arena.  
 2.8.3 Institutional frameworks and Public Regulations Analysis 
To emphasize the “practice-oriented” aspect of deliberative policy analysis, this study 
will analyze the changed and unchanged institutional frameworks and public 
regulations within Thai power policy during and after the impact assessment and 
communication process.  
Institutional frameworks and public regulations are considered in this study as the 
actual “practices” of policy process, because the power sector, even within the more 
liberalized market, is highly regulated by the institutional framework. The 
development of new technologies (and producers) and the continuation of the old 
technologies (and producers) depend very much on the structure of market, barriers to 
the market, pricing mechanisms (including subsidies and taxation), and environmental 
regulations, which are certainly institutionalized in the power system. The changes 
(and non-changes) in the institutional framework, therefore, are very crucial to the 
support or inhibition of specific policy directions in the power sector. Without any 
changes in the institutional framework and public regulation, we can consider that, in 
action, there is no policy change at all. Even though there may be some political 
announcement regarding policy changes, it can be perceived as a “non-action policy”, 
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which can happen in every policy sector, not only in the power sector. This idea also 
refers to the concept of “discourse institutionalization”, which is the main condition 
for every discourse to be meaningfully implemented and dominate the policy 
direction, as previously mentioned.  
With the further analysis, both changes and non-changes in the institutional 
framework and public regulation can represent the reflections, understandings (and 
misunderstandings), influential and conflicting values and interests, and practical 
judgments of, as well as the interaction between different policy actors or networks 
within the policy process. This study has followed the institutional and regulation 
changes (and non-changes) taken place in 2005-2006 or within one and a half year 
after the first policy communication was introduced in Thailand in the end of 2004. 
However, in practice, the institutional and regulation changes may require a wider 
time frame. Some non-changes may be in process of institutional changing. Thus, to 
overcome this time frame limitation, this study needs to cover in-process changes (and 
non-changes) through an analysis of agreement and conflicting ideas between 
different policy discourses in institutional frameworks. 
To understand and foresee the areas of agreement and conflict within the institutional 
changing process, an analysis of the institutional framework in a multi-dimensional 
nature must be conducted. According to Scott, three main dimensions of institution 
can be identified; namely cognitive, normative and regulative pillars229. Usually, 
people look at the institutional framework as a set of rules or the regulative dimension 
of institution. However, in fact, behind this set of rules, the normative and cognitive 
dimensions represent the values and interpretations of this institution. Between 
different policy discourses, agreement (and disagreement) normally occur or emerge 
from the cognitive and normative dimensions, and consequently, lead to agreement 
(and disagreement) in the regulative dimension. 
Hence, this study will analyze the changing institutional framework, the policy 
proposals for changes and non-changes, and the reactions to these proposals of 
different policy discourses. The analysis will be conducted at all levels of the 
institutional framework and public regulation, beginning with market structure, 
governance structure, market access, pricing structure, supportive mechanisms for 
renewable energy, planning process, research and development schemes, and 
environmental regulations. At each level, each proposal for changes and non-changes 
in regulative pillars will be analyzed and compared in order to understand the 
normative and cognitive differences and similarities between these proposals and 
between different policy discourses. The analysis will also show where and how the 
changes occur, or are likely to occur in the near future, as well as the areas in which 
and the reasons why the changes are not likely to take place. The results of this 
analysis will be presented in Chapter 7. 
At the end, the interactions of different policy networks and discourses in changing 
processes of institutional and public regulation provide an insight into how well this 
policy issue has been publicly deliberated in the Thai power sector and Thai society. It 
can show how communicative and learning processes are working (or not working) in 
the formulation and dynamics of the Thai power policy, as wished in the deliberative 
policy analysis. Hopefully, it can show the possibility of opening the policy process 
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and turning it into a social learning process. Therefore, from this viewpoint, these 
interactions and insights can provide a “societal validity test” of these research 
findings, of deliberative policy analysis, and of the healthy public policy notion, 
which will be presented in the last chapter.  
2.9 Healthy Public Policy Movements in the Power Sector 
The last part of this Chapter will provide an introduction to healthy public policy 
movements in the power sector, both in Thailand and in other countries. The main 
objective of this part is to provide an initial idea on how the concept of healthy public 
policy has been operationalized in different countries and situations and how this 
study plans to position itself, make the connection with others, and contribute to the 
movement of a healthy public policy.   
 2.9.1 International Experiences 
In comparison with environmental movement in energy policy, the concept of healthy 
public policy is quite new in the world community. It is emerging under the great 
debate on global warming and global environmental politics. Moreover, since the 
health impacts of the power sector are highly derived from negative environmental 
changes, in various cases, it is hard to separate healthy public policy movements from 
general environmental movement. However, there are a number of cases that clearly 
show the attempts to put health on the top of the policy agenda in the power sector 
and provide a systematic assessment of health impacts, as suggested in the healthy 
public policy concept. Some examples of these cases are discussed below; 
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• Clear the air, USA. 
 Clear the air is a US public education campaign to improve air quality and combat 
global warming by reducing emissions from coal-fired power plants. ‘Clear the air’ is 
the joint efforts of grassroots organizations, environmental groups and policy experts 
to implement stricter pollution control and present this aim to communities, 
government agencies, elected representatives and the media230.  
‘Clear the air’ publishes several reports, presenting concrete information on the health 
impacts of coal-fired power plants in the US. One of the most influential reports is 
“Dirty Air, Dirty Power: Mortality and Health Damage Due to Air pollution from 
Power Plants”231. In this report, the quantification of future health impacts and the 
cost-benefit analysis of four alternative bills, which purposed to mitigate health 
problems caused by power plant emissions, are presented. 
‘Clear the air’ also provides other interesting reports on the health impacts of coal-
fired power plants 232and organizes interactive campaigns to strengthen the Clean Air 
act and force local capacities to control air pollution.   
• Energy, Sustainable Development, and Health, WHO-Europe.  
The concerns of health impacts of power generation have been well-known in Europe, 
especially when they link to urban air pollution and climate change. In the 4th 
Ministerial Conference on Environment and Health, the issues of energy, sustainable 
development and health were addressed as one of the priority issues of emerging or 
increasing importance. WHO-Europe has co-ordinated a multidisciplinary team of 
experts to produce a scientific technical overview of the impact on health of the 
energy cycle, the future perspective on human health impacts of energy systems, and 
policy recommendations to protect human health233. 
This conference leads to the ministerial declaration which calls upon WHO-Europe 
and other relevant organizations to follow up developments on this issue, monitoring 
progress in reducing the burden of disease and reporting back to intergovernmental 
meeting in 2007234. 
• London Mayoral Strategies 
In London Mayoral Strategy, health has been set up as the cross-cutting issue in all 
mayoral specific strategies, including energy strategy. Therefore, to ensure the better 
health outcomes, in 2002, the London Health Commission together with the 
Environment Commission decided to use HIA to assess the Mayor’s draft energy 
strategy. According to the Mayor’s draft, the energy strategy addresses three primary 
goals; namely the reduction of London’s contribution to climate change, the 
eradication of fuel poverty, and the promotion of London’s economic development 
through a wide range of renewable and energy-efficient technologies235.   
The results of HIA confirm the health benefits of the Mayoral energy strategy, with 
the suggestion to show more explicit links to the health outcomes and other Mayoral 
strategies. HIA also highlights the interconnection between fuel poverty and health 
inequalities and the actions needed to tackle these relating problems. HIA also 
recommends the Mayoral energy strategy to set up clear policy priorities and targets, 
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for example “consideration should first be given to exploiting renewable energy on 
site and then to purchasing electricity from renewables over the grid”, “where fossil 
fuels are used, their conversion and distribution should be as efficient as possible, e.g. 
using combined heat and power, community heating”, or “the nuclear component of 
the energy supply should be no more than the national average” 236. 
• Lessons Learnt from International Experiences 
These examples show that the concept of healthy public policy can be integrated into 
the policy formulation process in the power sector. However, the ways to integrate 
health aspect are different in these three cases. In the case of ‘Clear the air’, its policy 
strategy is to advocate for stronger environmental regulations by presenting advanced 
scientific information on the health impacts of power generation to the general public 
and politicians, in the popular manner. At the same time, ‘Clear the air’ also aims to 
provide interactive channels for Americans to participate in monitoring their 
environmental and health impacts and supporting a more progressive legislation for 
health protection. For WHO-Europe, its main work is to establish a broad policy 
framework for healthy public policy and provide their member countries with general 
scientific understandings of the health impact of the power sector. WHO-Europe’s 
attempt is related to more inter-governmental discussion forums, and therefore, less 
specific policy proposals and public advocacy are presented. Last, for the London 
Mayor strategy, it is certainly an authorized policy process (for London), which is not 
seen in the first two cases. Interestingly, the level of policy information is much less 
technical and more integrated with other strategies in its policy contexts compared to 
the first two cases237.  
These differences in policy strategies of healthy public policy movement show that 
healthy public policy initiatives can take place with different actors, from different 
platforms, and through different languages (i.e., technical or general information) 
roles, and actions. Unfortunately, policy analyses or evaluations of these initiatives 
and strategies are still very rare. Thus, the most effective strategy for a healthy public 
policy movement in the power sector cannot be concluded within the near future, 
giving more rooms and asking more efforts to learn from the previous attempts.          
  2.9.2 Thailand’s Experiences 
Although Thai environmental movement in the power policy arena emerged in 1988 
(discussed in detail in Chapter 4), the healthy public policy movement in the Thai 
power sector has a much shorter history. Before the national health system reform, 
only the case of the Mae-Moh Lignite power plant, which causes severe health 
impacts through its emission, gave rise to public concern. However, this concern plays 
an important role in protesting against the coal-fired power plants in Prachaub Kiri 
Khun (also discussed in Chapter 4) in 1999-2001.  
After the launching of healthy public policy and HIA under the health system reform 
in 2001, the health impacts of several power plants and projects have been reported to 
the local communities, the health assemblies, and to the Thai public. These include 
the HIA of the Pak Mun hydro power plant, the Thai-Malaysia gas pipeline, the 
Wiang Hang lignite mining project, the Lamtaklong pump storage, and two biomass 
power plants in the central plain. All of these HIA studies are at the project level of 
HIA. Although some of them can be linked to policy suggestions, HIA and healthy 
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public policy movement in Thailand never touch upon comprehensive policy or 
planning changes in the Thai power sector.  
Concurrently, outside the health system reform process, the Greenpeace and other 
local NGOs have coordinately worked on the campaign against coal-fired power 
plants in Thailand and neighboring countries. Some NGOs, like the International 
River Network (South-east Asia region) and The Foundation for Ecological Recovery 
have worked on the issues of health and human rights in relation to the hydro power 
dam projects both in Thailand and neighboring countries (which sell most of their 
power outputs to Thailand). However, all these efforts both within and outside the 
health system reform have never had the chance to develop an overview assessment of 
the different policy directions and alternative proposals for a healthy public policy in 
the Thai power sector. Moreover, this movement still lacks in-depth policy analysis 
and a common policy strategy to develop a healthy public policy.  
This study is, therefore, in the position to develop a deliberative policy analysis of the 
Thai power sector, as well as to conduct an overview assessment of different policy 
directions. The aim of this study is to seek for healthier policy directions and, at the 
same time, to understand the opportunities and obstacles in making it happen in the 
real policy politics. Furthermore, this study also aims to be a forum for policy 
discussions and joint implementation for further policy deliberation and social 
learning process. All these attempts are expected to be essential components of the 
development of a healthy public policy in the Thai power sector.    
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Chapter 3 
Sustainable Energy and Health: 
Impacts, Assessment, and Potentials 
While Chapter 2 provides the theoretical background for analyzing the public policy 
process, this chapter will focus on the technical background for the analysis of the 
strategic impacts of different energy policy options on environmental, social, 
economic and health aspects. As this study is in the quest for better health 
consequences of power policy options, this chapter will begin by explaining energy 
and health linkages from household and community to the global scales. These 
linkages will provide a background concept for the analysis of health impacts of 
different power policy options.  
Although, it is quite clear from the literature reviews in the first part of this chapter 
that renewable energy technologies usually have positive impacts on human health, 
these healthier solutions have not always been chosen in the policy process. The 
second part of this chapter (from 3.2 to 3.6) will criticize the conventional policy 
assessment, which, consequently, leads to a number of suggestions for more 
appropriate policy assessment methods. These proposed assessments include a) the 
feasibility study and public regulation for innovation, b) strategic environmental 
assessment and c) institutional analysis based on Scott’s three main pillars. The 
insight gained from these sections will be applied to the analysis of strategic impact 
assessment (in Chapter 5 and 6) and the analysis of the institutional framework for 
healthy policy options (in Chapter 7) 
Since appropriate sustainable energy solutions depend very much on the local 
resource potentials, the last part of this chapter will provide the concise review of 
sustainable energy options in Thailand, which is necessary for identifying the suitable 
policy options for the Thai power sector in Chapter 5 and, later, compare it with the 
government’s and the utilities’ policy options in Chapter 6. 
3.1 Energy and Health Linkages 
Energy has certainly been one of the key factors in human development. It allows 
many people to enjoy unprecedented comfort, mobility, and productivity. In 
industrialized countries, people use more than 100 times as much energy, on a capita 
basis, than before humans learned to exploit the energy potential of fire.1  
However, the harvesting, processing, distribution and use of fuels and other sources of 
energy have major environmental consequences. Table 3.1 shows the human 
disruption index of various pollutants released into the environment by human 
activities. From this table, it is clear that energy systems significantly affect the 
cycling of important chemical species on the global scale, especially in terms of the 
carbon dioxide and sulphur emissions, which then, in turn, have led to a global 
climate change crisis. Obviously, the expansion of environmental impacts, which have 
grown from local perturbations to global disruptions, has been driven by a more than 
20-fold growth in the use of fossil fuels, and augmented by a tripling in the use of 
traditional energy sources such as biomass in the 20th century2.  
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Table 3.1  Environmental Damage Caused by Human Activities by Sector in the mid-
1990s 
Share of human disruption caused by Insult Human 
disruption 
index (a) 
Commercial Energy 
supply 
Other Main Source 
Lead emissions to 
atmosphere 
18 41% (fossil fuel 
burning, including 
additives 
59% (metal processing, 
manufacturing, refuse burning 
Oil added to oceans 10 44% (petroleum 
harvesting, 
processing and 
transport) 
56% (disposal of oil waste, 
including motor oil changes) 
Cadmium emissions to 
atmosphere 
5.4 13% (fossil fuel 
burning) 
70% (metals processing, 
manufacturing, refuse burning) 
12% (agricultural burning) 
Sulphur emissions to 
atmosphere 
2.7 85% (fossil fuel 
burning) 
13% (smelting refuse burning) 
Methane flow to 
atmosphere 
2.3 18% (fossil fuel 
harvesting and 
processing 
65% (rice paddies, domestic 
animals, land clearing) 
12% (landfill) 
Nitrogen fixation  
(as nitrogen oxide and 
ammonium) 
1.5 30% (fossil fuel 
burning) 
67% (fertilizer, agricultural 
burning) 
Mercury emissions to 
atmosphere 
1.4 20% (fossil fuel 
burning) 
77% (metals processing, 
manufacturing, refuse burning) 
Nitrous oxide flows to 
atmosphere 
0.5 12% (fossil fuel 
burning) 
80% (fertilizer, land clearing, 
aquifer disruption) 
8% (traditional fuel burning) 
Particulate emissions to 
atmosphere 
0.12 35% (fossil fuel 
burning) 
40% (agricultural burning) 
15% (smelting,  
non-agricultural land clearing, 
refuse burning) 
10% (traditional fuel burning) 
Non-methane 
hydrocarbon emissions to 
atmosphere 
0.12 35% (fossil fuel 
processing and 
burning) 
40% (agricultural burning) 
20% (non-agricultural land 
clearing, refuse burning) 
Carbon dioxide flows to 
atmosphere 
0.05(b) 75% (fossil fuel 
burning) 
15% (net deforestation for land 
clearing) 
Note: (a) The human disruption index is the ratio of human-generated flow to the 
natural (baseline) flow. (b) Although seemingly small, because of the long 
atmospheric lifetime and other characteristics of carbon dioxide, this slight imbalance 
in natural flow is causing a 0.4 percent annual increase in the global atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide. 
Source: Adapted from J.P.Holdren and K.R.Smith (2000, p.64). 
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 3.1.1 Human Health Effects 
Inevitably, human health is threatened both directly and indirectly by high levels of 
pollution and ecosystem degradation resulting from the harvesting, processing, 
distribution, and use of energy. According to the world energy assessment, the human 
health impacts of energy systems occur on all scales: household, workplace, 
community, regional, and global scales, as presented in Table 3.2. Fossil fuels, in 
particular, cause a range of human health impacts, from individual impacts on the 
health of coal miners to global impacts such as global climate change.  
 
Table 3.2 The Environmental and Health Impacts of Energy Systems, Classified by 
the Scales on Which They Occur and the Characteristics of Impacts. 
Scale Environmental Health Impacts 
(Direct Impacts) 
Ecosystem Health Impacts 
(Indirect Impacts) 
Household scale • Indoor air pollution from using 
solid fuels for cooking and 
heating 
• Inappropriate charcoal 
production and fuel wood 
harvesting 
Workplace scale • Significant risks for workers, 
due to injuries and poor 
working conditions including 
exposure to dust and 
radioactive materials.  
• Squalid living conditions of 
workers 
Community scale • Urban air pollution from fuel 
use 
• Stress from large population 
resettlement due to large-scale 
hydro power projects and risks 
of accidents related to nuclear 
power plants and their waste 
• Ecological damages from 
large-scale hydro power 
projects  
• Ecological damages from 
surface mining and squalid 
living conditions of workers  
Regional scale • Various human health impacts, 
especially respiratory diseases 
from fine particles, ozone, and 
nitrogen and sulphur emissions 
• Crop yield reduction due to 
the exposure of a high Ozone 
level 
• Damage of natural ecosystem 
and human-made structures 
from nitrogen and sulphur 
emissions 
Global scale • Global warming will expand 
the ranges of variety of 
diseases, including malaria, 
cholera, and dengue fever 
• Global warming will enhance 
the health impacts of certain 
air pollutants, which increases 
allergic responses and cardio-
respiratory disorders. 
• Global warming from 
greenhouse gas emissions 
will affect the food 
production and increase the 
frequency of extreme weather 
conditions and natural 
disaster.  
Source: Summarized from J.R. Holdren and K. R. Smith, 2000
3
.  
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Although indirect impacts are already included in the human health impacts presented 
in Table 3.2, those impacts still basically derive from the negative environmental 
changes. However, in reality, socio-economic factors within the energy system can 
also be an important determinant for health. WHO Europe-region stresses that energy 
affordability, efficiency, and fuel poverty have serious impacts on the health of the 
population in the region, especially in the case of the poor and disadvantaged groups 
within the society4. At the same time, the energy system can create more jobs within 
society, which may have a strong positive impact on health. 
Figure 3.1 Inter-Connections Between Health and Energy 
Driving 
Forces 
Population Growth and 
Economic development 
 Action 
    
Pressures Energy supply and demand 
 
 Global and regional 
energy strategies 
    
 
State 
 
Energy affordability, efficiency and 
fuel poverty 
Energy generation, transmission  
and distribution 
 National strategies: 
Financial and legal 
measures  
(energy price reform, 
subsidies on renewable 
sources, market 
penetration measures) 
    
Exposure Short term: 
Chemicals, heavy metals, ionizing and 
non-ionizing radiation through air, 
water and soil; coal and heat; lack of 
access to services and communication 
facilities; 
Long term: 
Climate change and trans-boundary 
air and water pollution 
 Technological 
improvement 
 
Exposure reduction 
measures 
 
Regulations to reduce 
environmental pollution 
    
Health Effects Cause of morbidity and mortality 
Respiratory diseases, 
Cardiovascular diseases, 
Intoxications, Injuries, 
Neurological and mental disorders, 
Allergic disorders, 
Genetic disorders, 
Cancer 
  
Health Impact 
Assessment  
 
Public information 
Source: WHO Europe, 2004
5
 
Based on the WHO’s DPSEEA model, WHO-Europe develops a systematic pathway 
of energy and health linkage, as shown in Figure 3.1. In this figure, population growth 
and economic development is perceived as the driving forces in this linkage, which 
create the pressures on energy supply and demand. Consequently, through the existing 
and new-coming institutions and conditions, the energy system will lead to the state of 
energy affordability, efficiency, and fuel poverty, and, at the same time, the state of 
energy generation, transmission, and distribution, including energy technological 
applications and organizations, within society. As a result of the good and bad state of 
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the energy system, the human exposures can be seen clearly both in the short run and 
in the longer term. Certainly, with the matters of scale, time, and personal conditions 
in mind, these exposures can, in the end, lead to the serious health problems, from 
respiratory diseases to cancer. 
The objective of developing this systematic pathway is to identify the potential 
actions at different levels, as shown at the right-hand side of Figure 3.1. The potential 
actions can be ranged from the global and regional energy strategies down to the 
release of public information on health impacts. In principle, the more upstream the 
actions, the more effective they are in terms of health protection and promotion. 
In this study, two main human health impacts will be highlighted; namely the health 
impacts of air pollutions and climate changes, which are now great concerns in Thai 
society.  
 3.1.2 Health Impacts of Air Pollution 
Human health impacts of the air pollution of energy systems have been highly evident 
in the last decades, though the quantified scales of impacts are somehow debatable. 
Moreover, the knowledge on human health impacts is still expanding in several areas, 
leading to more understanding and concerns over existing and future energy systems6. 
Through the acidification problem, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide is the most well-
known pollutants, which cause impacts on health. Both of them can cause respiratory 
system disorders with several symptoms and on different scales. SO2 can also link to 
cardio-vascular problems, low birth weight and increased risk of infant death. 
Children, elderly, and asthmatics are among the most vulnerable groups within 
society. 
Moreover, both SO2 and NOX can form a mixture of small solid particles and tiny 
sulfuric droplets. Combining with particulate matter which is directly emitted from 
the power plants, this fine particle becomes the serious concerns at the national and 
regional levels, since it can travel over long distances and, due to its small size, it can 
reach the blood system resulting in inflammation of the cardiac system. The 
inflammation of the cardiac system is the main cause of cardiac diseases, including 
heart attacks and strokes, leading to premature death. This particulate matter also links 
to low birth weight, premature birth, chronic airway obstruction and remodeling and 
sudden infant death. Again, children, elderly, children, and asthmatics are among the 
most vulnerable groups. 
The effects of ozone and mercury on human health are relatively new concerns. 
Ozone can create several respiratory system disorders and negative infant 
development. Mercury has strong negative developmental effects on infants, including 
poor performance in tests of the nervous system and learning abilities. In adults, 
mercury may affect blood pressure regulation and heart rate. Since, mercury 
emissions are deposited in watershed and transformed into methylmercury, which 
contaminates fish, the risk of mercury exposure is high to babies whose mothers have 
eaten contaminated fish during the pregnancy. In principle, pregnant women, children, 
and women of child-bearing age need to aviod mercury exposure, i.e. avoid eating 
contaminated fish. 
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Table 3.3 Health Effects of Power Plant Pollutants 
Pollutants What is it? How is it 
produced? 
Health effects Most 
Vulnerable 
populations 
Sulfur Dioxide 
(SO2) 
SO2 is a highly 
corrosive, 
invisible gas. 
Sulfur occurs 
naturally in fuels, 
especially coal 
and fuel oil 
SO2 is formed in the 
gases when fuel is 
burned. SO2 reacts 
with the air to form 
sulfuric acid, sulfates, 
and in combination 
with NOX, acidic 
particles 
Coughing, wheezing, 
shortness of breath, nasal 
congestion and 
inflammation.  
Make asthma worse.  
SO2 can de-stabilize 
heart rhythms.  
Low birth weight, 
increased risk of infant 
death 
Children and 
adults with 
asthma or other 
respiratory 
diseases. 
Nitrogen Oxide 
(NOX) 
A family of 
chemical 
compound 
including nitrogen 
oxide and 
nitrogen dioxide. 
NOX is formed in 
combustion process. In  
the atmosphere, NOX 
can convert to nitrates 
and form fine acidic 
particles. Reacts in the 
presence of sunlight to 
form ozone smog. 
NOX decreases lung 
function and is 
associated with 
respiratory diseases in 
children. Convert to 
ozone and acidic PM 
particle in the 
atmosphere. 
Elderly, children, 
astmatics 
Particulate 
Matter (PM) 
A mixture of 
small solid 
particles (soot) 
and tiny sulfuric 
acid droplets. 
Small particles 
are complex and 
harmful mixtures 
of sulfur, 
nitrogen, carbon, 
acids, metal, and 
airborne toxic. 
Directly emitted from 
fuel burning in power 
plants. 
Formed from SO2 and 
NOX in the 
atmosphere. 
PM crosses the lung into 
the blood circulation 
resulting in inflamation 
of the cardiac system, a 
root cause of cardiac 
disease including heart 
attack and stroke leading 
to premature death. 
PM exposure is also 
linked to low birth 
weight, premature birth, 
chronic airway 
obstruction and 
remodeling and sudden 
infant death. 
Elderly, children, 
asthmatics 
Ozone Ozone is a highly 
corrosive, 
invisible gas. 
Ozone is formed when 
NOX reacts with other 
pollutants in the 
presence of sunlight. 
Rapid shallow breathing, 
airway irritation, 
coughing, wheezing, 
shortness of breath. 
Make asthma worse. 
May be related to 
premature birth, cardiac 
birth defects, low birth 
weight and stunted lung 
growth 
Children, elderly, 
people with 
astma or other 
respiratory 
disease.  
People who 
exercise 
outdoors. 
Mercury A metal that 
occurs naturally 
in fuel, especially 
coal. 
Mercury is released 
when fuel is burned. 
Mercury emissions are 
deposited in watershed 
and transformed into 
methylmercury, which 
contaminate fish. 
Human exposure is 
primarily the result of 
the consumption of 
contaminated fish. 
Developmental effects 
on babies, who are born 
by women who ate 
contaminated fish while 
pregnant.  
Poor performance on test 
of nervous system and 
learning. In adults, it 
may affect blood 
pressure regulation and 
heart rate. 
Fetuses and 
children are 
directly at risk. 
Pregnant women, 
children, and 
women of child-
bearing age need 
to aviod mercury 
exposure. 
Source: Adapted from Schneider, 20047. 
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In the United States, a recent study show the health impacts of fine particle pollution 
of power plants. The study found that this fine particle pollution shortens the lives of 
nearly 24,000 people each year, including 2,800 due to lung cancer. Moreover, 
hundreds of thousands of Americans suffer each year from asthma attacks, cardiac 
problems, and respiratory problems associated with fine particles from power plants. 
These illnesses result in tens of thousands of emergency room visits, hospitalizations, 
and lost work days each year. The study also found that the elderly, children, and 
people suffering from respiratory diseases are most severely affected by the fine 
particle pollution. People who live in metropolitan areas near coal-fired power plants 
are highly and acutely affected, and their attributable death rate is much higher than 
the rates in areas with few or no coal-fired power plants8.  
In Thailand, there is no comprehensive and quantitative study like this. However, 
Thailand has an obvious experience in the case of the Mae Moh lignite-fired power 
plant, as ealier shown in Chapter 1. The air pollution from the power plant and other 
impacts of lignite mining have caused severe environmental and health problems 
around the mining and power plant area. Local people suffer from respiratory system 
disorders, including premature death9. In 2004, the court ruled EGAT to pay a 
compensation to the local affected people. In the same year, the Thai government also 
decided to relocate 4,000 villagers from the area after 10 years of local campaign for 
new healthy places of living 10. 
 
 3.1.3 Health Impacts of Global Climate Change 
Apart from air pollution, another emerging and expanding concern on human health 
impacts is the climate change problem. Figure 3.2 outlines the connection between 
climate change and human health. Based on this figure, population dynamics and 
unsustainble economic development lead to higher greenhouse gas emissions. The 
greenhouse gas emissions constitute the main cause for climate and weather changes 
on global and regional scales. The state of undesirable changes can be seen in terms of 
heatwaves, extreme weather, temperature, and precipitation. These weather changes 
can have human health effects through four main ways; namely the changes of the 
microbial contamination pathways, disease transmission dynamics, the deterioration 
of agro-ecosystem hydrology, and socio-economic and demographic changes. These 
four main ways may then have several health impacts, as presented in the right-hand 
side of the figure. 
In Thailand, the great concerns are identified in three main areas; 
• Extreme weather-related health effects; Thailand is now obviously 
facing an increase in weather-related natural disasters both in terms of 
scale and frequency. Flooding, landslide mudding, drought, and forest fire 
have increased throughtout the last decade11. Since Thailand still lacks 
coping capacities, both at the national and local levels, the increase in 
extreme weather events will lead to significantly negative impacts on 
health. 
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Figure 3.2 Climate Change and Health: Pathway from Driving Forces, through 
Exposures to Potential Health Impacts 
Source: Adapted from McMichael et al, 200312. 
 
• Vector-borne diseases; Although, in general, conditions of infectious 
diseases have improved in the last three decades, the vector-borne diseases 
are still the great concern in Thai society. Malaria and dengue are the most 
important diseases in the south-east asian countries in general and in 
Thailand in particular. A small increase in temperature can greatly increase 
the risk of malaria transmission. In terms of dengue, the increased rainfall 
in many locations can affect the vector density and transmission density. In 
Viet Nam, there is an evidence that the number of dengue cases increased 
in the year of El Niño13. Although, no specific study has been conducted 
on the relationship between climate change impacts and these diseases, the 
increasing appearance of cases in recent years should be sufficient to raise 
public concern on this issue. 
• Effect on food and water shortage; 60% of the Thai population still base 
their livelihoods, mainly or partly, on the agricultural sector. Although 
Thailand is one of the greatest food exporters in the world, some of the 
Thai people are still facing a food security problem. Combined with the 
deforestation and increasing demand for water in the industrial and urban 
sectors, water shortage is also more prominent in these recent years, 
leading to great impacts on agricultural production, food security, and 
conflicts over access and control of water resources14. Therefore, the 
climate change impacts on food and water shortage can greatly affect the 
health and well-being of the Thai population.  
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Apart from these three areas, the air-pollution-related health effects and temperature-
related illness (including mental disorders) can also be a future serious impact for the 
Thai population, especially for those who live in the big cities and industrial areas. 
However, the information on these effects are still lacking in the country.  
 3.1.4 Sustainable Energy and Positive Health Impacts 
If sustainable energy means “energy produced and used in the ways that support 
human development over the long term in all its social, economic and environmental 
dimensions,” sustainable energy systems must support both human and ecosystem 
health over the long term15. Therefore, due to their environmental disruptions and 
human health impacts, it is clear that current energy systems fail to meet this 
definition. As stated in Agenda 21, “Much of the world energy is currently produced 
and consumed in the ways that could not be sustained if technology were to remain 
constant and overall quantities were to increase substantially”16. 
The Extern-E project, which was later quoted by WHO-Europe, provides important 
information on human health impacts of different power technologies. As shown in 
Figure 3.3, years of life loss from acute and chronic mortality from air pollution are 
high in the conventional fossil-fuel technologies (except natural gas). Obviously, 
renewable technologies, especially wind, PV and hydro power, provide power with 
much lower negative impacts on human health. Concurrently, occupation accidents 
(death per TWH) are very high in coal and lignite cycles for power generation, as 
presented in Figure 3.4. In this aspect, renewable energy can also significantly reduce 
occupational accidents. As summarized in Table 3.4, renewable energy technologies 
have positive impacts on human health both in direct and indirect ways. Among 
renewable technologies, wind and solar energy technologies seem to be the most 
desiarable technologies in a health perspective. 
It is essential to recognize that the use of renewable energy provides opportunities for 
achieving benefits on more than one scale. In other words, if renewable energy and 
energy efficiency can reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, especially for those who 
use these fuels for transportation or power generation of large negative health impacts, 
significant improvements can be made at the local, national, regional, and global 
levels. As stated in the world energy assessment17, “with greenhouse gas reduction 
targets on the order of 10-20 percent, the scale of emissions of health damaging 
pollutants and associated reduction of ill health could lead to the same range or 
somewhat higher-perhaps a 250,000-750,000 annual reduction in premature death 
world-wide.” However, to achieve these mutual benefits, the energy, environmental 
and human health linkages must be stressed and become an integral part of energy and 
environmental assessment.  
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Figure 3.3 Years of Life Lost from acute and chronic air pollution effects per TWH 
by different power technologies 
 
Source: CIMAT, 1998 quoted by WHO-Europe, 2004. 
 
Figure 3.4 Occupational accidents (death per TWH) by Different Power Technologies 
 
Source: CIMAT, 1998 quoted by WHO-Europe, 2004. 
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Table 3.4 Summary of Health Impacts of the Different Forms of Electrical Power 
Generation 
 
Source: WHO-Europe, 200418. 
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3.2 Conventional Assessments and the Missing Link 
As mentioned earlier, this section concerns the limitation of conventional economic 
and environmental management approaches to link sustainable energy with its health 
and environmental benefits in decision-making processes.  
 3.2.1 Conventional Project Assessment Tools 
Currently, there are two main conventional assessments which have been used for 
justifying any energy development project: cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and 
environmental impact assessment (EIA). CBA attempts to compare the financial 
benefits and costs of a project to the project owner, as well as socio-economic benefits 
and costs to the whole society. EIA focuses on anticipating and analyzing 
environmental impacts derived from specific energy projects and providing mitigation 
plans to prevent such impacts.  
Unfortunately, these two important tools are typically used independently of each 
other. Normally, the CBA, which is often conducted at an early stage, does not 
include the external costs identified in the EIA. Therefore, the critical links between 
environmental aspects and energy aspects are often missing in CBA.  
Furthermore, these two conventional approaches are limited in analyzing long-term 
energy strategy, since they always apply to decision-making at the project level. 
Therefore, they do not cover overall or cumulative environmental impacts, such as 
climate change or acid deposition, which are the result of the cumulative long-term 
impacts of several energy projects. More importantly, selecting the most suitable 
energy technologies for society is not like catalog shopping. Sustainable energy 
technologies need time, investment, and the creation of appropriate institutional 
frameworks for their research, development, and application. Economic and 
environmental assessments need to go beyond the project level to focus more on long-
term policy alternatives. 
 3.2.2 Conventional Sectoral Assessment Tool 
At the sectoral policy level, the main conventional approaches to energy planning are 
least-cost utility planning (LCUP) and integrated resource planning (IRP), which were 
primarily developed for use by energy utilities. The LCUP focuses mainly on 
optimizing the economics of energy production, transmission, and distribution, 
without consideration for the environment.  Conversely, since the objective of the IRP 
is to minimize the socio-economic expenses of energy systems, the IRP includes 
environmental impacts in its analysis.  
However, in practice IRP is better suited for relatively short-term sub-optimization 
rather than long-term general planning of sustainable energy development19. This is 
mainly because: (a) due to its short-term and least-cost focus, it does not leave room 
for technologies under development; therefore, (b) most renewable energy resources 
are not included in IRP; and (c) its lack of consideration for institutional, 
organizational, and behavioral aspects does not allow for the fundamental changes 
which are required for a transition to sustainable energy. Therefore, “IRP is not worth 
very much in the long term. The power producers ought to focus their strength on 
Integrated Perspective Planning, extending 40-50 years into the future.”20. 
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 3.2.3 Conventional Time Frame and Priority 
This conclusion leads to another important weakness of conventional approaches at 
both the project and sectoral levels: time frame and time priority. Since the 
investments in energy systems are capital intensive, highly asset specific, and have 
very long technical lifetimes (often 20 to 40 years), the costs of the historic 
investment, which are built into the present technological systems, have a significant 
influence upon the way in which one should invest to reach the goals of energy 
systems of the future21. As often seen in economic assessments, the low short-term 
marginal costs of existing technologies always impede the penetration of new 
technological solutions, which need to generate adequate returns to cover their long-
term marginal costs. Therefore, if economic assessment performs an analysis with a 
rather short time horizon without including the long-term replacement of capital costs 
of existing technical and organizational systems, good solutions which are relatively 
independent of existing technical systems cannot be found and no strategic 
development of energy systems can be achieved.  
Furthermore, in conventional economic assessment, high interest rates, which are 
usually applied in order to discount the future benefits and costs into present values, 
will often devalue the future benefits of sustainable energy, as well as the external 
environmental costs of fossil fuel-based technologies. This is why the huge future 
benefits of renewable energy have always been evaluated as being much lower, in 
present value terms, than their high investment costs.  
According to the basic assumptions in the theory of investment analysis, the 
investments should be comparable over a relevant time horizon. Therefore, when 
dealing with energy technologies using different rates of scarce resources and having 
different levels of environmental impacts, a market rate of 5-7% is problematic in 
assessing the socio-economic feasibility of long-term energy investment. With the rate 
of 7%, the future environmental costs and benefits will be discounted to less than 10% 
of their value within 35 years. In other words, after 35 years, future environmental 
benefits and costs, like long-term global climate change, will mean almost nothing in 
a conventional economic assessment. Hvelplund and Lund suggest that, to counteract 
this time priority bias, when comparing investments with different levels of pollution 
and use of scarce resources, a much lower interest rate (0 to 3%) must be used22. 
 3.2.4 Conventional Single Purpose Planning 
Last, in the conventional approach, the goals of energy planning focus mainly on 
utility costs and system reliability to support national economic growth, while in 
reality, the energy system development can lead to various long-term national or 
human development goals.  
For example, investments in sustainable energy systems can create jobs and increase 
the national income. The development of renewable energy can stimulate 
technological progress and reduce the import burden of the country. The use of 
biomass and biofuels can increase the demand for agricultural products, thus raising 
farm product prices, and leading to decreased poverty and income inequality within 
the country. As mentioned earlier, renewable energy can also reduce environmental 
and health risks, leading to better long-term human development.  
In other words, sustainable energy development provides benefits not only to the 
energy sector, but also to other economic and social sectors, including health, 
agriculture, and natural resource management. Concurrently, as mentioned earlier, the 
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negative impacts of various existing energy technologies also occur across the 
traditional borders of these sectors.  
Therefore, energy assessment and planning is not an exercise for the energy sector 
alone, as usually seen in the conventional approach. It is also clear that limiting the 
analysis to single purpose planning, as seen in a conventional approach, will not fully 
recognize the linkages of energy, socio-economic environment and human health. 
Energy planning should be conducted as an intersectoral policy assessment, with 
participation and analysis of different stakeholders. Otherwise, the potential benefits 
and costs of different energy technologies and development paths may be overlooked. 
 
3.3 Feasibility Study and Public Regulation for Innovation 
To overcome the hindrances of the conventional approach, Hvelplund and Lund have 
developed the new feasibility and public regulation assessment to support radical 
technological changes, where the changes in instutional, organizational and profit-
sharing schemes must be involved, such as the development of renewable energy23.  
The core idea of this new approach is a) to link the feasibility study with the existing 
societal goals and relevant micro and macro institutional contexts and b) to change 
micro and macro institutional contexts in the directions that allow the benefits of 
radical technological development to be fully realized. In other words, this approach 
aims to create space or mechanism for innovative democracy, where society has the 
real “freedom of choice” between different technologies and organizational scenarios 
on the policy-making stage. 
 
 3.3.1 Radical Technological Change 
Feasibility studies or economic assessment of energy planning should include both the 
design of technically feasible alternatives, and an evaluation of the social, 
environmental and economic costs of those alternatives. When performing feasibility 
studies of new technologies such as energy conservation, small CHP plants and 
renewable energy, one must emphasize the character of radical technological 
change24. 
In the power sector, the alternatives to uranium-, large coal-, oil-, and gas-fired power 
plants are electricity conservation, renewable energy and cogeneration technologies. 
Hvelplund has identified the main differences between these new “sunrise” 
technologies, and the old “sunset” technologies as presented in Table 3.5 below25. 
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Table 3.5 Institutional characteristics of the “Sunset” and “Sunrise” technologies. 
Old techniques 
 “Sunset technologies” 
New techniques 
 “Sunrise technologies” 
1) Based upon a high level of fossil fuel 
and uranium consumption. 
(1) Based upon energy conservation, 
renewable energy and integrated efficient 
energy supply systems.  
2) Technical solutions are not 
contextually adaptable. 
(2) Technical solutions differ from place 
to place. 
3) Implementation in single purpose 
organisations. 
(3) Implementation in multipurpose 
organisations. 
(4) Sectored energy systems. (4) Integrated energy systems. 
(5) High degree of asset specificity; long 
technical lifetime, high capital costs and 
large strong organisations.  
(5) High asset specificity, medium long 
technical lifetime, moderately strong 
organisations. 
(6) Historically strong from financial and 
political points of view. 
(6) Historically weak from financial and 
political points of view. 
(7) Mostly using known techniques. (7) Often demand new techniques. 
(8) Often linked to existing knowledge. (8) Often require new knowledge. 
(9) Often based upon existing 
organisations. 
(9) Often require new organisations. 
Source: Adapted from Hvelplund, 2001 
 
These different characteristics are presented in various aspects of technological 
development. They do not differ only in technical basis, but also in knowledge, and 
organizational basis, including the way they earn the profit. According to Hvelplund, 
these differences indicate that the new technologies do not fit well into the 
organisation of the old fossil fuel and uranium technologies; which means that the 
organisations linked to these old technologies will be badly equipped to compete in 
the arena of the new technologies. 
 
 3.3.2 Micro Institutional Context (Analysis of Value-Added Structure) 
Consequently, Hvelplund suggests that one might expect heavy organisational 
resistance from the old technologies against the new technologies. He proved this 
assumption by analyzing 25 years of experiences of Danish Energy Policy and 
Development with the emphasis on the value-added changes of old and new 
organisations, when participating in this radical technological change, as presented in 
Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5 The change in value-added profile connected to the change from uranium 
and fossil fuel, to renewable energy and energy conservation systems.  
Source: Hvelplund 200126. 
 
From Figure 3.5, the changes in the value-added chain from old technology (figures 
based on coal-fired power plant) to the renewable energy and conservation (REC) 
technologies (figures based on wind energy) can be clearly seen within two main 
areas27: 
a. In the REC value-added chain, the fossil fuel value-added part has 
disappeared, and is replaced by investment in renewable energy capital 
equipment. 
b. In the REC value-added chain, the power production value-added part in a 
specific direct electricity supply system organisation has been replaced by 
“renewable energy system automation”, where it is probable that the 
maintenance, at least at the decentralised and consumer levels, will be 
performed by the suppliers of the wind turbines, the photovoltaic cells, the 
hydrogen production system, the electricity battery charging system, etc. 
The need for a specific power production organisation might decrease or 
disappear, as the day to day work on a power plant has been replaced by 
automatons requiring maintenance from, for instance, the wind turbine 
factory. 
It is naturally possible that the existing power company organisations will take over 
the maintenance of the renewable energy automatons, especially those connected with 
the large renewable energy plants, like off-shore wind farms. But even in this case, the 
added value directly linked to the power sector will only be halved compared to the 
present day28. 
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According to Hvelplund, as a consequence of (a) and (b), the direct electricity supply 
system organisation might reduce its size until it only consists of the transmission 
organisation and the distribution network organisation. In his estimation, in case of 
the Danish electricity system, the value added would be decreased from around 27% 
to around 18% of the electricity price29. 
 3.3.3 Macro Institutional Context  
With this analysis, Hvelplund concludes that, due to their inevitable loss of value 
added and the competitive disadvantage of moving towards the new technologies, the 
old technology industries would organize resistance against the development of new 
technologies. Since the old techonology industries are historically strong from 
financial and political points of view, this organized resistance cannot simply ignore 
sustainable energy planning and development. Therefore, “the political system should 
be aware that a green innovation policy would meet systematic resistance from the old 
uranium and fossil fuel companies”. 
To cope with the resistance, Hvelplund further suggests the process of “political 
liberalization”. This process can also be termed a “bottom up-top down-bottom 
action” process, which has nothing to do with a rigid central planning technique, but 
is more of an open-up procedure by means of which grassroots organisations, the 
general public, and local heat companies by parliamentary intervention are given the 
opportunity to introduce and implement innovations in the energy field. 
 
Figure 3.6 “Green innovation” and political liberalisation 
Source: Hvelplund, 2006. 
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In box (1), the discourse regarding goals and norms is performed. 
In box (2), the discourse regarding the realistic technical scenarios is carried 
through. 
In box (3), the discussion regarding concrete institutional reforms is taken. 
In box (4), the discussion with regard to the design of political institutions is of 
importance. 
In boxes (4a and 4b) the design of the information and resource balance 
between lobbyists is linked to the old uranium and fossil fuel interests (4a), 
and the lobbyists are presented who are economically independent from the 
interests of the uranium and fossil fuel companies. 
From the Danish experience, Hveluplund concludes, that if the parliamentarians want 
to have different political scenarios to chose in between, they must establish a 
resource and information balance between the economically dependent and the 
economically independent lobbyists. The establishment of this balance is essential, if 
a successful transformation from uranium and fossil fuel technologies to energy 
conservation and renewable energy technologies should be fulfilled. According to 
Hvelplund, the institutions constituting this balance can be  the institutions of 
political liberalisation. 
They are for instance: 
• The presence or establishment of independent research units, for instance 
independent universities, which have the freedom and the resources 
required to design technical scenarios which are independent of the present 
central administration and the large energy companies.  
• Extensive openness of information both with regard to public plans and the 
cost and capacity structure of existing energy plants.  
• The establishment of independent energy offices and test centres, which 
can give advises to the public regarding the possibilities and potentials of 
energy conservation and renewable energy.  
• Supply public funds to institutions, where the board is independent of the 
old fossil fuel interests.  
If these “political liberalisation” reforms are introduced and persistently secured, the 
public and the parliamentarians will get the “freedom of choice” between different 
technological and organisational scenarios on the energy stage. This is termed the 
process of innovative democracy. 
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3.3.4 The Applications of Feasibility Studies and Public Regulation for 
Innovation 
To facilitate the policy discussions within innovative democracy, Hvelplund and Lund 
suggest that the feasibility studies should be carried out within the present macro and 
micro institutional contexts, not just the calculation of costs and benefits as is usually 
the procedure of mainstream economic analysis.  
In their view, Socioeconomic feasibility studies and Public Regulation analysis 
should30: 
• perform analyses with a very long time horizon, in order to find the best 
solutions relatively independent of existing technical systems. 
• relate to the specific goals of organizations or society. Therefore, the goals 
must be made explicit and open. If the organizational goals include 
demands for technological innovation, job creation, national independence, 
and environmental sustainability, then the feasibility study should focus on 
the effects of these areas. 
• analyze the bindings of existing technical systems. This is particularly 
important in cases in which the existing energy system has an overcapacity. 
A system with overcapacity tends to result in either energy prices close to 
the short term marginal costs, or pressure from the energy companies upon 
the political process, urging the politicians to protect the existing energy 
companies from the competition of newer technologies. 
• analyze the links between the economy of a project and future changes in 
the technical energy system. For example, if we are dealing with an energy 
conservation plan, what impact would a period of overcapacity have upon 
our plan? This is called “a technical sensibility analyses”. 
• analyze the links between the economy of the project and the legislation 
needed to make it feasibile. For example, what happens if CO2 taxation is 
introduced? What happens if the rules assuring the right to sell electricity to 
the public grid are abolished? This is called “an institutional sensibility 
analyses”. 
• analyze the links between the above institutional sensibility analysis and the 
political process. For example, which agents on the energy market have the 
financial and political motivation to “kill” newcomer technologies? Are 
there counter forces which can support the newcomer technologies? How 
can the political balance of power on the energy stage be described?  Which 
political scenarios can be developed, and what effect will they have upon 
our project? This is called “a political sensibility analyses”. 
• be aware of the asymmetry of financial power between the old fossil fuel-
based technologies and the new energy conservation technologies. Often 
public regulation measures will not require subsidies for the new 
technologies, but just equal terms with regard to financial possibilities, by 
removing the capital advantages of the existing energy companies. 
• be aware of the imbalance in political power between the old fossil fuel-
based technologies and the new energy conservation technologies. Often it 
is necessary to create organizations within research, price and monopoly 
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control, advisory committees and funding, which are totally independent of 
the established fossil fuel companies.   
In this study, the application of this line of thought will be used a) for analyzing 
policy-making processes in Chapter 4, b) for analyzing Thailand’s societal goals and 
their relevant impact indicators which should be used for comparing different policy 
options in the policy process in Chapter 5, and c) for analyzing existing institutional 
and public regulation frameworks in Chapter 7. 
 
3.4 Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) 
As mentioned in the previous section, radical technological changes require an 
establishment of resource and information balance. Obviously, environmental and 
health consequences of different power technologies as seen in the first section 
constitute one of the most essential information balances that needs to be drawn in the 
policy process, especially when the concept of healthy public policy is emphasized. 
To provide an information balance on the impacts of different policy options in the 
Thai power sector, strategic environmental assessment (SEA) will be applied in this 
study. 
 
 3.4.1 Concept and General Application   
SEA shares its original roots and common principles with EIA tools, which are 
normally applied to projects. However, instead of being used at the end of the 
decision-making cycle, with a limited number of feasible alternatives, the idea is to 
use SEA on earlier stages, when a wide range of potential alternatives can be 
considered. SEA focuses on a sustainability agenda and uses sources of environmental 
degradation, rather than focusing on a standard agenda and treating symptoms of 
environmental degradation. Unlike EIA, SEA uses a broad perspective with a low 
level of details to provide a vision and overall framework31. The key differences 
between SEA and EIA are shown in Table 3.6 
The word “strategy” in SEA implies visions that look beyond existing facts. It also 
implies a long-term perspective, with objectives to be achieved in that time period. It 
identifies a roadmap or possible pathway that enables the achievement of these 
objectives within the long-range time frame32. In other words, SEA, including in this 
study, provides an assessment of an action plan that will enable the achievement of 
vision and shared objectives. 
The application of SEA has been expanded dramatically during the 1990s. The EU 
and countries such as China, South Africa and Canada have established legal 
provisions for SEA. To fit within diverse decision-making processes, the applications 
of SEA vary from place to place and from one case to another33.   
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Table 3.6 Key Differences Between SEA and EIA 
Aspects SEA EIA 
Nature of action Strategy, vision, concepts Construction/operational actions 
Level of decision Policy, planning, programming Mainly project 
Focus Strategic choices or decisions 
about “doing the right things” 
Project decisions about  
“doing things right” 
Issues Territory-wide sustainability 
issues, conflicts between 
objectives 
Impacts of projects; community 
specific 
Time Scales Long to medium Medium to short 
Assessment Fuzzy but important judgment or 
educated guess; qualitative and 
semi-quantitative 
More quantitative and specific 
Relation to decision Facilitator Evaluator, often only to meet 
administrative requirement 
Post-evaluation Other Strategic actions or project 
planning 
Objective evidence from 
construction and operation 
Source: Adapted from Au (2003)34 and Partidario (2003)35 
SEA can apply to sector-specific plans and programs, spatial and land use planning, 
regional development programs, natural resource management strategies, international 
and development assistance, legislative and regulatory bills, and investment and 
lending activities. The forms of SEA which are most relevant to sustainable energy 
planning are policy EA and sectoral planning SEA36. In general, there are five key 
elements in the SEA process37:  
• Vision: In the SEA process, sustainability frameworks of each case or 
each society must be reviewed. The review of sustainability frameworks 
leads to a shared set of strategic objectives and goals, which are used as 
benchmarks in each SEA process. At this stage, all sustainable 
development aspects (i.e., social, economic, environmental, and health 
aspects) have been included and well intergrated. 
• Options: SEA aims to facilitate the identification of development options 
and alternative proposals that are more suitable. Thus, in SEA processes, 
different policy and technological options to meet sustainable frameworks 
have to be reviewed, analyzed, discussed, and developed in participatory 
and transparent ways.    
• Analysis or Appraisals: At this stage, it is very important that the scoping 
of the sustainability assessment should be clearly defined for all 
stakeholders. The appraisals of options and policies should be done 
through the participatory process with independent and public review.  
This ensures a good policy combination according to sustainability 
frameworks, objectives, and indicators. 
• Actions: Action is needed to facilitate the decision-making process by 
providing the necessary information, at the right time and in a quick, short 
and readable format. Action also requires the determination of the chain of 
events and institutional frameworks required to promote sustainable 
solutions in practice. It is important to establish targets and indicators for 
follow-up and evaluation of proposed policy actions. 
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• Participation: SEA has to inform and involve interested and affected 
public and government bodies throughout the decision-making process. It 
has to explicitly address their inputs and concerns in SEA documentation 
and decision-making. To facilitate their meaningful participation, SEA has 
to provide clear, easily understood information requirements and ensure 
sufficient access to all relevant information. 
Based on these five key elements, Figure 3.7 presents an example of the SEA process 
and its interconnection with sectoral planning process. Within this process, the 
benefits of sustainable energy development will be clearly seen and highlighted, by 
connecting them to the national development vision. Then, all sustainable energy 
options will be analyzed to find the best ways to meet the national development goals 
over the long-term. Finally, all the benefits and opportunities of sustainable energy 
development will be translated into a policy document and action plan for public 
decision-making. 
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Sectoral Planning Process  SEA Process 
 Inputs and  
Area of Discussion 
 
National Development Vision 
(Society’s Vision) 
 Vision 
 
 
  
National Development 
Objectives, Targets, and 
Indicators 
 Identification of sustainability 
objectives, targets, and 
indicators 
 
 
  
Option Development and 
Selection 
 Sustainability scoping 
 
 
  
Policy Development and 
Preparation of Policy Document 
 Appraisal of Options 
 
 
  
Assessment of Policy Documents 
and Modification 
 Appraisal of Policies 
 
 
  
Decision-making  SEA Review and Report 
 
 
 
  
Implementation and Monitoring 
 
 Integration of Indicators and 
targets for Monitoring 
 
 
  
Review and Evaluation 
Leading to new planning process 
 SEA Review and Evaluation 
 
Figure 3.7 An Example of Interconnection Between SEA and Sectoral Planning 
Process, which can be applied to sustainable energy planning. 
Source: Adapted from Partidario, 2003b. 
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3.4.2 SEA and Decision-making Processes 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 and this chapter, the relationship between impact 
assessment and policy processes is crucial to the effectiveness of SEA contributions. 
Partadario summarizes the four models of relationship between SEA and decision-
making processes, as shown in Figure 3.8 and discussed below38. 
• Standard EIA-based model. This model refers to the totally separate 
processes between SEA and decision-making. The connection between 
these two processes is only present when the SEA report is finalized and 
presented to decision-makers or stakeholders in the decision-making 
process. In practice, the main problem of this model is that the decision-
makers do not pay enough attention to SEA report, because, normally, they 
already have a solution in their minds (or even in action). Moreover, 
submitting a report is also far from being a sufficient effort to encourage 
stakeholders to deliberately consider the issue and to take serious action. 
• Standard SEA parallel model. The second model is still influenced from 
the standard EIA process, but with the attempt to have more interactions 
between SEA and the decision-making process. However, the interactions 
are basically determined by the perspective of the SEA process. In other 
words, this is an attempt to create a standard SEA process for all policy 
issues. The main problem is that, normally, each policy sector has its own 
policy process, style, and context. Thus, in reality, it is difficult to develop 
one standard SEA process which fits all. 
• Fully integrated model. This third model is completely different from the 
first two models in the sense that it is fully integrated into the decision-
making process. This is mainly because this model was first developed as a 
planning tool, not for an environmental protection procedure. Although, 
logically, this model can lead to better chances in influencing the decision-
making process, it can oppositely raise a question about transparency and 
accountability, especially when it is done in very closed ways and 
decision-makers already have a solution in their minds. 
• Decision-centered model. The last model was also first developed as a 
planning tool. However, unlike the previous model, the SEA process is not 
fully combined in the decision-making process. The distinction between 
these two processes is clear, but the individual SEA process is designed to 
fit and have a strong relationship with the decision-making process (which 
is opposite to the standard SEA parallel model). By this way, to design an 
effective SEA process, it is very important to analyze the decision-making 
process and search for critical points so that SEA can contribute some 
insights to the decision-making process. Thus, SEA is more likely to be a 
process of continuous communication which needs to be readjusted along 
the decision-making process. On one hand, in practice, this model provides 
flexibility for both SEA and decision-making processes. On the other 
hand, it can also be a quite complicated and demanding process.  
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Figure 3.8 The Four Models of Relationship between SEA and the 
Decision-making Process 
Source: Adapted from Partadario 200339 
Model 1 Standard EIA-based Model 
Decision 
P
SEA Process
SEA Report 
Model 2 Standard SEA Parallel 
Model (One SEA process fit all 
decision process) 
Decision 
P
SEA Process 
Model 4 Decision-centered Model 
(SEA is tailor-made for each decision 
and shapes forms/process) 
Decision 
P
SEA Process 
Model 3 Fully Integrated Model  
Decision 
P
SEA Process
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3.4.3 The Applications to this study 
In this study, SEA is mainly used for providing the essential information on strategic 
impacts of different policy options in the Thai power sector. In other words, it is part 
of the operational concepts of deliberative and innovatiave democracy, according to 
which the economic, environmental, social, and health consequences of a policy 
decision will be better realized and discussed within society. The detailed elaboration 
on how SEA will be applied in this study will be presented in Chapter 5, where the 
strategic impact analysis of this study will be comprehensively explained. 
 
3.5 Institutional Analysis in Three Main Pillars 
The concepts of feasibility study and public regulation for innovation emphasize the 
importance of institutional frameworks for public policy processes and the necessity 
to create new institutional frameworks to facilitate a radical technological 
development. However, this approach does not provide an insight into how 
institutional frameworks have been formed and firmed. Therefore, a framework for 
institutional analysis must be provided in order to understand how the changes may or 
may not occur at the institutional level. 
Scott provides the insightful notion that regulative systems, normative systems, and 
cultural-cognitive systems are the vital ingredient of institutions40. According to 
Hoffman, “these three elements form a continuum moving from the conscious to 
unconscious, from the legal enforced to the take for granted”41. Therefore, it is 
possible to view these three elements “as contributing in interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing ways” to a powerful social framework42.  
 3.5.1 Three Pillars of Institutions 
According to Scott, the progress in institutional analysis can be made “by 
distinguishing among several component elements and identifying their different 
underlying assumptions, mechanisms, and indicators”43. Therefore, he suggests us to 
understand the differences of three pillars of institutions, namely regulative, 
normative, and cognitive pillars, as shown in Table 3.7. 
• Regulative Pillar: Since institutions constrain and regularize behavior, the 
regulative pillar refers to the regulative aspect of institutions. In his 
concept, “regulatory processes involve the capacity to establish rules, 
inspect others’ conformity to them, and as necessary, manipulate sanctions 
–rewards or punishments- in an attempt to influence future behavior”. 
According to North, institutions consist of both formal written rules as 
well as typical unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and supplement 
formal rules44. The focus of the analysis at this level is how regulative 
institutions function and how they interact with other institutional 
elements45. 
• Normative Pillar: The emphasis of the normative pillar “is placed on 
normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory 
dimension into social life”46. Normative dimensions include both values 
and norms. Values refer to “conceptions of the preferred or the desirable, 
together with the construction of standards to which existing structures or 
behaviors can be compared and assessed”47, while “norms specify how 
things should be done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued 
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ends”48. Therefore, in Scott’s view, the normative pillar defines goals or 
objectives but also designates appropriate ways to pursue them. In other 
words, normative systems both impose constraints on social behavior and, 
at the same time, empower and enable social action49. Normative pillars 
confer “rights as well as responsibilities, privilege as well as duties, license 
as well as mandates”50. 
• Cultural-cognitive pillar: the centrality of the cultural-cognitive pillar is 
the constitution of social reality and the frames through which meaning is 
made51. In the cultural-cognitive dimension, every human institution is a 
sedimentation of meanings or a crystallization of meaning in objective 
form52. The cultural-cognitive dimension recognizes that internal 
interpretive processes are shaped by an external cultural framework. In this 
view, “compliance occurs in many circumstances because other types of 
behavior are inconceivable” and “the routines are followed because they 
are taken for granted as the way we do these things”53. Therefore, cultural-
cognitive analysis focuses on the understanding of “cognitive containers in 
which social interests are defined and classified, argued, negotiated, and 
fought out”54. 
Table 3.7 Three Pillars of Institutions 
Pillar Characteristics 
Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Basis of Compliances Expedience Social Obligation Taken-for-grantedness
Shared understanding 
Basic of order Regulative rules Binding 
expectations 
Constitutive schema 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules 
Laws 
Sanctions 
Certifications 
Accreditation 
Common belief 
Shared logic of action 
Basis of legitimacy Legally 
sanctioned 
Morally governed  Comprehensible  
Recognizable 
Culturally Supported 
Source: Scott, 2001. p.52. 
 
 3.5.2 The Application to this Study 
This study found that the concept of three pillars of institutions is very useful for 
analyzing institutional frameworks in Chapter 7. The approach highlights the 
connection between the cognitive, normative and regulative levels, which provides a 
better understanding of the different existing and proposed institutions contested in 
the Thai power sector. In this view, different institutions will be analyzed in 
connection to their policy discourses (as a cognitive dimension), their normative 
judgments, and the existing and alternative rules and regulations, in Chapter 7.  
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3.6 Potentials for Sustainable Energy Solutions in Thailand 
This section provides the overall picture of the potential of sustainable energy 
solutions in Thailand, the present situation, and the Thai government’s target for 
renewable energy development. This section will be divided by each main renewable 
source, the overall picture, and the energy conservation, which can be part of healthier 
energy solutions in the Thai power sector.  
 
3.6.1 Biomass Resources 
Thailand has abundant biomass resources. Rice, sugar, palm oil, and wood-related 
industries constitute the main potential biomass energy resources. According to the 
Department of Alternative Energy Development and Energy Conservation (DEDE), 
an estimated 64.5 million tons of agricultural and wood residuals are produced each 
year in Thailand (Table 3.8). Presently, most of these residues are disposed of through 
open burning and dumping, except for bagasse, rice husk, fiber and shell of palm oil, 
and shell of coconut. In total, only 16 million tons (25% of total residues) is used for 
energy production, at the present. The remaining biomass resources, which can be 
used for energy purposes, is about 42 million tons, which equals 605 PJ or 2.5 times 
higher than the present biomass used for energy purposes. Later, DEDE also 
estimated the unused potential of all agricultural residuals, as shown in Table 3.9, and 
found that the overall resource potential of biomass is equal to 721,935.9 TJ or 9,630 
MW in terms of electric power. 
However, not all resource potentials are be commercially viable, especially with the 
regard to the difficulties in collecting agricultural residuals, such as leaf and top of 
sugar cane or rice straw, and their financial returns. Peter du Pont analyzes the 
commercial conditions of biomass resource utilization in Thailand and estimates that, 
within 2011, 2,463 MW of biomass resource will be commercial available. He also 
discounts this commercial potential by technological factor (25% lower) and 
institutional factor (50% lower) and concludes that 897 MW of new installed biomass 
power should be practically achievable during 2005-201155. 
Now, only the sugar industry, the pulp and paper industry, rice mills, wood industries, 
and palm oil mills have invested in biomass cogeneration and power plants. The 
current installed capacity from 44 Small Power Producers (SPPs) and 5 Very Small 
Power Producers (VSPPs) reaches about 938.5 MW, of which 432.4 MW export 
excess electric power to the grid. Furthermore, other 260.2 MW of biomass power is 
now already contract signed and in the process of approving power purchasing 
contracts, which is expected to sell 167.9 MW of power to the grid in the coming 
years. Therefore, in the near future, biomass power will reach 1,200 MW installed 
capacity with 600 MW of power sold to the grid. 
The Ministry of Energy expects the power generation potential of Biomass resources 
to be as high as 7,000 MW and sets up a clear target to stimulate biomass power 
generation up to 1,600 MW by 201156. 
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Table 3.8 Assessment of the Biomass Energy Potential of Agricultural Residuals in 
Thailand in 2000 
Utilization  
Rate (%)  
Quantity 
(Thousand Tons) 
Energy  
(PJ) 
Products and 
Production 
(Million Tons) 
Residuals Quantity 
(Thousand 
Tons) Used Unuse
d 
used Unuse
d 
used Unused 
Sugarcane 53.5 Bagasse 15,567 79.3 20.7 12,344 3,222 177.76 46.40 
  Leaf & Top 16,155 0.0 98.6 0 15,929 0.00 277.01 
Rice 24.2 Rice husk 5,560 50.7 49.3 2,819 2,741 40.23 39.11 
  Upper Straw  10,805 0.0 68.4 0 7,391 0.00 75.67 
Palm oil 3.26 Empty Bunch 1,394 3.0 58.4 42 814 0.75 14.54 
  Fiber 479 85.8 13.4 411 64 7.24 1.13 
  Shell 160 58.8 3.7 94 6 1.76 0.11 
  Leaf Stem 8,479 0.0 100.0 0 8,479 0.00 83.35 
  Stamen Bunch 759 0.0 100.0 0 759 0.00 12.39 
Coconut 1.40 Fiber 507 28.9 59.5 146 595 2.37 4.89 
  Shell 224 41.3 37.8 93 85 1.69 1.52 
  Bunch 69 14.4 84.3 10 58 0.15 0.89 
  Leaf 315 15.9 80.9 50 255 0.80 4.08 
Cassava 19.1 Stem 1,678 0.0 40.7 0 683 0.00 12.58 
Maize 4.29 Corncob 1,170 19.3 67.0 226 784 4.08 14.14 
Groundnut 0.14 Shell 45 0.0 100.0 0 45 0.00 0.56 
Cotton 0.03 Stem 116 0.0 100.0 0 116 0.00 1.69 
Soybean 0.32 Shell 849 0.7 76.0 6 646 0.12 12.55 
Sorghum 0.14 Leaf, Stem 178 11.8 64.8 21 115 0.40 2.22 
TOTAL RESIDUALS 64,509   16,262 42,494 237.31 604.82 
Source: DEDE, 2003, Alternative Energy Situation. www.dede.go.th 
 
Table 3.9 Assessment of Unused Biomass Energy Potential of Agricultural Residuals 
in Thailand in 2001/2002 
Raw 
Material 
Production 
(million 
ton) 
Residuals 
 
Quantity 
(million 
ton) 
Calorific 
Value 
(MJ/Kg) 
Energy 
(TJ) 
Power 
(MW) 
Sugarcane 60.013 Bagasse 3.616 14.40 52,056.04 764.21 
  Leaf & Top 17.087 17.39 310,762.62 4,105.92 
Rice 26.514 Rice husk 3.006 14.27 42,901.65 566.83 
  Upper Straw  8.106 10.24 83,011.61 1,096.78 
Palm Oil 4.089 Empty Bunch 1.002 17.86 18,253.88 241.18 
  Fiber 0.081 17.62 1,419.21 18.75 
  Shell 0.007 18.46 136.85 1.81 
  Leaf Stem 10.648 9.83 104,667.44 1,382.91 
  Stamen 
Bunch 
0.953 16.33 15,558.20 205.56 
Cassava 16.868 Stem 0.604 18.42 11,128.34 147.03 
Maize 4.466 Corncob 0.816 18.04 14,736.44 194.71 
Groundnut 0.129 Shell 0.042 12.66 527.50 6.97 
Cotton 0.036 Stem 0.116 14.49 1,685.94 22.27 
Soybean 0.292 Shell 0.591 19.44 11,488.51 151.79 
Sorghum 0.145 Leaf, Stem 0.118 19.23 2,262.18 45.14 
Wood 10.268 Wood 
residual 
2.670 14.98 39,991.81 528.39 
Total Residuals   721,935.91 9,630.18 
Source: DEDE, 2003, Alternative Energy Situation. www.dede.go.th 
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3.6.2 Biogas Resources 
Apart from solid biomass residues, waste water containing organic matters from 
livestock farms, landfill site, and agro-industries has increasingly been used for 
energy production. The biogas systems can be locally produced and installed by 
several techniques such as UASB and Fixed Film Technology. The production of 
biogas can alleviate not only the energy costs by substituting the on-site use of fuel 
oil, LPG, or electricity, but also the local water pollution problems57. 
DEDE estimates that the biogas production potential of three main sources, animal 
farm, landfill, and agro-industrials, equals 2,179 Mm3/year (Table 3.10). If it is 
assumed that 1 m3 of biogas can produce 1.2 kWh of electricity with 8 operation 
hours a day, the potential power generation would be around 900 MW. However, 
there are two important notes to keep in mind. First, in various cases, biogas energy is 
better used or should be used in other forms of energy, such as LPG on-site 
consumption. Second, if better biogas technology and waste management would be 
explored, instead of landfill biogas, the biogas potential would probably be much 
higher. 
Another source of resource potential estimation is presented by David Donnelly, the 
general manager of Clean Energy Development Co, Ltd., (Clean THAI), a firm which 
develops and finances biogas system fuels by waste products from cassava-processing 
industries and pig farms. With the existing SPP’s electricity purchasing price (detail in 
Chapter 7), the commercial potential of biogas exceeds 1,200 MW. It consists of 300 
MW from cassava waste water, 900 MW from cassava wet cake (or a fibrous waste 
byproduct of tapioca production), 50 MW from pig farms, and 15 MW from palm oil 
factories58. 
Peter du Pont uses this estimation as commercially viable power by counting only the 
365 MW biogas productions from cassava waste water, pig farms and palm oil 
factories, which have already been implemented in actual cases in Thailand. He also 
estimates that, from this commercial potential, 245 MW of biogas power plants 
should be practically achievable in 201159.  
At present, a total capacity of 12.4 MW can be generated from 8 VSPPs and 3 Clean 
THAI biogas power plants. Recently, the Thai government has aimed to increase the 
power generation from biogas to 100 MW by 2011. 
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Table 3.10 Assessment of the Biogas Energy Potential of Waste in Thailand in 2000 
Waste Quantity Biogas Production 
(mill. m3 / year) 
Energy 
(PJ) 
1. Animal waste  
(dry manual thousand ton /year) 
2,886.55 559.54 11.75
   1.1 Cattle  1,015.10 238.91 5.01
   1.2 Buffalo 441.63 96.95 2.04
   1.3 Swine 879.95 134.67 2.83
   1.4 Chicken 512.87 81.57 1.71
   1.5 Others1 37.00 7.43 0.16
2. Domestic Landfill Waste 
(Thousand ton/year) 
11,842.24 1,184.00 23.09
   2.1 Greater Bangkok 2,832.58 283.26 5.52
   2.2 Other Municipalities 3,656.30 365.63 7.13
   2.3 Outside Municipal area 5,353.36 535.34 10.44
3. Agro-industrial Waste water 
(thousand m3 / year)   
205,942.30 435.33 10.45
   3.1 Tapioca Starch Industry 55,005.09 166.27 3.99
   3.2 Sugar Industry 76,203.54 89.37 2.15
   3.3 Palm Oil Industry 3,256.00 67.72 1.63
   3.4 Seafood Canning 17,385.37 47.30 1.14
   3.5 Others2 54,092.30 64.67 1.55
4. Total Biogas Potential 2,178.87 45.29
Source: DEDE, 2003a, Alternative Energy Situation. www.dede.go.th  
Note:  1. Others include Duck and Elephant 
 2. Others include frozen seafood Industry, slaughterhouses, pineapple canning 
industry, carbonated soft drink industry, beer and liquor industry, and milk industry. 
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3.6.3 Solar PV Energy 
Thailand is endowed with solar energy all year long. For the whole country, the 
average energy from sunlight amounted to 18 MJ/m2/day. Moreover, 14% of the 
country received the most intensive energy with the average of 20 MJ/m2/day. From 
April to May, most areas in Thailand received maximum energy from sunlight 
ranging from 20 to 24 MJ/m2/day. Thus, the potential for exploiting solar energy in 
Thailand is considerable60. DEDE stresses that the power potential of solar PV energy 
can be as high as 5,000 MW. Peter du Pont estimates the practically achievable 
potential to be 100 MW in 201161. 
Until now, only about 23.3 MW PV for stand-alone and grid-connected application 
have been reported. Most of these MW (95%) are found in remote areas and are off-
grid, such as solar cell battery charging stations and PV pumping for village water 
supply.  
In 2003, the Ministry of Energy has set up the target for 2011 of 250 MW installation 
of solar PV. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Solar Resource Map 
Energy Intensity (MJ/m2-day) 
Source: DEDE, 2006 
http://www.dede.go.th/dede/index.p
hp?id=222  
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3.6.4 Wind Energy 
Thailand is not located in a windy area of the world. However, according to a report 
on wind resource assessment doned by DEDE in 2001, there are good wind areas with 
an annual average wind speed of 6.4 m/s or higher at 50 m height. These areas, around 
7.4% of the country, are influenced by monsoons and are loacted along the eastern 
coastline of the southern part of Thailand and in the mountains of the western and 
southern regions of the country62. If the assumption of an average wind turbine 
density of 4 MW/km2 is applied, all these areas could be converted into an area of 
3,044 MW wind turbine capacity (Table 3.11). At the present, DEDE has recognized a 
wind power potential of 1,600 MW in Thailand63. 
Due to the limited areas of potential and associated high investment costs, so far, only 
192 kw of electricity produced by wind turbines have been installed in the Phuket 
Province in the southern part of Thailand. Recently, the Thai government has stated 
that it  expects to increase the power generation of wind turbines to 100 MW by 
201164. 
Table 3.11 Assessment of Wind Energy Potential in Thailand 
Wind Potential Characteristics Item 
Poor 
(< 6 m/s) 
Fair 
(6-7 m/s) 
Good 
(7-8 m/s) 
Very Good 
(8-9 m/s) 
Excellent
(> 9 m/s) 
% of Total Land Area 92.60 7.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 
Land Area (sq. km) 477,157 37,337 748 13 0 
MW Potential NA (149, 348) 2,992 52 0 
Source: Wind Energy Resource Atlas of Southeast Asia, Quoted by Thai Net Metering 
Project, 2004. www.netmeter.org  
Note : For Large Wind Turbines Only. Potential MW assumes an average wind turbine 
density of 4 MW per square kilometer and no exclusion of parks, urban, or inaccessible areas. 
Wind speeds are for 65 m height in the predominant land cover with no obstruction. 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Wind Resource Map 
indicate the areas which have very 
good and good potential of wind 
energy in the southern part of 
Thailand 
Source DEDE, 2006 
http://www2.dede.go.th/dede/renew
/Twm/main.htm  
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3.6.5 Small and Micro Hydro power 
Since 1983, 59 micro-hydro power generators of a size below 200 kW have been 
installed in the rural communities, mainly in the northern part of Thailand, beyond the 
reach of the grid. Although the total installed capacity is approximately 2 MW, only 
half of this remains in service. The rest has fallen into disrepair or was abandoned 
when the electrical grid reached these villages. This is mainly due to the fact that in 
the past the villages were not allowed to connect their micro-hydro systems to the 
grid, forcing the villagers to choose either micro-hydro power or grid power65. Now, 
the Thai government hopes that the regulations for power purchasing from VSPP will 
encourage these communities to keep the micro-hydro power system and generate the 
revenue from selling power to the grid. 
Apart from micro-hydro power generation, there is a number of small hydro power 
plants in the country, with the overall installed capacity of around 40 MW. In 
November 2004, the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) issued the results of the 
studies of production costs of electricity from small hydro power project in Thailand, 
planned by DEDE, by PEA, and by RID in some of the 6,000 irrigation dams in 
Thailand. In total, 728 projects are planned with the installed capacity of 369 MW. Of 
these 728 projects, electricity generation costs have been estimated for 100 projects 
(totalizing of 271.3 MW). The weighted average cost of these 100 projcts is 1.74 
THB/kWh (see Table 3.12). According to du Pont, most of these 100 best projects 
should be commercially viable, operating as non-subsidised, non-firm SPP66. 
Overall, the Thai government plans to have 350 MW of small and micro-hydro power 
plants by 2011, which is about half of the 700 MW power generation potential 
estimated by DEDE67. 
 
Table 3.12 Planned Small Hydro Development by DEDE, RID, and PEA by 2010 
Project Owners No. of 
projects
Power 
(MW) 
Range of 
Production 
costs 
(THB/kWh) 
Average 
production 
costs(THB/Kwh)
DEDE  
(Feasibility study completed) 
23 70.2 0.78-3.12 1.91 
DEDE  
(Pre-feasibility study 
completed) 
26 44.8 1.06-4.15 1.69 
RID (medium size) 51 156.3 0.87-3.67 1.67 
SUB TOTAL 100 271.3 0.78-4.15 1.74 
DEDE (others) 72 19.29 n.a. n.a. 
RID (Small size) 550 20 n.a. n.a. 
PEA 6 38.67 n.a. n.a. 
TOTAL 728 369 n.a. n.a. 
Source: RID, 200468 
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3.6.6 Overall Potential of Renewable Energy 
Table 3.13 presents the overall picture of the renewable energy potential and targets 
from 5 major sources already discussed, plus geothermal source, of which Thailand 
has limited resource potential in the Northern part of the country. All together, the 
total power generation potential of renewable energy can be as high as 15,200 MW.  
However, the present total capacity of all these energy sources is only 1,018.3 MW. In 
fact, only biomass resource can be developed on the commercial scale. Apart from 
biomass, the development of other renewable sources contributes only with 80 MW to 
the Thai power system. 
The Thai government aims to resolve the situation of “high potential, low 
development” by setting up the target of renewable power generation in 2011. For the 
period of 2003-2011, the Thai government aims to reach 2,400 MW of renewable 
distributed generation, of which around 1,800 MW of new capacity have to be 
developed during this period. 
 
Table 3.13 Resource and Power Generation Potential, Total Installed Power Capacity, 
Government’s Target for Renewable Power Generation  
Energy 
Technology 
Resource Potential Power gen. 
Potential1 (MW) 
Present  
capacity (MW) 
Target (MW) 
20112 
Biomass 842 PJ 7,000 938.5 1,600 
Biogas 2,180 Mm3 or 45 PJ 9003 12.4 100 
Solar PV 18 MJ/ m2/day 5,000 23.3 250 
Wind Power See Table3 1,600 0.2 100 
Hydropower N/A 700 43.6 350 
Geothermal N/A N/A 0.3 104 
Total N/A 15,200 1,018.3 2,410 
Note & Source:  
 1 and 2 DEDE, 2003b. Policy Concept for Sustainable Energy Development: One 
Tumbol One Megawatt. www.dede.go.th  
 3. Include landfill biogas and Calculated by assuming power generation per biogas is 
1.2 kWh/m3 and operation time 2,920 hours/year 
 4. EGAT, 2003, Fang Geothermal Power Plant. www.egat.co.th/rdo/geothermal.html  
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 3.6.7 Potential for Demand Side Management 
Since 1991, Thailand has become the first Asian country to formally approve a 
country-wide demand-side management (DSM) plan. In 1992, Thailand also initiated 
a national energy conservation law, supplemented by financial incentives and an 
environmental conservation fund. In 1993, the DSM office was established as a 
department of EGAT and the program implementation began in 199569. 
While the analysis showed a potential of 2,000-3,000 MW reduction of peak demand, 
the first five-year DSM plan (1993-1997) aimed to avoid a demand of 1,080 GWh 
annually and 225 MW, respectively. Until June 2001, the DSM program had achieved 
a peak demand reduction of 638 MW and an energy reduction of 3,589 GWh, 
annually. On average, the costs of peak demand saving was 2,404 THB/kW and the 
cost of energy saving was 0.5 THB/kWh. The current DSM plan of EGAT (2002-
2006) also aims to achieve a peak demand reduction of 632 MW and an energy 
reduction of 2,508 GWh, annually70. 
Although the previous experience of DSM in Thailand is impressive, obviously, the 
current target is still moderate especially compared to the estimated DSM potential. 
Moreover, the long-term plan and financial support to DSM after 2006 is still unclear.  
In 2005, Peter du Pont estimated an economic potential of DSM in Thailand and 
found that the total economic potential of DSM in 2011 is 2,459 MW in peak demand 
reduction and 15,820 GWh in energy saving with the average cost of 0.92 THB/kWh. 
More than 60% of the total potential is DSM in the industrial sector (Table 3.14). He 
suggests that, if the implementation capacities of government agencies were taken 
into account, 2,207 MW in peak demand saving and 11,181 GWh in energy saving 
should be achieved by 201171. 
Based on this information, DSM can be one of the important sustainable energy 
options for the Thai power sector, both in terms of its potentials and cost 
effectiveness. 
 
Table 3.14 Economic Potential of DSM in Thailand by Sector in 2011 
Sector Saving in GWh Saving in MW 
Industry 9,687 1,499 
Commercial 3,431 537 
Residential 2,702 423 
TOTAL 15,820 2,459 
Source: Du Pont, 200572. 
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3.7 The Present Situation of Sustainable Energy Development 
The last section of this chapter provides information on the present situation of 
sustainable energy development in Thailand. The objective of this part is to show that 
several sustainable energy solutions have actually been developed in Thailand for a 
number of years. In other words, the quest for a sustainable energy future in Thailand 
is not based on a dream, but on real action. 
 3.7.1 Present Renewable Power Producers 
Presently, there are five main groups of renewable power producers in Thailand, as 
explained below; 
• Firm SPPs are renewable energy producers, who account for less than 90 
MW of the power sold to the grid and have to meet the following criteria: 
a) to generate electricity 4,670 hours/year, b) to include March, April, May 
and June (the peak period in Thailand), c) to have monthly capacity factors 
from 0.51 to 1.00, and d) to set their maintenance shut down during off-
peak months with the maximum of 35 days in a 12 month cycle. The 
payment to firm SPPs includes the monthly capacity or availability 
payment (in THB/kW/month) and energy payment (in THB/kWh), which 
are based on EGAT’s long-run avoided capacity and energy costs73 
• Non Firm SPPs are normally those who fail to meet the criteria for firm 
SPPs. Therefore, due to the EGAT criteria, they can only get an energy 
payment based on EGAT’s short-run avoided energy costs74. Normally, the 
payment they get is much lower than the one which firm SPPs receive 
(discussed in detail in Chapter 7). 
• VSPPs are renewable power producers with less than 1 MW capacity sold 
to the grid, which, due to their smaller size, have great difficulties in 
applying for firm or non-firm SPPs. The VSPP pricing scheme is similar to 
the net metering system in the USA, where the excess capacity generated 
by renewable producers will spin the existing customer’s electricity meters 
backwards and bank it until it is needed by the customers. In Thailand, in 
the case of excess generation, the payment will be based on EGAT’s 
wholesale Time of Use (TOU) rate (including Ft or fuel adjustment 
tariff)75. 
• EGAT Own Projects include several renewable power generation 
projects invested and run by EGAT, such as the solar PV project in Mae 
Hong Son, the Geothermal project in Chiang Mai, or the wind energy in 
Phuket. 
• Other Producers include renewable power generation invested by PEA 
(normally solar PV in the remote area), DEDE (both solar PV in the 
remote area and micro-hydro power in the mountainous area), and some 
private projects (such as biogas plants), which do not sell power to the grid 
(thus, they are not part of VSPPs or SPPs). 
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 3.7.2 Present Power Generation Capacity 
Table 3.15 presents the overall power generation capacity of renewable energy in 
Thailand. Presently, in Thailand, the installed capacity of renewable energy is 1,018.3 
MW at present. Of these, 480.7 MW of power capacity is sold to the grid. Most of the 
existing installed capacity (938.5 MW or 92.1%) is biomass power generation. The 
second largest renewable source is micro-hydro power with 43.6 MW installed 
capacity. In terms of power producer types, more than half of the installed capacity 
comes from non-firm SPP (571.2 MW). However, in terms of power sold, firm SPPs 
constitute the largest renewable energy type with more than 50% (244.2 MW) of the 
overall power sold produced by renewable energy. 
Apart from the existing producers, there are several renewable energy projects, which 
already have a signed contract or are currently in the approval process. All together, 
these newcomers will be expected to contribute with 274.5 MW of installed capacity, 
with 173.4 MW power sold, to the Thai power system. The majority of these 
newcomers are still biomass energy and non-firm SPP. Combined with the existing 
renewable power producers, the overall installed capacity is likely to reach 1,300 
MW, with more than 650 MW of power sold to the grid. However, of these figures, 
nearly 1,200 MW of installed capacity will be based on biomass energy. 
Interestingly, half of today’s installed capacity and power sold to the grid has been 
developed in the last three years, as shown in Figure 3.11. In 2001, the total installed 
capacity of renewable power generation was only around 320 MW, before being 
expanded to around 650 MW in 2003 and beyond 1,000 MW today. As earlier 
mentioned, the fast growing trend is more likely to continue in the coming years. The 
explanations of this fast growing development will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 7. 
Apart from renewable energy generation, DSM has also been implemented in 
Thailand as earlier mentioned. The latest evaluation in June 2001 showed that DSM in 
Thailand’s DSM program had reached a peak demand reduction of 638 MW and an 
energy reduction of 3,589 GWh, annually. Combining the DSM achievement with the 
present renewable energy generation capacity, the total capacity of sustainable energy 
solutions in Thailand is likely to reach 2,000 MW within the near future. 
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Table 3.15 Present Renewable Generation by Installed Capacity and Power Sold to the Grid 
Installed Capacity Power Sold to the Grid 
Types of RE 
Project Biomass Biogas PV 
Micro-
hydro 
Wind&
Geo All RESBiomass Biogas PV 
Micro-
hydro 
Wind&
Geo All RES
Already Sold to the Grid or to Users       
Firm SPP 357.2 - - - - 357.2 244.2 - - - - 244.2
Non-Firm SPP 571.2 - - - - 571.2 184.3 - - - - 184.3
VSPP 10.1 5.4 0.5 - - 16.0 3.9 3.3 0.5 - - 7.7 
EGAT - - 0.5 - 0.5 1.0 - - 0.5 - 0.5 1.0 
Others - 7.0 22.2 43.6 - 72.9 - - - 43.6 - 43.6 
Total 938.5 12.4 23.3 43.6 0.5 1,018.3 432.4 3.3 1.0 43.6 0.5 480.7
Only Contract Signed & In Process       
Firm SPP 81.3 - - - - 81.3 61.8 - - - - 61.8 
Non-Firm SPP 175.7 - - 6.7 - 182.4 104.3 - - - - 104.3
VSPP 3.2 7.5 0.1 - - 10.8 1.8 5.5 0.1 - - 7.3 
EGAT - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Others - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total 260.2 7.5 0.1 6.7 - 274.5 167.9 5.5 0.1 - - 173.4
Overall RE Projects       
Firm SPP 438.5 - - - - 438.5 306.0 - - - - 306.0
Non-Firm SPP 746.9 - - 6.7 - 753.6 288.6 - - - - 288.6
VSPP 13.4 12.9 0.6 - - 26.9 5.6 8.8 0.6 - - 15.0 
EGAT - - 0.5 - 0.5 1.0 - - 0.5 - 0.5 1.0 
Others - 7.0 22.2 43.6 - 72.9 - - - 43.6 - 43.6 
Total 1,198.8 19.9 23.4 50.3 0.5 1,292.8 600.2 8.8 1.1 43.6 0.5 654.2
Source: Compiled from EPPO, 200676. 
 
 110
 
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
Sold
0
200
400
600
800
1000
MW
Year
Figure 3.11 Installed Capacity and Power Sold 
to the Grid 
by Renewable SPPs
Sold
Install
 
Source: Compiled from EPPO, 200677. 
 
 3.7.3 Present Generation Costs 
Table 3.16 presents the existing generation costs of renewable energy technologies. 
Although the calculations of generation costs of three references vary due to 
assumptions used on plant factor, investment cost, and fuel cost, to some extent, it still 
provides a good overview of the economic potentials and possibilities of renewable 
energy development in Thailand.  
Notably, based on this cost estimation, biomass and biogas are quite competitive 
renewable options, especially when compared to 1.93 THB/kWh of present marginal 
costs at the low voltage line, where most of renewable power generations are 
connected. This is certainly part of the reason why biomass energy has been growing 
so fast in these recent years. It is also highly foreseeable that biogas energy will 
follow the same pattern in the coming years.  
Micro-hydro power is, in fact, also competitive, though its generation cost depends 
very much on its location. However, the problem with micro-hydro, compared to 
biomass and biogas, is the investment possibility, since most of the potential resources 
belong to the royal irrigation department and local communities. If we can turn this 
limitation around by providing supportive investment scheme, it can also be a good 
opportunity for local communities to participate more meaningfully in the Thai power 
system. 
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Obviously, in the Thai context, wind and solar PV energy are still expensive options 
for the Thai power sector, though, as already mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter, it provides the best outcomes in a human health perspective. 
Apart from renewable energy, DSM is also an economically attractive option for the 
Thai power sector. From the latest evaluation in June 2001, the average costs of DSM 
peak demand saving was 2,404 THB/kW and the cost of energy saving is 0.5 
THB/kWh. For the near future (up to 2011), the average cost of DSM’s energy saving 
is estimated to be 0.92 THB/kWh78. 
Based on the high resource potentials, the existing power capacity, the fast growing 
trend, and the competitive investment options, it is likely to conclude that renewable 
energy and DSM can really be a policy option for health public policy in the Thai 
power sector. 
Table 3.16 Recent Cost Estimations of Renewable Power Generation (unit: 
THB/kWh) 
Renewable Energy E for E (2004) Du Pont (2005) EGAT (2003) 
Biomass 1.81 1.74-1.85 2.63 
Biogas - 1.54-1.80 - 
Municipal Waste - - 5.12 
Micro-hydro 2.13 1.74 - 
Wind  4.59 5.20 7.32 
Solar PV 10.74 10.10 21.36 
DSM - 0.92 - 
Source: E for E (2003)79, du Pont (2005)80, and EGAT (2003)81 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The information in this chapter shows that health and energy have linked together in 
several aspects and levels. Obviously, sustainable energy, such as renewable energy 
and energy conservation, can significantly reduce the negative health impacts of fossil 
fuel-based power generation, and can therefore provide healthier solutions in a 
healthy public policy perspective.  
Unfortunately, the conventional assessments, like cost-benefit analysis and EIA, do 
not pay enough attention to health and energy linkages and, consequently, they do not 
take the actual advantages of these healthy policy solutions into account. Therefore, 
the alternative frameworks are required to overcome this hindrance.  
In this chapter, the feasibility and public regulation for innovation, strategic 
environmental assessment, and institutional analysis have been introduced. The core 
notions of these alternative assessments are to look beyond a) the present market and 
governmental decisions to understand the influential institutional frameworks behind 
them, b) the specific consequences at project levels to foresee strategic impacts at the 
policy level, and c) the existing regulative frameworks to realize underlying values, 
norms, and cultural-cognitive frameworks behind them. The insights from these 
frameworks will be applied in a) understanding the policy process of the Thai power 
sector in Chapter 4, b) identifying strategic impact assessment framework in Chapters 
5 and 6, and c) analyzing present institutional framework and public regulations in the 
Thai power sector in Chapter 7. 
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Last, apart from energy and health linkages and alternative assessment frameworks, 
this chapter also provides the clear picture of the overall potentials of these 
sustainable energy solutions in Thailand as well as their current statuses. In short, 
Thailand has both potential and experiences in sustainable energy development. Most 
of these sustainable energy solutions are also economically viable. Therefore, these 
sustainable energy developments or, in healthy public policy perspective, these 
healthier solutions can certainly be possible policy options for the Thai power sector. 
Moreover, to facilitate deliberative and innovative democracy, these policy options 
need to be compared, in various aspects, with the existing policy directions and search 
for opportunities for desirable policy changes, as later shown in the remaining 
chapters.  
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Chapter 4 
Historical Development and Policy Discourse Analysis 
of the Thai Power Sector 
 
This chapter takes history as a point of departure in deliberative policy analysis. The 
main idea is to understand how different policy discourses have been developed and 
evolved in the dynamic socio-political contexts. In the historical development 
analysis, the development and interactions of different actors within the Thai power 
sector will be divided into six main periods. In each period, the driving forces of 
policy, both internationally and domestically, will be analyzed. Then, the general 
situation of energy policy will be summarized and followed by information on the 
important actions and interactions between different policy actors, before  a short 
conclusion will be provided of each period. 
After the historical development analysis, the structure of the Thai power sector and 
the evolution of policy processes in the Thai power sector will be summarized. From 
this evolution, it is clear that policy processes in the Thai power sector have become 
much more complex due to policy negotiation, public resistance, and public 
deliberation. From the analysis, it is obvious that, in the Thai power sector, policy 
contestation has been intensified by different policy discourses. In this study, four 
policy discourses have been identified and explained. At the end, the comparison 
between different policy discourses is provided. To analyze different impacts of  
different policy directions, the differences of these four policy discourses will 
constitute  a point of departure for the strategic impact assessment in Chapters 5 and 
6.   
4.1 Before the National Development Plan (From 1855-1956) 
Before the end of the nineteenth century, Thailand initially adopted modern energy 
systems. It was a period when King Chulalongkorn had to struggle against western 
colonialism. There were three main strategies for this struggling. The first strategy 
was to develop the Siamese Nation State with a  high degree of centralization. 
Second, the politics of being a neutral buffer state between French and British 
colonial states was effectively applied. Last, to be a civilized country, modernizing the 
country had been planned. 
In this period, the development of modern energy can be seen in three main ways. 
First, as seen in the railway system, energy was one of the main mechanisms and 
symbols of national consolidation. Second, energy was used for expanding the 
potential and capacity of economic initiatives and trade activities. The steam engine 
was applied to the rice milling industry (started in 1858), leading to big expansion in 
rice export. Last, it was clear that the investment in two power plants (started in 
1898), the electric tram system, and the introduction of the car (in 1904) gave the 
opportunities for elite groups in Bangkok to enjoy new western lifestyle and, 
therefore, energy became a symbol of modern living1.  
After World War I, the development path told a completely different story. The 
expansion of modern energy systems was stunted by political and economic instability 
around the world. The recession of  rice export and the deficit in the government 
budget limited the potential of the Thai government to continue investing in energy 
facilities. It was clear in the power sector that, apart from the two power plants 
mentioned above, there was no more investment in big power stations, only in  the 
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small decentralized power plants owned by local private investors in some cities, 
towns, factories, and mines.  
After World War II, Bangkok was in crisis of power shortage. The Thai government 
tried to solve this problem by establishing state-owned enterprises, such as the 
Bangkok Electricity Authority or the Lignite Authority, and uniting electricity 
services. However, limited foreign investment and aid as well as economic hardship 
inhibited the opportunities for a significant improvement of the Thai power sector.  
In this period, the Thai civil society sector still had a quite limited role. The change 
from monarchy to democratic system had just begun  in 1932, followed by a number 
of military force interruptions. Probably, the modernizing state in itself was not yet 
the question for Thai civil society at that time. Therefore, main contributions from the 
civil society sector to energy policy were hardly seen in this long period of time. 
Table 4.1 Historical Events of the Power Sector Development and Policies in 
Thailand during the Period Before the National Development Plan (1884-1954) 
Time 
Period 
Historical Events 
1884 The first power generator in Thailand was in operation and provided  the 
royal palace in Bangkok with light 
1898 The Danish company, Siam Electric Co., Ltd., was established and received 
concession for electricity generation and distribution in Bangkok with the 
steam turbine engine power plant (normally called the Wat Leab power 
plant), fuelled by fuel wood, coal, oil, and rice husk. 
1912 The new power plant (normally referred to as the Sam Sen power plant) 
was built and operated two years after with the responsibility to supply 
electricity to the northern part of Bangkok. 
1927 Ratchaburi municipality operated and sold electricity for the first time 
outside Bangkok. 
1929 The Electricity Division was set up within the Ministry of Interior to take 
care of the expansion of electricity service areas outside Bangkok. 
1945 During  World War II, the Wat Leab and Sam Sen power plants were 
heavily affected by bombing, leading to the great electricity shortage in 
Bangkok. 
1948 The Thai government introduced the “Power Development Plan and 
System in Thailand” to overcome the electricity shortage problem. 
1950 The Thai government set up the state-owned enterprise, Bangkok 
Electricity Authority, to operate the Wat Leab Power Plant after the end of 
concession . 
1953 The Thai government established the “National Energy Authority” for 
national energy policy and planning.  
1954 The Lignite Electricity Organization was set up to operate the Mae Moh 
lignite mining in Lampang (the North of Thailand) and another lignite 
mining in Krabi (the South of Thailand) 
1954 The Provincial Electricity Organization was founded as a state-owned 
enterprise to expand electricity services outside Bangkok and to take over 
the electricity companies from the private sector.  
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Energy, 20042. 
It is clearly seen that, during this long period, the policy capacity of the energy sector 
did not develop much, neither in the state nor the civil society sector. Energy 
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investment was still highly subjected to external forces, without its own trajectories. 
Possibly, the main outcome of this era, which would affect the formation of the 
energy sector and policy in later periods, is the establishment of the centralized 
government system and the creation of national, economic, and modernized symbols 
of the modern energy system. 
 
4.2 Modernization and National Development Plan (1957-1972) 
 a) Modernization Driving Force 
This is the period in which  the existing Thai power system was first developed as an 
individual  policy sector. The structure of the Thai energy systems was developed as a  
part of the National Development Plan. Both the National Development Plan and 
energy policy were highly and explicitly influenced by the Modernization theory, as a 
manifesto for non-communist countries in the Cold War era. Especially, since 
Thailand became one of the strategic points for anti-Communist strategy in the Indo-
Chinese war, the international support in various forms to the modernization of the 
country was enormous. Between 1958 and 1967, Thailand received 321.4 million 
USD in economic aid and 379.5 million USD in military aid from the US, which was 
a significant addition compared to the about 200 million USD of the Thai annual 
budget3. 
The starting point of the modernization period in Thailand can be recognized as  the 
coup d’ etat by Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat in 1957. The nationalist policy of Field 
Marshall’s Pibulsongkram government was substituted by the modernization policy of 
the new government, with the support from the US government and the World Bank. 
The first National Development Plan was developed through the technical support 
from the World Bank. Various economic planning and policy organizations were  
established4.  
According to the First National Development plan, the main national agenda was to 
establish modern economic sectors by transferring economic surplus from the 
agricultural sector and investing in developmental infrastructures by government, with 
international financial and technical supports. Another main economic policy was the 
infrastructure development, described by the Thai slogan “nam lai, fai sawang, tang 
dee” (water flows, light shines, and good road)5. The plan was very successful in 
promoting agricultural commodification and export. The industrial, commercial and 
urban sectors were rapidly developed with a high degree of economic protection and 
subsidies. Unsurprisingly, in this period, the annual economic growth was generally 
high.  
 b) Establishment of the Centralized Power System 
The development of energy systems, of course, was the main component of 
infrastructure development within the National Development Plan. In the power 
sector, during the period of 1960-1969, several new power plants were built all over 
the country to keep pace with the rapid demand growth (see Table 4.2 for detail). The 
total installed capacity was increased dramatically together with the expansion of the 
nation-wide transmission system6.  
Three state-owned enterprise models, recommended by the World Bank, were applied 
to take care of this mission. The establishment and reorganization of new state-owned 
enterprises were  carried out throughout the period (see Table 4.2 for detail). Finally, 
in 1969, The Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT) was established to 
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take care of power generation, transmission systems and supply electricity to the 
Municipal Electricity Authority (MEA) and the Provincial Electricity Authority 
(PEA) for distribution and services to Thai consumers in Greater Bangkok and the rest 
of Thailand, respectively. Like other governance systems in the country, the power 
sector in Thailand was initially developed as a highly centralized system7. All these 
state-owned enterprises, especially EGAT, assumed all responsibilities of policy, 
planning, operation, and regulation. 
It should also be noted that, according to the World Bank model of state-owned 
enterprise, the good state-owned enterprise should not be under the control or 
intervention of politics and government. As explained by Mr. Kasem Jatikawanich, 
the founding governor of EGAT8,  
“It was the first time in history when we had a state-owned enterprise 
(i.e. EGAT) with its own Act. The Act was very strong and did not allow 
politicians to involve in EGAT administration. Absolutely no political 
involvement is the heart of EGAT. Even the appointed executive board 
could not be changed, except in case of death, resignation, and 
corruption. Apart from these, the board cannot be touched. After we did 
this, we can borrow 65 million USD from the World Bank for 
constructing the Yanhee hydro power dam”. 
It was almost the ideal period of modernization, since the expansion of energy 
generation and consumption did not face  any crucial resistance or limitations. The 
cheap oil, the external available financial resources, the high economic growth, and 
unseen (or unforeseen) environmental and social consequences allowed the energy 
systems to expand without any anticipated limits. The annual growth rate of energy 
consumption was around 20 percent during this period. Before the end of the period, 
the total peak demand for electricity was, for the first time,  above 1,000 MW9.  
Therefore, energy planning in this period was really a  matter of “predict and 
provide”. The main method of planning in the power sector was a techno-economic 
perspective. The most important criterion for planning is the system reliability, or, in 
other words, to ensure enough power to be supplied to the  demand at all time. In Mr. 
Kasem Jatikawanich’s own words10,  
“The profound testament of EGAT people is no shortage (of electricity). 
We are always taught that there is no electricity as expensive than no 
electricity. No electricity is the most expensive one.”  
Environmental and some socio-economic parameters were still far from being 
essential issues in power planning. To support rapid economic growth, available 
imported technology and fuels were adopted. At the end of this period, about 75% of 
the energy in power sector depended on imported oil and the rest came from large 
hydro power plants11. 
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Table 4.2 Historical Events of the Power Sector Development and Policies in 
Thailand during the Modernization and National Development Plan (1957-1972) 
Time 
Period 
Historical Events 
1957 The Yanhee Electricity Company was established to provide electricity 
services in the North and Central regions, including to develop the first two 
large modern power plant projects, namely the Northern Bangkok Power 
Plant and the Bhumibol Hydro power Dam (previously called the Yanhee 
Dam) 
1958 The Bangkok Electricity Authority (operating the Wat Leab Power Plant) 
and the Sam Sen Electricity Authority (operating the Sam Sen Power Plant) 
were united into the Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA) providing 
electricity services in Bangkok and its vicinity. 
1960 The Provincial Electricity Organization was changed into the Provincial 
Electricity Authority (PEA) with the responsibility for electricity services 
outside Bangkok. 
1960 The Lignite Electricity Organization was changed into the Lignite 
Authority and the first lignite power plant in Lampang, with an installed 
capacity of 13.5 MW, was firstly operated and the construction of another 
lignite power plant in Krabi was begun. 
1961 The Northern Bangkok Power Plant, with 75 MW installed capacity, firstly 
supplied electricity to Bangkok through MEA and became the largest 
power plant in the country at that time. 
1962 The North-Eastern Electricity Authority was founded to provide electricity 
service in the northeastern Thailand. 
1964 The Bhumibol Hydro power plant, with 70 MW installed capacity,  firstly 
generated electricity to the North and Central regions. At the same time, the 
Krabi lignite power plant began  its operation to supply electricity to the 
south of Thailand 
1966 The Ubonrattana Hydro power dam was operated to supply electricity to  
the northeastern Thailand 
1968 The high-voltage transmission line between Thai-Laos and the Nong khai 
province?? was firstly connected. 
1969 The three state-owned enterprises, namely theLignite Authority, the Yanhee 
Electricity Authority and the North-Eastern Electricity Authority, were 
united into the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) to take 
full responsibility and control over the electricity generation and 
transmission in the country.  
1971 The Southern Bangkok Power Plant was, for the first time, operated with an 
installed capacity of 200 MW. 
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Energy, 200412. 
 c) Emergence of Thai Civil Society 
Thai civil society has gradually, but crucially, emerged during this period. Over two 
decades of authoritarian governments, Thai civil society increasingly demanded for a 
“better governance system”which recognizes and assures people’s rights, as well as, 
allows and facilitates the participation of the Thai people. The Thai democratic 
movement was begun  by intellectuals and student activists in the late 1960s. 
However, the main focus of the movement was on the political systems and 
ideologies, rather than on development and environmental issues.  
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It is very important to note that, during this period, the concept of “development” as a 
“national progress” was very popular and less questionable in Thai society. The word 
“development” still generally meant something good for Thai people. The official 
request to “sacrifice for national development” could be raised without any strong 
resistance or even critical questions in the Thai public. In other words, the awareness 
of environmental degradation or, in a more political connotation, environmental 
exploitation was not clearly seen at this moment. However, the spirit of assuring 
people rights and meaningful participation within this democratic movement is 
certainly one of the core values of and also main contribution to the upcoming 
environmental movement in Thailand in the next period.  
 d) Conclusion 
The favorable economic and political situation and problems which were still 
unforeseen made the development and planning process seem very optimistic. In this 
period, the energy policy capacity was initially established and developed on the basis 
of a centralized state system, ready-made imported technology, and techno-economic 
imported expertise. The notion of “national development” as national progress was 
very powerful. “Energy” itself also maintained its symbolic characters of “national 
development”, “economic expansion” and “modernized society”. In short, it was the 
perfect formation period for the existing dominating power within the Thai power 
sector.  
 
4.3 Period of Political and Oil Crisis (1973-1986) 
 a) Crisis and Security Driving Forces  
Just like a wave, the political and economic situation, both at the international and the 
national level, led Thai society into a difficult period. At the international level, the oil 
crisis in 1973/74 and again in 1980/81 caused economic problems to the Thai energy 
systems, which were previously based on cheap imported oil. Thailand’s oil import 
share had increased drastically from 10% to 30% of its total import. At the national 
level, under the situation of higher oil prices and higher military expenditures, the 
economic burden, in terms of the balance of payment, had undoubtedly increased, 
followed by high inflation and economic decline.  
Moreover, the series of political conflicts within the country made Thai society 
unstable for more than a decade. First, it began with the October revolution in 1973 by 
the democratic movement mentioned above, leading to the new constitution and 
general election in 1975. However, in 1976, the military forces took over government 
again with an insurrection of bloodshed. Many intellectuals and student activists were 
forced to join the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in fighting against the Thai 
government. It was the strongest period of Thai communist movement. However, it 
did not last long. By 1981, the conflicts within CPT and the changes in the Thai-
Chinese relationship had weakened the CPT and the party collapsed in the late 1980s.  
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 b) Coping Strategy of the Thai Power Sector 
Certainly, Thai energy policy had to cope with this tough situation. Thailand’s coping 
strategies can be seen in four main ways. First, the Thai government aimed to reduce 
the oil import burden by focusing on domestic resources. The installed capacity of the 
Mae moh Lignite power plant, in Lampang, was increased from 150 MW in 1973 to 
1,125 MW in 1989, leading to heavy air pollution problems and mining-related 
problems around the area, up to now. The hydro power plants still played an 
important role in the Thai power system. Then, in 1981, Thailand had successfully 
discovered its own natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand (see also Table 4.3). With all 
these attempts, at the end of this period, the share of oil in fuel used for power 
generation was reduced significantly from 75% to 20%. However, it is also obvious 
that the Thai power sector has still, and possibly more, firmly relied on large-scale 
and fossil-based technology. 
Second, due to the increasing oil prices and thereby increasing  electricity tariffs, Thai 
government had to face a high inflation problem, together with a high unemployment 
rate caused by economic recession. In this period, the oil price became one of the 
most influential “political indexes”. In 1980, Prime Minister General Kriangsak had to 
resign from his positions since the parliament disagreed on his policy to increase oil 
taxes. Politically, the new Prime Minister, General Prem, had to decrease oil taxes and 
use the oil taxes fund to subsidy for lower electricity tariffs and retailed diesel prices. 
Even with the state subsidy, electricity tariffs increased four times during 1975-1981. 
The subsidy was abandoned in 1986, after the continuous reduction in the world oil 
prices. Therefore, the “compromising” mode of policy style forced the Thai 
government to avoid using pricing policy to reduce its import burden13. 
Third, the Thai government thus inevitably had to control electricity consumption by 
other means, especially, during the special dry period in 1979/80, when the water 
storage level in two large hydro power dams was historically low. The government 
initiated both voluntary programs and compulsory measures (for example, limiting 
service time for entertainment business, petrol station, and TV broadcasting). The 
famous slogan in this period was “namman kadklan kuikubfan kortongdubfai” (due to 
oil shortage, please switch off the light when talking with your lover). 
Because of economic recession and strict demand side management measures, the 
annual energy growth rate was only about 5% during this period. Unfortunately, after 
this crisis and new economic booming, these demand side management measures 
were totally abandoned and became “the bitter story” of the Thai public. Moreover, in 
later periods, the Thai government also used this bitter story as a counter-argument 
against opposition groups in pursuing its power expansion projects  
Last, like other oil-importing countries, during this period, the Thai government 
invested  in the development  of renewable technology as an alternative energy 
source. Regional centers for renewable energy development were established in all 
regions in Thailand. Various renewable energy projects, mainly with  international 
support, were implemented all over the country. Solar PV, biogas plants, and efficient 
cooking stoves were quite popular by the beginning of the 1980s. However, without 
an appropriate technological adaptation process and a proper maintenance program, 
few years later, most of these energy projects became one of the monuments of 
unsuccessful experiences in many local Thai villages.  
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Table 4.3 Historical Events of the Power Sector Development and Policies in 
Thailand during the Political and Oil Crisis (1973-1986)  
Time 
Period 
Historical Events 
1973 The first oil crisis hit the country leading to a sharp increasing of the trade 
deficit and generating costs of electricity. 
1975-
1981 
The electricity tariff was raised four times in 1975, 1977, 1980, 1981.  
1979-
1981 
The founding governor of EGAT became the Minister of Industry in the 
Prem Government 
1980-
1981 
The strict demand side management measures were implemented to cope 
with high oil prices and low water levels in the two largest hydro power 
dams (Bhumibol and Sirikit Dams). 
1981 The natural gas supply from the gulf of Thailand was operated for the first 
time and supplied fuel to the Bangpakong (in the central) and the Khanom 
(in the south) power plants to secure the electricity system in the central 
country and the southern region, respectively. 
1973-
1989 
The Mae Moh lignite power plants were expanded from 150 MW in 1973 
to 1,125 MW in 1989. 
1981-
1987 
Two large hydro power dams, namely Srinakarin and Vachiralongkorn 
hydro power dams, were built and operated in the Kanchaburi province and 
the Ratchaprapha hydro power dam was built in the south.  
1986 The National Energy Policy Office (NEPO) was formed under the Prime 
Minister’s Office as  a secretariat of the National Energy Policy Committee, 
to take care of the energy policy and planning process and to administrate 
the Energy Conservation Fund. 
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Energy, 200414 and Chuanchom S. Greacen and 
Chris Greacen, 200415. 
 
 c) Refocusing Strategy of Thai Civic Movement 
If the previous period was the initial step, this period is the crucial formation period of 
Thai civil society. The successful democratic movement against the dictatorial 
government in October 1973 led  to the flourish of civic movement and networks. The 
main focuses of the movement were still on political and human rights of 
disadvantaged groups in Thai society and on establishing a democratic system which 
would become the legacy of Thai civic movement.  
Due to the political situation, the movement had inevitably involved in the political 
ideology conflict and contest. This certainly increased the tension of society in 
relation to the future instability, and thus intensified the conflict within Thai society. 
Consequently, this situation stimulated the aggressive counter-revolution from 
conservative groups within the country. After the bloodshed in October 1979, many 
intellectuals and activists could not continue their roles and were forced to join the 
CPT.  
However, joining the communist movement was not the right choice for them. 
Therefore, after the Thai government initiated the compromising policy, the 
intellectuals and activists returned to their works. Some of them began to work as civil 
intellectuals and activists, this time mostly at the grassroots level, rather than focusing 
on political structure as they did before.  
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This can be defined as an important refocusing strategy of Thai civic movement. 
Although the outcomes of the new strategy cannot be seen yet in this period, these 
strategic shifts become the backbone strategy for Thai civic movement, clearly shown 
in the next period. Under this strategy, it is clear that development critique gradually 
but firmly emerged from the bottom level, based on grounded evidence and 
knowledge. 
 d) Conclusion 
Although the oil crisis proved that the newly established power system based on 
centralized and imported fuels and technology could be problematic, the lack of 
strong civic participation and alternative development concepts prevented this 
question from changing the direction of the Thai power system. The coping strategies 
were more or less the temporary measures. This is why all initiatives to cope with the 
crisis were quickly phased out from the agenda of Thai government and society. In 
general, the crisis did not lead to any significant improvement in the energy policy 
capacity, neither for the state nor society, contrary to what occurred in some countries, 
like Denmark for instance. The centralized power system and modernized symbol of 
energy still remained. However, the political crises helped Thai civic movement in 
refocusing the strategy and starting the new legacy of Thai civic movement, including 
the emerging of Thai environmental movement in the coming period. 
 
4.4 Economic Miracle and the Emergence of Sustainable Development (1987-
1996) 
a) The Two Driving Forces 
Thailand’s economic wave was turned up again in this period. It became the period of 
high economic growth and quite stable and favorable political conditions for 
economic expansion. Internationally, the cold war was coming to an end. The 
conflicts within the Indo-china sub-region were quite successfully resolved. The Thai 
government’s slogan of “plian sanamrob pen sanam karnkar” (changing the battle 
field to a trading place) was echoed. The influx of foreign investment boosted Thai 
economy to grow beyond 10% annually at the beginning of this period, before slightly 
slowing down to the rate of 8% of annual growth in the second half. The industrial 
sector clearly became the most important economic sector. The mindset was changed 
from “national security” to “opening-up” for economic opportunities and becoming 
one of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs).  
Concurrently, the domination of “Neo-liberalism” came to Thailand together with the 
powerful notion of “globalization”. The World Bank and IMF suggested the Thai 
government to open up the economy. The national economic strategy shifted from 
import-substitution to export-oriented industries. The Thai government actively 
reduced trade barriers and deregulated the financial market. The private sector 
invested increasingly in high profit public services, including telecommunication and 
power sectors. Privatization policy was also highly recommended by the World 
Bank16.  
However, the concepts of “sustainable development” and “public participation” were 
also echoed. They derived from both international and domestic movements and 
actions. The international community and forum persuaded and forced the Thai 
government to be more concerned about the environmental consequences of its 
development processes and activities. The new National Environmental Act came into 
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force in 1992 with new government organizations for environmental protection and 
more influence of Thai civil society.  
The Black May Uprising in 1992 has rooted the democratic and human rights 
principles and culture in Thai society. Various domestic experiences also confirm that, 
in many cases, the costs of development or the “sacrification for development” were 
usually too high, mostly unfair, and sometimes without sound justification. It was 
much clearer at that time that Thai society needed to internalize and operationalize our 
democratic culture into broader aspects and practices of public decision-making. 
Therefore, the emerging of both concepts has created the political opportunity 
structure and a new development language for upcoming environmental movement in 
Thailand. 
 b) Power Expansion and Privatization 
Undoubtedly, this became a busy period for power generation and expansion again. 
The annual growth of energy consumption increased from 5% in 1986 to 10% in 1987 
and 20% in 1989. The electricity peak demand increased from 4,000 MW in 1987 to 
10,000 MW in 1991. According to EGAT’s own words17, more than 1,000 MW of 
new installed capacity was needed every year. Certainly, this rapid demand growth 
threatened the EGAT system’s reliability. Especially, since in the previous period, 
EGAT also had to postpone some of their expansion projects to alleviate the foreign 
debt burden. To cope with this higher demand situation, EGAT had to speed up their 
investment plan and rely more on Natural Gas Combined-cycle power plants, which 
require a shorter installation time and also consume the domestic resource18. By 1992, 
the proportion of NGCC power plants in the total installed capacity had  increased 
dramatically from zero to 35%.  
The rapid demand expansion also offered a very good opportunity for economic 
liberalization policy advocates, especially the World Bank and the newly established 
National Energy Policy Office (or NEPO). Certainly, EGAT needed enormous 
financial resources to invest in its power expansion projects, including through the 
World Bank. Therefore, as conditions for EGAT’s loans and guarantee, the World 
Bank suggested the Thai government to allow private power producers to join this 
highly profitable business, in order to reduce the public debt burden and keep pace 
with the increasing domestic demand19.  
However, EGAT and EGAT’s labor union were aggressively against the proposal of 
privatization. In 1989, one minister, who supported the privatization policy, was 
forced to leave his position, after a big protest by EGAT’s labor union. Under the Thai 
compromising policy style, in 1992, EGAT set up their private company subsidiary 
called EGCO, to run their two new NGCC power plants and sell electricity back to 
EGAT20. Then, NEPO succeeded in forcing EGAT to launch the power-purchasing 
program for independent power producers (or IPPs for large producers) and small 
power producers (or SPP)21. Therefore, in this period, private producers emerged and 
started playing their roles on this energy policy stage. However, EGAT still maintains 
its monopoly position as the largest producer, as well as a single buyer and a system 
operator for all producers and consumers.  
Apart from private participation, economic liberalization policy advocates also 
succeeded in varying the energy prices, both domestic oil prices and electricity tariffs 
in 1992. However, there is a main difference between these two sectors. In the case of 
the domestic oil market, it is an oligopoly market with intense competition, especially 
when newcomer retailing petrol companies enter into the market. Oppositely, in the 
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power sector, varying the energy price (called Fuel Adjustment Mechanism or Ft), 
without competition and an effective regulatory framework might allow EGAT to 
place all investment and operation costs in the hands of the Thai consumer.  
 c) Power Expansion, Resistance, and Responses 
Unlike the modernization period in the 1960s, in this period, many power expansion 
projects, especially large hydro power dam projects, faced strong criticisms and 
resistances. It became more obvious to Thai society that previous large hydro power 
dams had caused serious negative impacts on ecosystems and human well-being. In 
1988, the movement of environmental experts, NGOs, students and local activists 
succeeded in opposing against the Num Chon dam project, which planned to turn the 
heart of the largest national forest area (which later became a world heritage site) into 
a large water reservoir. This successful action of opposition presented the crucial roles 
and potentials of Thai civil society in the development processes and started the 
legacy of the Thai environmental movement.  
In 1990, the movement accomplished again in pressuring the Thai government into 
canceling the Krang Krung hydro power dam project. Although the Pak Mun hydro 
power dam was finally built in 1992, after a long series of local protests together with 
a critical academic forum, EGAT had to pay a high compensation rate not only for 
private land, but also, for the first time, for common properties like fishery resources. 
After that, no large hydro power dam was built in Thailand22. Obviously, the 
contribution of hydro power to the overall power generation was sharply reduced 
from 20% in 1986 to 10% in 1996.   
Certainly, both domestic and international movements have forced the Thai 
government organizations to change their practices. The Thai government had clearly 
seen the new actors, the civil society, entering the energy policy arena. On the one 
hand, the government has applied a compromising policy style, like canceling the 
Krang Krung dam, pursuing the Pak Mun dam or paying higher compensation. On the 
other hand, the government organizations began to apply the concept of “sustainable 
development” and “environmental management” to their practice. In 1992 and 1993, 
the Thai government pushed the Energy Conservation Law into force and encouraged 
EGAT to start the Demand Side Management (DSM) program. However, although 
some initiatives were quite successful, these attempts were too small to cope with the 
increasing serious environmental impacts of a rapidly growing economy23. 
It is also very important to note that, in this period, the Thai government began to 
open some rooms for renewable energy. The SPP purchasing program, started in 
1994, was initially aimed to boost the renewable energy production. However, due to 
unfair buy-back rates and complicated purchasing procedures, renewable energy 
producers found great difficulties in developing and investing in these new 
technologies and in participating in the program. For the same amount of electricity 
produced, the renewable energy producers in the SPP program received less than 
EGAT’s own short-term avoided costs. There was no need to talk about the positive 
externalities. This is why the proportion of renewable energy in the SPP program was 
very low, only around 5% of the total SPP generation in this period.  
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Table 4.4 Historical Events of the Power Sector Development and Policies in 
Thailand during the economic miracle and the emergence  of sustainable 
development. (1987-1996) 
Time 
Period 
Historical Events 
1988 The big demonstrations and movement against the Nam Chon hydro power 
dam in Kanchanaburi emerged and led to the emergence of environmental 
movement in the Thai power sector. 
1989  EGAT’s Labor Union organized the big demonstration against the 
government’s idea of EGAT Privatization 
1992  The Anand government amended the EGAT act to allow  private producers 
to supply electricity to the system 
1992 EGAT established its first subsidiary private company, Electricity 
Generation Public Co., Ltd. (EGCO) by taking over EGAT’s two natural 
gas combined cycle power plants.  
1992 The Anand government introduced the automatic fuel adjustment 
mechanism (Ft), instead of the requirement for cabinet resolution for tariff 
adjustment. 
1993 EGCO was capitalized in Thailand’s stock Exchange 
1993 EGAT started its DSM program to relieve the burden of high demand 
increasing during economic boom. 
1994 EGAT announced Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and Small Power 
Producers (SPPs) offering to sell electricity to the grid. 
1994 The big protest, organized by the Assembly of the Poor, claimed for the 
compensation of fishery income losses during the three years of 
construction of the Pak Mun dam. Later, the government accepted to pay  a 
compensation. 
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Energy, 200424, Chuanchom S. Greacen and Chris 
Greacen, 200425, and Decharut Suukumnoed et al., 199926. 
 
 d) The Emergence of the Thai Environmental Movement  
As introduced earlier, the “Thai environmental movement” originally has its roots in 
the democratic movement of the 1970s. The refocusing strategy of intellectuals and 
activists in the beginning of the 1980s allowed this new movement to gain a firm 
ground, both in terms of local knowledge and experiences, and also local supports. In 
1988, unacceptable expected negative impacts of the Num Chon dam project sparked 
the movement formation of various environmental experts at universities and 
government organizations and activists in NGOs who joined the anti-dam campaign 
and mobilized the environmental movement.  
Through these networks and actions, the Thai environmental movement has 
introduced new words and new concepts to Thai society. The words “local wisdom”, 
“intellectual villagers”, “community rights”, “people-centered development”,  
“holistic approach”, and “community research” have echoed during this period. All 
these concepts were introduced synchronously with the ongoing democratic 
movement, which had tried to develop more “transparent and accountable” 
governance systems,  assure “citizen’s rights” and allow “meaningful public 
participation”. All these concepts from the two relating movements became the core 
of Thai civic movement in the 1990s. 
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With the supports of many academicis, the Thai environmental movement has 
increasingly participated in research and knowledge development. Although the 
knowledge derived from the movement is still recognized as an alternative to 
mainstream approach, it clearly shows a strong connection between “concepts”, 
“operational practices”, and “empirical outcomes”, leading Thai society to gradually 
apply these concepts to their attitudes and practices. By the end of this period, all 
these concepts became the core component of the 8th national development plan, 
which, for the first time, shifted its focus from economic expansion towards human-
centered development. More importantly, in 1997, the Thai civic movement 
successfully pressured the Thai government and parliament into drafting the new 
constitution, which asserts and assures human, local and community rights and public 
participation in the public policy and development processes.  
 e) Conclusion 
In this period, it was the first time that all three sectors; state, private, and civil 
society, played their roles together on the energy policy stage. The new mainstream 
concept of liberalization has introduced a new player, i.e. the private sector, which 
will share the high profits within the Thai power sector, though EGAT still maintain 
their superior monopoly power. Concurrently, from the part of civil society, a new 
development language was also developed around the world, challenging the 
mainstream practices and power rationality within Thai society. In general, the new 
environmental practices have been developed and adopted to various parts of Thai 
society. In energy policy, the costs of power expansion systems became clear to Thai 
society. Thus, the requests to “sacrifice for development” become more or less 
irrational. The symbols of “electricity” or the mindset of Thai society on “electricity” 
have been gradually changed. Electricity does no longer have an absolutely positive 
meaning. Costs have to be weighed. It was also clear that Thai society must initially 
demand a “sustainable development” of the new technology trajectory. 
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4.5 Economic Crisis and Recovery (1997-2000) 
 a) Contested Driving Forces 
The Asian economic crisis in 1997 turned down the Thai economic wave again. In 
some aspects, it was even worse than the economic recession of the 1980s. High 
foreign debt and limited foreign reserves forced the Thai government to join the IMF 
restructuring program and follow a number of policy conditions suggested by the 
IMF. In 1998, Thai economic growth became negative (-8%). After that, the 
economic recovery began slowly and continued until 2002.  
After the crisis, the financial market liberalization policy was blamed as the main 
booster for the expansion and collapse of the Thai “bubble” economy. The notion of 
“open-up” economy, thus, was somehow less powerful. The introduction of the king’s 
“sufficiency economy” philosophy, in December 1997, has influentially encouraged 
Thai society to find the moderate and more balanced path of economic development 
in order to self-immunize the country from the risky global economy. The concept of 
“sufficiency economy” emphasizes the notion of self-reliance (but not self-
protection), moderate living, stability (both short term and long term), and mutual 
benefits (both among people and between people and nature). The application of this 
concept can be seen in various policy arenas, especially later in the 9th National 
Development Plan (2002-2006)27. 
However, liberalization was still on the top of the agenda of international 
organizations and also the Thai government. To many Thais, this economic crisis was 
just the outcome of “misconducting” economy, not a “misconception” of the 
development direction. Therefore, they just looked for “yesterday once more”, not an 
alternative direction. These two concepts (sufficiency economy VS liberalization) 
have contested in various forms, implicitly and explicitly, in various public spheres 
and policy arenas. 
Another important event at the beginning of this period was the implementation of the 
New Constitution, in 1997, which asserted human and community rights, including 
the rights to participate in public policy formulation, administration processes, and 
environmental management. However, in practice, there are still a lot of obstacles for 
Thai people to exercise and protect their rights. Various independent organizations 
which appear in the constitution to protect the rights of the Thai people, for example 
an independent organization for consumer protection and an independent organization 
for environment assessment, have not yet been established at the present day. 
Similarly, the rules and the standard procedures for local community rights and public 
participations, as stressed in the constitution, are still undergoing very long procedures 
of preparation. In other words, the new basis is being formed, but  without clear rules 
for all stakeholders.  
 b) Overcapacity and Liberalization  
The main characteristic of the Thai energy sector, during this period, has been 
changed to an “overcapacity” situation. Due to economic contraction and recession, 
the demand for electricity decreased in 1998 and slightly increased after that. Apart 
from much lower demand growth, the hasty construction and contracting power 
expansion projects from the previous period have worsened the situation. The reserve 
margin of the Thai power system reached 40% from the normal criteria of 15%.  
Since the policy direction in the previous period was to encourage the private sector to 
invest and participate in the power sectors, all projects and contracts were set up on 
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the high profit-guarantee basis (15-20% internal rate of return guarantee), including 
guaranteed purchasing principle (or in Thailand, called the take-or-pay principle), 
exchange rate compensation, and front-end pricing system. Therefore, when demand 
was slowed down, all these benefits given to private enterprises became the high 
excessive costs for EGAT. As later mentioned by Prime Minister Thaksin, EGAT had 
over-invested, including already committed power-purchasing contracts, by 400 
billion THB (or about 10 billion USD).  
The overcapacity and higher cost situation pushed EGAT and NEPO to readjust the 
power demand forecasting and the power expansion plan. Their main limitation of the 
adjustment is still the “take-or-pay” principle in the purchasing contracts from private 
power producers and natural gas suppliers. What EGAT could do in this period was 
only to delay its own projects and, even, shut down its existing power plants. 
However, in 1998, the cabinet resolution prevented EGAT from accepting the offer 
(i.e. the purchasing contract) from non-renewable co-generation SPPs due to high 
electricity surplus, leading to the freezing of this previously rapid growth technology 
in the Thai power sector. 
Although the energy situation was totally different, from high growth to overcapacity, 
and the negative effects of previous privatization policies became much clearer to 
Thai society, the advocacy for privatization policy from the World Bank and NEPO 
was still powerful. The liberalization policy, in general, and the restructuring of the 
power system towards the “power pool” model, in particular, were strongly supported 
by the Chuen government. The new arguments were, firstly, to use the state-owned 
enterprises’ assets for alleviating the national financial difficulty and, secondly, to 
break down EGAT’s monopoly structure as a main source of inefficiency in the 
viewpoint of the Chuan government28.  
Following, the power pool model, EGAT’s vertical integration between generation 
and transmission will be broken down. The power pool will be a new system operator 
instead of EGAT. In other words, EGAT will concentrate only on the generation sub-
system. Moreover, to stimulate competition on the future power market, EGAT is 
recommended to separate into three generation companies29. To support this policy 
direction, in 1999-2000, EGAT also set up the new company for the Ratchaburi power 
plant, the new and largest power plant in the country, and capitalized it in the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) 30.In 1999, the Chuan government introduced the State 
Enterprise Corporatization Act, which allows the government to privatize state-owned 
enterprises without any amendment of each state enterprise act (i.e. without necessity 
to pass through the parliamentary process)31. 
As a result of its own financial hardship and the need for government credit guarantee, 
the resistance from EGAT was rather weak, especially compared to the previous 
one32. The main concerns came from Thai civic organizations, due to unclear 
regulation mechanisms to block or control well-known cross-sharing among existing 
and potential power producers in Thailand (later shown in Figure 4.3) as well as to 
control price manipulation within expected oligopolistic power markets33.  
In 2000, the Chuan government approved the master plan for the restructuring of the 
power sector and the establishment of the Thai power pool. Originally, the draft of the 
new energy act and power pool model was planned to be ready by 2003. However, 
after the Thaksin government came into power in 2001, this plan was blocked and 
finally cancelled in 2003. 
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 c) Thai Civic Movement in the Energy Sector 
In this period, Thai energy policy has changed significantly, after the emergence of 
specific civic movement in the energy sector, in two main ways.  
First, it is clear that strong local protests against various energy-related projects have 
occurred all over the country, including coal-fired power plants, transnational gas 
pipeline, and coal mining projects. On the one hand, the local protests can lead to a 
better human rights protection in Thai society. However, the situation of “opening 
new ground without clear rules”, due to the incomplete implementation of the new 
constitution, has turned protests into conflicts in most of the cases. Thus, almost all 
energy-related projects have reached deadlock in the “conflictual” mode of public 
decision-making. At least, two energy-related projects, the coal-fired power plants and 
the Thai-Malaysian Gas Pipeline, ended up with violation of local people.  
Second, NGOs and academics, who work on different energy issues, have formed the 
Sustainable Energy Network for Thailand (SENT) in 1998, aiming to connect all 
energy-related issues and co-ordinate civic actions towards the development of 
sustainable and democratic energy systems. In 1998, SENT and the Foundation for 
Consumers (FFC) helped Thai society to discover the unfair electricity pricing system 
and excessive EGAT over-investment costs. This public disclosure forced the Thai 
government to adjust the Ft pricing mechanism structure,  to allow the participation of 
customer representatives in the Ft pricing committee, and finally, to return an 
excessive and miscalculation payment back to Thai customers in 2001. More 
importantly, the movement has succeeded in changing the perceptions and attitudes of 
Thai society, that the investment in the power sector is not necessarily good for Thai 
economy, especially if it is made within a biased power structure and a closed system 
of vested interests.  
Another important action for the Thai civic movement is the campaign against two 
coal-fired power plants in Prachuab Kiri Khun. Throughout the campaign, local 
protesters have successfully shown the Thai public the problematic of environmental 
management practices. Later in 2000 and 2001, local people, together with some 
academics, proved several mistakes and cases of misinformation in official EIA 
reports, leading to a stronger societal demand for an overall EIA system reform.  
In 1999, inspired and supported by Danish renewable energy experiences, SENT 
succeeded in presenting an alternative energy development option, based on DSM, 
biomass, and micro-hydro power, to replace one coal-fired power plant. In the SENT 
report, the development objectives of the 8th National Development Plan were applied 
systematically for the comparison between the reference and alternative energy 
options. In other words, the sustainable development language was operationalized 
and the analysis showed the advantage of developing domestically based renewable 
technology, rather than imported coal-based technology and fuel. Apart from 
alternative solutions, SENT also suggested that the Thai government should change 
its way of power planning by emphasizing all related national development 
objectives, such as job creation, income distribution, or better environment, in the 
energy planning analysis, not only the least-cost solution as NEPO and EGAT always 
used to do34.  
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Table 4.5 Historical Events of the Power Sector Development and Policies in 
Thailand During the Economic Crisis and Recovery (1997-2000) 
Time 
Period 
Historical Events 
1997 The power-purchasing agreements (PPA) between EGAT and seven IPPs 
were signed in December 1997, although the economic crisis caused a huge 
reduction in power demand. 
1997 The Mae Moh Lignite power plant installed FGD for the first time to tackle 
down air emission problems.  
1997 The local protests against IPPs’ Coal-fired Power Plants in Prachuab Kiri 
Khun began. 
1998 Cabinet resolution was made to prevent the EGAT from accepting the offer 
from non-renewable co-generation SPPs due to a high reserve surplus. 
1998 The Foundation for Consumers (FFC) and the Sustainable Energy Network 
for Thailand (SENT) criticized for the first time the unfair Ft and tariff 
mechanism. 
1999 EGAT set up its second subsidiary, Ratchaburi Holding Public Co, Ltd. 
(RATCH) by taking over EGAT’s Ratchburi NGCC power plant. Later, 
RATCH also capitalized in the Thailand stock exchange. 
1999  The Chuan government introduced the State Enterprise Corporatization 
Act, which allow the government to privatize state-owned enterprises 
without any amendment to the individual state enterprise act.  
1999 SENT launched the study of the alternative solution to the coal-fired power 
plant in Prachuab Kiri Khun and urged for more investment in renewable 
energy, together with more public participation and a broader focus in the 
planning process.  
2000 The Chuan government announced the master plan for the electricity supply 
industry reform and the Thailand power pool with the aim to establish the 
power pool by 2003. 
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Energy, 200435, Chuanchom S. Greacen and Chris 
Greacen, 200436, and Decharut Suukumnoed et al., 199937. 
On the issue of privatization and power structure, SENT and FFC had criticized the 
power pool model. The oligopolistic structure of the power pool model was the main 
concern of SENT and FFC, since tight shareholding relations existed among EGAT 
and private power producers in Thailand. It became more obvious when the Thai 
government denied establishing a clear mechanism to regulate these shareholding 
relations between the IPPs in the draft of a new energy act38.  
 d) Conclusion 
The diverse policy-driving forces, the two contrasting development concepts, and the 
three societal sectors have played crucial roles in relation to Thai energy policy. In 
this period, thus, Thai energy policy becomes much more complicated and dynamic. 
Several issues in the Thai power sector, which were previously taken for granted, are 
now uncovered and discussed in Thai society. However, the state still maintains its 
power and determines the main policy direction in various aspects. The private sector 
still limits its role to the protection of its profits to a joined privatization policy. 
Although Thai civic movement has actively mobilized to implement changes and has 
already succeeded in some areas, it is still far from changing the whole structure of 
the Thai power sector and reaching a sustainable energy future.  
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4.6 The Thaksin Government and the Domination of the National Champion 
(2001-2006) 
a) The Political Factor of the National Champion 
The landslide election victory and the coming into power of the Thaksin government 
in 2001 have notably changed the development discourse and policy arena. The main 
focus of the Thaksin government is the “competitiveness of nations”. The differences 
between these two related concepts, liberalization and competitiveness of the nation, 
are illustrated by the fact that the government has turned to support a “monopoly” 
model in some specific sectors, such as the power sector, for the sake of national 
competitiveness on the regional market. On the other hand, the government decided to 
liberalize air transportation services, also for the sake of “competitiveness of the 
nation”. Since, to compete with other nations, this new concept does not comply with 
any particular theories or principles, it allows the Thaksin government to rationalize 
its diverse policy directions in various and sometimes opposite ways. 
Due to a good economic situation and the populist policies of the Thaksin 
government, the vast majorities in the Parliament and the high popularity among Thai 
voters, , allow the government to introduce and implement various policy initiatives in 
order to increase “national competitiveness”, including the reshuffle of the public 
administration system into a  more “efficient centralized system”. By 2003, the 
economic recovery seems to influence Thai society to believe more in the 
“competitiveness of the nation” model, which is later called “Thaksinomics”. Other 
concepts discussed in society and stated in the 8th and the 9th National Development 
Plans, such as “sustainable development”, “social capital”, and “good governance”, 
have now been reinterpreted by the government and included in the umbrella concept 
of the “competitiveness of the nation”.  
b) National Champion and New Privatization Idea 
In terms of privatization of the Thai power sector, the Thaksin government decided to 
postpone and, then, cancel the implementation of the power pool model in 2003. In 
the perspective of the Thaksin government, EGAT should maintain its monopolistic 
power in power generation and transmission, but sell part of its shares in SET. 
According to the new model, the participation of the private sector would be as a 
single buyer under EGAT control and regulation, which is usually called the 
“enhanced single buyer” model39.  
The opposite policy direction change is the result of two main policy reasons. First, 
according to the main national competitiveness strategy, which plans to develop 
Thailand into the “hub” of the regions in various sectors, including the energy 
sector40, the Thaksin government prefers EGAT to maintain its monopoly power and 
act as the strong national player on the future regional market or so-called ASEAN 
grid system.  
Second, since the capitalization through SET was seen as one of the main instruments 
to accelerate national economic recovery, reduce public debt burden and improve the 
competitiveness of the nation, the Thaksin government has a clear plan to capitalize or 
sell part of the shares of highly profitable state-owned enterprises, like Petroleum 
Authority of Thailand (PTT) and EGAT, in SET41. Following this logic, it is clear that 
EGAT’s monopoly power will ensure its future profitability and, therefore, raise the 
demand and the market values in the stock exchange.  
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According to the former governor of EGAT, this model is also acceptable and more 
preferable to EGAT than the power pool model, since EGAT can keep its own 
organization (instead of dividing into three generation firms and another transmission 
firm) and its monopolistic position within the Thai power system42. At the same time, 
according to the Minister of Energy, EGAT can mobilize the financial resources from 
the stock market to investment in the new expected economic growth period. 
In 2001, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) was the first state enterprise in 
the energy sector that has been privatized to become the PTT Public Company and 
successfully sold its shares on the stock market. The value of PTT’s shares has 
increased from 35 Baht to 230 Baht in 4 years, which means that the PTT Public 
Company will serve  as a model for other state enterprise privatizations.  
Concurrently, the government restructured the administrative system with the new 
rearrangement of the central authority. The Ministry of Energy was established in 
2002, merging all agencies related to the energy field. The National Energy Policy 
Office changed its name to the Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO). Under the 
new ministry, the roles regarding electricity policy have been transferred directly to 
the ministry and the executive body, rather than the delegation of NEPO. As the first 
step of the new ministry, the National Energy Strategy was announced in August 
2003. 
 c) EGAT Privatization Process 
At the end of 2003, the government proposed the Enhanced Single Buyers as a pilot 
model in the EGAT privatization and electricity system restructuring. This model was 
based on a study by Boston Consulting Group, which proposed to maintain the 
authority and the role of EGAT as a single buyer, responsible for the united power 
production and the transmission system in order to maintain power system stability. 
Under this model, the government would privatize the EGAT on the stock market to 
achieve sufficient investment capital to expand the power generation capacity and 
electricity system in response to increasing electricity demands of the future.  
At the initial stage, the government expected to complete the EGAT privatization 
within 2004. The public hearing was conducted at the beginning of 2004. Later, civic 
groups together with State Enterprise Labor Unions (led by the EGAT Labor union) 
opposed the government proposal and held various demonstrations, resulting in 
critiques in society and in academic forums. During March 2004, the government 
announced the postponement of the EGAT privatization, stating that further study 
would be conducted before taking the next policy decision.  
The civil society movement and public attention rapidly reduced its attention after the 
postponement. Public hearings were held and opinions were gathered from relating 
sectors such as the Ministry of Energy, EGAT, EGAT Labor Union and the civil 
society sector (including the National Economic and Social Advisory Council 
(NESAC) in June 2004. Unfortunately, the results of such hearings came out late 
(mid-2005), and it was not responded by any sectors in society43.   
After the second landslide victory in the general election in February 2005, the Taksin 
government  once again initiated the EGAT privatization. Prior to the election, the 
EGAT governor (Mr. Kraisri Kannasoot) proposed a series of findings from studies of 
EGAT privatization alternatives. Hearings and a survey of the EGAT staff opinions 
led to internal negotiations between EGAT and the government. Several issues 
discussed were the integration of power production and transmission system into 
EGAT; the designation of EGAT’s proportion for new power plant constructions at 
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50%; and extra benefits from the privatization to the EGAT staff44. At the same time, 
the government announced the Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on the 
Electricity Regulatory Commission in March 2005 to secure the issues previously 
criticized by various sectors. Finally, the EGAT Public Company was established on 
23 June 2005.   
Surprisingly, the EGAT privatization process in 2005 was carried out without strong 
public attentions compared with the reactions in 2004. The EGAT Labor union was 
much less powerful in its anti-privatization attempt, partly due to the reduced support 
from EGAT employees after receiving an extra benefit package from the government.  
The position of the civil society sector became prominent in September 2005 when it 
was suggested to restructure electricity tariffs and to increase electricity tariffs to 
lessen the burden of EGAT prior to the sale of its shares on the stock market. The 
civic groups then began the movement against the EGAT privatization and against the 
increased burden of electricity tariffs. To relieve the political pressure, the 
government decided that EGAT should be responsible for 21,000 million baht of the 
Ft burden, while the electricity base tariff would be fixed for 3 years. The PTT Public 
Company should average part of the high natural gas price to be collected in the 
future, so that the electricity tariffs of October 2005-January 2006 would not be as 
high as to stimulate more opposition and would thus not become an obstacle to the 
EGAT privatization.  
In November 2005, a group of researchers (including the author) presented the 
preliminary results of a governance assessment study, showing the lacks of public 
participation and accountability in the EGAT privatization process. Later, the 
Confederation of Consumer Organization (CCO) submitted the petition to the 
Administrative Court for the suspension of EGAT’s stock allocation on the stock 
market due to its large-scale negative impacts on public interests. On 17 November 
2005, the Administrative Court ordered the temporary suspensions of EGAT’s share 
allocation, until there is any order deemed appropriate. Finally, in March 2006, the 
Supreme Administrative Court ruled to cancel the two royal decrees for the EGAT 
privatization due to unlawful actions, and therefore, the already privatized EGAT 
public company became EGAT again45. 
d) Target and Growth of Renewable Energy 
Apart from the privatization policy, another important aspect of the Thaksin 
government’s policy on the Thai power sector is the renewable energy development 
policy. Renewable energy and energy efficiency were  the main components of the 
National Energy Strategy, announced in August 2003. Although earlier Thai 
governments have announced national energy policies or strategies, this was the first 
time that the government set up clear targets and policy mechanism for renewable 
energy development. It was also the first time that very high potentials of renewable 
energy  (more than 15,000 MW, see Chapter 3 for details) were accepted by the 
government organizations46, compared to less than 3,000 MW in most of the NEPO 
documents published during public debates on the controversial coal-fired power 
plants. 
The two main targets in the National Energy Strategy were a) the reduction of energy 
intensity from 1.4 to 1 (between the growth of energy consumption and GDP) and b) 
the 8% contribution of modern renewable energy in total energy consumption by 
2011. For the power sector, the target of 6% renewable contribution in total electricity 
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generation by 2011 was also set up47. In other words, the Thai government aimed to 
reach 2,400 MW of renewable power generation by 2011. 
In fact, the Thai government has created a space for renewable energy, since the 
introduction of SPPs in 1994. However, because the criteria of firm and non-firm 
SPPs with different buying prices make renewable energy investment less attractive 
(detailed discussion provided in Chapter 7), in 2002, the Encon Fund decided to 
provide a five-year subsidy through the bidding program for 300 MW. Although the 
subsidy was limited to the first 5 years of operation, the cheaper solutions (due to the 
bidding system) and only for one round offer, it provided good initiatives for 
investment and for access to the grid. 
In the National Energy Strategy, apart from existing SPPs, the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) was announced as the main policy mechanism without any prior 
public consultation. This has led to the strong criticism of several organizations, 
including academic organizations, NGOs, and even EPPO. According to these 
organizations, RPS will create complications and uncertainties for renewable energy 
producers. They suggest applying feed-in tariffs instead. In practice, up to 2006, RPS 
has not yet been applied and government tends to shift from RPS to feed-in tariffs 
after the 3 years of policy discussions about these two pricing regulations (detailed 
discussion in Chapters 7 and 8). 
Although the main policy mechanism is not yet in place, renewable energy, especially 
biomass energy SPPs, has grown very fast. As presented in Chapter 3, the installed 
capacity of renewable SPPs has increased from less than 300 MW in 2000 to 928 MW 
in 2005. By mid-2006, the total installed capacity of all renewable energy producers 
reaches 1,000 MW. The main reasons for the rapid expansion are, a) the better 
utilization of renewable resources, b) the learning curve of technological 
development, and c) the increasing fuel prices and electricity tariffs. As a result of this 
impressive expansion, in 2005, the Federation of Thai Industry, one of the most 
influential business organizations in Thailand, set up a new group for renewable 
energy producers. 
Concurrently, the Thai civic movement, led by the Appropriate Technology 
Association (ATA), also played a key role in renewable energy technology 
development. Local knowledge on renewable energy and local energy planning was 
begun, disseminated, and accumulated. According to the Thai civic movement, all 
these attempts have created the great connection between sustainable energy 
development and the king’s philosophy of “sufficient economy”, since the most 
important benefits of these renewable energy innovations are, a) the increase in 
demand for domestic agricultural products, b), thus, the raise in farm prices and 
increased price stability, and c) the reduction of the import bill. In other words, they 
pave the way for a self-immunization of Thai economy from global market variations, 
both on energy and agricultural markets. 
 
e) The Expanding Roles of Civic Movement in the Thai Power Sector 
The roles of civic movement have been continuously expanded in this period. During 
2001-2002, SENT, FFC, and other civic groups were formallyinvited to participate  in 
several decision-making processes. In 2001, SENT and FFC took part of a Ft revising 
sub-committee in pursuing  a better tariff system. Later, in 2001, SENT also 
participated in the decision to open the Pak Mun dam gate for ecosystem and 
livelihood recovery. Lastly, in December 2001, SENT also took part in the televised 
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public debates over the necessity of the coal-fired power plants in Prachaub Kiri Khun 
together with NEPO and environmental NGOs.  
In case of the coal-fired power plants in Prachaub Kiri Khun, when the Thai 
government was close to the decision-making deadline, SENT and FFC also amply 
informed the government and public that, “within the high overcapacity situation, 
over-demand forecasting and the excessive investment in these two coal-fired power 
plants would lead to the increasing of  the electricity bill for Thai customers”. Finally, 
in 2002, the Thai government decided to cancel these two projects and change to 
natural gas.  
Although during 2001-2002, the contributions of civic movement influenced the 
formal government decision in several cases, it was still mainly on a case-by-case 
basis. In other words, the overall power structure could not be significantly changed. 
From 2003, Palangthai, CCO, NESAC, and the Health Systems Research Institute 
(HSRI) became the leading actors in civic movement and they moved towards more 
structural issues and renewable energy policy. 
In the civic movement perspective, the proposed “enhanced single buyer” model, 
based on a private monopoly structure, will worsen the situation, especially in relation 
to consumer protection and sustainable energy development. In 2004, Palangthai and 
CCO succeeded in the prediction that the Thaksin government would allow EGAT to 
raise the electricity tariff before launching in the Stock Exchange of Thailand, and it 
did happen in February 2004. Subsequently, the civic groups and the EGAT Labor 
Union joined hands in protesting against the EGAT privatization, leading to the 
postponement of the privatization process in March 2004, as mentioned before. 
It is interesting to note that, although the civic groups and the EGAT Labor Union 
protested against the same privatization proposal in 2004, they used somehow 
different languages, as shown in Figure 4.1, which contained different policy 
meanings or interpretations. In the case of the EGAT Labor Union, the main message 
is “selling (privatizing) Water and Power Utilities will kill the whole Thai nation”. In 
other words, the union highlights the whole Thai nation, as linked to the concept of 
nationalism and national security. And, at the same time, the word “sell” or 
“privatize” is highlighted. Contrastingly, the message of the civic group emphasizes 
the competitive priorities between “people” and “profit”, which implicitly means that 
the extra profit, even within the existing EGAT monopoly structure, should also be 
eliminated not only stopping its privatization.  
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F i g u r e  4 . 1  D i f f e r e n t  P o l i c y  M e s s a g e s  
i n  A n t i  E G A T  P r i v a t i z a t i o n  C a m p a i g n
E G A T  L a b o r  U n i o n ’ s  M e s s a g e
“ S e l l i n g  W a t e r  a n d  P o w e r  
U t i l i t i e s  w i l l  k i l l  t h e  w h o le  T h a i  
n a t i o n ”
C i v i c  g r o u p s ’ M e s s a g e
“ P e o p l e b e f o r e  t h e  P r o f i t ”
 
Note: The highlights are made by the author.  
After the postponement of the EGAT privatization, NESAC developed the first 
alternative model of the Thai power structure, introduced by the civil society group 
(later in this study, the model will be termed decentralization model) and presented to 
the Senate commission in June 200448. Later, NESAC, by Mr. Witoon 
Permpongsacharoen, also proposed the alternative power development plan mainly to 
reduce EGAT’s investment burden, which is used by the Thaksin government as a 
main argument for EGAT privatization49.  
Concurrently, Palangthai and HSRI also organized the policy forum suggesting the 
Thai government to move from RPS mechanisms to a feed-in tariff system (the 
detailed discussion of these two regulations will be presented in Chapter 7). These 
activities represent an attempt of the Thai civic movement to move towards more 
structural changes. 
However, Thai civic groups still have the limited ability to raise public attention to the 
EGAT privatization and other issues, leading to the government’s fast move in the 
privatization process in 2005. This is also partly due to the fact that EGAT’s Labor 
Union looses its strong supports and, thereby, its influential power. Fortunately, by 
September 2005, Thai civic groups are able to gain public attention again, when the 
government proposes to raise electricity tariffs before launching EGAT in SET. As 
already mentioned, this attempt finally leads to the stronger protests, the petition to 
the Court, and the cancellation of the EGAT privatization.  
Through this long story, it is quite clear that the roles of Thai civic movement in the 
power sector have been expanded into more structural issues and moved in a policy 
direction. The final judgment of the Supreme Administrative court to cancel the two 
royal decrees is certainly a significant step for the Thai public on the way to gaining 
more control of their own power system. 
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Table 4.6 Historical Events of the Power Sector Development and Policies in 
Thailand during the Thaksin Government (2001-2006) 
Time 
Period 
Historical Events 
2001 FFC and SENT organized a public forum and later protest against unfair tariff 
surging after the commissioning of the Ratchaburi power plant, leading to the set-
up of an ad hoc committee to review the Ft mechanism. 
2001 The Thaksin government announced a one-year Pak Mun dam’s gate opening for 
ecosystem and livelihood recovery after the World Commission’s study on the 
dam had presented significant negative impacts of the dam on the local people and 
ecosystem in 2000. 
2001 The televised public debates over the necessity of the coal-fired power plants in 
Prachaub Kiri Khun between NEPO and Environmental NGOs, SENT. 
2001 The Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) was privatized under the State 
Enterprise Corporatization Act and later capitalized in the stock exchange. 
2002 The Energy Conservation Fund (Encon Fund) offered the 5-years subsidy for new 
renewable SPPs for 300 MW under the tendering system.  
2002 The Ministry of Energy was established under the Thaksin government’s 
bureaucratic reform, uniting all government organizations and state-enterprises 
working on energy issues. 
2002 Two coal-fired power plants in Prachaub Kiri Khun were cancelled and changed 
their fuel to natural gas and their location to Ratchaburi and Saraburi. 
2003 The Thaksin government proposed the master plan for establishing the power pool 
and later announced the Enhanced Single Buyer (ESB) model as the structural 
model for the Thai power system and the EGAT privatization 
2003 The Ministry of Energy announced the National Energy Strategy for 
competitiveness with the targets of 6% renewable energy in power generation and 
1:1 energy intensity in comparison to GDP growth. 
2004 The Thaksin government initiated the EGAT privatization process with the target 
to capitalize EGAT in the stock exchange by mid-2004. 
2004 The EGAT Labor Union and civic groups organized a big protest against the 
EGAT privatization plan, leading to the government’s cancellation of this plan. 
2004 The National Economic and Social Advisory Council (NESAC) introduced the 
decentralization model as an alternative to the ESB model and also introduced an 
alternative PDP in comparison to EGAT’s PDP-2004. 
2005 After winning a landslide election, the Thaksin government began the EGAT 
privatization process again. In June, the government announced the completion of 
the EGAT privatization process, without strong opposition from the Labor Union 
or civic groups.  
2005 From September 2005, FFC and CCO organized a protest against the EGAT 
privatization and accused the Thai government of unlawful actions in the Supreme 
Administrative Court. In November 2005, the Supreme Administrative Court took 
the decision to postpone the EGAT privatization process for the court’s 
consideration. 
2005 The Federation of Thai Industry (FTI) formed a network of renewable power 
producers and suggested the implementation of the feed-in tariff system. 
2005 The Ministry of Energy established the Interim Regulator. 
2006 The Supreme Administrative Court announced the final decision in cancelling the 
EGAT privatization process due to unlawful process. 
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f) Conclusion 
The latest period becomes the period in which all policy actors play crucial roles in 
shaping the policy directions of the Thai power sector. It is the period in which we 
experience the strongest political powers and, at the same time, the more expanded 
roles of civic movement. It is a period in which policy-making is increasingly out of 
the full control of government or authorities and closed door negotiation is combined 
by more public negotiation and deliberation. However, it does not mean that the 
government and EGAT have lost their control and power. Oppositely, they are still 
more powerful than others, but their power is now limited through some specific 
political or public conditions. Evidently, their predominant power and rationality are 
now increasingly subject to questions and discussions, leading to more space for 
public participation, deliberation, and new policy directions. 
 
4.7 The Structure of the Thai Power Sector 
a) Centralized Power System in Thailand 
From the 1960s, the Thai power system has been based on three state-owned 
enterprises, namely the Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT) for 
generation and transmission, the Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA), and the 
Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) for distribution in the Greater Bangkok and 
other areas, respectively. Moreover, the supply of natural gas, the main fuel sources 
for power generation, is also controlled by the Petroleum Authority of Thailand 
(PTT)50 .  
From 1992, the private power producers have been allowed to generate power and sell 
power to the grid through EGAT. In 2005, around 50% of the power generation were 
still operated by EGAT and 39% were controlled by 6 independent power producers 
(IPPs)51 , of which the 2 largest IPPs were EGAT’s subsidiaries (equal to 27% of the 
total power generation). All of them relied on the centralized power and fossil fuel 
technology. The contribution of small power producers (SPP) using renewable energy 
and co-generation was only around 10%52.  
Of the total turnover of almost 240 billion THB in 2002, these four enterprises and 
subsidiaries absorbed more than 90% (Figure 4.2). The total profit margin within the 
system summed up to 38% of the turnover53. The high control of power and profit, 
combined with a new trend in vertical integration, like establishing new IPPs, and 
capitalization in the stock exchange market, encourage them to maintain the fossil 
fuel-based centralized power system, as their path dependency. Unsurprisingly, 
EGAT’s contribution to renewable energy generation is only 0.54 MW and 1.8 GWh 
a year54 .  
Recently, EGAT has proposed a future structure of the power generation sector with 
even more centralized power plants55. In EGAT’s Power Development Plan 2004 
(PDP2004), the contribution of distributed generation will be reduced from 11.3% in 
2003 to 6.9% in 2015. According to PDP2004, new installed power plants will mostly 
be developed by new IPPs based on centralized power generation, through the bidding 
program of the EGAT power purchasing agreement. It is quite clear that the market 
structure and the planning process of the Thai power sector provide little room for 
distributed generation, including renewable power generation. 
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 b) Private Sector: High Profit, But Not Yet High Power 
As mentioned earlier, since the previous period, the liberalization process has 
introduced new players on the energy policy stage, the private sector. Due to the main 
differences in their structures, sizes, and interests, it is necessary to divide this sector 
into four main groups as follows;  
• EGAT subsidiaries power producers, namely EGCO and RATCH, who 
share 22% of total installed capacity and 27% of total electricity sales. 
These EGAT subsidiaries become the largest private producers. Moreover, 
they still hold the major share in several IPPs and SPPs (see Figure 4.3). It 
is possible to perceive them as EGAT’s key players to gain profit from 
privatization policy and maintain EGAT’s power over the power market.  
• Independent Power Producers (IPP) who are altogether now 4 
companies and now share 9% of total installed capacity and 12% of total 
electricity sales. Their power plants are mostly larger than 700 MW, based 
on coal-fired and natural gas combined cycle technologies. These 
producers are mainly the joint venture between trans-national companies, 
Thai large business firms, and EGAT and PTT subsidiaries (also see figure 
4.3).  
• Small Power Producers (SPPs) who own the combined heat and power 
plants, which are lower than 90 MW of power sold to the grid. Generally, 
they are big industrial companies in Thailand. All together (31 firms), they 
share around 8% of installed capacity. These SPPs get the highest buying 
price because of, according to NEPO, their higher efficiency in producing 
both power and heat for industrial estates. However, these power 
producers are still based on fossil fuel technology. As mentioned earlier in 
1998, Cabinet had a resolution for EGAT to stop buying power from new 
co-generation SPPs, due to a high reserve margin in the power system.  
• Renewable Small Power Producers (Renewable SPPs) who are also 
small and very small power producers, based on biomass and other 
renewable resources. Mostly, they are recognized as the non-firm SPP, 
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since most of them cannot provide firm power generation to EGAT. 
Consequently, they get the lowest buying price from EGAT. According to 
this rule, it is clear that their environmental and social benefits are not 
included. Partly because they are small (all together 103 firms and share 
only 2% of install capacities) and, for some of them, power generation is 
only a by-product of their main business, they are less organized and also 
less powerful. Hopefully, the initiatives from FTI, in 2005, in setting 
renewable energy group will lead to more influential participation in the 
policy process. 
It can be seen that, although the private sector becomes the new major player, this 
sector cannot change much the power relations in Thai energy policy, since more than 
80% of the total installed capacity is still under control of EGAT and its subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, the centralized powerful organizations, like PTT and EGAT, also hold a 
major share in several private producers, both IPPs and SPPs as shown in Figure 4.3. 
In fact, they are less likely to be called “independent” power producers, due to their 
strong business connections with EGAT and PTT. Oppositely, the renewable energy 
producers are still too small, discriminated, and less powerful. Under this condition, 
without any new policy driving forces, it is hard to expect any significant changes in 
the Thai energy policy coming directly or mainly from this private sector, at least in 
the near future. 
 c) Confusing Policy Roles 
Apart from a superior market structure, the powerful state-owned enterprises, like 
PTT and EGAT, also have crucial roles in regulation and policy formulation (the 
detailed discussion will be presented in Chapter 7), which can easily turn out to be an 
institutional barrier to other competitors. The EGAT’s authority in power plant 
approval is one good example of the conflicting roles of the Thai power sector. In the 
case of PTT, the obligation of EGAT to buy natural gas only from PTT is another 
good example. Before 2001, only NEPO had more or less balanced influences on the 
policy formulation in the Thai power sector. 
After the establishment of the Ministry of Energy in the Thaksin government, many 
policy roles were transferred from both NEPO and EGAT to the minister. NEPO 
changed its name to Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO). Under the new 
ministry, roles regarding electricity policy have been transferred directly to the 
ministry and the executive body. Even though EPPO may still be considered the 
distinct agency for energy policy and planning, there is no condition to which the 
executive body must  formally consult or respond in relation to its proposal. 
Moreover, the operation of EPPO and the annual budget allocation depend upon the 
consideration of the Ministry of Energy.  
However, since there is no provision prohibiting key personnel in the Ministry to 
engage in electricity business, several officials from the Ministry of Energy were 
designated as committee members in various companies related to the electricity 
sector, including PTT and its subsidiaries, EGCO, and RATCH, which may easily 
lead to conflict of interest issues56.
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4.8 Evolution of Policy Processes in the Thai Power Sector 
 4.8.1 Linear Policy Processes 
Obviously, the Thai power sector was primarily designed for the linear policy and 
planning process, within the full control of EGAT. As mentioned by Dr. Kasem 
Chatikawanich, even politicians (which certainly included the Thai government) were 
blocked from involving in EGAT planning and administration. This linear policy model 
has been supported by several techno-economic planning models and criteria, including 
the power development plan and a 15% minimum reserved margin in order to find the 
best-rationalized solutions to society. This model worked as the sole policy model during 
the second and the third periods (from 1957-1986). 
The challenges to this model occurred in the forth period (1987-1996), when a) the World 
Bank and the Thai government shifted their policy towards more private sector’s 
participation, b) NEPO was established to take care of energy policy in Thailand, and c) 
the Thai people began to protest against several government projects. However, the 
outcomes of these challenges generally ended up with the policy negotiation within the 
formal policy process. One of the examples is the decision to allow EGAT to establish 
EGCO, as the first IPP, in order to push the IPP-purchasing policy. In other words, the 
other sectors in Thai society still never got involved in the policy process at that moment. 
The real challenge to this model, perhaps, has been more clearly seen after the economic 
crisis, in the fifth and sixth periods (1997-presents). This is basically because the 
previous promises of the government seem to provide the opposite results and 
consequently economic hardship to Thai economy. The IPP policy with the fully 
attractive benefits to investors contributed to the tariff surge and EGAT’s financial 
burden rather than to alleviate these, as claimed before. As discovered by SENT and 
FFC, the fuel adjustment mechanism incorporated several cost items apart from the fuel 
fluctuation as it used to be in the beginning, allowing EGAT to charge consumers for 
excessive costs. The load forecast was normally too high compared to the actual ones, 
leading to an over-investment and later tariff surging. The study of the World 
Commission on Dam in 2001 also questioned EGAT’s and the government’s decision 
criteria and analyses of the Pak Mun Hydro power plant project, because the dam hardly 
showed an economic justification (even without consideration of its negative external 
costs).  
Despite the strong criticisms, both the Thai government and EGAT still try to keep the 
linear policy model, such as power development planning or later EGAT privatization, as 
the main policy process. They do not allow meaningful participation from other sectors in 
society, especially from the civil society sector.  
In the latest period (2001-present), this linear policy model faces the strong political 
power of the Thaksin government. In the Thaksin government, the political vision like 
“the national champion” can change the policy direction without conventional 
rationalization model or analysis. The best example is the EGAT privatization, which was 
introduced without any policy comparative study. Consequently, the present EGAT 
power development plan (PDP2004) was set up to support the EGAT privatization and its 
deals (such as the EGAT’s quota of 50% construction of new power plants) without the 
least-cost analysis, as normally done before. 
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 4.8.2 Policy Negotiation 
With the decline of the linear policy model, policy negotiation seems to be more obvious 
and perhaps becomes the most relevant policy model the in Thai power sector. In fact, the 
policy negotiation model has been increasingly visible through the struggles over the 
privatization (and anti-privatization) policy, as already explained before. 
The policy negotiation model seems to start behind closed doors, before opening the 
doors to more public negotiation and participation. In the closed-door negotiation, 
obviously, the protection of vested interests and the profit sharing of powerful 
newcomers are discussed with clear threats to public interests. During 1992-1997, the IPP 
policy was developed to provide very attractive returns to private investors and the first 
private investors are EGAT’s subsidiaries. In recent years, EGAT was forced by the 
Thaksin government to privatize and, in return, EGAT will hold the rights for 50% of the 
new power plant projects as well as maintain several state authorities. 
Later, public negotiations become more important. Public negotiations were first linked 
to the project resistances and then expanded to more structural issues, such as 
privatization policy. However, the power of public negotiation depends very much on 
political and economic situations in Thai society. For example, the cancellation of coal-
fired power plants was highly linked to the excessive reserve margin and over-investment 
problem. The success of the latest anti-privatization campaign was also coincident with 
the sharp decline of the political popularity of the Thaksin government in the late 2005. 
 4.8.3 Public Resistance 
After 1988 and more obvious after 1997, Thai civic movements have increasingly played 
a role in Thai power policy. Usually, the dynamics of Thai civic movement is the history 
of resistance. In the power sector, it is resistance against government policy, planning, 
determination, and technological development, which cause power effect on them in 
different ways. The resistance comes from different parts of society, namely affected 
communities, consumers, NGOs, and academics, who act differently in their struggles.  
According to Foucault58, analyzing the resistance can be another way to understand a new 
economy of power relation, by “taking the forms of resistance against forms of power as 
a starting point”. In his own words, he suggested to “use this resistance as a chemical 
catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, finding out their 
points of application, and methods used”. In other words, he suggested that, “we can 
analyze power relations through the antagonism of strategies”. 
 a) Struggles Against Forms of Exploitation 
It is clear in this case that, from the starting point, the struggles in the Thai power sector 
come from the power effects imposed on specific actors. For example, Thai consumer 
organizations did not start protesting against the privatization. They initially protested 
against the raising of tariffs, as an unfair burden imposed on them. Or Thai communities 
did not start a protest against large hydro power and fossil fuel technological 
development, they just resisted to defend their healthy living. 
This can be viewed as the “immediate” struggles. In other words, people start to criticize 
instances of power that are closer to them”. According to Foucault, they look for the 
“immediate enemy” rather than the “chief enemy”. Possibly, they do not expect to find an 
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ultimate solution to their problem on a future date. From this aspect, they struggle 
primarily “against forms of exploitation” that separate people from what they produce 
and live with59.  
From this perspective, at least, two main forms of exploitation can be clearly seen in the 
Thai power sector. The first form of exploitation is the pricing structure, which allows 
EGAT and private producers to set up and maintain their high profits at the expense of 
Thai consumers. The second form is the environmental and resource exploitation, which 
leads to serious difficulties of the affected communities. 
 b) Struggles Against Forms of Domination 
Sooner or later, after their struggles against forms of exploitation, they have to face the 
domination or the privilege of knowledge, societal values, and power-rationality, which 
tries to maintain and defend the existing forms of exploitation. Inevitably, they are now 
struggling “against forms of domination”. The new concepts, practices, and knowledge, 
or so-called policy discourses, have been developed to counteract the existing forms of 
domination. As already seen, local communities in Thailand are quite successful in 
showing how local action research can be more accurate than official EIA reports done 
by experts, which are certainly elaborated with the aim of implementing the projects. Or 
SENT has suggested NEPO and EGAT to change their planning perspective and practices 
in order to allow the Thai power sector to fulfill various related national sustainable 
development goals, not just power system reliability and utilities’ least cost. 
Of course, the existing dominant forms of knowledge, values and power-rationality have 
to respond to these emerging concepts, practices, and knowledge, both in aggressive and 
tactical ways. In aggressive ways, it means that they ignore or deny the claims or 
rationality and evidence of these emerging concepts, practices, and knowledge. In tactical 
ways, it means that they accept some aspects of the new emerging concepts, practices, 
and knowledge and, then, reinterpret or submerge these new concepts, practices, and 
knowledge into their own frameworks of thinking. It is clearly seen that the Thai 
government may accept to provide “additional” subsidy for renewable energy, as 
suggested by Thai civic movement, but without significant changes in the existing 
planning perspective and monopolistic structure.  
On the one hand, this may be regarded as the difficulties to maintain the core values of 
their emerging concepts, practices, and knowledge. However, on the other hand, it may 
also be recognized as a process of fine-tuning their emerging discourses to be able to fit 
within specific institutional contexts and to be interactively appropriated by different 
actors in society. 
 c) Struggles Against Forms of Subjection 
Probably, the most challenging struggling for Thai civic movement is the struggles 
“against forms of subjection”, which control and manipulate their ways of thinking 
through the economic and social abstractions of who they are and what their lives should 
be and aim for. For example, Thai civic movement has challenged the subjection of the 
Thai government on “what should be the meaning of development and national progress” 
by questioning the concept of “pre-emptive expansion” and proposing the concept of 
“sustainable”. Another example is the success of Thai local communities in moving 
beyond the subjection of “affected communities” to “resource owners”, which can 
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significantly shift the discussion from compensation issues into local rights, public 
participation, and rationality claims. It is also very important to sustainable energy 
development that Thai consumers look beyond the subjection of economic-textbook 
consumers, who pay their attention only to getting low cost electricity and consuming. 
For radical technological shifts, strong support is certainly needed from the “citizen 
quests” for a better future.  
 d) Transversal Struggles 
One important note is that the struggles, as we saw in Thai energy policy, are 
“transversal” struggles. The struggles over the forms of exploitation, domination, and 
subjection have not been limited to one sector and to one country. In Thai society, these 
struggles have also happened in other sectors. In the energy sector, the international 
networks can bring new concepts, knowledge, and practices to Thai society. The success 
and failure of the struggles in one sector or country can be very good lessons learnt or 
spill-over effects useful to the struggles in other sectors and countries. This note asserts 
the importance of the integration of struggling processes in one specific area with other 
and broader struggling processes within human society in general. 
 4.8.4 Public Deliberation 
It is hard to exclusively distinguish between public negotiation and public deliberation. 
Normally, due to the pre-domination of the linear policy model and the unbalance of 
power in  the Thai power sector, public deliberation hardly occurred without public 
negotiation. Evidently, public deliberation is an outcome of, first, public resistance and, 
later, public negotiation. Although, in principle, public deliberation notably emphasizes 
intellectual activities of controversial decision-making processes, in reality, due to the 
mixes between power and rationalities, public deliberation always occurred in the nest of 
political conditions and negotiation.  
It is clearly seen in the last period (2001-present) that some decision-making processes 
have become much more open, transparent, reflective and deliberative discussions within 
the public forum or space, than was previously the case. The televised three-hour debate 
over the two controversial coal-fired power plants in 2001 is one of the good examples. 
Moreover, as warned in Chapter 2, we should not limit the forms of public deliberation to 
only direct or face-to-face deliberation. Several attempts, which try to publicly analyze 
and achieve a better understanding of the policy issues in different perspectives, should 
also be included as activities in public deliberations. By this viewpoint, the petitions and 
protests of consumer organizations also brought further and better understanding of the 
privatization policy to Thai society. 
However, in the present political conditions, the emerging of public deliberation cannot 
be ensured in all important policy issues. As earlier mentioned, the pre-domination of the 
linear policy model and the unbalance of power in the Thai power sector are two main 
obstacles to stimulating public deliberation in the Thai power sector. Moreover, the 
technically complicated nature of policy issues in the power sector also potentially 
inhibits the thoughtful public deliberation, especially when the technical complications 
are over-emphasized. Last, to be effective in terms of policy-making, public deliberation 
certainly requires public attention and, therefore, requires the active involvement of mass 
media, which is highly uncertain due to the competition of different public issues in the 
limited mass media space and resources. 
 
 147
The experience and potential of public deliberation in the Thai power sector during these 
three years of study will be analyzed and presented in Chapter 8. 
 
4.9 Policy Discourse Analysis 
Policy negotiation is not only the process of protecting specific interests but also a 
battlefield of policy ideas. Within the last four decades, Thailand’s economic and power 
sector curves have been turned up and down. In each turn, new development languages or 
new concepts have been tried to provide the better explanations of the situation and the 
better perspectives to cope with the situation and search for a better future for Thai 
society. These new languages or concepts lead to the new practices in Thai energy policy 
in terms of agents, knowledge, and institutions. For example, in the last two periods, 
liberalization concepts have led to the introduction and growth of private power 
producers. Concurrently, the concepts of sustainable development and public 
accountability have led to new roles of civic movement in protecting environment from 
power expansion projects and in developing renewable energy technology and 
sustainable energy systems. 
It is clear in the case of the Thai power sector that these new languages and concepts 
have been introduced and carried out by different actors according to different values and 
norms. Therefore, they usually refer to different policy directions and contest each other 
in gaining public and political support through public campaigns and deliberations. In 
their contestations, the different (or sometimes conflicting) series of evidence have been 
presented to the Thai public in connection with their underlying values and norms. The 
strong evidence (and its values) can certainly lead to changes in public opinions, societal 
values, and public policy over specific issues. As seen in Thailand, for the Thai public, 
power expansion projects are now no longer perceived as absolutely good for the Thai 
people, after the impacts of the previous projects have been clearly presented.  
However, at the same time, this new evidence has normally been evaluated and criticized 
by pre-dominated knowledge forms, truth criteria, and societal values. In the short term, 
conflicts between the new evidence and the old forms of knowledge and truth criteria 
may end in any specific public decision-making, usually depending on the power 
rationality and political situation in each case. In the long term, the conflicts may lead to 
the development of new forms of knowledge, values, and truth criteria within society. 
The interconnection of languages (or concepts), practices, and power rationality should 
be analyzed as “policy discourses”. The discourses “are the process of articulation in 
specific vocabularies and transformation into social reality”, both in terms of policies and 
practices, “through the actions of social agents within different institutional contexts”60, 
including different and diverse policy driving forces. 
In this study, four policy discourses, playing crucial roles in Thai power policy are 
summarized from the previous historical analysis. By analyzing the policy discourses, 
Thai society may achieve a better understanding of the connection of power rationality, 
concepts & practices in the Thai power sector, as explained above. Thus, it urges Thai 
society to take a closer and deeper look into the planning and development of the Thai 
power sector, instead of handing it over to the government and private sectors, as mainly 
done before. It also provides the alternative power rationality, concepts & practices for 
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energy development in Thai contexts. To pursue the new power rationality, concepts & 
practices, the new forms of knowledge and truth criteria have been developed and 
established, leading Thai society to gain more tools to understand the different aspects of 
reality and to achieve a desirable future. 
4.9.1 Policy Discourse I: State Monopoly Discourse 
The first policy discourse, state monopoly discourse, was developed together with the 
formation of EGAT and the main structure of the Thai power sector during 1956-1969. 
As a result, this policy discourse has been embedded in EGAT’s way of thinking, 
planning and managing the power system, as well as EGAT’s positions in several policy 
debates. Both EGAT executives and the Labor Union have used this policy discourse in 
public discussions and debates in the last three decades.  
The discourse represents the grand idea that “since the power sector is very essential to 
national security and economic growth, the power system reliability must always be 
ensured”. As stressed by Dr. Kasem Chatikawanich, “the main testament for EGAT is no 
shortage of power”. According to this discourse, the best way to ensure  system reliability 
is to equip the state-owned enterprises with essential technical knowledge and skills and 
allow them to plan and manage the power system, without interruptions from politicians 
or uncontrollable market mechanism. This is why this discourse is referred as the state 
monopoly discourse, in this study. 
In practice, EGAT has also fulfilled this mission with a very good record of system 
reliability. Therefore, during the EGAT privatization debates, the message linking to 
national security and power system reliability was always in focus, as shown before. 
Obviously, the failures of the power pool model in California and the privatization in 
Argentina were highly emphasized by this policy discourse. In various cases, the policy 
message or framing are closely linked to the notion of “economic nationality”. 
In terms of planning, the “predict and provide” approach is the main approach in this 
state monopoly discourse. The main idea is to predict demand growth and later to provide 
the increasing demands though new investment in the expansion of power-generating 
capacities. The 15% reserve margin has been set as a main criterion for ensuring the 
availability of power in the system. During the summer of almost every year, EGAT 
announces the new high record of power peak demand and persuades to the new 
investment. Since, as stressed before, this discourse believes that “no power is the most 
expensive one”, the investment in the power sector is always recognized as a good deal 
for Thai economy.  
Technologically, this policy discourse preferred the large fossil-fuelled and hydro power 
technologies. As represented in the EGAT power development plan, only these 
technologies are perceived by EGAT as dependable options. Apart from the 
dependability, the economy of scale of large fossil-fuelled and hydro power technologies 
has also been highlighted. The EGAT’s technological choices always vary from oil, to 
lignite, hydro power, and gas. In today’s facing of high natural gas prices and limited gas 
reserves, the imported coal technology is suggested. 
The role of EGAT in the renewable energy development is thus unsurprisingly minimal. 
The concept of “dependable” capacity, or “firm VS Non-firm SPPs”, was also used by 
EGAT as the main criterion for setting purchasing prices for SPPs, leading the renewable 
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power producers into the inferior conditions due to their higher variations in resources 
and power generation (discussed in detail in Chapter 7). 
At the same time, this policy discourse has always emphasized the importance of  “cheap 
electricity” in stimulating the economy and societal welfare. EGAT always claims that 
the Thai electricity tariff is among the lowest ones in the Asia-Pacific region. This “cheap 
electricity” argument was used both in the debate on anti-privatization and in refusing 
more contributions from cogeneration SPPs and renewable energy in the Thai power 
system. 
In this policy discourse, the environmental concerns basically work at the project level 
and are normally handled by end-of-pipe technologies. There is no space for 
environmental consideration in the PDP process or in other strategic planning processes.  
In short, this policy discourse believes in the centralized power system with the 
authorized monopoly power of the state-owned enterprises in order to ensure power 
system reliability and cheap power, both in terms of planning and management. 
Certainly, privatization and renewable energy are not the right policy directions in their 
perspective.  
The domination of this policy discourse was obvious until the beginning of 1990’s, when 
the World Bank and the Thai government changed its policy directions towards more 
privatization process. This policy discourse was rather weak during the domination of the 
power pool model (discussed later) in 1997-2000, due to EGAT’s financial hardship. 
Later, during the Thaksin government, the EGAT executive had given up on the 
predominant notion of state monopoly to join the Prime Minister’s vision of private 
monopoly as a national champion. In other words, now only the EGAT Labor Union is 
still maintaining this discourse, but with support from the civic groups promoting the 
economic nationalism ideology. 
Therefore, like other nationalism discourses, this policy discourse is still somehow 
powerful in Thai politics, especially when EGAT has now moved back to state monopoly 
after the court rule in March 2006. However, this model is now in difficulties in 
providing the long-term answer. The power market has been continuously changed in 
various dimensions. The centralized power system with  large-scale and fossil fuel 
technologies is no longer the most appropriate answer to solve today’s problems.  The 
development of a decentralized power system and renewable technology is now forming 
part of reality, but is still blocked by existing institutions. The full utilization of the 
financial market needs more flexible organizations than state-owned enterprises. The 
democratization process asks the Thai government to make a clear distinction between 
the roles of operational, planning, and regulatory organizations. Certainly, the existing 
structure in the Thai power sector can no longer be the “bottleneck” in any perspective.  
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4.9.2 Policy Discourse II: Power Pool Discourse 
The second policy discourse, the power pool discourse, has been strongly influenced by 
the ideology of liberalism during the 1990s. The suggestion of the World Bank and IMF, 
the policy direction of the Chuan government, and the dominant role of NEPO in policy-
making are the three main forces that place the power pool model on the top of the policy 
agenda and dominate policy discussions, especially during 1997-2000. 
In this policy discourse, like other liberalist discourses, monopoly is always blamed to be 
the main cause of inefficiency. In order to promote more efficiency, competition is 
needed. Furthermore, the market mechanism must be developed to stimulate and promote 
the competition within the power sector. 
Practically, this policy discourse began with allowing private producers to take part in the 
power-generating business, as seen in IPPs, SPPs, and VSPPs regulation. The next step is 
to unbundle the power sector by separating generation and transmission, which according 
to this discourse will promote fairer competition between EGAT and other producers. 
Moreover, in order to promote more competition, EGAT is recommended to separate into 
three generating companies. Ultimately, this policy discourse aims to establish the 
“power pool” as the centralized system operator instead of EGAT. 
Compared to the state monopoly discourse, this policy discourse has paid more attention 
to the development of renewable energy. Although this discourse seems to view 
renewable energy as a minor supplementary option, at least, the positive externality of 
renewable energy is recognized, leading to the later introduction of a 5-year subsidy to 
new SPPs and VSPPs. However, even within the 5-year subsidy program, the bidding, as 
a symbol of competition, must be implemented. In other words, according to this policy 
discourse, renewable energy must be developed within a competitive environment with 
some reasonable supports and market mechanisms will then determine the future of 
renewable energy. 
This idea also implies that at least some environmental aspects are considered in the 
introduction of new public regulation. However, these environmental concerns still 
cannot go deeply into the planning stage, as they are still ignored by EGAT PDP. 
Perhaps, it is also partly because, according to market mechanisms, the centralized PDP 
will gradually lose its roles. Therefore, this policy discourse did not attempt to improve 
its practices. 
As earlier mentioned, this policy direction gained fully support from the Chuan 
government and was planned to be fully implemented in 2003. However, after losing its 
ground together with the former Chuan government and later NEPO, the power pool 
model seemed to fall off the public agenda without any signs of return yet. Apart from 
political situations, the worst experiences in California and new academic finding have 
warned that possibly the power pool is still too complicated and risky to be implemented 
in Thai society.  
Logically, since this model previously reached the top of the public agenda together with 
the “liberalization” policy, if it may return, it should return under the pressure of 
“liberalization”. Although, in general, the pressure of liberalization seems to be lower 
according to Thailand’s better economic status, the free-trade agreements with various 
developed countries may turn out to be the pressure for “liberalization” in the future. 
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Last, although its future domination is still unclear, several concepts such as fairer 
competition and the control of monopoly power are still influential in policy debates 
included in the latest anti-privatization under the private monopoly model. 
4.9.3 Policy Discourse III: Private Monopoly Discourse 
The third policy discourse, the private monopoly discourse, was introduced by the 
Thaksin government and rapidly dominated the policy direction and discussion due to the 
strong political power of the Thaksin government.  
As a monopoly idea, this policy discourse shares several similar policy directions with 
the state monopoly discourse. In the national energy strategy launched in 2003, the first 
slide was a picture from New York’s 2003 blackout, aiming to frame the importance of 
power system reliability. In this policy discourse, the centralized power system and the 
centralized authority, like EGAT, are very important and even more important if Thailand 
wishes to become an energy hub of the region. In fact, the concept of energy hub and 
regional market is explained as the way to further gain economy of scale for the Thai 
power system. Therefore, opposite to the power pool model, this policy discourse 
protects the monopoly structure of the existing power structure. This is also a key point 
that leads the EGAT executives to switch from state monopoly to private monopoly 
under the threat of the power pool model61. 
The main difference begins with the idea of the competitiveness of the nation and the 
energy hub. Both new policy framings suggest that the protecting of the monopoly 
structure for the sake of power system reliability is no longer adequate. To be 
competitive, EGAT needs to expand beyond the borders and create new forms of 
management. To fuel its expansion and new management, the private monopoly model 
and the capitalization in the stock exchange are therefore recommended.  
With this logic, the EGAT privatization is certainly an inevitable policy direction. The 
notion of “national champion” has been introduced to provide a better policy framing or a 
better policy explanation of this model. The word “national champion” also aims to offset 
the strong opposition of nationalist activists. However, it does not seem to work well in 
this aspect. The strong protest against the selling of national public services still echoed 
during the recent anti-privatization campaign, as seen in Figure 4.1. 
It is also different in terms of main fuel source. In the call for the national champion, the 
Thai power system is planned to be more dependant on natural gas, which also 
monopolized another national champion, PTT, as seen in PDP2004. In PDP 2004, the 
least-cost utilities planning, a main planning tool in the state monopoly discourse, was 
still applied but only within the scope of predetermined policy directions, including the 
more reliance on natural gas. This provides a clearer idea of how private monopoly 
businesses influence the policy direction and would run the Thai power sector.  
Another main difference from the state monopoly discourse is the realization of 
renewable energy potentials and their benefits. In the private monopoly model, with the 
phase “high potential, but low development”, the full potential of renewable energy 
(around 15,000 MW) has been highlighted by the Ministry of Energy. The benefits of 
renewable energy are also broader perceived including economic advantages in higher oil 
price situations and as a main source of competitiveness of the nation. Through the 
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announcement of a national energy strategy, the target for renewable energy development 
was firstly set. 
Undoubtedly, this policy discourse has strong political support from the present 
government. The explanation of the idea is based on the political and business vision 
rather than on any economic principle, as seen in the power pool model, or technical 
analysis, as seen in the state monopoly model. As the visionary model together with 
strong supports from the government, it always sounds nice. However, without clear and 
firm foundation, this kind of political vision model sometimes has difficulties in 
providing satisfactory and accountable answers to the whole society, both in principle 
and at the practical level. For example, it is hard to explain how the fair competition of 
other power producers will be ensured in this model or how public interest will be 
protected, while the private monopoly, like EGAT, also holds the state authorities. 
Therefore, although political factors are powerful in supporting this policy discourse, due 
to its unclear principle, it is also quite politically fragile. Especially, if the opponent can 
raise the critical questions in the right timing and manner, as successfully done in the 
recent years.   
4.9.4 Policy Discourse IV: Decentralization Discourse 
The last discourse, the decentralization discourse, has emerged from the public resistance 
of the civic movement since 1988 and more obviously after 1997. As the outcomes of 
struggle processes, this discourse takes a longer time in emerging. It began with the 
opposition to specific projects and policies before developing alternative policy ideas and 
gradually accumulating them into the full set of the policy proposal in 2004, as explained 
already. 
This discourse emphasizes three main concepts or principles. Firstly, “fairness” is always 
highlighted in this discourse. According to this discourse, the main cause of the problems 
in the Thai power sector is the monopoly power, which blocks more progressive solutions 
in the society. As mentioned by Chuenchom Sangarasri Greacen, the founder of the 
Palangthai group, “The main obstacles of renewable energy do not link to its cheap and 
expensive costs, but mainly link to the monopoly power in Thai power structure”62. 
Therefore, this policy discourse has suggested to break down centralized monopoly 
power by separating generation and distribution and providing fair grid access to all 
power producers, especially the less powerful ones (detailed will be discussed in Chapter 
7).  
However, this policy discourse disagrees with the power pool ideas in allowing market 
mechanisms to regulate the power market, since the word “fairness” in this discourse is 
interpreted beyond just price competition. Fairness must include the societal rights to 
protect and promote better public interests, including better environmental and social 
consequences of power generation. Moreover, under the domination of oligopolistic 
power and tensed business connections between IPPs, it is hard to imagine how the 
fairness will be ensured within the power pool model. 
The second concept is “sustainability”. Since the establishment of SENT in 1998, 
sustainability is always an issue in this policy discourse. In practice, this policy discourse 
fights for more contribution of distributed power and fair institutional framework for 
renewable energy. Apart from environmental sustainability, this discourse also criticizes 
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the economic sustainability of the existing power system, by showing the expansion of its 
investment burden, fuel cost risks, and more imported burden, especially in a high oil 
price situation. After 2001, this discourse has also incorporated the concept of healthy 
public policy into their “sustainability principle”, by presenting more evidence on the 
health impacts of different power development project.  
The last main concept is the notion of “good governance”, which includes three relating 
principles of transparency, participation, and accountability in the decision-making and 
regulating process. In general, this discourse urges transparency, public participation, and 
accountability in the decision-making process of the Thai power sector. In specific, the 
establishment of an independent regulatory body and an independent system operator is 
highly recommended. Moreover, the processes of demand forecasting, power 
development planning, renewable energy subsidies, and IPP bidding require more 
openness both in terms of participants and alternative proposals or inputs. In 2005-2006, 
this policy discourse succeeded in conducting the research on “Electricity Governance of 
Thai Power Sector”, which elaborated in more detail how the concept of good 
governance should be interpreted and operationalized in the Thai power sector. As 
already mentioned, this attempt also links to the cancellation of the EGAT privatization. 
This policy discourse is referred to as the “decentralization” discourse, because, unlike 
the three previous discourses, the centralized system has been criticized by this discourse 
as the main source of problems, no matter if it is run under state monopoly, private 
monopoly, or power pool’s market mechanism. Therefore, it is very important to de-
entrap the Thai power sector by allowing more producers and stakeholders, especially the 
smaller and powerless ones, to join in the fair, sustainable, and good governance bases. 
Up to now, unlike the previous policy discourses, the decentralization discourse has never 
dominated the policy directions in the Thai power sector. It usually works as 
counterarguments of main policy discourses, which, in some cases, become inevitable 
facts or logics in the formal decision-making process, as recently seen in the 
establishment of an interim regulator or the cancellation of the EGAT privatization. In the 
near future, it is less likely that this policy discourse will be systematically translated into 
formal policy directions. It will be more likely to sporadically incorporate point-by-point 
into formal policy directions and institutions. Perhaps, this is a realistic way for a 
politically powerless policy discourse to operationalize its persuasive ideas under less 
favorable conditions. 
4.10 Conclusion 
Throughout the chapter, the policy processes in the Thai power sector have been 
historically and conceptually analyzed, based on a deliberative policy analysis. It is quite 
clear that through their dynamics, conflicts, and contestations, policy processes in 
Thailand become more complex and, at the same time, more open to broader 
participation and alternative policy directions. Although the external factors and 
government policy directions are still influential, the battle of ideas, interpretations, 
policy discourses, and public deliberations becomes a more powerful factor in the policy 
processes of the Thai power sector. Table 4.7 summarizes the key ideas, languages, 
actors, and policy proposals of the four policy discourses, which play their crucial roles in 
the recent history of policy changes.  
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In the future, the dynamics of driving forces and policy discourses will continue to play a 
crucial role in energy policy. The Thai government, the private sector, and the civic 
movement will continuously seek to explain the new situations and make suggestions for 
a desirable future. The relevance and appropriateness of the knowledge they make to 
connect and convey power rationality, concepts & practices within different future 
driving forces and situations will significantly determine the success of their attempts and 
shape the future of the Thai power system. 
The next two chapters, Chapters 5 and 6, will apply strategic impact assessment to 
analyze the future impact of these different policy directions, with the focus on the power 
development planning. Although the aim is clearly to compare the impacts of different 
policy options, it should be emphasized that this study will try to provide the final answer 
to Thai society (by claiming the best solution for the society). Oppositely, the impact 
analysis should be viewed as an attempt to facilitate an enrichment of further public 
deliberation on related policy issues, with the clearer idea of the possible alternatives and 
their consequences to society. 
Table 4.7 The Comparison of Four Policy Discourses in the Thai Power Sector 
Item State Monopoly Power Pool Private Monopoly Decentralization 
Main Languages or 
Policy framing 
- National security 
- Public services 
- Economic growth 
- Efficiency 
- Competition 
- Competitiveness of  
the nation 
- National Champion 
- Regional energy hub 
- Fairness for all 
stakeholders 
- Sustainability 
- Good governance 
Main Rationale for 
policy/planning 
- Power system  
reliability 
- Economy of Scale 
- Competition-led 
improvement 
- Power system 
reliability 
- Expansion into 
regional market 
- Democratic and 
integrated planning 
- Sustainable 
development 
Actors - EGAT executives 
(before 2003) 
- EGAT Labor 
Union 
- NEPO 
- Chuan 
Government 
- Thaksin government 
- PTT 
- EGAT Executive 
(from 2003) 
- Civic Groups 
(NESAC, FFC, CCO, 
SENT, HSRI, 
Palangthai 
Proposals for 
Market Structure 
Centralized system 
& state monopoly 
Centralized market 
mechanism 
Centralized system & 
private monopoly 
Decentralized power 
system 
Proposal on EGAT 
privatization 
No Privatization Privatized and 
broken down 
EGAT 
Privatized but no 
separation of EGAT 
No privatization but 
separation b/w 
Generation and 
Transmission 
Proposals for 
planning process 
Centralized 
planning, like PDP 
Market mechanism Centralized planning, 
like PDP 
Integrated and 
participatory 
planning 
Proposals for 
future investment 
Pre-emptive 
expansion 
Expansion through 
market signals 
Pre-emptive expansion Moderate strategy 
Preferable future 
fuel source 
Shifting to 
Imported Coal 
Shifting to 
Imported Coal 
Stay with Natural Gas Switching to 
Renewables 
Environmental and 
Health Issues 
Focus on project 
level 
Focus on project 
level 
Focus on project level Focus on policy and 
planning level 
Renewable energy 
development 
Limited Depend on market 
and reasonable 
subsidies 
High potential and need 
of target and policy 
mechanism. 
High potential and 
need of fair 
institution and policy 
mechanism. 
Domination period 1957-1991 1992-2000 2001-2005 Not yet dominate the 
policy direction 
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Chapter 5 
Analytical Framework for  
Strategic Impact Assessment 
The policy analysis in the previous chapter provides an insight into how different 
groups in Thai society interpret the concept of power development policy differently, 
and how these interpretations contest and interact with each other to construct social 
realities in the Thai power sector. Certainly, different policy interpretations will lead 
to different policy recommendations and actions, which, consequently, will result in 
different impacts on Thai society.  
Therefore, an understanding of different policy discourses is still not enough to 
develop a healthy public policy in the Thai power sector. According to the concept of 
healthy public policy, the systematic assessment of health impacts of different policy 
proposals is needed to ensure that the health aspect and healthier options will be taken 
into account in the policy process. At the same time, since healthy public policy also 
aims to make a healthier option an easy option to make for decision-makers, this 
systematic impact assessment cannot be focused only on the health aspects, but also 
on other dimensions of policy formulations, including contestable aspects of policy 
discourses, as learned from the previous chapter.  
Although, like other policies, power sector policy is a multi-facet process, the 
formulation of a power development plan (or PDP) can be recognized as one of the 
most concrete or practical-oriented aspects of the policy process, which is of 
particular interest to strategic impact assessment. This is mainly because, as a 
strategic investment plan, the power development plan determines the types of power 
plants, technologies, and power producers (including IPPs and SPPs) in which the 
plan will invest on specific scales and at determined times. Therefore, from a broad 
policy direction perspective, the PDP provides a concrete step towards future realities 
in the competing public policy process.   
Within the four policy discourses described in the previous chapter, three discourses 
have paid serious attention to the formulation of a “power development plan”, which 
will strategically shape the realities of the Thai power sector.  However, the three 
policy discourses represent notably different views on all important aspects of the 
power development plan, including demand forecasting, renewable energy potentials, 
and power market structure, as shown in Table 5.1. Certainly, these three policy 
directions will end up with different types of impacts on Thai society, including health 
impacts. Therefore, it is a good idea to analyze and compare the impacts of these three 
policy strategies.  
In this study, the power development plan will be used as a focal point for further 
policy analysis with the attempt to understand the different impacts of these three 
policy strategies and search for the healthiest policy direction. However, since the 
impact assessment process is, in various cases, highly contestable and can (explicitly 
or implicitly) link to specific policy assumptions and consequently specific policy 
recommendations, it is necessary to determine how the impact will be assessed and 
under which policy and scientific assumptions. This chapter will provide an analytical 
framework for strategic impact assessment by applying the concept of strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA), as explained in Chapter 3. Specific focus will be 
placed on the power development plan and health impact analysis.  
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Table 5.1 The Different Views and Directions of the Four Main Policy Discourses in 
the PDP Formulation Process. 
Aspects in PDP 
Formulation 
State 
Monopoly 
Power pool Private 
Monopoly 
Decentralized 
power 
Importance of PDP 
in system planning 
Very important Not so important, 
market can 
decide. 
Very important Very important 
Investment 
Strategy 
Expansionists Expansionists Expansionists Moderate 
View on the 
appropriateness of 
the present demand 
forecasting 
OK OK but not 
necessary, since 
market can 
decide 
OK Systematic  
over-estimation 
lead to  
over-investment 
Power Market 
Structure 
Centralized by 
EGAT 
Centralized at 
power pool 
Centralized by 
EGAT co, ltd.  
Decentralized 
Potentials of 
Renewable Energy 
Limited Depends on 
market and 
policy 
High Potential High Potential 
Main Fuel Sources 
of power 
generation 
Increasing of 
coal in the fuel 
mix. 
Depend on 
market, support 
differentiation to 
coal 
Natural Gas Introducing 
renewables and 
distributed power 
Consideration of 
Environmental and 
Health aspects  
Should be 
considered at 
project level 
(not PDP level) 
Should be 
considered at 
project level 
(not PDP level) 
Should be  
considered at  
project level 
(not PDP level) 
Should be 
considered at 
strategic level,  
such as in PDP. 
PDP-Options for 
Impact Assessment 
in this study  
PDP-Coal - PDP-Gas PDP-Renewables 
Source: Summarized from Chapter 4. 
The chapter will begin with the introduction of the specific SEA applications in this 
study, which will be designed and explained. Then, the formulation process of a 
power development plan in Thailand will be presented. After that, three PDP options, 
which derive from these three policy discourses, will be described and discussed. 
Later, the detailed discussions on the analytical framework in each aspect will be 
explained, i.e. environmental, health, economic, resource, and social aspects, 
respectively. In the last section, the process of public communication as a main 
component of both SEA and deliberative policy processes will be described.     
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5.1 SEA Applications in This Study 
Along with the conflicts over the power plant projects, Environmental Impact 
Assessment (or EIA), legalized by the National Environmental Quality Act in 1992, is 
always the issue of debate and criticism, as described in the previous chapter. In 
general, EIA in Thailand have been conducted with very limited public participation 
and transparency. Moreover, several EIA reports of power plant projects have 
contained obvious and serious mistakes leading to public mistrust of the EIA process 
and its outcome1.  
At the same time, since the power system needs a long-term investment plan with the 
clear schedule of each power plant project, EIA seems to be inadequate to facilitate 
public discussion at the policy level. A more proactive approach of impact assessment 
is thus needed in the strategic planning of the Thai power sector2. 
Since SEA is a tool for searching for opportunities rather than just impacts, it is 
certainly useful for facilitating sustainable energy policy and planning in Thailand. 
The Thai government has established a clear vision for sustainable development from 
the National development plan to the ministerial level, as already pointed out. The 
critical task remaining is the bridging of this sustainable development vision and a 
sustainable energy strategy. One of the best ways to fulfill this task is to assess long-
term societal impacts in all aspects, thus aiming to promote the policy options which 
support a sustainable future. 
 5.1.1 National Vision and Goals  
For Thailand, the good starting point for SEA is the national vision of development. 
The 9th National Development Plan (2002-2006) clearly defined the king’s philosophy 
of “Sufficient economy” as the country’s development vision. According to this 
sufficient economy philosophy, moderation and due consideration in all modes of 
conduct of the populace should be promoted. Concurrently, the development process 
should incorporate the need for sufficient protection from internal and external 
shocks, and lead to the development of self-support and self-reliance. It should also 
establish development objectives and targets, which are closely related to the 
development of sustainable energy. For example, the development target of (a) 1-2% 
surplus in the annual current account, (b) new employment of more than 230,000 jobs 
annually, and (c) the access to resources to achieve good health and education, are 
highly relevant to the aims and benefits of sustainable energy investment3.  
Apart from the National Development Plan, the Thai government has stated that 
renewable energy development is one of the three national energy strategies. The 
main rationales for increasing renewable energy shares are (a) to reduce the import 
dependence and burden; (b) to reduce environmental and social impacts of existing 
energy technologies; and (c) to make the best use of national resources. The Thai 
government also established clear targets for renewable energy, aiming to increase 
renewable energy shares from 0.5% to 6% in the power sector within the next 10 
years. In general, the national energy strategy also aims to reduce the increase in total 
energy consumption from 1.4:1 to 1:1 of national income growth4. 
Both the National Development Plan and government targets are basically the creation 
of conducive environment for better health, therefore, they are following the same line 
of concepts in healthy public policy. Moreover, relating sustainable energy policy, as 
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a healthy policy option, to well-stated national visions and goals is one of the best 
way to make a healthier choice an easier one to make for decision-makers. 
 5.1.2 Strategic Options 
This study will focus on the Power Development Plan (PDP). PDP is the long-term 
investment plan of the Thai power sector. The PDP determines the construction of all 
new power plants according to the long-term power demand forecast. The decisions 
on energy options are made in the planning process and these include fuel and power 
plant technology, the power-generating capacity of each project, and the potential area 
for construction. Accordingly, other related energy projects, such as lignite mining, 
gas pipeline, as well as the expansion of the power transmission system are 
developed5. 
Therefore, the PDP will set forth the development direction of the electricity as well 
as the energy sector. Hence, the plan will determine the impacts and consequences for 
society, not only the emissions and other externalities but also the investment, import 
burden, fuel price risks, employment, technological development, etc. This is the main 
reason to focus on PDP as the main policy mechanism in the Thai power sector in this 
study. 
Three PDP options have been identified in this study based on on-going policy 
discourses in Thailand. The first option is the existing PDP, which relies mostly on 
natural gas and its combined-cycle power plants. The second option reflects the 
attempt to promote more coal in Thailand’s fuel mix, mainly proposed by EGAT. 
Last, the people’s proposal on more renewable and decentralized power generation 
has been developed further to be one of the PDP options. The details of these PDP 
options will be presented in the next section. 
 5.1.3 Strategic Impacts 
Since healthy public policy aims to create supportive environments for healthy living 
and, at the same time, to make a healthier choice an easier choice to make in decision-
making, the promotion of healthy public policy needs to look beyond physical health 
outcomes and to emphasize more on the changes in its wider determinants of health.  
Concurrently, as defined by the World Energy Assessment6, sustainable energy means 
“energy produced and used in the ways that support human development over the long 
term in all its social, economic and environmental dimensions”. Therefore, the 
promotion of a sustainable energy policy also requires a strategic impact assessment, 
which can provide the whole picture of social, economic, environmental, and health 
consequences. 
Hvelplund and Lund also suggest that the societal objectives/goals should always be 
at a center of every energy planning analysis, in order to ensure that energy planning 
will ultimately lead to desirable outcomes, as defined by society7.  
Thus, as a strategic environmental assessment and healthy public policy advocacy, 
this study aims to cover the wider range of impacts. Based on the concept of 
ecosystem health (or holistic health) presented in Chapter 2, Figure 5.3 shows the area 
of impact indicators, which will be analyzed in this study. In short, these impact 
indicators can be categorized into 6 main areas, as follow. 
• Environmental impact indicators are six main air pollutants, which 
cause climate change, acidification, air pollution and, consequently, health 
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problems. The detailed discussion on environmental health impacts will be 
presented in section 5.5. 
• Health impact indicators include mortality, morbidity and the loss of 
healthy life years (or disability-adjusted life years – DALYs), which in this 
study focus mainly on the physical health impacts of air pollution, climate 
change and accident. The health impact analysis will be described in 
section 5.6. 
• Economic impact indicators always constitute one of the most influential 
dimensions in Thai energy policy-making, thus the analysis of economic 
impact is required in making a strategic decision. From the healthy public 
policy perspective, it is also essential for making a healthier choice an 
easier one to make. There are five economic indicators in this study; 
namely investment requirement, generation costs, balance of payment 
effect, GDP contribution, and external costs. In section 5.7, the method 
and assumption of impact analysis will be explained. 
• Resource impact indicators focus on a) domestic resource share as a 
reflection of national self-sufficiency in power generation, b) impacts on 
national natural gas reserves and c) renewable energy share, both as a 
long-term sustainable perspective. 
• Social impact indicators include the impact on job creation, the impact on 
decentralization and the impact on social conflicts. Although they are 
called social impacts, all of these indicators are, in reality, highly related to 
the health status of the population. However, due to limits of information 
and its high context-dependency, the related health outcomes of these 
social impacts cannot be quantified in this study.  
• Government Target Achievement is the set of indicators that can analyze 
the possibility of each PDP option in reaching the government target of 6% 
renewable energy share and 1:1 energy elasticity with economic growth.  
 
 
 164
Im p act Ind ica to rs
H ea lth
E nv ir o nm e nt
- G H G  em iss ion
- S O 2 , N O X , T S P
- H g , N M V O C
G ov er nm e n t T a rg e t
S oc ia l
- Job  c rea tio n
- D e cen tra liza tio n
- S oc ia l C on flicts
E c o n om ic
- in v es tm e n t req u irem en t
- to ta l g en era tion  c os t
- G D P  C o n trib u tio n
- B O P  b u rd en
-E xtern a l C os t
R e so ur ce
- R en ew ab le S h a re
- N a tu ra l G as  R eserv es
- D om es tic  R es ou rce S h a re
- M o r ta lity
- M o rb id ity
- L o ss  o f  H e a lth y  
L ife  y e a r
 
Figure 5.1 Impact Indicators in This Study 
 
5.1.4) Strategic Position and Communication 
Since this study is neither a part of the SEA legal requirement nor the formal PDP 
planning processes, the most appropriate position of this study is as a communicative 
policy learning process outside the formal decision-making process. In other words, 
this study has applied the decision-centered model of SEA, as explained in Chapter 3. 
This standing point allows the study to discuss more freely deliberative policy in Thai 
society, in terms of policy options, policy impacts and policy institutions and 
mechanisms.    
As a decision-centered SEA model, two import elements must be in focus in its 
applications. Firstly, insightful decision-making analysis is required in order to design 
an effective SEA process. During the SEA process, the communication strategy is 
essential to the deliberative policy discussion. Since various perspectives and 
preferences exist in Thai society, the most important consideration is to keep the SEA 
process open, transparent, and communicative, in order for it to become a real 
dialogue (which refers to “between-reasons”) and, hopefully, a continuous learning 
process in society. The detailed discussion on policy communication and policy action 
was explained in the first chapter. 
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5.1.5) Overall Process  
In summary, the SEA process applied in this case has been conducted in seven main 
steps as follow;  
1) Analyzing Development Visions and Goals. The National 
Development Plan and national energy strategy have been analyzed to 
find an appropriate indicator for strategic impact assessment as earlier 
described. 
2) Developing Policy Options. In this step, three policy options of four 
policy discourses are defined as the main directions and priorities of 
power development planning. 
3) Identifying PDP Options. Then, all these three policy options have to 
be readjusted to match the power planning criteria both in terms of a 
15% reserve margin and sufficient energy generation to ensure system 
reliability. After the re-adjustment, these policy options will be 
presented in the form of three PDP options with investment and 
generation details, as explained in this chapter. 
4) Calculating Strategic Impacts. The strategic impacts of all three PDP 
options will be calculated on the basis of their investment and 
generation plans and the coefficients of the impact indicators. The 
coefficients of each power technology, which will be utilized in each 
PDP option, are shown in the later parts of this chapter. 
5) Preparing a policy document. After the calculation, all impact 
indicators of the three PDP options will be presented and compared 
with each other. The comparison will lead to the identification of the 
most suitable options in terms of health and sustainable perspective, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
6) Policy communication. The result of this calculation, combined with 
relevant information on local sustainable energy potentials of 
sustainable energy trips and fairs, has been used for stimulating public 
discussion on the energy policy direction in each public forum in order 
to gain more insightful recommendations from different perspectives. 
7) Policy Recommendations and Actions. At the end, the policy 
recommendation will be presented to related authorities and the Thai 
public through a series of policy workshops combined with some 
policy actions, including mass media communication to stimulate 
further discussion and policy changes.  
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5.2 Power Development Plan 
As mentioned earlier, the Power Development Plan (PDP) is the long-term investment 
plan of the Thai power sector (normally of a 10-15-year period), which determines all 
new power plant projects according to the long-term demand forecasting. It also 
determines fuel, technology and generating capacity of each project. In other words, it 
represents the gatekeeper which determines the future of the Thai power sector. 
Therefore, it has great impacts on environmental quality, resource management, 
economic growth and burden, social consequences and technological development. 
Since the PDP is the strategic focus of this study, this section will provide the 
background information about the PDP, its planning processes, its critiques and the 
demand for an alternative PDP in Thai society.   
 5.2.1 PDP Planning Process 
The PDP planning process can be divided into three main steps8, as shown below. 
• Demand Forecasting. The first step of the PDP planning process is the 
forecast of the future electricity demand, which is the responsibility of the 
Sub-committee for Load Forecasting, appointed by the Ministry of Energy. 
In this step, the sub-committee also considers an expected demand side 
management as a part of demand forecasting, in stead of allowing DSM to 
be one choice of power development plan, as is usually done in Integrated 
Resource Planning.  
• Planning Process. Then, the Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT) will plan the PDP in response to the forecast with the concrete 
rules of a 15% reserve margin (above annual peak demand) of system 
reliability. EGAT will begin with its consideration of the existing power 
plants and the progress of the under-construction projects, which will 
constitute the fixed choices of the PDP. Then, different options of fuel and 
power plant technologies will be analyzed according to technical factors 
and financial viability. The data from the analysis will be entered in the 
least-cost programming and EGAT’s least-cost option will be selected and 
presented as EGAT’s PDP in the decision-making process. 
• Decision-making Process. The political decision-making process has four 
main steps. First, it begins with the Board of EGAT, of which a senior 
governmental staff or senior academic is the chair. Then, it has to be 
considered by The Energy Policy Executive Committee, before going to 
the National Energy Policy Council, which is led by the Deputy Prime 
Minister. The final decision is made by the Cabinet. 
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5.2.2 Problems of the existing PDP process 
At present, the existing PDP process has faced six main criticisms, which lead to the 
problem of making an actual strategic decision.  
First, although the electricity development has vast impacts on society, the goals of 
the PDP planning are still limited to only the energy security and the utilities’ least-
cost solution. The other important societal goals, like self-sufficient economy, balance 
of payments (BOP), employment, environment, and health have never been included9. 
Second, although for many years, the local people and many civil society 
organizations have been advocating for their participation in energy planning10 and 
several cases of social conflict over the deadlock situation at the project level have 
taken place, there has been no public participation at all throughout the PDP process. 
Not only the civil society has been excluded from participation, but the parliament, 
senate, academics, consumer groups, and mass media, have not had any role to play in 
the process, either11 12.  
Third, the forecast of power demand has been too high for more than a decade, 
leading to excess power plant projects, over-generating capacity and also over-
investment, as shown in Figure 5.2. Recently, in 2005, the difference between actual 
peak demand and the PDP forecast was 600 MW. Probably, the main cause of the 
problem is the fact that all overrun costs can be passed on to Thai customers. In other 
words, there is no means of public accountability in the PDP Process13.  
 
Figure 5.2 Previous Demand Forecasting and Actual Peak Demand
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Fourth, the PDP process in Thailand is fully controlled by authorities, especially 
EGAT and MoEn. The PDP process never begins without the approval of these 
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authorities or a strong political signal from the government. Although it was quite 
clear in mid-2005 that the demand forecasting was overestimated and that several 
assumptions do not match real economic conditions, EGAT still denies reconsidering 
and revising its own PDP15. In other words, there is no clear corrective mechanism 
within the PDP process.  
Fifth, since renewable energy technologies are perceived by EGAT as being neither 
economically nor technically viable, the fuel and technology options are always 
limited to large-scale conventional energy projects, i.e. fossil fuel power plants and 
large hydroelectric dams. In other words, there has been no real comprehensive 
consideration of other energy alternatives. 
Last, in the PDP of 2004, no actual least-cost option analysis was presented since 
several government energy policies predetermined the choices in the planning 
process. For example, the EGAT privatization policy with the Enhance Single Buyer 
model locked 50% of new installed capacity to EGAT without any least-cost analyses. 
Renewable energy was also locked into the 5% Renewable Portfolio Standard 
mechanism without considering the possibilities of moving beyond 5% of energy 
contribution and of being independent options rather than fixed with the new fossil 
fuel-based power plant projects. 
5.2.3 The Need for an Alternative PDP 
The concept of alternative PDP was developed in Thailand in 1999, when the 
Sustainable Energy Network for Thailand (SENT) proposed that Thai government 
should invest in sustainable energy technologies instead of investing in a controversial 
coal-fired power plant project. This was based on the arguments that the sustainable 
energy choice would lead to a higher GDP contribution to the national economy, 
reduce the BOP burden, create more jobs, and lower the GHG emission compared to 
the coal-fired power plant16. Concurrently, critiques of overestimated demand 
forecasting and the high reserve margin of the power sector were also echoed, leading 
to the final decision to postpone the project17. 
However, SENT’s study is still at the project level. The actual alternative PDP was 
suggested by the National Economic and Social Advisory Council in 2004, during the 
public debate on a government privatization policy for the Thai power sector. Since 
one of the main forces of privatization is to release public investment and debt burden, 
the aim of this alternative PDP was to point out how alternative PDP could reduce the 
investment requirement and, thus, release the pressure for privatization18. 
Unfortunately, this alternative PDP did not link to other development goals or 
impacts. 
Concurrently, in August 2003, the Thai government launched the National Energy 
Strategy, which set up quite ambitious targets for energy-efficient and renewable 
energy development. The strategy also provided new information on the potential of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency as main alternatives for the power 
development in Thailand19. However, the strategy did not show the direct link 
between the proposal and its environmental social and health consequences. 
This study resumes the idea of an alternative PDP and the National Energy Strategy 
by showing that an alternative way is possible and perhaps even better. At the same 
time, the study will include another possible alternative to the PDP 2004 suggested by 
EGAT, as well.  
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5.3  Three Power Development Plan Options 
Three main PDP options are discussed and analyzed in this study; namely the existing 
PDP (or PDP-Gas), EGAT’s alternative PDP (or PDP-Coal), and the renewable 
alternative PDP (or PDP-Renewables). These three policy options will be described in 
this section and will be analyzed and compared according to their strategic 
consequences in Chapter 6. 
5.3.1 The Existing PDP (PDP-Gas) 
The present Power Development Plan (PDP2004) was approved by the Cabinet in 
September 2004. It was based on the power demand forecast in the beginning of 2004, 
which assumed a constant annual economic growth rate of averagely 6.5 percent 
through out the planning period (2004-2015)20. 
Consequently, 23 new power plant projects were planned in addition to the seven 
projects, which were already ‘under construction’. These new projects can be divided 
into two groups by the period of construction. During 2004-2010, five new projects 
were decided with gas as the fuel. For 2011-2015, 18 new projects were planned with 
gas as the fuel. The planned installed capacity and expected peak demand of the PDP-
Gas is shown in Figure 5.3 and the fuel-mix of PDP-Gas is presented in Figure 5.4.  
It is clear from Figure 5.6 that the future of the Thai power sector will rely mostly on 
natural gas, which will account for 81 percent of the power generation in 2015. This is 
why, in this study, it will be referred to as “PDP-Gas”. The PDP-Gas also includes the 
investments in renewable energy under the renewable portfolio standard (or RPS) 
scheme, which means that every new IPP project based on fossil fuels has to invest or 
buy renewable energy equal to 5% of its capacity. 
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that, during the negotiation process of 
privatizing EGAT, the government has agreed that EGAT will be responsible for half 
of the new projects in 2011-2015, equal to nine projects. In the case of the other half, 
the government will open the bidding process. However, EGAT subsidiaries may 
enter the bidding and compete with other IPPs, as discussed in the previous Chapter. 
Up to September 2006, PDP-Gas still received strong support from the Thai 
government. There is no clear sign that the Thai government will change its policy 
direction away from natural gas. With its monopoly in gas suppliers, PTT also 
implicitly supports this PDP option by highlighting the availability of natural gas 
supplies (including the investment proposal of a liquid natural gas system) and its 
cleaner environmental effects. 
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5.3.2 EGAT’s alternative PDP (PDP-Coal) 
Since the PDP of 2004 mostly relied on gas, EGAT expressed their concern for the 
energy security. Therefore, EGAT proposed that the new projects should utilize more 
coal to diversify the fuel mix.  
This initiative was obvious when EGAT organized the Coal-Trans International 
Conference in Lampang in January 2005 and promoted the use of coal in Thai 
newspapers during and after the conferences. Later, in January 2006, an EGAT 
subsidiary, EGGO, also announced its plan for coal-fired power plant investment, 
mainly because the developed natural gas reserves were too limited and the coal 
technology was now more environmentally friendly than before.    
However, the discussion is still going on and, thus, the proposed capacity of coal-fired 
technology in the PDP has not been defined yet. As a result, to provide an insight into 
the effect of coal initiatives, this study has assumed that half of the new projects, or 
nine 700 MW power plants, will switch from gas to coal. In this study, it will be 
referred to as the “PDP-Coal”. 
By this way, the planned installed capacity and expected peak demand of PDP-Coal is 
totally similar to that of PDP-Gas (already shown in Figure 5.3), but it has a large 
difference in the fuel mix as shown in Figure 5.5. From this figure, the increased share 
of coal in energy can be seen clearly. At the end of the period, the proportion of coal 
and lignite in the Thai fuel mix is expected to reach 27% (compared to 11% in PDP-
Gas). 
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Figure 5.3 Total Installed Capacity and Peak Demand 
in PDP-Gas and PDP-Coal
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Figure 5.4 Fuel Mix of PDP-Gas in Total Energy 
Generation
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Figure 5.5 Fuel Mix of PDP-Coal in Total 
Energy Generation
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5.3.3 The Alternative PDP 
 a) Principle 
The development of an alternative PDP has followed six planning and operational 
principles, which are important in Thai society.  
• The first principle is the Ninth National Development Plan, which follow 
the king’s Sufficient Economy Philosophy. Thus, the Plan will emphasize 
on more balanced economic growth and self-reliance.  
• The second fundamental principle is the National Energy Strategy which 
aims to improve energy efficiency and promote renewable energy in the 
country, as explained earlier. 
• Third, the renewable alternative PDP should be based on the present 
potential of domestic energy resources and the present energy technology, 
which means that this alternative PDP will be pragmatic and feasible under 
the present resources and technology. 
• Fourth, more realistic assumptions of the power demand forecast are 
crucial to prevent over-investment in the power system expansion. 
• Fifth, this renewable alternative PDP requires the maintenance of the 
system reliability of the Thai power system. Operationally, its reserve 
margin needs to be above 15% and the annual power generation needs to 
cover the annual energy demand for the whole planning period. 
• Lastly, to make this renewable alternative an easier choice for decision-
makers to make, especially in terms of the financial perspective, this PDP-
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option will try to combine a) cheaper solutions (compared to conventional 
power plants), such as revising the demand forecast and DSM, with b) 
competitive solutions, like Industrial CHP, biomass and biogas, and c) 
more expensive solutions, like wind and solar energy.    
Since this alternative PDP has the clear aim and strategy to promote renewable 
technology, it will be referred to as “PDP-Renewables”, in this study. 
 b) Measures 
Based on the six principles, seven measures have been employed to develop this PDP-
Renewables.  
Firstly, according to the suggestion of NESAC21, the power demand forecast has been 
adjusted to the more realistic annual economic growth rate, since in the twenty-years 
record, the long-term economic growth rate of the country was just around 5.2%, and 
not 6.5% as assumed in the existing PDP (or PDP-Gas). At the same time, the 
forecasted demand in 2004 should be adjusted to the actual peak demand, which is 
almost 300 MW lower than in the forecast. This measure is very important in 
preventing the Thai power sector from over-investing due to over-forecasting, as it 
has usually happened. The revised version of the demand forecast for PDP-
Renewables is presented in Table 5.2.   
Second, Demand Side Management (DSM) and energy saving are top priorities 
because of their low investment costs with low negative impacts. From the overall 
DSM potential of around 2,000-3,000 MW (discussed in Chapter 3), 2,400 MW of 
DSM in 2015 is applied to this PDP-Renewables.  
Third, the high potential of various renewable energies will be exploited. The 
promising renewable energy in Thailand includes biomass and biogas, solar, mini-
hydro, and wind. Table 5.3 presents the huge differences between the power potential 
and the existing installed capacity and the government target to promote renewable 
energy. From the same table, it is clear that PDP-Renewables is following the same 
line as the government’s own target, with a small modification. Among different 
renewable technologies, PDP-Renewables will focus more on biomass and biogas 
technology, because of their economic and investment advantages, as previously 
discussed in Chapter 3. It is also important to notice that, in 2015, PDP-Renewables 
will only employ less than half of the overall potential. 
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Table 5.2 Existing Demand Forecast and Its Revised Version for PDP-Renewables 
Jan 04 Forecast Adjustments to Jan 04 forecast (MW) Forecast (adjusted) 
Year 
Assumed 
per 
annum 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
Peak 
demand 
(MW) 
Use 
actual 
2004 
peak as 
base 
(19,326)
GDP 
growth = 
5.2% 
(average 
past 15 
yrs) 
Peak Cut 
(according 
to 
EGAT's 
PDP 2004)
Total 
(MW) 
Revised 
peak 
demand 
(MW) 
2004 6.5% 19,600 -274 0 0 -274       19,326  
2005 6.5% 21,143 -296 -304 0 -600       20,543  
2006 6.5% 22,738 -318 -637 -500 -1455       21,283  
2007 6.5% 24,344 -340 -990 -500 -1830       22,514  
2008 6.4% 26,048 -364 -1361 -500 -2225       23,823  
2009 6.4% 27,852 -389 -1771 -500 -2661       25,191  
2010 6.6% 29,808 -417 -2278 -500 -3195       26,613  
2011 6.5% 31,844 -445 -2804 -500 -3750       28,094  
2012 6.5% 33,945 -475 -3367 -500 -4341       29,604  
2013 6.5% 36,173 -506 -3983 -500 -4989       31,184  
2014 6.4% 38,515 -538 -4626 -500 -5664       32,851  
2015 6.5% 40,978 -573 -5348 -500 -6421       34,557  
Source: Witoon Permponsacharoen, 200522. 
 
Table 5.3 Renewable Energy Potential, Installed Capacity in 2004, Government 
Target and The Planned Capacity in PDP-Renewables 
Government 
Target (MW) 
Planned in PDP-
Renewables (MW) 
Resources Power 
Gen. 
Potential 
(MW) 
Present 
Installed 
Capacity 
(MW) 
2006 2011 2011 2015 
Biomass 7,000 609.5 703 1,600 1,500 2,700 
Biogas 900 4.6 12 100 270 470 
Solar 5,000 5.5 21 250 270 470 
Wind 1,600 0.2 26 350 100 260 
Micro-hydro 700 2.0 26 350 180 300 
Geothermal N/A 0.5 6 10 - - 
Total  15,200 622.3 774 2,410 2,320 4,200 
Source Decharut Sukkumnoed, 200323 
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Fourth, after the DSM and renewable energy technology, PDP-Renewables also 
employs a co-generation system with natural gas as the main fuel, because of the high 
efficiency achieved through the combined production of heat and power in one 
system. This system can be based on several industrial estates around the country 
(especially in the East, Central and South where they have a natural gas pipeline). 
From the overall potential of 3,000 MW of the new installed system, PDP-
Renewables plans to invest around 2,500 MW during this planning period.  
The fifth energy measure is the re-powering of the existing power plants of EGAT, 
which means the construction of new power plants to replace the existing ones. The 
benefits of this measure are to improve the energy efficiency of the old plants and to 
avoid the potential conflicts in new project sites. In PDP-Renewables, an additional 
2,800 MW of re-powering projects will be employed apart from the existing plan of 
2,800 MW in PDP-Gas, while the total potential of re-powering projects is around 
7,700 MW24. 
Sixth, after employing all five measures, it is firmly possible to cancel the new 
conventional projects. These include the two controversial projects, Nam Theun 2 
Dam in Laos and the Jana Gas Power Plant, as well as the other 19 new power plant 
projects (both NGCC in the PDP-Gas and Coal-fired power plants in PDP-Coal). 
Moreover, three IPP projects can be postponed from 2009 to 2010 and 2011. In 
addition, the consumption of fuel oil and diesel for power generation in 2004-2006 
has been reduced. 
Lastly, the Mae-Moh lignite power plant, which is the most well-known power plant 
in terms of the negative health impacts of its pollutant emissions and mining process, 
will reduce its production to only half of its total installed capacity and its normal 
power generation in order to alleviate negative health impacts.    
Based on these seven measures, PDP-Renewables will be able to meet the 15% 
reserve margin, as required (Figure 5.6). In fact, because of lower load hours in 
several renewable technologies, to meet annual energy demand, the PDP-Renewables’ 
reserve margin is much higher than 15%. The lowest reserve margin in PDP-
Renewables for the whole period is 23.9% in 2006. 
Unlike the first two PDP options, Figure 5.7 clearly shows an increasing trend in 
renewable power generation and the decrease in coal contribution to the Thai fuel 
mix.  By the end of the period, the renewable share is expected to be almost 10%. 
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Figure 5.7 Fuel Mix of PDP-Renewables 
in Total Energy Generation
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Figure 5.6 Total Installed Capacity and Peak Demand in PDP-
Renewables
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5.3.4 Main Differences between the Three PDP Options 
Table 5.4 presents the main differences between the three PDP options. Obviously, 
the revising of demand forecast and DSM can lower the power demand and, 
consequently, the installed capacity and energy generation in PDP-Renewables.  
It is also clear that the proportions of energy generation in these three PDP options 
differ significantly, as shown in both Table 5.5 and Figure 5.8. Obviously, PDP-Gas 
will push for the Thai power system to be based on natural gas up to 81%. PDP-Coal 
tries to avoid this situation by increasing the fuel share of coal from 11% to 27% and 
reducing natural gas share to 65%. Oppositely, PDP-Renewables maintains the natural 
gas share at 70% and reduces the coal share to 10%, while increasing the renewable 
energy share from 2%  to almost 10% in 2015. 
 
Table 5.4 Main Differences between the Three PDP Options 
Items PDP-Gas PDP-Coal PDP-
Renewables 
1. Assumed Economic Growth Rate 
(%) 
6.5 6.5 5.2 
2. Power Demand in 2015 (MW) 40,978 40,978 34,557 
3. Installed Capacity in 2015 (MW) 47,334 47,334 41,485 
4. Energy Generation in 2015 
(GWh) 
265,786 265,786 232,534 
(218,134) 
5. Proportion of Energy Generation in 2015 (%)   
    - Gas 81 65 70 (75) 
    - Lignite & Coal 11 27 10 (10) 
    - Oil 1 1 1 (1) 
    - Renewable energy 2 2 9 (10) 
    - Large hydro 2 2 2 (2) 
    - Import 3 3 2 (2) 
    - DSM - - 6 (0) 
Note: The Figures in Parenthesis are the energy generation and the proportion of 
energy generation excluding DSM. 
 
 178
-
50.000
100.000
150.000
200.000
250.000
300.000
GWh
PDP-Gas PDP-
Renewables
Figure 5.8 Energy Generation and the Fuel 
Mix in 2015
by Three PDP Options
DSM
Renewable
Import
Hydro
Oil
Coal
Natural gas
 
 
5.4 Environmental Impact Analysis 
The environmental impact analysis is one of the key analyses in this study, because 
the environmental aspect has always been on the agenda of energy policy debates. At 
the same time, environmental impacts are also the main sources of physical health 
consequences of power generation, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
At the strategic planning level (i.e. PDP level), where the specific plant locations and 
pollution control technologies have not been identified, the environmental impact 
analysis has to be at an overview level. In this study, the focus will be on the 
atmospheric pollutant emissions from power generation both due to their major 
impacts on human health and to the availability of information about these emissions.  
The emissions of six pollutants will be analyzed in this study. First, the study will 
look at the climate change problem by analyzing future greenhouse gas emissions 
from power generation in each PDP option. Then, the study will analyze the emissions 
of each PDP option of five main pollutants that cause local and regional air pollution 
problems, including SO2, NOX, TSP, mercury and Non-methane Volatile Organic 
Compounds (NMVOC) emissions. 
The calculation of these six atmospheric pollutant emissions will be done through the 
multiplication of annual energy generation (as shown in Appendix 1) and an assumed 
emission factor for each power technology (and also for each pollutant emission). By 
this way, the selection of emission factors is crucial to the results of the analysis. 
Therefore, it is quite important to discuss the nature of these emission factors, based 
on the review of previous life cycle assessments, as presented below.  
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a) Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Due to its impact on climate change, greenhouse gas emission has always been the 
focus of life cycle assessment studies in the energy sector. Normally, these studies 
provide the emission results in “ton (or kg.) of CO2 equivalent”, which means that 
CO2 and other greenhouse gases have been included in the assessment through the 
conversion of “global warming potential”, in relation to CO2. 25. 
In terms of power generation, the most important greenhouse gas is CO2. Any 
combustion will produce CO2. The differences in the CO2 emissions of different 
combustion power technologies is mainly determined by the carbon content in each 
fuel source and the energy efficiency of power plants. Although Table 5.5 presents 
some variation in assessing life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of each power 
generation technology, the variation is rather small compared to other pollutants 
emission, discussed later. This is mainly because there is no commercial scrubbing of 
CO2 available on the market26.      
Table 5.5 Ranges of Estimated Greenhouse Gas-intensity of Selected Fuels.  
(Unit: gram CO2 per kWh). 
Fuels Holdren and Smith, 2000. Rowlands, 2005. 
Conventional Coal 960-1300 
Advanced Coal 800-850 
Coal = 790-1182 
Oil 690-870 733-935 
Natural Gas 460-1230 362-653 
Nuclear 9-100 2-59 
Large Hydro power 2-410 2-48 
Biomass 37-166 15-101 
Solar PV 30-150 13-731 
Wind 11-75 6-124 
Geothermal - 15-97 
 Source: Complied from Holdren and Smith, 200027 and Rowlands, 200528. 
Certainly, non-combustion power technologies, like wind energy, PV, or micro hydro 
power, provide very low greenhouse gas emission in their whole life cycles. Their 
greenhouse gas emissions are normally related to the construction process, not the 
generation process. Although biomass and biogas power-generating technologies also 
require a combustion process, their life cycle of regenerating biomass will absorb the 
same amount of CO2 from the atmosphere, leading to very low greenhouse gas 
emissions in their life cycles. In cases of biogas technology, since it reduces CH4 
emission, compared to the natural decomposition process of animal manures, it even 
has a negative greenhouse gas emission in its life cycle29. In practice, the greenhouse 
gas emission of biomass and biogas power generation depends very much on the 
transportation distance between fuel sources and power plants30.   
 
 
b) Sulfur Dioxide Emission 
The main problems of SO2 emission are the acidification and negative health impacts, 
as described in Chapter 2. From the life cycle analysis by Gagnon et al, it is clear that 
the SO2 emission of each power generation technology can vary significantly (Figure 
5.11) due to various factors, especially fuel sources, technologies and regulations31.  
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For example, the sulfur content of coal can vary from 0.5% to 5% and in the case of 
oil, it can vary from 0.2% to 2%32. In coal-fired power plants, there are a number of 
technologies that can reduce the SO2 emission33. The commercial scrubbing 
technologies can remove up to 90% of emissions, but these technologies have not 
been widely implemented. Therefore, generally, coal, oil, and diesel are still the main 
polluters in terms of acidification34. 
Natural gas has virtually no sulfur, because it is removed in processing plants after 
extraction. Depending on the sulfur concentration and regulation, this process can also 
lead to low or high SO2 emission35. A study of Korea shows that, unlike the case of 
other fossil fuels, more than 99% of SO2 emission in the natural gas life cycle comes 
from the upstream process, and is not a direct emission from the power plant36. 
Compared to fossil fuels, biomass and other renewable energy technologies have a 
low SO2 emission factor37, thus, they can contribute to the alleviation of the 
acidification problem. 
 
 Figure 5.9 SO2 Emissions from Different Power Technologies Based on Life 
Cycle Assessments.  Source: Gagnon et al. 2002. p. 1272. 
 
c) Nitrogen Oxides Emission 
NOX Emission can also vary widely (Figure 5.10). However, unlike SO2, the variation 
of NOX basically depends on combustion technologies and conditions rather than fuel 
sources, because NOX formation can occur when the temperature is higher than 1370° 
C38. Normally technologies that involve air compression, like the diesel engine, will 
produce a high level of NOX emission. 
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Certainly, non-combustion renewable technologies, like wind and solar energy, have 
very low NOX emissions in their whole life cycle. Unlike SO2 emission, due to their 
combustion condition, biomass and biogas technologies still have quite high NOX 
emissions39 40. Therefore, better combustion technologies and higher efficiency are 
required to reduce NOX emissions41. 
 
 Figure 5.10 NOX Emissions of Different Power Technologies Based on Life 
Cycle Assessments 
 Source: Gagnon et al. 2002. p. 1273 
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d) Other Pollutants 
Apart from three main pollutant emissions, Gagnon et al also provide emission factors 
of three other pollutants, which also have direct and more local effects on health; 
namely total suspended particles (TSP), mercury, and non-methane volatile organic 
compounds (NMVOC) emissions, as shown in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 Other Atmospheric Emissions of Energy Options  
(Note: Some data is not life cycle assessment).  
 
Source: Gagnon et al. 2002. p. 1277.  
However, as cautioned by the authors, much of the data in the Table are only direct 
emissions from power plants, not the results of life cycle assessment42. Like the SO2 
and NOX emissions, the figures in the Table show a variation of emission factors of 
each technology. Normally, non-combustion technologies provide much less 
emission. Natural gas also has quite low emissions compared to other combustion 
technologies, except in terms of NMVOC emissions.   
With all the variations in these emission factors, identifying an emission factor of 
each technology, as an assumption for the impact analysis of each PDP option, is not 
an easy task. Although Chuangsanguansit et al present a comparison of direct 
emission of some power plants in Thailand, as shown in Table 5.7. These figures do 
not include the whole life cycle emission and the recent improvement in dust control 
technologies for biomass power plants43. Therefore, the selection of appropriate 
assumed emission factors needs to compare the emission factors of each technology 
from several sources. The results of this selection are summarized and presented in 
Table 5.8. 
In the case of high variations in these emission factors, a sensitivity analysis is needed 
to ensure the range of validity of this impact analysis. The details of the sensitivity 
analysis will be presented in section 5.9. 
Last but not least, it is also important to note that all these environmental impacts do 
not include solid waste. In fact, different power technologies can lead to completely 
different impacts in terms of solid waste, both in terms of quantity and toxicity. 
Especially, when coal-fired and nuclear power plants have been considered as options, 
the analysis of solid waste impacts is very important and can lead to different policy 
results.  Therefore, based on this fact, the absence of assessment of solid waste 
impacts is one of the major limitations of this study. 
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Table 5.7 Direct Pollutant Emissions from Biomass and Other Fossil fuel Power 
Plants 
Emission (kg/MWh) Item 
Roi Et Green 
(Biomass) 
Coal Oil Gas Combined 
Coal, Oil, Gas 
CO2 Nearly Zero 1260 810 570 730 
SO2 0.32 2.8 1.3 0.0003 0.65 
NOX 2.5 5.8 2.9 1.4 2.4 
CO 0.71 0.20 0.27 0.20 0.20 
TSP (dust) 0.080 0.0037 0.097 0.0036 0.036 
Source: Chuangsanguansit et al44. 
 
Table 5.8 The Assumed Emission Factors of Each Technology Applied in This Study 
GHG NOX SO2 TSP Hg NMVOC Technology 
g./kWh g./kWh g./kWh g./kWh mg./kWh g./kWh 
Lignite 1,200 5.800 5.270 0.618 0.042 0.029 
Coal 960 3.790 3.760 0.329 0.360 0.029 
Oil 770 2.900 4.900 0.247 0.013 0.022 
Diesel 650 2.900 1.285 0.247 0.013 1.570 
Natural Gas 512 1.250 0.314 0.010 0.001 0.164 
Biomass 46 2.500 0.302 0.200 0.002 0.089 
Biogas -33 1.944 0.068 0.100 0.002 0.164 
Solar PV 30 0.008 0.023 0.017 0.000 0.070 
Large Hydro 15 0.020 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Micro hydro 2 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Wind 10 0.000 0.069 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Cogeneration 343 0.838 0.210 0.007 0.001 0.110 
Import Laos 15 - - - - - 
Im. Malaysia 443 - - - - - 
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5.5 Health Impact Analysis 
 5.5.1 DPSEEA Model 
The health impact analysis in this study follows the World Health Organization’s 
DPSEEA model, as previously discussed in Chapter 2. Normally, the DPSEEA model 
of power generation takes its point of departure in the expansion of economy as the 
main driving force, which encourages to  the investment in fossil fuel-based power 
generation.  This pressure, then, leads to changes in environmental qualities, 
ecosystems and local livelihoods, and, in the case of Thailand, a higher economic 
burden (both for import fuels and investment). These changes raise peoples’ exposure 
to poor physical environment (both from local air pollution and climate change) and 
present more difficulties to the maintenance of socio-economic conditions (due to 
more social conflicts and insecurity, and negative impacts on local and national 
economy). Last, due to the exposure, health effects can occur in forms of physical 
impacts of poor environment (like respiratory system disorders and diseases or 
expansion of communicable diseases) or psychological and social related health 
impacts of the negative changes in the social determinants of health, as previously 
mentioned. This normal version of the DPSEEA model is presented in Figure 5.11 
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 Figure 5.11 DPSEEA Model of Health Impacts of Power Generation 
 
However, with the direct relationship between the expansion of economy and power 
demand as a main presupposition, this normal DPSEEA model seems to disregard the 
fact that the Thai power sector always over-forecasts its expansion for a decade, as 
previously shown in this chapter. In other words, the expansion of power demand is 
not only the effect of economic growth, but partly it becomes a strategy (or so-called 
expansionist strategy) of the Thai power sector itself. Concurrently, the pressure of 
generating more fossil fuel-based electricity should not be another precondition of the 
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model. With a variety of potential sustainable energy options, as shown in Chapter 3, 
Thai power can simply reduce this pressure by investing more in energy efficiency 
and renewable energy technologies. Therefore, instead of ending up with end-of-pipe 
technologies, as usually done, this study aims to provide more “upstream actions”, as 
suggested in the concept of healthy public policy. 
Hence, in the analytical model of health impact analysis, as presented in Figure 5.12, 
two upstream actions are now taken into account. The first attempt is to review the 
demand forecasting. The second action is to increase the share of renewable energy 
and DSM and, consequently, to reduce the share of fossil fuel-based power generation 
in the Thai fuel mix. Certainly, as already explained, both attempts are now included 
in PDP-Renewables. Therefore, the main task of the health impact analysis is to 
compare the health impact of PDP-Renewables with two other PDP options based on  
the DPSEEA model. 
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 Figure 5.12 Analytical Model of the Health Impacts of Power Generation in 
Thailand 
Due to the limitation of information, not all aspects of this DPSEEA model can be 
quantified into physical health units. For the effect of poor environmental quality, the 
study will calculate the health impacts in terms of mortality, morbidity, and disability-
adjusted life years, described later in this section. However, for socio-economic 
changes, it is very difficult to quantify these effects into specific physical units. 
Therefore, these effects will be reported in terms of the changes in determinants of 
health, like more job creation, less import burden, lower generation cost, etc. 
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           5.5.2 Impact Analysis on Mortality and Morbidity (The Extern-E 
Approach) 
The analysis of health impacts in this study is based on the report of the World Health 
Organization for European Region45, which refers to the analytical results of the 
Extern-E project. The Extern-E project is the first comprehensive attempt in Europe to 
evaluate the external costs associated with different fuel cycles. The Extern-E project 
represents the growing interest in developing an approach to the quantification of 
environmental and health impacts of energy uses and also their external costs46.  
The Extern-E project applies an impact pathway analysis, by starting from the 
specific, site-dependent activity (in this case, power plant emissions and their fuel 
processes) that gives rise to health effects. In the case of air pollution, the emission is 
then modeled  by use of atmospheric transport modeling techniques, before mapping 
it to human receptors in different locations, based on regional and national population 
statistical databases. Later, the integrated model called ECOSENSE generates the 
estimation of the physical health impacts of energy-related activities. Finally, the 
model converts these impacts into monetary terms by multiplying the physical health 
impacts by monetary unit values that are estimated for each impact. In the case of the 
accident-related health impacts, the results are estimated by use of probabilistic 
analysis based on historical data47. 
In this approach, the types of health impacts are disaggregated into different effects, 
for example, premature death, chronic bronchitis, etc. and their units (e.g. number of 
cases, years of life loss). In order to compare alternative energy technologies, the 
health impacts are expressed in terms of the physical unit per TWh of electricity 
generated by each power technology. In the Extern-E project and also in this study, 
“comparability is essential in order for research exercise to be able to inform policy 
decision relating to the internalization of these external impacts”48. The example of 
health impact results (of coal) is presented in Table 5.9.  
In this table, it is very important to note that the physical health impacts of air 
pollution (both acute and chronic impacts) is the sum of those from individual 
pollutants; namely SO2, NOX and TSP.  
Based on the fact that the impacts of power generation can vary greatly due to the 
differences in fuel sources, combustion technologies, and regulations, in general, the 
results shown in the WHO-Europe report and also applied in this study are based on 
the UK context, which has impact rates that are close to the average of the EU. For 
coal technology, the results in Table 5.9 are based on the use of a conventional 
pulverized fuel generation technology with flue gas desulphurization (FGD) 
abatement technology. For lignite, the results are based on those for Germany. The air 
pollution health impacts from lignite are approximately 30% higher than those of coal. 
From the Extern-E results, wind energy is considered to have the lowest level of 
negative health impacts, which are around 10% of those from coal for the same 
amount of electricity generation49.   
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Table 5.9 Main Health Impacts of the Generation of Electricity by Coal in Europe 
    
Source: Hunt, A. 2004.  
 
Certainly, the Extern-E approach has faced a number of limitations and uncertainties. 
In terms of limitations, the Extern-E approach fails to include the health impacts of  
climate changes and secondary air pollution problems (e.g. very fine particles from 
the chemical reaction of SO2, NOX and other pollutants), which are now the growing 
concerns of health experts, as shown in Chapter 3. In terms of uncertainties, its results 
can be varied on the basis of the uncertainty of parameters of the model (e.g. an 
exposure-response function, etc.), the uncertainty of future technology development 
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(both in power generation and in medical treatments), and the uncertainty of 
incomplete or ambiguous information50. 
Although the results of the Extern-E project face some limitations and uncertainties, 
especially as they are applied to Thailand, which has considerably differences in 
atmospheric and settlement conditions, they provide very good basic information for 
analyzing health impacts at the strategic level. To a certain extent, the application of 
this Extern-E project can provide Thai society with insightful information on potential 
future health impacts of power generation and its development plan. Following the 
Extern-E approach, the health impact assumption, which will be used for the health 
impact analysis in this study, is presented in Table 5.10. 
5.5.3 Impact Analysis on Disability-adjusted Life Years  
(The Eco-indicator Approach)  
Another approach to health impact analysis is the calculation of disability-adjusted 
life years (or DALYs), which is developed by the Eco-indicator 99 project funded by 
the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment (VROM). The 
aim of the project is to develop indicator scores for life cycle assessment, which can 
be widely used by many designers. To reach this aim, the calculation of more 
aggregated impact information is needed. In this project, three types of environmental 
damages; namely human health, ecosystem quality, and resource, are calculated, 
weighted, and finally integrated into the single eco-indicator51. However, since the 
focus of this analysis is on the health aspect, only the indicator on human heath 
damage will be applied to this study. 
 a) Disability-adjusted Life Years 
To identify human health damage, the concept of disability-adjusted life years (or 
DALYs), developed in collaboration between the World Bank and the World Health 
Organization, is used as an aggregated unit for various physical health impacts52. This 
is due to the fact that DALYs measure the total amount of ill health of the population 
(or the loss of healthy life years) by summing the time (or years) lost due to premature 
death (or years of life lost: YLL) and the years lost due to disability (years lived 
disability: YLD). Basically, the YLL “correspond to the number of deaths multiplied 
by the standard life expectancy at the age at which the death occurs”. At the same 
time, “to estimate YLD for a particular cause (or disease) in a particular time period, 
the number of incident cases in that period is multiplied by the average duration of the 
disease and a weight factor that reflects the severity of the disease on a scale from 0 
(perfect health) to 1 (dead)”53. 
The main advantage of the DALYs approach is that it is able to include several 
important factors in life cycle assessment, like “the number of individuals effected by 
the problem, the time humans suffer from disabilities and the lifetime lost by 
premature death, as well as the severity of the health problem, ranging from premature 
death to irritation”, in one indicator and “can be quantified theoretically”54. 
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 Table 5.10 The Assumed Health Impact Factors of Each Technology from the Extern-E Project Applied to This Study 
Co-efficient Item Unit Lignite Coal Oil Diesel Gas Biomass Biogas PV Hydro Micro-hydro Wind DSM Cogeneration
Death from accident Cases/TWh 0.116 0.116 0.033 0.033 0.021 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.014
Severe Injuries Cases/TWh 2.670 2.670 0.234 0.234 0.263 0.000 1.102 0.000 0.167 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.176
Minor injuries Cases/TWh 22.468 22.468 2.471 2.471 1.555 0.000 5.810 0.000 2.176 1.088 0.000 0.000 1.042
Acute Mortality cases/TWh 3.710 2.786 2.658 2.658 0.039 0.130 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026
Acute Year of Life Loss Years/TWh 2.780 2.089 1.994 1.994 0.029 0.100 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020
Acute Hospital admissions cases/TWh 6.060 4.557 3.076 3.076 1.757 0.818 3.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.177
Acute Congestive heart failure cases/TWh 1.690 1.271 0.913 0.913 0.165 0.250 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110
Acute Restricted Activity Days Days/TWh 9991.000 7511.800 5402.000 5402.000 959.000 1134.000 2167.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 642.530
Chronic Mortality cases/TWh 28.870 21.690 15.570 15.570 2.770 4.500 9.050 13.040 0.000 0.000 2.100 0.000 1.856
Chonic YOLL Years/TWh 288.420 216.860 155.700 155.700 27.700 45.300 90.600 130.400 0.000 0.000 21.000 0.000 18.559
Chronic Bronchitis (adult) cases/TWh 19.340 14.546 10.377 10.377 1.890 3.080 4.270 1.300 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.000 1.266
Chronic Bronchitis (Children) cases/TWh 271.720 204.300 147.000 147.000 26.090 42.000 58.960 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 17.480
Chronic cough episodes/TWh 350.000 261.580 189.000 189.000 33.500 54.780 75.710 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 22.445
 
 190
b) Model Calculation 
For the power generation, the eco-indicator approach initiates its calculation with the fate 
analysis linking the emissions of several air pollutants, including SO2, NOX, TSP, 
NMVOC, and CO2, to a temporary change in their concentrations. Then, it makes an 
exposure analysis linking this temporary concentration to a dose. Later, in the effect 
analysis, it links the dose to a number of health effects, like the number and types of 
respiratory system disorders. Finally, the damage analysis links the specific health effects 
to DALYs55. Figure 5.13 presents the overall methodological approach of the eco-
indicator project.  
 
 
Figure 5.13 Overall Methodological Approach of the Eco-indicator Project 
Source: Goedkoop, M. and R. Spriensma. 2001. 
 
By this way, the units of the end results in the eco-indicator project, which will be used in 
this study, are the DALYs per Kg of each pollutant emission (not physical unit per kWh 
as applied in the Extern-E approach). Therefore, to calculate the health impact in this 
study, the calculation of environmental impacts (in terms of each pollutant emission) is 
required, as planned and described in the previous section. Finally, to summarize the 
overall health impacts of all pollutants derived from power generation, the summation of 
health impacts of each pollutant will be done, with the identification of two important 
types of health effects; namely climate change and respiratory effects of air pollution. 
It is very important to note that, based on the results of the eco-indicator, that the so-
called health impacts of air pollution in this study are only the respiratory effects. In other 
words, the growing concerns of lung cancer caused by air pollution and children 
neurobehavioral impairment related to mercury exposure56, as discussed in Chapter 3, do 
not form part of this analysis.  
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Concurrently, due to the available information, health impacts of climate change in the 
eco-indicator include the increasing of diseases as a result of higher average temperature 
(such as malaria, schistosomiasis, dengue fever, cardiovascular and respiratory disorder) 
and the number of people that have to be displaced due to the rising sea level57. The 
following are excluded from the eco-indicator, a) other diseases than vascular diseases 
due to heat waves, b) other vector-borne diseases than malaria, schistosomiasis, dengue 
fever, c) effects on malnutrition and hunger, d) increased impact of pollutant at higher 
temperatures, and e) the effects of extreme weather events58.        
Moreover, to better represent the situation in the real world decision-making, three sets of 
health damage factors are identified in the eco-indicator project.  Based on cultural 
theory, “Egalitarian” refers to a long-term perspective and a more pre-cautionary 
approach, which means that even a minimum of scientific proof justifies inclusion into 
the damage model. Oppositely, “Individualist” refers to a short-term perspective and only 
proven effects are included in the model. Last, “Hierarchist” represents a balanced time 
perspective and uses consensus among scientists to determine the inclusion of effects59. 
In general, the Hierarchist version is suggested by the authors, since it represents a 
consensus-building process and a balanced view of long and short-term perspectives60.   
Table 5.11 presents the results of the eco-indicator, which will be used as an assumption 
of this study. Apart from health impacts of NOX, the table shows only slight differences 
between the three perspectives of decision-making. As suggested by the authors, this 
study will mainly use the hierarchist version as a standard for further analysis. 
 
Table 5.11 The Eco-indicator’s Health Damage Factor of Selected Pollutants in Three 
Decision-making Perspectives (Unit: DALYs per kg of emission). 
Pollutants Hierarchist Egalitarian Individualist 
CO2 2.10E-07 2.10E-07 2.00E-07 
SO2 5.46E-05 5.46E-05 3.90E-05 
NOX 8.87E-05 8.91E-05 1.19E-06 
TSP 1.10E-04 1.10E-04 8.03E-05 
NMVOC 1.28E-06 1.28E-06 1.19E-06 
Source : Compiled from Goedkoop and Spriensma, 2001. 
Like the Extern-E approach, the limitations and uncertainties of the eco-indicator 
approach lie under the scope of available information and model development. In 
specific, health damage factors of the eco-indicator are still based on existing European 
experiences, except from those of climate change (which are based on the global scale). 
These factors do not cover the full range of health impacts of power generation, as 
mentioned earlier either. At the same time, they are based on the present knowledge of 
health impacts and relied on present technologies for health protection and treatment.       
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5.5.4 Comparison of the Two Approaches 
Based on the above description, the differences between the Extern-E and the Eco-
indicator approaches are summarized in Table 5.12.  
Table 5.12 The Comparison between the Extern-E and the Eco-indicator approaches 
Items Extern-E Approach Eco-indicator Approach 
Nature of health impact 
factors 
Disaggregation into different physical 
units (e.g. no. of mortality cases or 
chronic bronchitis cases) 
Aggregation into DALYs 
Units of health impact 
factors 
Different physical units per kWh of 
each power technology 
DALYs per kg of each pollutant 
emission from power generation 
Identification of different 
impacts 
Yes, mainly divided into acute and 
chronic health impacts 
No. All impacts included into DALYs 
Calculation procedure in 
this study 
Directly from energy generation of 
each technology determined in each 
PDP option 
Indirectly from amount of pollutant 
emissions, calculated in 
environmental impact analysis 
Main types of health 
impacts 
Impacts of air pollution and accidents Impacts of air pollution and climate 
change 
Inclusion of air pollutants 
(excluding climate change) 
SO2, NOX, and PM SO2, NOX, TSP, and NMVOC 
Main source of information European experiences Mainly European experiences (except 
climate change) 
Differentiation for different 
decision-making schemes 
No differentiation Three sets of factors applied to 
different decision-making schemes 
 
Obviously, the differences in the nature of health impact factors between these two 
approaches lead to the different applications in this study. For the Extern-E approach, the 
different types of health impacts can be identified, but an overall health impact indicator 
cannot be obtained. Oppositely, the aggregation into DALYs allows the eco-indicator to 
present a picture of the overall health impact of power generation, while it fails to present 
different types of health impacts.  
In terms of calculation, since the Extern-E approach provides factors based on kWh of 
each technology, the calculation of health impacts can be easily performed directly from 
power generation in each PDP option. However, because the health damage factors in the 
eco-indicator approach are based on the amount of each pollutant emission, the 
calculation of health impacts requires the results of pollutant emission from the 
environmental impact analysis. 
Last, in terms of scope of health impacts, these two approaches do not cover the same 
aspects, although both rely on the existing experiences of the European region. Both 
approaches cover health impacts of air pollution with small differences in terms of 
pollutant inclusion. While the Extern-E approach fails to include climate change effects, 
the eco-indicator misses the accident-related health impacts in its analysis. 
Based on this comparison, it is useful to apply both approaches to this study. Applying 
both approaches will allow us to know both overall and specific health impacts from the 
analyses. It also provides useful insights into all health impacts of accidents, air pollution, 
and also climate change. It can also provide some comparability between the results of 
these two approaches, at least in terms of health impacts of air pollution. Since the eco-
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indicator approach covers both YLL and YLD (while the Extern-E approach calculates 
only YLL) and more pollutant emissions,  the DALYs results of health impacts (of air 
pollution) from the eco-indicator approach should principally exceed the years of life loss 
presented in the Extern-E.     
5.5.5 Limitations and Uncertainties 
Like other strategic impact analyses, the limitations and uncertainties of the study depend 
mainly on the availability of information and the appropriateness of the applied model.  
Based on these two approaches, the health impact analysis in this study faces five 
limitations and uncertainties, as discussed below; 
• Not all health impacts can be included in the analysis. Mainly the physical 
health impacts of air pollution, climate change, and accident are quantified in 
the analysis. All socio-economic consequences cannot be translated into 
physical units, but they are part of the great concerns in Thai society, as 
shown in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4. 
• Since both approaches rely on European epidemiological studies and models, 
they can lead to important uncertainties when applied to Thailand. Among all 
differences between Europe and Thailand, four main different conditions must 
be considered; namely, weather conditions, demographical conditions, coping 
capacities of health sector and society, and environmental regulations. For 
example, the warmer weather can lead to greater negative impacts of air 
pollution61. Higher population density and a higher proportion of children in 
the total population can lead to greater negative health impacts as well.  
Poorer coping capacities and environmental regulation can certainly lead to 
poorer environmental conditions, higher risk exposures, and consequently 
much worse impacts on health.    
• Because Thailand’s PDP does not specify the locations of new power plants,  
an actual exposure analysis of Thailand cannot be obtained in this study. In 
other words, this study uses direct calculations from amounts of power 
generation and pollutant emissions without considering the importance of 
location in its impact analysis. 
• In practice, each power plant can lead to different environmental and health 
impacts. Therefore, to use one impact co-efficient for each technology 
(assuming that all power plants using the same technology) is associated with 
some uncertainty. 
• The impacts of future technologies, both in the power sector (including in 
pollution controls) and in medical treatment (to reduce the health impacts or 
preventing premature death), and future knowledge about health impacts 
(more scientific proofs and consensus on health impacts from power 
generation), cannot be included in this study.  
Although they face these limitations and uncertainties, it is still useful and worthwhile to 
apply these two approaches to analyze the health impacts of Thailand’s PDP. This is 
mainly because they can provide an overview picture of what may happen  (i.e. potential 
health impacts) in each PDP option, based on previous international experiences and 
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knowledge.  Since no systematic health impact analysis of power generation in Thailand 
has previously be conducted , the future health impacts of different development options 
with different power technologies cannot be systematically compared and deliberatively 
discussed in Thai society without these calculations. Moreover, both approaches form 
part of state-of-the-art in this research field and have been widely adopted across the 
world. Therefore, while facing limitations and uncertainties, this quantified health impact 
analysis is still expected to contribute with a valuable insight to healthy public policy 
discussions in Thai society. 
 
5.6 Economic Impact Analysis 
Economic impacts are very important aspects in overall impact analysis. This is not only 
because the economic aspect forms part of the social determinants of health, as shown in 
the DPSEEA model, but also because it is considered to be the most important factor in 
policy-making within Thai power policy. Therefore, regarding the concept of healthy 
public policy, the implementation of an economic impact analysis can be seen as an 
attempt to make the healthier choice an easier one for decision-makers. 
 a) Economic Impact Indicator 
Although, in theory, we can identify the final endpoint or the ultimate indicator for 
economic analysis, like the maximization of net present value or the minimization of 
societal costs, in reality, there is always more than one aspect of economic impacts which 
needs to be discussed in policy-making processes. The balancing between economic 
growth and stability is one of the obvious examples. Another example that can be 
identified is the balancing between short-term and long-term benefits. 
Therefore, to represent the reality of policy-making, the economic impact analysis in this 
study will provide five main indicators, which are relevant to policy discussion in the 
Thai power sector and Thai society. 
• Investment requirement. Although investment requirement should not 
be a big concern for a relatively high stable and profitable electricity 
market like Thailand, it becomes a part of the main policy argument for 
EGAT privatization (discussed in Chapter 4). In short, its analysis can 
show which PDP options are financially viable in this present context.  
• Generation costs. Generation costs are always on the top of the agenda 
of policy debates and politics in the Thai power sector (see Chapter 4). It 
becomes a political indicator in itself. Thus, it is essential to this analysis 
to show the impacts of different PDP options on generation costs. 
• GDP Contribution. At the national level, GDP growth is always a top 
development indicator for the Thai government. Recently, the Thai 
government has also considered the power generation project as a part of 
the mega-projects which can boost national economy. Considering the 
fact that investment in different power technologies can lead to great 
differences in their GDP contributions to national economy (mainly due 
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to the differences in local contents), it is very useful to identify the most 
valuable PDP option in terms of GDP contribution. 
• Balance of Payment Effect. After the economic crisis in 1997, 
economic stability has certainly become a great concern in Thai society 
even though, unlike GDP growth, it is not yet a politically sensitive 
indicator. The 9th National Development Plan has stated clearly the target 
of national balance of payment as a part of the development of the 
sufficiency economy. Thus, in this study, the different import burdens 
arisen from different PDP options will be calculated and compared in 
order to provide an insight into how power generation investment plans 
can affect national economic stability. 
• External Cost. In economic theory, calculating external cost is the way 
to integrate external impacts into the decision-making equation (or 
consideration).  Therefore, to many economists, it can be the bridge to 
sustainable development planning; though, in practice, it cannot easily 
work and reach the public decision-making process, as assumed in 
theory. However, according to its theoretical intention, it is a good idea 
to analyze the effect of internalized future impacts of power generation 
on the PDP decision-making process. 
b) Data Assumption and Calculation 
To calculate all economic impact indicators, the information on cost structure in the Thai 
context is required. From the several sources of information found through the review of 
literature, three main sources of information have been applied to the study, as described 
below; 
• The study of IEA (2005)62 on Projected Costs of Generating Electricity 
(a summary of results is shown in Table 5.13) can be used as a recent 
international reference. 
• The EGAT’s PDP report provides EGAT’s own assumptions on 
investment costs in several conventional power technologies, including 
natural gas (combined-cycle and re-powering plants), coal, fuel oil, etc.63  
• The Report of E for E Foundation64 for Thailand’s Energy Policy and 
Planning Office presents a comparative cost structure of different power 
technologies in the Thai context, as shown in Table 5.14. 
Based on these main sources of information with some modifications, the investment 
costs, O&M costs, and fuel costs of each technology have been identified as assumptions 
of this study (later shown in Table 5.17).  The investment costs will be based basically on 
EGAT’s own assumption and, in other cases, on the E for E report. The O&M and fuel 
costs will be based on the E for E report. Modification is required to represent the actual 
cost changes in 2003 (mainly fuel cost changes) and load factors as planned in EGAT’s 
PDP. For Biogas technology and DSM, of which no information is available in these 
documents, the assumption will be based on the OVE handbook for Thailand’s Ministry 
of Energy’s local energy planning project65. 
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Table 5.13 The Projected Costs of Different Types of Power Plants in OECD Countries 
5% Discount (US cent/KWh) 10% Discount (US cent/KWh) Type Construction 
Cost 
(USD/kWe) 
Invest. O&M Fuel Total Invest. O&M Fuel Total 
Coal 1000-1500 10-12 4-9 12-30 25-50 18-23 4-12 10-29 35-60 
Gas 400-800 4-10 2-5 32-44 37-60 18-36 6-10 4-8 40-63 
Nuclear 1000-2000 10-18 6-10 4-8 21-31 18-36 6-10 4-8 30-50 
Wind 1000-2000 27-60 6-20 - 33-76 46-90 5-15 - 45-120 
Solar 2500-6000 115-480 5-50 - 120-480 205-740 5-50 - 210-740 
Hydro 1300-3000 31-50 2-13 - 40-60 55-90 2-13 - 65-100 
CHP 500-1500 6-35 1-23 21-50 25-65 10-50 1-23 21-50 30-70 
Biomass 1700-2200 15-19 10-13 13-53 37-85 28-34 10-13 13-53 50-100 
Source: Summarized from IEA (2005). 
Note: CHP data includes heat credit. 
Table 5.14 The Generation Costs of Different Power Technologies in the Thai context 
Item Unit Coal Gas Fuel Oil Biomass
rice husk 
Micro-
hydro 
Wind Solar 
PV 
Capacity MW 300 729 735 18 0.06 1 0.003 
Load factor % 80 80 25 80 50 16.6 13.7 
Lifetime Year 25 20 25 25 25 20 20 
Fuel Price  569.7 
THB/ton 
148 
THB/m.btu 
7.01 
THB/l. 
350 
THB/ton 
- - - 
Investment 
cost 
THB/kW 54,920 18,800 27,000 54,639 61,833 56,640 190,429 
O& M Cost THB/kWh 0.1470 0.0493 0.1382 0.3817 0.6123 0.6492 0.0292 
Fuel Cost THB/kWh 0.6197 1.0738 1.5710 0.4734 - - - 
Total Cost THB/kWh 1.4469 1.3570 2.0170 1.5697 1.7564 3.9764 9.0665 
Source: Summarized from E for E (2003), pp 2-86 to 2-89. 
 
From these assumptions, the annualized capital costs have been calculated for each power 
technology in order to compare annual generation costs with different project lifetimes 
(in different technologies) and different time frames of investment of each PDP option. In 
this calculation, the interest rate of 5% is assumed to represent a less risky market 
situation in the Thai power sector. For the conventional power technologies, a project 
lifetime of 25 years is assumed, while, to represent higher chances of new technological 
development, a 20-year project lifetime is assumed for renewable technologies. 
In analyzing the GDP contribution and the BOP effect, information is needed on the 
domestic and import characteristics of each technology. Unfortunately, this information is 
not complete in the Thai context. However, from the work of Songkrot Kalnpongwarn66 
and the analysis of the latest 2000 Input-Output table, Table 5.15 provides some initial 
idea which can be used for identification in this study. In the study, the assumptions (as 
also later shown in Table 5.17) of import content will be separately identified for capital 
costs (or construction costs), O&M costs, and fuel costs, to reflect the different natures in 
cost distribution in these cost activities. 
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Table 5.15 Share of Import Costs in Power Generation and Related Activities 
From Songkrot kalnpongwarn, 2001 Own Analysis from 2000 I-O Table 
Biogas to power 8.82% Coal and Lignite 34.52% 
Biomass power  18.2% Petroleum and gas 70.98% 
LPG 57.18% Electricity 28.13% 
Electricity 26.66% Power Plant Construction 26.65% 
Source: Summarized from Songkrot Kalnpongwarn (2001) and own analysis 
In terms of external costs, this study is based on the recommendation of the E for E 
Foundation67 (to Thailand’s Energy Policy and Planning Office), which now becomes a 
formal proposal for internalizing the benefits of renewable energy in the Thai context 
(namely in government subsidies and pricing). The E for E recommendation is basically 
referring to the result of the Extern-E project, adjusted by the purchasing power 
difference between Thailand and the EU according to the method of benefit transfer. In 
this recommendation, two types of externality costs are identified; namely, the minimum 
level of external costs for government subsidies and the average level of external costs 
for real economic pricing, as shown in Table 5.16. In this study, the average level of 
external costs is applied to represent the idea of real economic pricing. 
 
Table 5.16 Suggested Externality Costs of Power Generation in the Thai Context (Unit: 
THB/kWh). 
Approach Coal Fuel Oil Gas Biomass Hydro Wind Solar PV 
Minimum Level  
(for gov. subsidy) 
2.09 2.02 0.60 0.48 0.30 0.04 0.11 
Average Level 
(for real econ. Pricing) 
2.76 2.67 0.79 0.63 0.39 0.14 0.05 
Source: Summarized from E for E (2003), pp. 2-106 to 2-107. 
 
Through all these assumptions and calculation, the final set of economic assumptions 
used in this study is identified and presented in Table 5.17. 
It should be noted that, since the fuel costs of each technology are based on the fuel price 
in 2003, when the recent world oil price rise had not yet occurred, the sensitivity analysis 
of higher fuel costs is thus essential. This sensitivity analysis will be explained in section 
5.9.      
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Table 5.17 The Economic Assumption for Each Power Technology in This Study  
Co-efficient Item Unit Lignite Coal Oil Diesel Gas Biomass Biogas PV Hydro 
Micro-
hydro Wind DSM Laos Malay. Co-gen
Investment Costs 
M.THB 
/MW 45.000 42.000 27.000 55.000 25.000 55.502 80.750 190.429 23.150 61.833 56.640 7.500 - - 36.000
Annualized 
Capital Costs 
(5%) 
M. THB 
/MW 3.20 2.98 1.92 3.91 1.78 4.44 6.46 15.23 1.64 4.95 4.53 - - - 2.56 
Import Content % 50 70 70 60 70 50 30 50 60 30 60 50 0 0 70 
Operation & 
Maintenance 
THB 
/kwh 0.11 0.18 0.14 1.86 0.10 0.51 1.20 0.03 0.13 0.62 0.65 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.12 
Import Content % 10 15 15 15 15 10 15 15 10 10 15 15 0 0 15 
Fuel costs  
THB 
/kWh 0.570 0.670 1.571 3.023 1.125 0.786 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.650 1.600 1.182 
Import Content % 20 90 90 90 70 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 70 
External Costs 
THB 
/kwh 4.04 2.76 2.67 2.67 0.79 0.63 - 0.05 0.39 0.13 0.14 - 0.39 0.79 0.47 
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5.7 Resource Impact Analysis 
Power generation, especially in conventional technologies, is a resource-consuming 
activity and Thailand is certainly not a rich country in terms of fossil-based resources.  
Therefore, according to the concept of sustainable development and sufficiency economy, 
better strategic energy resource management is highly required. The analysis in this study 
aims to provide information on how different PDP options with different power 
generation technologies will lead to different patterns of resource utilization, self-
sufficiency and conservation. 
There are three indicators in this resource impact analysis; 
• Share of domestic resource. The share of domestic resource in power 
generation represents the idea of self-sufficiency in the Thai power sector. 
However, it should be used with caution, since the present high domestic 
resource share, especially in terms of finite resources, may lead to a higher 
rate of resource depletion and, therefore, a lower rate of resource self-
sufficiency in the longer term. 
• Effect on Natural Gas Reserve. Natural gas is the most important fuel for 
power generation in Thailand, but Thailand has only a limited existing natural 
gas reserve. The imported natural gas from neighboring countries becomes 
more and more important in the near future, as presented in Chapter 3. 
Therefore, the relevant strategic impact assessment should include the 
different effects of PDP options on natural gas consumption, natural gas 
reserve, and resource lifetime. 
• Renewable Energy Share. Renewable energy share can be a very good 
indicator for moving towards a sustainable future. Apart from lower negative 
environmental and health impacts, renewable energy means less reliance on 
risky energy markets. Recently, the Thai government also announces the clear 
target of 6% renewable energy share of the total power generation by 2011. 
Since most of these indicators can be calculated directly from the PDP and its energy 
generation table (in appendix 1), it is less complicated compared to previous health and 
economic analyses. The natural gas reserve information in this study is based on the 2003 
annual report of the Department of Mineral Fuels68 and the internal document of the 
National Energy Policy Office (NEPO)69. The information on natural gas consumption 
outside the power sector and the natural gas mix (between different sources in Thailand 
and neighboring countries) is also based on the NEPO internal document70.  
 
5.8 Social Impact Analysis 
Normally, the social impacts of power projects and generation depend very much on 
contexts, implementation and interaction between actors, which are quite difficult to 
assess at the strategic level. However, due to the differences in technologies, fuels, types 
of projects and ownership structures in the three PDP options, four sets of social impact 
indicators can be identified in this study, including; 
 
 200
• Employment Effect. Although the unemployment in Thailand is 
considerably low, job creation is still very important to the poverty 
alleviation strategy. The 9th National Development Plan also set up a 
specific target of job creation. This impact analysis will provide an 
estimation of job creation in each PDP option. 
• Decentralization Effect. Thailand’s constitution presents a clear direction 
of decentralization in Thai society, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, in 
practice, decentralization is hardly taking place in a highly centralized 
power system, like Thailand71. This study will foresee the impact of each 
PDP option on the share of decentralized power generation and on the 
overall power market structure. 
• Potential Conflicts in Society. As earlier mentioned, social conflicts are 
highly context and process-dependent. At the strategic level, this study in 
itself cannot provide a finite answer to future conflict assessment. 
However, since each PDP option leads to big differences in types of power 
plant investment as well as the scales of environmental and health impacts, 
which certainly link to different potentials in terms of social conflicts, this 
study will provide a discussion on this point. 
• Government target Achievement. In 2003, the Thai government set up 
two main targets for sustainable energy development, as mentioned 
earlier; namely the 1:1 energy intensity (as compared to GDP growth) and 
the 6% renewable energy share by 2011. This study will analyze how the 
three PDP options will lead to the achievement of these government 
targets. 
The decentralization effect, potential conflicts, and government target achievement can 
be calculated, compared and discussed directly from power investment and generation 
plan in each PDP option. For employment effect, there are two ways of calculation. The 
first approach is the calculation of employment share (or wage or salary share) in cost 
structure72 and the second one is  the calculation of the direct employment coefficients of 
each power technology. This study applies the latter approach, using the coefficients from 
the study of Goldemberg 73with some modification, as noted in Table 5.18. 
However, it is important to note that the main assumption of this direct job calculation is 
that all power generation, fuel supply, construction, and equipment processes are  done 
domestically. The problem is that no information exists on the expected number of jobs 
created in Thailand through different power technologies. Therefore, with this limitation, 
the study decides to use the lower number within the range of suggested coefficients. 
Especially, for coal-fired power plants, which rely on imported coal, the assumption is 
made that only half of the jobs will be created in Thailand.  
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Table 5.18 Direct Jobs in Power Generation and Fuel Supply 
Summarized by 
Goldemberg (2004) 
Assumption for this study Power Technologies 
(Job-Year/TWh) (Job-Year/TWh) 
Lignite - 370 
Coal 370 185 (1) 
Natural Gas 250 250 
Nuclear 75 - 
Wood Energy 733-1,067 733 
Hydro 250 250 
Mini-hydro 120 120 
Wind 918-2,400 1,200 
Solar PV 29,589-107,000 35,500 
Biogas - 733 (2) 
DSM - 1,000 (2) 
Source: Goldemberg (2004). 
Note: (1) Due to the import of coal (2) Own Assumption 
 
5.9 Sensitivity Analysis 
A strategic impact analysis is normally based on several assumptions, as described in this 
chapter, which, in many cases, are highly uncertain and also contestable. In some cases, 
like fuel costs, the current prices are even unforeseeable. To confirm reliability and to 
understand the validity of the results, sensitivity analysis is quite useful and essential. In 
this study, four sensitivity analyses are conducted, relating to the variation of 
environmental and health impact factors, fuel prices, the high demand growth situation, 
and the low demand growth situation. 
a) Sensitivity Analysis I : Environmental and Health Sensitivity 
Since environmental and health impacts constitute the main focus of this study, the first 
sensitivity analysis is dealing with the uncertainties in emission factors and health impact 
factors, which, as explained earlier, vary greatly due to different conditions. The main 
objective of this sensitivity analysis is to test how the variability of these environmental 
and health coefficients will lead to different results in environmental and health impact 
analyses.    
In terms of environmental analysis, the sensitivity analysis will focus on the changes in 
the emission factors of six pollutants. For CO2, this sensitivity analysis applies the lowest 
international references for greenhouse gas emissions from coal, natural gas, and lignite 
power generation technologies (both for old and new power plants). For the other five 
pollutants, of which the emission can vary greatly as explained above, different 
percentage reductions of emission factors in coal, natural gas, and lignite power 
generation technologies (in both old and new power plants) are tested in order to identify 
the level that will change the results of the environmental and health analyses.  
 
 202
For the health impact analysis, since the analysis in the eco-indicator approach is 
calculated from the pollutant emission levels of three PDP options, the sensitivity 
analysis in this approach is closely related to the previous environmental sensitivity 
analysis. As a result, the earlier changes in emission factors are also applied to the 
sensitivity test in the eco-indicator approach to health impact analysis. 
Unlike the eco-indicator approach, the analysis of health impacts in the Extern-E 
approach is not calculated from various pollutant emissions; therefore, an additional 
sensitivity analysis is needed. Using the same logic, health impact coefficients of all coal, 
natural gas, and lignite power technologies are assumed to be reduced in equal 
percentages and the health impact results will be recalculated.   
 
 b) Sensitivity Analysis II: Fuel Price Sensitivity 
The variation of fuel price is certainly crucial to every strategic impact assessment in 
energy planning. However, it is an unpredictable factor, regarding today’s world energy 
market situation. Therefore, the sensitivity analysis of different fuel price situations is 
useful, both to find the least-cost solution in different situations as well as to search for 
the most secure options for an uncertain future.  
Three different price situations are applied to the fuel price sensitivity analysis in this 
study. The base case scenario refers to the assumptions used in the existing PDP, i.e. the 
2003 normal price situation (or the price of natural gas at 155 THB/btu). The second 
scenario (the so-called situation II) is the scenario of an increasing natural gas price in 
Thailand, up to the highest level of 2005 (and also in the beginning of 2006), at 190 
THB/btu. The last scenario (the so-called situation III) is the situation in which the prices 
of both imported coal and biomass are also increasing proportionally to the natural gas 
price, because of their substitution effect. The comparison of fuel costs in the three 
situations can be seen in Table 5.19.  
 
Table 5.19 Fuel Cost Assumptions for Fuel Price Sensitivity Analysis (Unit: THB/kWh) 
Price Situations Natural Gas Coal Biomass 
Situation I (Base case) 1.125 0.670 0.786 
Situation II 1.379 0.670 0.786 
Situation III 1.379 0.791 0.904 
Source: Own Assumption. 
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c) Sensitivity Analysis III: High Demand Growth Sensitivity 
There are two main differences between PDP-Renewables and the other two PDP 
options. These two main differences are their different fuel mixes and the demand 
forecasting. Regarding the demand growth expectation, though the figures of peak 
demand in 2004 and 2005 are much closer to what is predicted in PDP-Renewables than 
those of the other two options, as shown in Table 5.20, several planners will continuously 
take into consideration an unexpected high economic growth and, consequently, a high 
electricity demand growth. These expansionist planners prefer to keep over-estimating in 
order to ensure system reliability and business expansion and are, therefore, reluctant to 
accept PDP-Renewables, due to its lower demand growth assumption.  
 
Table 5.20 The Differences between the Actual Peak Demand, Existing Demand 
Forecasting, and the Adjusted Forecast in PDP-Renewables (unit: MW). 
Year Existing Demand Forecasting 
(as in PDP-Gas & PDP-Coal) 
Adjusted Demand 
Forecasting  
(as in PDP-Renewables) 
Actual Peak Demand 
2004 19,600 19,326 19,325 
2005 21,143 20,543 20,538 
2006 22,738 21,283 21,064 
 
This sensitivity analysis will deal with this concern by analyzing the flexibility of PDP-
Renewables in maintaining system reliability as well as its environmental, health, social, 
and economic advantages if the high demand growth is assumed (or the high demand 
growth become an obvious situation in the Thai power sector in a few years time). 
The analysis will begin by changing PDP-Renewables’ assumption of the power demand 
growth rate after 2006 to the same growth rate as the other PDP options (i.e., from 5.2% 
GDP growth assumption to 6.5% GDP growth assumption). Then, the adjustment of 
PDP-Renewables is needed in order to meet the new peak demand and maintain system 
reliability. In this study, the adjustment of PDP-Renewables will be done in the following 
way; 
• Increase the installed capacity and energy generation of renewable 
technologies and DSM by 10% from the normal PDP-Renewables 
generation plan;  
• Lower the reduction of the Mae Moh power plant from 50% reduction (or 
1,200 MW reduction) in 2015 as previously planned in PDP-Renewables 
to a 37.5% reduction (or equal to 900 MW reduction);  
• Install 700 MW new gas combined-cycle power plants in 2013, 2014 and 
2015, respectively (all together 2,100 MW installed capacity in 2015). 
By this generation plan adjustment, it is ensured that PDP-Renewables can secure the 
power system for the whole period with an adequate reserve margin (the lowest reserve 
margin will equal 19.3% in 2015). Last, the impact analysis of adjusted PDP-Renewables 
will be recalculated and compared to other PDP options.  
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d) Sensitivity Analysis IV: Low Demand Growth Situation 
Oppositely, the last sensitivity analysis will analyze the low demand growth situation 
with the idea that, within a couple of years, the over-forecasting may become too obvious 
to ignore. Therefore, the existing PDP, or PDP-Gas, may decide to lower its installed 
capacity requirement to the same expectation as presented in PDP-Renewables 
In other words, in this new situation of analysis, PDP-Gas is no longer employing the 
expansionist strategy (or no over-investment) but still prefers natural gas as a main source 
of power generation rather than renewable energy technologies. The PDP-Gas with lower 
demand expectation will be referred to as PDP-Gas (low), in this study. Because over-
investment can have several negative environmental, health, and economic impacts, it is 
essential to recalculate the impacts of PDP-Gas (low), or PDP-Gas with no over-
investment effects, and compare it to PDP-Renewables.  
Following this logic, this sensitivity analysis also paves the way for a decomposition 
analysis of the benefits (or advantages) of PDP-Renewables. By comparing PDP-Gas and 
PDP-Gas (low) and PDP-Gas (low) and PDP-Renewables, respectively, the overall 
benefits of PDP-Renewables in each item will be classified into two categories; namely 
forecasting effect and renewable energy effect. The forecasting effect refers to the 
difference between PDP-Gas and PDP-Gas (low) and, with the same expectation of 
future electricity demand, the renewable energy effect refers to the difference between 
PDP-Gas (low) and PDP-Renewables. The summation of these two effects will equal the 
overall effect (between PDP-Gas and PDP-Renewables) in each item. Therefore, these 
two effects can be compared as percentages of the overall effect in this decomposition 
analysis. 
Strategically, this decomposition analysis of the benefits of PDP-Renewables will 
provide an insightful answer on whether both revising demand forecasting and investing 
in renewable energy are needed in the PDP in order to make PDP-Renewables a more 
desirable choice in the policy-making process. 
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Chapter 6 
Strategic Impact Assessment  
of Three PDP Options 
This chapter presents the results of the impact analysis of three PDP options, namely 
PDP-Gas, PDP-Coal, and PDP-Renewables, based on the analytical framework 
discussed in Chapter 5. The aim of this chapter is to identify the best PDP options, in 
relation to health and other perspectives.  
Since the physical health impacts of power generation are highly related to 
environmental quality changes, the chapter will begin by presenting environmental 
impact analysis. Then, physical health impacts will be analyzed. After that, the 
analysis of social impacts, including job creation and decentralization of the power 
sector will be discussed. However, investment policy in the power sector is highly 
economy-driven and resource-dependent, and therefore, the fourth and the fifth parts 
will concentrate on economic impact analysis and the impact on domestic resources, 
respectively. The last impact analysis will focus on how these three PDP options lead 
to the achievement of the governmental target of the present National Energy 
Strategy. 
All impact analyses are based on a number of assumptions, including emission 
factors, health damage factors, fuel prices, and demand forecasting, and therefore, to 
ensure the reliability and validity of the analytical results, especially in terms of policy 
implications, the sensitivity analysis is certainly crucial. As told in Chapter 5, four 
sensitivity analyses will be presented and discussed in this chapter. The first 
sensitivity analysis will focus on the changes in the emission factors of the main fossil 
fuel technologies. Then, the changes in the fuel price situation will be discussed in the 
second sensitivity analysis. Later, the situation of high demand growth will be applied 
to PDP-Renewables in order to test its flexibility and advantages. Last, the low 
demand growth situation will be applied to the existing PDP (or PDP-Gas) in order to 
compare it with PDP-Renewables, which also assumed a low demand growth in its 
forecasting and investment plan.         
6.1 Environmental Impacts 
Power generation and its required investments can have several environmental 
impacts, both at the local and global levels. However, only two types of impacts are 
quantitatively assessed in this study; namely climate change impact and air pollution 
impact, which are among the most serious concerns in Thai society. 
6.1.1 Climate Change Impact 
Based on the existing Power Development Plan, i.e. PDP-Gas, the Thai power sector 
is estimated to increase its greenhouse gas emissions from 66.1 million tons CO2 in 
2003 to 143.6 million tons CO2 in 2015. Adding more coal to Thailand’s fuel mix, as 
planned in PDP-Coal, will lead to higher greenhouse gas emissions, up to 162.4 
million tons CO2 in 2015. Oppositely, improving energy efficiency, investing in 
renewable energy and revising demand forecasting, as mentioned in PDP-
Renewables, will reduce greenhouse emissions to 106.4 million tons CO2 in 2015, or 
25.9% lower compared to PDP-Gas and 34.5% lower than PDP-Coal. More 
importantly, Figure 6.1 also shows that implementing PDP-Renewables can provide 
the strong hope for the Thai power sector that it will be able to stabilize its greenhouse 
gas emissions in the near future.   
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Figure 6.1
 Greenhouse Gas Emission in Three PDP Options
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6.1.2 Air Pollution Impacts 
As mentioned earlier, in Chapter 5, five main air pollutants have been assessed in this 
study as follows.  
• Nitrogen Oxides Emissions 
The pattern of the NOX emissions in the three PDP options is quite similar to what is 
previously presented about the greenhouse gas emissions (Figure 6.2). PDP-Coal is 
the heaviest polluting PDP option with NOX emissions of 530,310 tons, while PDP-
Gas is expected to emit 423,684 tons in 2015. PDP-Renewables is still the best 
possible option with emissions of 352,439 tons in 2015, or 16.8% lower than PDP-gas 
and 33.5% lower than PDP-Coal.    
• Sulfur dioxide Emissions 
The SO2 emissions in all PDP-options have increased during 2003-2006 as a result of 
the short-term switching to fuel oil in some power plants due to the shortage of the 
natural gas supply. After that, the level of SO2 emissions in PDP-Gas will increase 
only gradually (as shown in Figure 6.3), because natural gas has quite low SO2 
emissions in its life cycle. In 2015, PDP-Gas is expected to emit 213,351 tons of SO2. 
Switching half of the planned power plants to coal-fired technology will increase SO2 
emissions considerably after 2011 and end up with 358,011 tons of SO2 in 2015. On 
the contrary, investing in renewable energy and reducing the power generation from 
the Mae Moh lignite power plant, as planned in PDP-Renewables, will reduce SO2 
emissions by 23.2% compared to PDP-Gas and 54.2% compared to PDP-Coal.    
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• Total Suspended Particulates Emissions 
Like SO2 emissions, based on power generation from natural gas, the existing PDP or 
PDP-Gas will lead to a small increase in TSP emissions, up to 17,875 tons in 2015. 
Unlike the other environmental indicators, PDP-Renewables will result in higher TSP 
emissions compared to PDP-Gas during the period of 2009-2012, before going down 
because of the scaling down of the power generation from the lignite-fired power 
plant from 2011 (Figure 6.4). In 2015, PDP-Renewables will emit 16,172 tons of TSP, 
or 9.5% lower than PDP-Gas. Obviously, PDP-Coal is still the most polluting option 
in terms of TSP with 31,263 tons of TSP emissions in 2015. 
• Mercury Emissions 
As mentioned earlier, Hg emissions are highly associated with power generation from 
coal. Therefore, with a smaller portion of coal in their fuel mixes, PDP-Gas and PDP-
Renewables will almost stabilize their Hg emissions around 5.0-5.5 tons/year from 
2008 till 2015 (Figure 6.5). In this case, PDP-Renewables can provide only little 
reduction in Hg emissions, around 5.7% compared to PDP-Gas. Oppositely, shifting 
to coal as intended in PDP-Coal will lead to a considerable increase in Hg emissions 
and end up with 20.5 tons of Hg emissions in 2015.  
• Non-methane Volatile Organic Compounds Emissions 
Unlike other environmental indicators, PDP-Gas becomes the main polluter in terms 
of NMVOC emissions with the level of 36,976 tons, while PDP-Coal is expected to 
emit 31,309 tons in 2015 (Figure 6.6). PDP-Renewables is still the best possible 
option with 28,834 tons of NMVOC emissions, which provides an emission reduction 
of 7.9% compared to PDP-Coal and 22.0% compared to PDP-Gas.  
Based on these six environmental indicators (both climate change and air pollution 
impacts), it can be concluded that PDP-Coal is certainly not a good solution in an 
environmental perspective and PDP-Renewable is the most desirable option for Thai 
society, both in terms of climate change and air pollution mitigation. However, 
improving environmental management of renewable technologies is still highly 
recommended in order to lower its remaining negative impacts, especially in terms of 
TSP and NMVOC.  
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Figure 6.2 
NOx Emission in Three PDP Options
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Figure 6.3 
SO2 Emission in Three PDP Options
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Figure 6.4 
TSP Emission in Three PDP Options
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Figure 6.5
Hg Emission in Three PDP Options
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Figure 6.6 
NMVOC Emission in Three PDP Options
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6.2 Physical Health Impacts 
Two main ways of analyzing the physical health impacts of power generation are 
applied to this study, as described in detail in Chapter 5. The presentation of their 
results will begin with the mortality and morbidity assessment (or the ExternE 
approach) and continue with the disability-adjusted life year assessment (or the Eco-
indicator approach).    
6.2.1 Mortality and Morbidity Assessment (ExternE Approach)  
Based on the health effect coefficients from the ExternE project, three kinds of health 
impacts can be quantified as presented below. 
• Injuries  
Table 6.1 shows that PDP-Coal, with the expected 12 cases of death, 239 cases of 
severe injuries and 1,907 cases of minor injuries in 2015, is the most serious PDP 
option in terms of injuries. Implementing PDP-Gas is expected to lead to 9.5 cases of 
death, 138 cases of severe injuries and 1,030 cases of minor injuries. With more 
reliance on renewable energy generation, PDP-Renewables is the best possible option 
with a 36.1% reduction in terms of death, a 22.9% reduction in severe injuries and a 
23.2% reduction in minor injuries in 2015, compared to PDP-Gas. However, when 
compared in absolute reduction figures (a 3.4 cases reduction of death in 2015, for 
example), the improvement effect in injuries can be considered as a quite small 
advantage, especially compared to chronic health effects. 
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Table 6.1 Health Impacts from Air Pollution in Three PDP Options           
2015 2003-2015 Gas-Renewable Coal-Renewable 
Items Unit Gas Coal Renew. Gas Coal Renew. 2015 % 2003-2015 % 2015 % 2003-2015 % 
Injuries                               
Total Death from 
Injuries Cases 9.5 12.0 6.1 83.9 90.9 72.2 3.4 36.1 11.7 14.0 5.9 49.4 18.7 20.6 
Severe Injuries Cases 137.9 239.0 106.3 1,416.2 1,699.0 1,305.8 31.6 22.9 110.3 7.8 132.7 55.5 393.1 23.1 
Minor Injuries Cases 1,029.5 1,907.4 791.1 10,883.1 13,340.1 10,072.1 238.4 23.2 811.0 7.5 1,116.3 58.5 3,268.0 24.5 
Acute Health Effects                
Acute Mortality Cases 113.0 228.3 87.7 1,439.4 1,762.1 1,361.1 25.2 22.4 78.3 5.4 140.6 61.6 401.1 22.8 
Acute Years of Life 
Loss Years 84.7 171.1 65.8 1,079.0 1,321.0 1,020.5 18.9 22.3 58.5 5.4 105.4 61.6 300.5 22.7 
Acute Hospital 
Admission Cases 542.9 660.4 418.6 5,259.6 5,588.6 4,750.7 124.3 22.9 509.0 9.7 241.8 36.6 837.9 15.0 
Acute Congestive 
Heart Failure  Cases 82.4 128.9 65.8 895.4 1,025.5 837.6 16.6 20.1 57.9 6.5 63.0 48.9 187.9 18.3 
Acute Restricted 
Activity Days 
Thousand 
days 483.6 758.7 381.4 5,263.1 6,033.0 4,900.6 102.2 21.1 362.5 6.9 377.3 49.7 1,132.3 18.8 
Chronic Health Effects                
Chronic Mortality Cases 1,428.7 2,223.0 1,136.7 15,314.5 17,537.4 14,340.1 292.0 20.4 974.4 6.4 1,086.2 48.9 3,197.3 18.2 
Chronic Year of 
Life Loss Years 14,282.4 22,223.2 11,369.0 153,084.2 175,308.1 143,366.1 2,913.4 20.4 9,718.1 6.3 10,854.1 48.8 31,942.0 18.2 
Chronic Bronchitis 
(Adult) Cases 947.5 1,478.8 758.6 10,267.0 11,753.9 9,613.3 188.9 19.9 653.7 6.4 720.2 48.7 2,140.7 18.2 
Chronic Bronchitis 
(Children) Cases 13,173.7 20,654.8 10,554.5 143,372.0 164,309.5 134,273.0 2,619.2 19.9 9,099.0 6.3 10,100.3 48.9 30,036.4 18.3 
Chronic Cough Episodes 16,927.2 26,501.8 13,568.9 184,283.9 211,080.5 172,636.3 3,358.3 19.8 11,647.6 6.3 12,932.9 48.8 38,444.1 18.2 
Source: Own Calculation         
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• Acute Health Effects 
Obviously, PDP-Coal can cause serious acute health effects from air pollution. 
Installing more coal-fired power plants will lead to a considerable increase in the 
acute mortality effect of PDP-Coal after 2010 (Figure 6.7), while the acute effect of 
PDP-Gas is stable. In 2015, the acute mortality effect of PDP-Coal may be doubled 
compared to the effect of PDP Gas, and will also lead to the double effect in terms of 
years of life loss  (Table 6.1). On average, the years of life loss of each case is lower 
than one year, which indicates that the acute mortality effects are more likely to affect 
the elderly people. 
PDP-Coal will also lead to more incidences of acute hospital admission, acute 
congestive heart failure and acute restricted activity days, as shown in Table 6.1. 
However, the scales of the differences (compared to PDP-Gas and PDP-Renewables) 
are lower than the difference in acute mortality rate (see also figure 6.8 for the acute 
hospital admission effect).  
PDP-Renewables can play a key role in reducing acute health effects since it provides 
the least negative impacts in all acute health indicators. PDP-Renewables can lower 
acute mortality by 22.4% compared to PDP-Gas (or 25.2 cases in 2015) and 61.6% 
compared to PDP-Coal (or 140.6 cases in 2015). It can also reduce acute hospital 
admission by 22.9% compared to PDP-Gas (or 124.3 cases in 2015) and 36.6% 
compared to PDP-Coal (or 241.8 cases in 2015). Moreover, PDP-Renewables will 
also reduce the number of cases of acute congestive heart failure by 20.1% and the 
acute restricted activity days by 21.1% compared to PDP-Gas. As shown in Figure 
6.7, it is also important to note that, although power generation will continue to 
increase after 2010, PDP-Renewables can lower its acute mortality effect.         
• Chronic Health Effects 
Like acute health effects, PDP-Coal also has the most negative chronic health 
impacts. Implementing PDP-Coal will lead to 2,223 cases of chronic mortality in 
2015. On average, the affected persons will lose around 10 years of their lives from 
chronic respiratory system-related diseases. PDP-Coal also leads to more than 22,000 
cases of chronic bronchitis, of which 90% are children, and 26,500 episodes of 
chronic cough in 2015 (Table 6.1). In comparison, PDP-Gas will lead to 1,429 cases 
of chronic mortality, more than 14,000 cases of chronic bronchitis (also mostly 
children) and 16,927 episodes of chronic cough. Therefore, shifting from gas to coal, 
as suggested in PDP-Coal, is not a good policy direction in health perspective. 
On the contrary, PDP-Renewables provides much better results in terms of chronic 
health impacts. In 2015, when compared to PDP Gas, PDP-Renewables can annually 
reduce the number of cases of chronic mortality by 292 (equal to 20.4% of the effect 
from PDP-Gas), the number of cases of chronic bronchitis by 2,808 (equal to 19.9%) 
and the number of episodes of chronic cough by 3,358 (equal to 19.8%). Compared to 
PDP-Coal, the reduction in health effects of PDP-Renewables in 2015 will be almost 
50%. Furthermore, Figures 6.9 and 6.10 also show the declining trend in health effects 
of PDP-Renewables after 2011, compared to the increasing trend in both PDP-Gas 
and PDP-Coal. 
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Figure 6.7 Total Acute Mortality from Air Pollution 
in Three PDP Options
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Figure 6.8 Total Acute Hospital Admissions from Air 
Pollution
 in Three PDP Options
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Figure 6.9 Total Chronic Mortality from Air 
Pollution in Three PDP Options
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Figure 6.10 Total Chronic Bronchitis (Children) 
From Air Pollution
in Three PDP Options
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In conclusion, combining the three health impacts, it is obvious that PDP-Renewables 
is the best option in a health perspective. It can reduce negative health impacts by 
approximately 20% in 2015, which can save more than 300 lives and prevent 3,000 
people a year from getting a chronic disease, compared to the existing PDP (or PDP-
Gas). Moreover, with the declining trend in negative health impacts, PDP-Renewables 
provides a strong aspiration to de-link negative health impacts from the increase of 
power generation in the near future. 
6.2.2 Disability-adjusted Life Year Assessment (Eco-indicator Approach) 
An alternative approach to analyzing health impacts is to calculate the health impacts 
of the amount of selected pollutants together with the health damage factors provided 
by the Eco-indicator project (details will be discussed in Chapter 5). The result of this 
calculation is presented in terms of the disability-adjusted life year (or DALY), which 
combines both years of life loss (mortality cases) and the years lost due to disability 
(morbidity cases) in the population. Thus, applying DALY is an effort to represent the 
overall effect in terms of the years of “healthy life loss” (see also the discussion in 
Chapter 5). 
Another advantage of this approach is the ability to take the health impact of climate 
change into account, which will provide a much better overview of the healthy public 
policy option in the Thai power sector. 
This approach also presents its results in three different decision-making perspectives 
in dealing with uncertainties in scientific information. Although Table 6.2 presents the 
results from all three perspectives based on the suggestion of the project and the 
discussion in Chapter 5, this section will concentrate mainly on the results of the 
hierarchical perspective. 
Table 6.2 shows that the existing PDP, or PDP-Gas, will lead to 81,405 years of 
healthy life loss of the total Thai population in 2015, which is composed of 30,162 
years of healthy life loss from climate change effects and 51,243 years of healthy life 
loss from air pollution effects. 
Similar to the previous approach, PDP-Coal is still the most negative option in terms 
of health impact. The years of healthy life loss from climate change effects in PDP-
Coal will be 34,111 in 2015 and from air pollution effects 70,065 in the same year. In 
total, PDP-Coal will lead to 104,176 years of healthy life loss of the total Thai 
population. 
Since PDP-Renewables is the best PDP option according to all environmental 
indicators, it is not surprising that PDP-Renewables is also the best possible option in 
terms of disability-adjusted life years (Figure 6.11). In 2015, PDP-Renewables is 
expected to cause 22,349 years of healthy life loss from climate change effects, which 
equals a 25.9% reduction compared to PDP-Gas and a 34.5% reduction compared to 
PDP-Coal. In terms of air pollution effect, PDP-Renewables will decrease the healthy 
years of life loss by 18.0% compared to PDP-Gas (or 9,214 years in reduction) and by 
40.0% compared to PDP-Coal (or 28,036 years in reduction). 
In total, PDP-Renewables can save the Thai population’s healthy life by 17,027 years 
compared to PDP-Gas (equals 20.9% of the PDP-Gas impact) and by 39,799 
compared to PDP-Coal (or equal to 38.2% of the PDP-Coal impact). 
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Table 6.2 Health Impacts of Three PDP Options in Disability-adjusted Life Years (Unit: DALYs)        
2015 2003-2015 Gas-Renewables Coal-Renewables 
Impact Indicators PDP Gas PDP Coal Renewables PDP Gas PDP Coal Renewables 2015 % 2003-2015 % 2015 % 2003-2015 % 
Hierarchical Perspective              
From Climate Change 30,162 34,111 22,349 284,841 295,894 250,893 7,813 25.9 33,947 11.9 11,762 34.5 45,001 15.2
From Air Pollution 51,243 70,065 42,029 537,381 590,058 504,533 9,214 18.0 32,848 6.1 28,036 40.0 85,525 14.5
Total Health Impact 81,405 104,176 64,377 822,221 885,952 755,426 17,027 20.9 66,795 8.1 39,799 38.2 130,526 14.7
Egalitarian Perspective              
From Climate Change 30,162 34,111 22,349 284,841 295,894 250,893 7,813 25.9 33,947 11.9 11,762 34.5 45,001 15.2
From Air Pollution 51,412 70,277 42,170 539,073 591,870 506,119 9,243 18.0 32,954 6.1 28,107 40.0 85,751 14.5
Total Health Impact 81,574 104,388 64,518 823,914 887,764 757,012 17,056 20.9 66,902 8.1 39,870 38.2 130,752 14.7
Individualistic Perspective              
From Climate Change 28,725 32,487 21,285 271,277 281,804 238,946 7,441 25.9 32,331 11.9 11,202 34.5 42,858 15.2
From Air Pollution 10,304 17,141 8,146 121,265 140,400 114,357 2,158 20.9 6,908 5.7 8,995 52.5 26,044 18.5
Total Health Impact 39,029 49,628 29,431 392,542 422,204 353,302 9,599 24.6 39,239 10.0 20,197 40.7 68,901 16.3
Source: Own Calculation              
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It is also worthwhile to notice that the differences in hierarchical and egalitarian 
perspectives are very small, as shown in Table 6.2. However, the differences are much 
larger when compared to the individualistic perspective. This is due to the 
perspective’s very conservative view on the health impacts of NOX, as described in 
Chapter 5.  However, despite these huge differences, the results of the individualistic 
perspective confirm that PDP-Renewables is still the best possible option in relation 
to climate change effects, air pollution effects, and overall health impact. 
In conclusion, both health impact analytical methods confirm that PDP-Renewables is 
the best PDP option to protect  the health of the Thai population. In relative terms, in 
2015, PDP-Renewables is expected to save 300 lives annually from acute and chronic 
mortality and prevent 3,000 people from getting a chronic disease (compared to PDP-
Gas). At the same time, PDP-Renewables can save 17,000 healthy life years of the 
total Thai population. In general, the health benefits of PDP-Renewables will be 
approximately a 20% reduction in negative health impacts compared to PDP-Gas and 
a 40% reduction compared to PDP-Coal. 
 
6.3 Social Impacts 
In principle, the social impacts are highly process and context-specific, especially in 
terms of institutional frameworks and implementation processes, which are quite   
difficult to assess at the strategic planning level. However, based on this impact 
analysis, three consideration points should be addressed in this study; namely, 
employment impact, decentralization impact, and impact on social conflicts. 
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6.3.1 Employment Impact 
One of the main advantages of renewable energy is that it creates jobs at the local 
level. Based on a life-cycle employment factor discussed in Chapter 5, the 
employment effect of the three PDP options is calculated as presented in Figure 6.12 
The existing PDP, or PDP-Gas, with new installed power plants and more power 
generation will increase the total employment in power and fuel sectors from 31,785 
in 2003 to 81,200 person-year in 2015. Since new coal-fired power plants will solely 
rely on imported coal, PDP-Coal will lead to a slightly lower employment effect 
(78,741 person-year in 2015) compared to PDP-Gas. 
Since it is more dependent on domestic resources and small-scale technologies, the 
employment effect of PDP-Renewables, is much higher than the effects of PDP-Gas 
and PDP-Coal. In 2015, PDP-Renewables is estimated to employ 98,811 person-year, 
which is 17,611 person-year higher than PDP-Gas (or equal to an employment effect 
21.7% higher than that of PDP-Gas).    
 
Figure 6.12 Employment Effect from Three PDP 
Options
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6.3.2 Decentralization Impact 
In Thailand, the concept and the need for decentralization is clearly stated in the 1997 
Constitution and the 8th and 9th National Development Plans. However, in the power 
sector, the decentralization process is much less systematically organized in practice. 
As described in chapter 4, there have been two important efforts to increase 
decentralized generation, firstly through the introduction of SPPs in 1995 and later 
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through the introduction of VSPPs in 2001. However, the share of decentralized 
power generation is still lower than 10% of the total energy generation in the Thai 
power sector. 
Table 6.3 indicates that relying on PDP-Gas and PDP-Coal will even lead to a lower 
proportion of decentralized power generation, both in terms of installed capacity and 
energy generation. In terms of energy generation, the share of decentralized power 
generation is expected to decrease from 9.9% in 2005 to 7.0% in 2015. This is 
because, according to PDP-Gas, most of the new installed capacity will be found at 
the centralized power plants with only a 5% share for renewable energy producers 
under the scheme of the renewable portfolio standard (RPS). Moreover, since 1998, 
the cabinet resolution has still blocked the new co-generation SPPs in entering into the 
power market.  
With all these barriers to decentralized power generation, plus the government’s 
agreement to allow EGAT to hold 50% of new installed power plants, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, EGAT can maintain its share above 50% of total installed capacity, at least 
up to 2015. At the same time, the concentration ration of the four largest power 
producers (or CR4) is still around 65-70% in terms of installed capacity and 55-57% 
in terms of energy generation. 
Table  6.3  Comparison of the Market Structure in the Three PDP Options (%) 
EGAT CR4 
Decentralized power 
generation 
PDP Options 2005 2010 2015 2005 2010 2015 2005 2010 2015 
By Install Capacity          
PDP-Gas 59.81 53.71 52.44 83.51 73.70 66.89 7.43 6.65 6.19 
PDP-Coal 59.81 53.71 52.44 83.51 73.70 66.89 7.43 6.65 6.19 
PDP-Renewables 60.73 50.67 52.19 84.80 72.88 70.24 7.54 15.00 22.43 
By Energy Generation          
PDP-Gas 50.28 43.80 46.18 76.88 62.73 57.46 9.86 7.83 6.98 
PDP-Coal 50.28 43.80 46.18 76.88 62.73 57.46 9.86 7.83 6.98 
PDP-Renewables 50.76 37.17 42.14 77.26 57.67 55.88 9.96 15.96 23.32 
 
Although PDP-Renewables cannot make a significant change in terms of EGAT’s 
market share and concentration ratio of the four largest power producers, it can lead to 
a big improvement in the share of decentralized power generation. The share of 
decentralized power generation in PDP-Renewables will rise from 10% in 2005 to 
23.3% in 2015, which is much higher compared to its share in PDP-Gas and PDP-
Coal. 
Certainly, several institutional and regulation arrangements need to be revised, 
improved and introduced in order to make this figure come true. All these regulations 
issues will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
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6.3.3 Impact on Social Conflicts 
Evidently, Thailand has had great difficulties in dealing with conflicts arisen from 
large fossil-fuelled and hydro power plants for more than a decade, as described in 
Chapter 4. The nature of conflicts is closely related to the lack of public participation 
in the decision-making process and the unequal distribution of costs and benefits in 
Thai society. While the lack of public participation will be discussed in the next 
chapter, the issue of unequal distribution will be the point of discussion in this impact 
analysis. 
PDP-Gas and PDP-Coal, with the concentration of large power plants, will worsen the 
problem of unequal distribution between those who are affected by the projects and 
those who consume electricity and get the profit from power investment. As usual, 20 
new power plants can individually be a point of conflict in Thai society. Especially 
with the 9 new coal-fired power plants and much higher environmental and health 
impacts, as shown in previous sections, PDP-Coal can easily raise public concerns 
and, in various cases, create conflicts around these power plant projects. Although, in 
the existing PDP, the location of the plants is not mentioned at this point, but it is 
highly expected that new power plants in PDP-Gas and PDP-Coal will locate mainly 
in the provinces which already have the infrastructures required; namely, gas-pipeline 
for PDP-Gas and deep sea-port for PDP-Coal. This will certainly increase the 
concentration of impacts around these specific areas, which can easily create conflicts.  
Alternatively, PDP-Renewables will considerably change the investment pattern of 
new power plant projects, as shown in Chapter 5 and in this chapter. With the revised 
demand forecast, demand side management and decentralized power generation, PDP-
Renewables does not require any further investment in large gas-fired or coal-fired 
power plant projects, apart from EGAT’s already committed projects. Most of the 
investment projects in PDP-Renewables will be smaller projects spread around the 
country with lower environmental and health impacts, as shown before. Moreover, to 
alleviate the existing impacts, PDP-Renewables also aims to reduce the power 
generation of the most well-known polluting power plant, the Mae Moh lignite power 
plant.  Therefore, it is highly expected that PDP-Renewables can reduce the tensions 
and conflicts over the future power generation investment.  
However, this is not a suggestion that renewable energy projects will not lead to any 
social conflict. In fact, in Thailand, there are a number of cases, especially biomass 
projects that have led to social conflicts in local communities. Nevertheless, with the 
smaller sizes of impacts and of the projects themselves, they are principally much 
easier to mitigate, to negotiate, and, more importantly, it is easer to control and to 
share the costs and profits of these smaller projects. The issue of local control over 
renewable projects will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
6.4 Economic Impacts 
Although, from environmental, health, and social impact analyses’ points of view, 
PDP-Renewables is clearly more desirable than PDP-Gas and PDP-Coal, the 
comparison of their economic impacts is much more crucial in the policy debate and 
policy-making in the Thai power sector, especially when “cheap electricity” becomes 
a main goal of power politics in Thailand, as described in Chapter 4. To facilitate a 
further discussion on healthy public policy in the Thai power sector, this chapter 
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provides the comparison of four economic impact indicators in three sections as 
presented below.      
6.4.1 Impact on Investment Requirement 
Following the existing PDP, or PDP-Gas will require investment in an additional 
installed capacity around 651.6 billion THB (only in the generation sub-sector) during 
the period of 2003-2015. Moving to PDP-Coal will lead to a higher investment 
requirement, roughly 758.7 billion THB for the whole period (Figure 6.13). Investing 
more in renewable energy also pushes the investment requirement of PDP-
Renewables slightly higher than PDP-Gas but still lower than PDP-Coal. For the 
whole period, PDP-Renewables requires 683.3 billion THB, which is 31.7 billion 
THB (or equal to 4.9%) more than PDP-Gas. The difference in investment 
requirement between PDP-Renewables and PDP-Gas is smaller than normally 
expected, because PDP-Renewables in this study tries to combine cheaper solutions, 
like DSM or demand forecasting reconsideration, and competitive solutions, like 
biomass power plants or co-generation, with the present expensive solutions, e.g. solar 
PV and wind energy.   
With only a small difference in investment requirement, PDP-Renewables is certainly 
an affordable policy choice. However, the investment requirement is not the only 
aspect to consider. In the economic perspective, it is important to compare the total 
generation costs of the three PDP options, the distribution of the costs within and 
outside national economy and the external costs of these PDP options.     
Figure 6.13
 Investment Requirement in Three PDP Options 
2003-2015
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6.4.2 Impact on Generation Cost 
Although PDP-Gas requires the least additional investment, the higher price of natural 
gas as its main fuel source makes PDP-Gas the most expensive PDP option in terms 
of generation costs. Figure 6.14 shows the generation costs of the three PDP options 
in 2015. The total generation costs of PDP-Gas in 2015 is expected to be 408.7 billion 
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THB, while the costs of PDP-Coal and PDP-Renewables are expected to be 400.6 and 
366.5 billion THB, respectively. In comparison, PDP-Renewables is 42.2 billion THB 
or around 5.2% cheaper than the existing PDP due to its lower fuel costs. 
In terms of the net present value of the generation costs for the whole PDP period, the 
result also confirms that PDP-Gas will lead to the highest generation costs with 2.58 
trillion THB. For the whole period, PDP-Coal will cost around 2.57 trillion THB in 
the net present value term. PDP-Renewables is the PDP option with the lowest 
generation costs at 2.46 trillion THB for the same period and the same present value 
term. In other words, compared to PDP-Gas, PDP-Renewables will lead to cost 
savings of 121.9 billion THB (around 4.7%) for the whole period.   
With the lower fuel costs of renewable energy and better demand management, PDP-
Renewables obviously becomes the cheapest solution, both at the final settlement and 
in the whole period comparison.     
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6.4.3 Impact on GDP contribution and Balance of Payment 
The analysis of cost distribution within and outside the country is quite essential to 
a small economy like Thailand, since higher costs of imported fuels and power 
technologies can also lead to the increase of the import burden, and the potential 
deficits in balance of trade and balance of payment (BOP). On the contrary, 
relying more on domestic resources and investments can directly contribute to the 
growth of the national economy and lower the import burden. Therefore, this 
study will provide an impact analysis on GDP contribution and balance of 
payment (or import burden). 
 
 227
For the whole PDP period (2003-2015), PDP-Gas will contribute with 905.7 
billion THB to the national economy and, at the same time, raise the import 
burden by 1,677.9 billion THB in the present value term. The GDP contribution of 
PDP-Coal, with the higher share of imported coal in its fuel mix, will be 896.1 
billion THB, which is slightly less than PDP-Gas. However, with the import cost 
of 1,675.3 billion THB, the import burden of PDP-Coal is also expected to be 
slightly smaller than that of PDP-Gas. 
As shown in Figure 6.15, PDP-Renewables provides the best outcomes both in 
GDP contribution and balance of payment effects. In terms of GDP, PDP-
Renewables is expected to contribute with 929.7 billion THB to the Thai economy 
for the same period, which equals 2.65% more than PDP-Gas. In terms of BOP, 
the import costs of PDP-Renewables are estimated to be 1,532.0 billion THB for 
the whole period, which is around 8.7% lower than PDP-Gas.  
Based on this result, PDP-Renewables is much more suitable for Thai economy 
both in terms of accelerating economic growth through higher GDP contribution 
and in terms of stabilizing national economy through lower import burden.        
Figure 6.15 
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6.4.4 External Costs  
The last important economic indicator is the comparison of external costs of the three 
PDP options. This indicator represents the idea that economic analysis should 
incorporate environmental, health and other societal consequences (both positive and 
negative) into its analysis by putting an external cost value on these consequences (or 
impacts). However, in practice, the valuation of impacts of power generation is very 
tricky and consequently highly debatable. This study follows the suggestion of the E 
for E foundation in valuing the external impacts in the Thai power sector as discussed 
in Chapter 5. The discussion about external cost calculation can be seen in Chapter 5, 
while the result is presented in Figure 6.16. 
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The result indicates that PDP-coal has the highest external costs, which is quite 
related to its higher negative environmental and health impacts, as discussed earlier in 
this chapter. In 2015, the external costs of power generation based on PDP-Coal are 
estimated to be 366.4 billion THB, which almost equals its own generation costs 
(400.6 billion THB in 2015). For PDP-Gas, its external costs will be 283.7 billion 
THB in 2015, which is much lower compared to PDP-Coal. Therefore, if the external 
impacts are internalized into an economic analysis for power development planning, 
as shown in Figure 6.17, PDP-Coal is now far from being a desirable choice for Thai 
society. 
Related to its lowest negative impacts on environment and health, PDP-Renewables is 
again the most favorable PDP choice. The external costs of PDP-Renewables are 
expected to be around 217.2 billion THB in 2015, which is 66.5 billion THB/ year 
lower than PDP-Gas (or equal to 23.45% lower than PDP-Gas). When combined with 
its lower generation costs, as discussed in the previous section, the total economic 
savings of PDP-Renewables by 2015 will be 108.7 billion THB a year (see also  
Figure 6.17 for comparison). Therefore, this study suggests that PDP-Renewables has 
its own economic advantages, which can be used for stimulating economic growth, 
stabilizing national economy, and encouraging sustainable development within the 
country.    
Figure 6.16
 The External Costs of Three PDP Options 
-
50.000,00
100.000,00
150.000,00
200.000,00
250.000,00
300.000,00
350.000,00
400.000,00
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
Year
M
ill
io
n 
TH
B/
Y
ea
r
PDP Gas
PDP Coal
PDP Renewables
 
6.5 Domestic Resources Impacts  
Thailand is an energy import country. Although Thailand has natural gas and lignite 
reserves, which are the most important fuel sources for power generation at present, 
the need for natural gas import from its neighboring countries has been, and will be, 
increasing. The effect of the PDP on domestic resources, therefore, becomes an issue 
of concern in Thai society, especially for those who follow the king’s philosophy of 
sufficiency economy, as discussed in Chapter 5. From this point of view, two analyses 
will be presented here for further policy discussion.   
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6.5.1 Impact on Domestic Resources Share 
The first indicator is the domestic resources share, which intends to represent the 
levels of national self-reliance in power generation. Figure 6.18 indicates that 
Thailand’s share of domestic resources in power generation is presently decreasing 
from nearly 75% in 2003 to around 60% in 2006, with the increased share of natural 
gas import from Myanmar and imported coal.  
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The analysis shows that following the existing PDP, or PDP-Gas, will lead to a lower 
domestic resource share. In 2015, the domestic resource share in PDP-Gas will be 
around 52%. Moreover, shifting fuel sources from gas to imported coal for new power 
plants as planned in PDP-Coal will lead to a further decrease in domestic resource 
share down to 44% in 2015. From the self-reliance perspective, investing in 
renewable energy, as suggested in PDP-Renewables, is the best way to maintain the 
domestic resource share at around 58% during the period of 2010-2015.   
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Figure 6.18
Share of Domestic Resources in Power 
Generation From Three PDP Options
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6.5.2 Impacts on Domestic National Gas Reserve 
In dealing with exhaustible resources, like natural gas, a dynamic perspective is 
required in the self-reliance analysis. This is due to the fact that a higher domestic 
resource share may end up with a shorter resource lifetime, which implies less self-
reliance in the long run. Certainly, natural gas reserves in Thailand and its 
neighboring countries are limited. Therefore, on one hand, increasing the share of 
natural gas in Thailand’s fuel mix may maintain the domestic resource share at a 
certain point (especially compared to PDP-Coal). On the other hand, it can lead to a 
higher rate of resource depletion, i.e. a shorter resource lifetime, which is the concern 
of many Thais. The analysis in this part will discuss this concern. 
Table 6.4 presents an overall picture of natural gas reserves in 2004 according to three 
definitions; natural gas consumption both in the power sector and other sectors from 
2005 to 2015 and the impacts of these PDP options on gas reserve and resource 
lifetime.  
With the 2P reserve definition (proven and probable gas reserve), as officially used in 
Thailand, Thailand only has 25.59 Tcf. domestically plus 13.95 Tcf from neighboring 
countries, or all together 39.54 Tcf. in its own account. Based on the existing plan, 
PDP-Gas which relies 81% on natural gas will consume 12.01 Tcf. during 2005-2015. 
During the same period, the consumption for other purposes will be around 3.31 Tcf. 
(equally assumed for all three PDP options). In summary, the total gas consumption 
for this period will be 15.31Tcf. 
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If there is no new reserve to be found, with this consumption level, the natural gas 
reserve in 2015 will be reduced to 16.88 in Thailand and 7.34 in the reserves of its 
neighboring countries. With the consumption rate of 2015, the domestic gas reserve 
will last only for another 16.8 years after 2015 (i.e. around 25 years from now) and 
the neighboring countries’ reserve will last only for another 8.1 years (i.e around 17 
years from now). On average, the gas reserve lifetime is expected to be only 12.7 
years after 2015 (or around 22 years from now). With this reserve lifetime, based on 
PDP-Gas, other new natural gas power plants cannot be added into the system after 
2015 if they are dependent on a reliable fuel resource. Even with the 3P definition (2P 
plus possible reserve), the reserve lifetime of PDP-Gas after 2015 is still expected to 
be lower than its projected 25 year-lifetime. Therefore, although it can maintain the 
domestic resources ratio beyond 50% in 2015, PDP-Gas cannot be considered a self-
reliance option in the longer term. 
PDP-Coal, which relies more on imported coal, can reduce the total natural gas 
consumption during 2005-2015 to 14.45 Tcf. (11.15 Tcf. for power generation). This 
will result in a slightly higher gas reserve after 2015 (24.22 for the total 2P gas 
reserve) and a longer reserve lifetime after 2015, 20.6 years for domestic gas-reserve 
and 10.2 years for neighboring countries’ reserve. Totally, when compared to PDP-
Gas, PDP-Coal can expand the gas reserve lifetime with around 3 years. 
PDP-Renewables, which requires the least natural gas consumption of the three PDP 
options, will reduce the gas consumption to 13.92 Tcf for the period 2005-2015. 
Consequently, the level of gas reserve after 2015 will increase to 17.60 Tcf. for 
domestic gas and 8.02 Tcf. for neighboring countries’ gas reserve. Therefore, in total, 
the reserve lifetime is expected to be 16.7 years after 2015, which is around 3 years 
longer than the lifetime achieved with PDP-Gas and 1 year longer than the one 
achieved with PDP-Coal.     
Although PDP-Renewables provides the best result in prolonging the natural gas 
reserve with around 4 years, it does not make a big difference in the longer term (i.e, 
25 years from now on). PDP-Renewables is clearly much less reliable on natural gas, 
which is not a reliable source anyway, in the long run. Therefore, strategically, PDP-
Renewables takes a first step towards a less natural gas-dependent power system for 
the future. However, with these figures, the next step for the Thai power sector (after 
2015) is even more challenging, especially when natural gas is not able to adequately 
supply the new power plants.   
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Table 6.4 Effects on Natural Gas Consumption and Reserve from Three PDP Options 
Natural Gas Reserve 2004
Gas Consumption 
 2005-2015 Gas Consumption 2015 Reserve and 
Consumption 
 (Unit: Tcf) 1P 2P 3P 
PDP-
Gas 
PDP-
Coal 
PDP-
Renew.
PDP-
Gas 
PDP-
Coal 
PDP-
Renew.
Power Generation    12.01 11.15 10.61 1.57 1.27 1.19 
Domestic    6.82 6.37 6.09 0.83 0.66 0.62 
Neighboring countries    5.18 4.77 4.52 0.75 0.60 0.57 
Other Consumption    3.31 3.31 3.31 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Domestic    1.88 1.89 1.90 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Neighboring countries    1.43 1.42 1.41 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Total 28.27 39.54 58.91 15.31 14.45 13.92 1.91 1.61 1.53 
Domestic 14.32 25.59 34.21 8.70 8.26 7.99 1.00 0.84 0.80 
Neighboring countries 13.95 13.95 24.70 6.61 6.19 5.93 0.91 0.76 0.73 
Gas Reserve in 2015 PDP Gas PDP Coal PDP-Renewables 
(Unit: Tcf) 1P 2P 3P 1P 2P 3P 1P 2P 3P 
Domestic 5.62 16.88 25.51 6.06 17.32 25.95 6.33 17.60 26.22 
Neighboring countries 7.34 7.34 18.09 7.76 7.76 18.51 8.02 8.02 18.77 
Total 12.96 24.22 43.60 13.82 25.08 44.46 14.35 25.62 45.00 
Reserve Lifetime  
after 2015 PDP-Gas PDP-Coal PDP-Renewables 
(Unit: years) 1P 2P 3P 1P 2P 3P 1P 2P 3P 
Domestic 5.6 16.8 25.4 7.2 20.6 30.8 7.9 21.9 32.7 
Neighboring countries 8.1 8.1 19.9 10.2 10.2 24.2 11.0 11.0 25.8 
Average 6.8 12.7 22.8 8.6 15.6 27.7 9.4 16.7 29.4 
Source: Own Calculation 
Note 1P = Proven reserve 
         2P = Proven reserve and Probable reserve 
         3P = Proven reserve, Probable reserve and Possible reserve 
  
 
 233
 
6.6 Government Target Achievement 
Another important aspect of the impact analysis is how these three PDP-options will 
help the Thai power sector to achieve the government target. As mentioned in Chapter 
4, the two important targets of the power sector are a) to lower the energy intensity 
from 1.4:1 (energy generation expansion : GDP growth) to 1:1 and b) to increase the 
share of renewable energy generation from 0.8% to 6.0% by 2011. 
Table 6.5 shows that neither PDP-Gas nor PDP-Coal can provide satisfactory results 
in reaching both of these targets. Both PDP options can lower the energy intensity to 
1.1:1 (not 1:1 as planned by the Thai government) and increase the renewable energy 
proportion to 1.26% in 2011 (not 6% as declared). Even with the expansion period to 
2015, the renewable share in these two PDP options will still be lower than 2%. 
Therefore, it is quite clear that, within the three PDP options, only PDP-Renewables 
can successfully reach the government target, with 1.02:1 energy intensity (which is 
still slightly higher than the target) and 6.43% renewable energy in 2011. And, in 
2015, the renewable share of PDP-Renewables will nearly reach 10%. 
Table 6.5 Comparison of Three PDP Options in Achieving Government Targets 
Items Government 
Target 
PDP-Gas PDP-Coal PDP-
Renewables 
Assumed GDP Growth (%)  6.5 6.5 5.20 
Growth in energy generation (%)  7.1 7.1 5.35 
Energy Intensity 2015 1 : 1 1.09 : 1 1.09 : 1 1.02 : 1 
Renewable Energy Share 2011 (%) 6.0 1.26 1.26 6.43 
Renewable Energy Share 2015 (%) >6.0 1.95 1.95 9.87 
Source: Own Calculation 
 
6.7 Overall Impact Analysis 
All these six aspects of impact analysis conclude that, within the three PDP options, 
PDP-Renewables is the most desirable option for Thai society. Table 6.6 presents the 
overall summary of the impact analysis, which can be concluded as followed; 
• Environmentally, in 2015, PDP-Renewables can reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions from power generation by 26% compared to PDP-Gas 
and 34% compared to PDP-Coal, as well as other pollutant emissions 
by 6-23% compared to PDP-Gas and 8-54% compared to PDP-Coal. 
• In a health perspective, PDP-Renewables can save more than 300 lives 
compared to PDP-Gas and more than 1,200 lives compared to PDP-
Coal annually in 2015. The overall health benefits will be around a 
20% reduction in negative health impacts of power generation 
compared to PDP-Gas and a 40-60% reduction compared to PDP-Coal. 
• In the social aspect, PDP-Renewables will create more jobs (13,787 
extra jobs compared to PDP-Gas and 16,515 extra jobs compared to 
PDP-Coal). It will also increase the share of decentralized power in 
2015 from 7% in PDP-Gas to more than 23%. 
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Table 6.6 Overall Impacts of the Three PDP Options 
2015 Difference 
Impact Indicators PDP-Gas PDP-Coal Renew. Gas-Renew. % 
Coal-
Renew. % 
Environmental 
Indicators        
CO2 Emissions (million 
Ton) 143.63 162.43 106.42 37.20 25.90 56.01 34.48 
NOX Emissions (ton) 423,684 530,310 352,439 71,245.13 16.82 177,871.79 33.54 
SO2 Emissions (ton) 213,351 358,011 163,949 49,402.11 23.16 194,061.75 54.21 
TSP Emissions (ton) 17,872 31,263 16,172 1,700.00 9.51 15,091.30 48.27 
Hg Emissions (kg) 5,426 20,496 5,117 309.32 5.70 15,379.78 75.04 
NMVOC Emissions 
(ton) 36,976 31,309 28,834 8,141.82 22.02 2,474.65 7.90 
Health Impacts (Eco-indicator approach)      
Climate Change 
(DALY) 30,162 34,111 22,349 7,813.03 25.90 11,762.42 34.48 
Air Pollution (DALY) 51,243 70,065 42,029 9,214.22 17.98 28,036.21 40.01 
Total Impact (DALY) 81,405 104,176 64,377 17,027.25 20.92 39,798.63 38.20 
Health Impacts  (ExternE approach)      
Acute Mortality (cases) 113.0 228.3 87.7 25.25 22.35 140.57 61.58 
Acute Mortality 
(YOLL) 84.7 171.1 65.8 18.88 22.30 105.35 61.56 
Chronic Mortality 
(cases) 1,428.7 2,223.0 1,136.7 291.98 20.44 1,086.23 48.86 
Chronic Mortality 
(YOLL) 14,282.4 22,223.2 11,369.0 2,913.40 20.40 10,854.14 48.84 
Resource Indicators        
Domestic Resource 
Share (%) 52.51 44.35 58.51 (6.00) - (14.16) - 
Domestic Gas Reserve 
after 2015 (tcf) 16.88 17.32 17.60 (0.72) (4.24) (0.27) (1.59) 
Renewable Share (%) 1.95 1.95 9.87 (7.92) - (7.92) - 
Social Indicator        
Domestic Employment 
(person-year) 80,323 77,594 94,109 (13,786.53) (17.16) (16,515.16) (21.28) 
Decentralization Ratio 
2015 (%) 6.98 6.98 23.32 (16.34) - (16.34) - 
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Table 6.6 Overall Impacts of the Three PDP Options (continued) 
2015 Difference 
Impact Indicators PDP-Gas PDP-Coal Renew. Gas-Renew. % 
Coal-
Renew. % 
Economic Indicators 2003-2015 (NPV million THB)     
Generation Costs 2,583,545 2,571,413 2,461,623 121,922.04 4.72 109,790.31 4.27 
GDP Contribution 905,674 896,067 929,672 (23,998.10) (2.65) (33,605.33) (3.75) 
BOP Effect 1,677,871 1,675,346 1,531,951 145,920.14 8.70 143,395.64 8.56 
Fuel Costs 1,756,419 1,726,282 1,573,750 182,668.19 10.40 152,531.23 8.84 
 In 2015 (million THB)     
External Costs 283,722 366,420 217,178 66,543.61 23.45 149,242.24 40.73 
Fuel Costs  281,287 262,207 222,805 58,481.88 20.79 39,402.42 15.03 
Generation Costs  408,723 400,606 366,541 42,182.10 10.32 34,065.07 8.50 
Source: Own Calculation 
 
• Economically, PDP-Renewables will reduce generation costs by 4.7% 
(compared to PDP-Gas) and contribute with almost 24 billion THB 
more to GDP (equal to 2.7% more compared to PDP-Gas) for the 
whole period. It will also reduce the import burden by 145.9 billion 
THB (around 8.7% lower than PDP-Gas). Regarding environmental 
and health impacts, in 2015, PDP-Renewables will reduce external 
costs by 23.5% or around 66.5 billion THB compared to PDP-Gas and 
almost 150 billion THB compared to PDP-Coal. 
• In terms of domestic resource, PDP-Renewables will maintain a 
domestic resource share at around 58% of the total power generation 
and prolong the national gas reserve lifetime with around 4 years. 
More importantly, with nearly 10% renewables in its fuel mix at the 
end of the period, PDP-Renewables provides a good strategic move 
toward less natural gas dependency in the longer term. 
• Politically, PDP-Renewables is the only option that can help the Thai 
power sector to reach the government targets of both energy efficiency 
and renewable energy development. 
Based on these results, PDP-Renewables is highly recommended. However, because 
impact analyses are normally based on planning assumptions, which, in many cases, 
are also highly contestable, a sensitivity analysis is also required and will be discussed 
in the next section to confirm the reliability and validity of these results and their 
policy implication.    
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6.8 Sensitivity Analysis I : Environmental and Health Sensitivity 
As the main focus of this study is health and related impact assessment, the first 
sensitivity analysis is dealing with the uncertainties in emission factors and health 
impact factors of the main power technologies. Of course, all these factors vary 
greatly in different contexts due to various factors, which to some extent are difficult 
to forecast today, as discussed in Chapter 5. It is, therefore, important to test to which 
extent these analyses reach the same results on the basis of the variability of 
environmental and health coefficients.    
6.8.1 Environmental Impacts 
In the environmental aspect, the sensitivity analysis will focus on the changes in 
emission factors of six pollutants. For CO2, this analysis applies the lowest 
international references for greenhouse gas emissions from coal, natural gas, and 
lignite power generation technologies (for old and new power plants). For the other 
four pollutants, of which the emission can vary greatly, different percentages of  
reductions of emission factors of coal, natural gas, and lignite power generation 
technologies (in both old and new power plants) are tested in order to if a certain level 
will change the previous conclusion in environmental and health aspects.  
The results of Table 6.7 show that, with an emission reduction of up to 60% (except 
CO2) in all coal, natural gas, and lignite technologies, PDP-Renewables will still 
achieve the best results, i.e. the least polluting options, except for the case of TSP in 
which PDP-Gas provides the better results.  
When the analysis moves to 65% and 70% emission reduction (except CO2), PDP-
Renewables achieves half of the best emission results, namely the best results in CO2, 
SO2, and Hg emission. At this point, PDP-Gas is the best option for NOX and TSP 
emission and PDP-Coal is the best option for the reduction of NMVOC emissions.  
The second part of Table 6.7 presents the emission reduction in two main renewable 
technologies; i.e. biomass and biogas. The results from this table show that, with 20% 
emission reduction (except CO2) in biomass and biogas, technologies, PDP-
Renewables will mostly achieve the best results of up to a 70% emission reduction in 
coal, natural gas, and lignite technologies (except CO2), instead of 60% as previously 
tested. Even at a 75% emission reduction in coal, natural gas, and lignite technologies 
(except CO2), and a 20% emission reduction (except CO2) in biomass and biogas, 
technologies, PDP-Renewables will still be the best possible option of three 
indicators, namely CO2, SO2, and Hg emission. 
With these results, it can be concluded that PDP-Renewables is the best possible 
option with up to around 65-70% reduction in emission factors of all coal, natural gas, 
and lignite power generation technologies. In addition, if the emission reduction of 
biomass and biogas is taken into account (at a 20% reduction level), the total result 
will be a 75% reduction in emission factors of all main fossil-based technologies in 
Thailand.      
It should also be noted that, in this sensitivity analysis, the changes in the economic 
results of emission reduction technologies are not taken into consideration. If 
additional investments or costs are required to achieve a lower emission rate, the 
economic disadvantage of PDP-Gas and PDP-Coal (compared to PDP-Renewables) 
will certainly become larger, and, therefore, these two will be less preferable PDP 
options.   
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Table 6.7 Sensitivity Analysis of Environmental and Health Impacts (Eco-indicator 
Approach) from Emission reduction 
2015 2003-2015 
Impact Indicators Gas Coal Renewables Gas Coal Renewables
  60% Emission Reduction (except CO2) in Coal, Gas and Lignite 
Greenhouse gas (million Ton CO2) 123.67 138.49 91.75 1,172.36 1,213.83 1,032.86 
NOX (ton) 176,695 219,345 172,317 1,864,606 1,983,973 1,863,238 
SO2 (ton) 90,986 148,850 73,883 1,220,439 1,382,384 1,160,106 
TSP (ton) 7,761 13,118 8,920 101,811 116,803 109,533 
Hg (kg) 2,191 8,219 2,087 22,728 39,599 22,418 
NMVOC (ton) 15,625 13,358 13,280 145,853 139,508 129,233 
Health :Climate Change (DALY) 25,972 29,084 19,268 246,196 254,905 216,901 
Health : Air Pollution (DALY) 21,514 29,043 20,317 243,412 264,483 240,825 
Total Health Impact (DALY) 47,486 58,127 39,585 489,608 519,389 457,726 
 65% Emission Reduction (except CO2) in Coal, Gas and Lignite 
Greenhouse gas (million Ton CO2) 123.67 138.49 91.75 1,172.36 1,213.83 1,032.86 
NOX (ton) 156,112 193,431 157,307 1,667,385 1,771,832 1,688,112 
SO2 (ton) 80,789 131,420 66,377 1,112,006 1,253,708 1,060,552 
TSP (ton) 6,919 11,606 8,316 92,136 105,253 100,534 
Hg (kg) 1,921 7,196 1,834 20,024 34,786 19,764 
NMVOC (ton) 13,845 11,862 11,984 130,859 125,308 116,499 
Health :Climate Change (DALY) 25,972 29,084 19,268 246,196 254,905 216,901 
Health : Air Pollution (DALY) 19,037 25,625 18,507 218,915 237,352 218,849 
Total Health Impact (DALY) 45,009 54,708 37,776 465,111 492,257 435,750 
 70% Emission Reduction (except CO2) in Coal, Gas and Lignite 
Greenhouse gas (million Ton CO2) 123.67 138.49 91.75 1,172.36 1,213.83 1,032.86 
NOX (ton) 135,530 167,518 142,297 1,470,165 1,559,690 1,512,985 
SO2 (ton) 70,592 113,990 58,872 1,003,574 1,125,033 960,998 
TSP (ton) 6,076 10,094 7,712 82,461 93,704 91,534 
Hg (kg) 1,651 6,172 1,582 17,320 29,973 17,110 
NMVOC (ton) 12,066 10,366 10,688 115,865 111,107 103,765 
Health :Climate Change (DALY) 25,972 29,084 19,268 246,196 254,905 216,901 
Health : Air Pollution (DALY) 16,560 22,206 16,698 194,418 210,221 196,874 
Total Health Impact (DALY) 42,531 51,290 35,966 440,614 465,126 413,775 
Note: Bold figures indicate the best PDP option in each impact indicator. 
Source: Own Calculation 
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Table 6.7 Sensitivity Analysis of Environmental and Health Impacts (Eco-indicator 
Approach) from Emission reduction (continued) 
2015 2003-2015 
Impact Indicators Gas Coal Renewables Gas Coal Renewables
 
 70% Emission Reduction (except CO2) in Coal, Lignite and Gas 
plus 20% Emission Reduction in Biomass and Biogas 
Greenhouse gas (million Ton CO2) 123.67 138.49 91.75 1,172.36 1,213.83 1,032.86 
NOX (ton) 134,438 166,426 133,192 1,460,074 1,549,600 1,465,271 
SO2 (ton) 70,477 113,875 57,858 1,002,407 1,123,865 955,684 
TSP (ton) 5,995 10,012 7,012 81,671 92,914 87,867 
Hg (kg) 1,650 6,172 1,574 17,311 29,965 17,071 
NMVOC (ton) 12,018 10,317 10,315 115,477 110,719 101,811 
Health :Climate Change (DALY) 25,972 29,084 19,268 246,196 254,905 216,901 
Health : Air Pollution (DALY) 16,448 22,094 15,758 193,372 209,175 191,945 
Total Health Impact (DALY) 42,419 51,178 35,026 439,567 464,080 408,846 
 
75% Emission Reduction (except CO2) in Coal, Lignite and Gas 
plus 20% Emission Reduction in Biomass and Biogas 
Greenhouse gas (million Ton CO2) 123.67 138.49 91.75 1,172.36 1,213.83 1,032.86 
NOX (ton) 113,856 140,512 118,182 1,262,854 1,337,458 1,290,144 
SO2 (ton) 60,280 96,445 50,353 893,974 995,189 856,129 
TSP (ton) 5,152 8,500 6,407 71,996 81,365 78,867 
Hg (kg) 1,381 5,148 1,322 14,607 25,152 14,417 
NMVOC (ton) 10,238 8,822 9,019 100,483 96,518 89,077 
Health :Climate Change (DALY) 25,972 29,084 19,268 246,196 254,905 216,901 
Health : Air Pollution (DALY) 13,970 18,676 13,948 168,874 182,044 169,970 
Total Health Impact (DALY) 39,942 47,759 33,217 415,070 436,949 386,871 
Note: Bold figures indicate the best PDP option in each impact indicator. 
Source: Own Calculation 
6.8.2 Health Impacts (Eco-indicator Approach) 
Since the health impact analysis in the eco-indicator approach derives from the 
pollutant emission level of the three PDP options, the sensitivity analysis in this 
approach is closely related to the previous environmental sensitivity analysis. 
Therefore, the changes in emission factors are also applied to the sensitivity test of 
health impacts in the eco-indicator approach. 
Table 6.7 also confirms that, in a health perspective, PDP-Renewables will provide 
the best results up to a 65% emission reduction (except CO2) in all coal, natural gas, 
and lignite technologies. When it approaches a 70% emission reduction (except CO2), 
PDP-Gas becomes the best possible option in relation to the air pollution impact on 
health. However, at this point, PDP-Renewables will still be the best PDP option in 
relation to climate change impacts on health and also total health impact.  
When the emission reduction in biomass and biogas are taken into account (at the 
same level of 20% emission reduction), PDP-Renewables will continue to provide the 
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best results up to a 75% emission reduction in all coal, natural gas, and lignite 
technologies. 
This confirms that PDP-Renewables is the best PDP option in a health perspective 
with up to 70-75% emission reductions in all main fossil-based technologies.  
6.8.3 Health Impacts (ExternE Approach) 
Apart from the sensitivity analysis in the eco-indicator approach, the calculation of 
health impacts on the basis of health impact coefficients, as applied in the ExternE 
project, is also tested. Following the same concept, health impact coefficients of all 
coal, natural gas and lignite power technologies, which can also vary greatly, are 
assumed to be reduced by equal percentages. The health impact results will be 
recalculated as presented in Table 6.8.   
Table 6.8 shows that PDP-Renewables will achieve the best results up to a 75% 
reduction in health impact coefficients of coal, natural gas, and lignite technologies. 
With a 80% reduction in health impact coefficients, PDP-Renewables will still be the 
best option for most of the health impact indicators, except from chronic bronchitis. 
PDP-Gas is the best option of most indicators, when health impact coefficients of 
coal, gas, and lignite approach a reduction level of 85%. 
Therefore, the ExternE approach, confirms, to an even higher degree, that PDP-
Renewables is the best option for health with up to a 75-80% reduction in health 
impact coefficients of all main fossil-based technologies. Within this range, it is a 
quite confirmative suggestion that PDP-Renewables should be the healthier option for 
Thai society.   
 
6.9 Sensitivity Analysis II : Fuel Price Sensitivity 
The assumption of fuel price is certainly crucial to every energy planning process. 
Moreover, it is almost impossible to provide a realistic prediction today of the riskier 
world energy market of tomorrow. In this situation, the sensitivity analysis of 
different fuel situations is useful, not only to find the least-cost solutions in different 
situations but also to search for the options which are most in an uncertain future.  
In this study, three different price scenarios are applied to the fuel price sensitivity 
analysis. The base case scenario takes its point of departure in the assumptions used in 
the existing PDP, i.e. the 2003 normal price situation. As the base case scenario, its 
results have already been presented earlier in previous sections of this chapter. The 
second scenario (the so-called situation II) is the scenario of an increasing natural gas 
price in Thailand, up to the highest level of 2005/2006. The last scenario (the so-
called situation III) is the situation in which the prices of both imported coal and 
biomass increase proportionally to the natural gas price because of their substitution 
effect, as shown in the statistical correlation analysis and observation discussed in 
Chapter 3. The economic analysis results of these two additional scenarios will be 
compared to the base case scenario, as shown below.            
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Table 6.8 Sensitivity Analysis of the Health Impacts of the reduction of Health Impact 
Coefficients 
2015 2003-2015 
Items Unit Gas Coal Renewables Gas Coal Renewables 
  75% Reduction in Health Impact Coefficients for Coal, Lignite, and Gas 
Acute Mortality Cases           32.9         61.7          28.2          523.2          603.9           501.3  
Acute Years of Life Loss Years           24.7         46.3          21.1          392.3          452.8           376.1  
Acute Hospital Admission Cases         142.3       171.7        123.7       1,507.1       1,589.3        1,431.4  
Chronic Mortality Cases         412.7       611.2        385.4       4,898.3       5,454.0        4,859.9  
Chronic Year of Life Loss Years      4,126.0    6,111.2     3,858.6     48,971.8     54,527.7      48,610.0  
Chronic Bronchitis (Adult) Cases         261.3       394.1        251.2       3,242.0       3,613.7        3,222.2  
Chronic Bronchitis (Children) Cases      3,606.4    5,476.7     3,479.7     45,296.4     50,530.7      45,010.7  
  80% Reduction in Health Impact Coefficients for Coal, Lignite, and Gas 
Acute Mortality Cases           27.6         50.6          24.2          462.2          526.7           444.1  
Acute Years of Life Loss Years           20.7         38.0          18.2          346.6          395.0           333.2  
Acute Hospital Admission Cases         115.8       139.4        104.6       1,259.6       1,325.4        1,214.1  
Chronic Mortality Cases         345.3       504.1        336.2       4,208.1       4,652.6        4,234.2  
Chronic Year of Life Loss Years      3,452.3    5,040.4     3,366.3     42,073.0     46,517.8      42,356.7  
Chronic Bronchitis (Adult) Cases        215.7       322.0         217.9      2,776.5       3,073.9          2,800.5 
Chronic Bronchitis (Children) Cases    2,971.7     4,467.9      3,015.9   38,797.6     42,985.1        39,120.0 
  85% Reduction in Health Impact Coefficients for Coal, Lignite, and Gas 
Acute Mortality Cases           22.2         39.5          20.2          401.2          449.6           386.9  
Acute Years of Life Loss Years           16.7         29.6          15.2          300.9          337.2           290.3  
Acute Hospital Admission Cases           89.4       107.0          85.5       1,012.1       1,061.4           996.9  
Chronic Mortality Cases        277.9       397.0         286.9      3,517.8       3,851.3          3,608.6 
Chronic Year of Life Loss Years    2,778.5     3,969.6      2,873.9   35,174.3     38,507.9        36,103.4 
Chronic Bronchitis (Adult) Cases        170.2       249.9         184.7      2,311.1       2,534.1          2,378.7 
Chronic Bronchitis (Children) Cases    2,337.0     3,459.2      2,552.1   32,298.9     35,439.6        33,229.2 
Note: Bold figures indicate the best PDP option in each impact indicator. 
Source: Own Calculation 
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6.9.1 Impact on Fuel Costs 
An increase of the natural gas price in Situation II will lead to a sharper increase of 
fuel costs for PDP-Gas, which is already the most expensive PDP option in terms of 
fuel costs. In 2015, the shift from the base case to situation II will raise the fuel costs 
of PDP-Gas from 281.3 billion THB to 333.3 billion THB, Since PDP-Gas mainly 
depends on natural gas, the additional increase of imported coal and biomass prices 
(Situation III) has a much lower effect on its fuel costs, as seen in Figure 6.19. These 
higher costs make PDP-Gas much less attractive compared to PDP-Coal and 
especially to PDP-Renewables. 
Certainly, as it is much less dependent on gas, the increased price of natural gas in 
situation II has little effect on PDP-Coal (Figure 6.19). Even with an increase of the 
imported coal price in situation III, the fuel costs of PDP-Coal is still lower than those 
of PDP-Gas in situation II (its fuel costs in Situation III are 310.4 billion THB in 
2015). In this perspective, PDP-Coal is the more secure option compared to PDP-Gas, 
in both scenarios. 
With the same logic of comparison, it is quite clear that PDP-Renewables provides the 
best secure option in an uncertain future. In Situation II, the fuel costs of PDP-
Renewables are only 257.4 billion THB (or 22.8% lower than PDP-Gas) and, in 
Situation III, its fuel costs are only 260.9 billion THB (or 22.1% lower than PDP-
Gas). As shown in Figure 6.19, in both scenarios, its fuel costs are even lower than the 
base case scenario of both PDP-Gas and PDP-Coal. In other words, with the 
investment in PDP-Renewables, the Thai power sector can stabilize its future fuel 
costs at a lower price than the existing PDP plan (or PDP-Gas). 
6.9.2 Impact on Generation Costs 
The sensitivity analysis of generation costs reveals almost the same pattern of impact 
as previously shown in the fuel costs analysis. Figure 6.20 shows that, in 2015, the 
increase in natural gas prices will raise the generation costs of PDP-Gas from 408.7 
billion THB in the base case scenario to 460.7 billion THB in the second scenario (or 
Situation II). However, the increase in the prices of imported coal and biomass in 
Situation III will make only a little difference in its generation costs (only up to 462.5 
billion THB), which is still higher than PDP-Coal and much higher than PDP-
Renewables. Therefore, this confirms the previous conclusion that PDP-Gas is much 
less attractive considering fuel price uncertainties. 
Although PDP-Coal still has an advantage over PDP-Gas in its lower costs, this 
advantage is smaller when it comes to generation costs compared to previous fuel 
costs. In 2015, the generation of PDP-Coal in Situation III is 448.8 billion THB, 
which is only slightly lower than PDP-Gas. However, its generation costs in Situation 
III are still lower than those of PDP-Gas in situation II. 
Despite its higher capital and O&M costs, PDP-Renewables still holds its advantage 
as regards low generation costs in all three pricing situations. In 2015, the generation 
costs of PDP-Renewables in Situation II are 401.1 billion THB (12.9% lower than 
PDP-Gas) and in situation III 404.6 billion THB (12.5% lower than PDP-Gas), which 
is even lower than the generation costs of PDP-Gas in the base case scenario and only 
slightly more than the generation costs of PDP-Coal in the same scenario (400.6 
billion THB). Therefore, PDP-Renewables is the best PDP option in dealing with a 
future high price situation.      
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Figure 6.19 
Fuel Cost of Three PDP Options in Different Price 
Situations
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Figure 6.20 
Generation Cost of three PDP Options in 
Different Price Situations
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6.9.3 Impact on Balance of Payment 
Figure 6.21 presents the impact on balance of payment (or import burden) in total 
present value terms. It indicates almost indifferent effects of increasing fuel prices 
between PDP-Gas and PDP-Coal, especially in Situation III. In Situation III, the total 
present value of the import burden from PDP-Coal will be 1,883.2 billion THB, 
compared to an impact burden from PDP-Gas of 1,890.4 billion THB. 
As in the base case scenario, PDP-Renewables still provides import savings to Thai 
economy in both Situations II and III. In Situation II, the total present value of import 
savings achieved by PDP-Renewables is 180.2 billion THB for the whole period 
compared to PDP-Gas (or equal to 9.6% savings). This shows the larger import saving 
compared to the base case scenario. In Situation III, when the increasing price of 
biomass is also assumed, the import savings of PDP-Renewables (compared to PDP-
Gas) have dropped slightly to 179.3 billion THB (or 9.5% saving).  
This suggests that PDP-Renewables is a good choice to stabilize the national balance 
of payment by reducing import costs, especially when import burdens increase due to 
higher fuel prices, as is the case today. 
Therefore, all these results of the fuel price sensitivity analysis confirm that, among 
the three PDP options, PDP-Renewables is the best option for Thai society to mitigate 
the risk of increased fuel prices, as experienced today. Its advantages can all be seen 
in terms of lower fuel costs, lower generation costs, and lower import costs, which are 
all crucial to the growth and stability of Thai economy.  
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6.10 Sensitivity Analysis III : High Demand Growth Sensitivity 
Apart from their different fuel mixes, another main difference between PDP-
Renewables and the other two PDP options is the demand growth expectation. 
Although the predicted figures of peak demand in 2004 and 2005 are much closer to 
the figures of PDP-Renewables than those of the other two options, as previously 
shown in Chapter 5, several expansionist planners are continuously concerned about 
the return of an unexpected high growth economy and, consequently, a high 
electricity demand growth. As discussed in Chapter 5, they prefer to keep over-
estimating in order to ensure system reliability and business expansion. This 
sensitivity analysis will deal with this concern by analyzing the flexibility of PDP-
Renewables in relation to the maintenance of system reliability as well as its 
environmental, health, social, and economic advantages. 
The analysis will begin by changing the assumption of PDP-Renewables’ power 
demand growth rate after 2006 to the same growth rate as of other PDP options (i.e., 
from 5.2% to 6.5% GDP growth assumption). Then, the adjustment of PDP-
Renewables is required to meet the new peak demand, by accelerating renewable 
energy and DSM investment by 10% (from normal PDP-Renewables), delaying the 
plan for scaling down the Mae Moh power plant (from a 1,200 MW reduction to a 900 
MW reduction), and installing 2,100 MW of gas combined-cycle power plants by 
2015.  
Through this adjustment, it is ensured that PDP-Renewables can secure the power 
system for the whole period with an adequate reserve margin. Consequently, the 
impact analysis of the adjusted PDP-Renewables will be checked and compared to the 
existing PDP, or PDP-Gas, which is preferable from a health perspective compared to 
PDP-Coal. The results of the comparison are presented below.    
6.10.1 Environmental and Health Impacts 
Table 6.9 shows that although the environmental impacts of the adjusted PDP-
Renewables, the so-called PDP-Renewables (High), are generally 8-9% higher than 
those of the original PDP-Renewables (except in Hg emission with an increase of only 
1.5%), PDP-Renewables (High) still provides the better result compared to PDP-Gas 
in all environmental indicators. The advantage in greenhouse gas emission reduction 
is still more than 19%. For other pollutants, the emission reduction ranges from a 2% 
reduction in TSP to a 17% reduction in SO2. This confirms the environmental 
advantage of PDP-Renewables over PDP-Gas in a high demand growth situation. 
At the same time, Table 6.9 also confirms the health advantage of PDP-Renewables 
(high) over PDP-Gas. In mortality assessment, PDP-Renewables (high) has around 
220 cases less than PDP-Gas, which equals a 17.2% reduction in acute mortality and a 
13.9% reduction in chronic mortality. In terms of the loss of healthy life years (or 
DALY), in total, PDP-Renewables (high) can still save 11,323 healthy life years 
(around a 13.9% reduction compared to PDP-Gas) of the total Thai population. 
Therefore, in conclusion, with a 7-9% increase in impacts compared to the base case 
scenario, PDP-Renewables can still maintain its health benefits over PDP-Gas in the 
high demand growth scenario.   
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Table 6.9 Sensitivity Analysis of Health and Environmental Impacts in a High Demand 
Growth Scenario 
2015 Difference 
Impact Indicators PDP-Gas 
PDP-Renew 
(high) 
PDP-
Renewables
Gas-Renew 
(High) % 
Renew 
(high) -
Renew % 
Environmental Indicators              
Greenhouse gas 
Emissions  
(million Ton CO2) 143.63 116.12 106.42 27.51 19.15 9.70 9.11 
NOX Emissions (ton) 423,683.71 384,373 352,438.57 39,310.55 9.28 31,934.58 9.06 
SO2 Emissions (ton) 213,351.13 176,488 163,949.01 36,863.13 17.28 12,538.98 7.65 
TSP Emissions (ton) 17,871.96 17,514 16,171.96 357.72 2.00 1,342.28 8.30 
Hg Emissions (kg) 5,425.96 5,193 5,116.64 233.20 4.30 76.12 1.49 
NMVOC Emissions 
(ton) 36,975.79 31,628 28,833.98 5,347.72 14.46 2,794.09 9.69 
Health Impacts (Eco-indicator approach)      
From Climate Change 
(DALY) 30,162 24,385 22,349 5,777.04 19.15 2,035.99 9.11 
From Air Pollution 
(DALY) 51,243 45,697 42,029 5,545.77 10.82 3,668.45 8.73 
Total Impact (DALY) 81,405 70,082 64,377 11,322.81 13.91 5,704.44 8.86 
Health Impacts  (ExternE approach)      
Acute Mortality 
(cases) 112.96 93.57 87.71 19.38 17.16 5.86 6.68 
Acute Mortality 
(YOLL) 84.67 70.19 65.79 14.48 17.11 4.40 6.68 
Chronic Mortality 
(cases) 1,428.71 1,229.48 1,136.73 199.23 13.94 92.75 8.16 
Chronic Mortality 
(YOLL) 14,282.41 12,296.67 11,369.01 1,985.74 13.90 927.66 8.16 
Source: Own Calculation 
 
6.10.2 Economic Impacts 
Table 6.10 indicates that, with additional investments to meet a higher expected 
demand, PDP-Renewables (High) is characterized by 1.8% higher generation costs, 
1.4% higher import burden, and 1.5% higher fuel costs compared to the original PDP-
Renewables. However, all these costs of PDP-Renewables (High) are still lower than 
those of PDP-Gas (i.e. 3.1% lower generation costs, 7.4% lower import burden and 
9.1% lower fuel costs). The economic savings in terms of generation costs is still 
nearly 80 billion THB and in terms of BOP is still more than 124 billion THB (both in 
present value term) compared to the normal scenario. Concurrently, with more 
investment, the GDP contribution of PDP-Renewables (high) becomes 2.3% higher 
than the contribution of the original PDP-Renewables, which results in a 45.3 billion 
THB higher GDP contribution compared to PDP-Gas (around 5% of PDP-Gas). The 
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external costs of PDP-Renewables (high) are also 16.8% lower than those of PDP-
Gas. With all these figures, Table 6.10 confirms that, in a higher growth situation, 
PDP-Renewables still yields the better economic results compared to PDP-Gas. Thus, 
from  an economic point of view, PDP-Renewables is clearly preferable to PDP-Gas. 
 
Table 6.10 Sensitivity Analysis of Economic Impacts in a High Demand Growth Scenario 
2015 Difference 
Impact Indicators PDP-Gas 
PDP-Renew 
(high) 
PDP-
Renewables
Gas-Renew 
(High) % 
Renew 
(high) -
Renew % 
2003-2015 (million THB in present value)         
Generation Costs  2,583,545 2,504,629 2,461,623 78,915.92 3.05 43,006.12 1.75 
GDP Contribution  905,674 950,963 929,672 (45,288.69) (5.00) 21,290.59 2.29 
BOP Effect  1,677,871 1,553,666 1,531,951 124,204.61 7.40 21,715.53 1.42 
Fuel Costs  1,756,419 1,597,266 1,573,750 159,152.07 9.06 23,516.11 1.49 
In 2015 (million THB in nominal term)     
External Costs   283,722 236,040 217,178 47,681.76 16.81 18,861.85 8.68 
Fuel Costs   281,287 242,432 222,805 38,854.76 13.81 19,627.12 8.81 
Generation Costs 408,723 395,933 366,541 12,790.10 3.13 29,392.01 8.02 
Source: Own Calculation 
 
6.10.3 Social and Domestic Resource Impacts 
Like in the analyses of other impacts in this sensitivity test, PDP-Renewables (High) 
also yields better results than PDP-Gas in all resource and social indicators, as shown 
in Table 6.11. With higher investment, it even provides higher benefits compared to 
the original PDP-Renewables in terms of domestic resource share (from 58.5% in the 
original PDP-Renewables to 59.1% in PDP-Renewables (High)), renewable share 
(from 9.87% to 9.98%) and domestic employment (from 94,109 to 103,070 person-
years). Therefore, it is clear that PDP-Renewables is still a better solution than PDP-
Gas, also in a high growth situation. 
Although Tables 6.9-6.11 do not present the impact indicators of PDP-Coal, the 
figures of PDP-Renewables (high) in these three tables can be directly compared to 
the figure of PDP-Coal in Table 6.6, in which the advantage of PDP-Renewables 
(high) in all impact indicators can be seen clearly.  
The results of this sensitivity analysis represent the flexibility of PDP-Renewables in 
coping with a higher demand growth situation and its ability to maintain all 
advantages over the other PDP options. Therefore, the concern of high growth 
economy and power demand should not inhibit the support and implementation of 
PDP-Renewables.  
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This sensitivity analysis also provides very practical suggestions to Thai energy 
policy. Based on the better performance of PDP-Renewables, instead of following 
PDP-Gas and announcing for new IPPs agreement in 2006, the Thai government may 
delay the IPP bidding process and check the high growth assumption until 2008 (in 
order for the 700MW new gas combined-cycle plants to be ready in 2013). PDP-
Renewables also reduces the expected number of IPP biding requirements in 2015 
considerably from 12,600 MW to only 2,100 MW.  
However, since this suggestion is based on PDP-Renewables (High), the investment 
in renewable energy and DSM must be implemented as mentioned in PDP-
Renewables (High) in order to gain both its benefits and its flexibility in the case of a 
high growth situation. 
 
Table 6.11 Sensitivity Analysis of Resource and Social Impacts in a High Demand 
Growth Scenario  
2015 Difference 
Impact Indicators PDP-Gas 
PDP-Renew 
(High) 
PDP-
Renewables
Gas-
Renew 
(High) % 
Renew 
(High) -
Renew % 
Resource Indicators               
Domestic Resource 
Share (%) 52.51 59.06 58.51 (6.55) - 0.55 0.00 
Domestic Gas Reserve 
after 2015 (tcf) 16.88 17.48 17.60 (0.60) (3.55) (0.12) (0.66) 
Renewable Share (%) 1.95 9.98 9.87 (8.03) - 0.11 0.00 
Social Indicator        
Domestic Employment 
(person-year) 80,323 103,070 94,109 (22,747.84) (28.32) 8,961.31 9.52 
Decentralization Ratio 
(%) 6.98 22.34 23.32 (15.37)  (0.97)  
Source: Own Calculation 
 
6.11 Sensitivity Analysis IV : Low Demand Growth Sensitivity 
The last sensitivity analysis is based on the opposite assumption compared to the 
previous one. Instead of higher growth demand, this sensitivity analysis assumes that, 
within a couple of years, the over-demand forecasting may become too obvious to 
ignore and will lead to an expansionist strategy in the Power Development Plan. 
Operationally, it may be decided that the existing PDP, or PDP-Gas, must lower its 
installed capacity requirement to what is expected in PDP-Renewables, i.e. no over-
investment is done, but natural gas is still preferred to renewable energy technologies. 
Over-investment may certainly have several negative consequences in terms of health 
and economic impacts. It is, therefore, important to re-check whether PDP-
Renewables still yields better results than the PDP-Gas with no over-investment 
effects or PDP-Gas (low). 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, another benefit of this sensitivity analysis is the 
decomposition analysis of the overall benefits (or advantages) of PDP-Renewables. 
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As previously discussed in this chapter, these benefits may be divided into two main 
categories; namely forecasting effect and renewable energy effect. The forecasting 
effect refers to the difference between PDP-Gas and PDP-Gas (low). With the same 
expectation of future electricity demand, the renewable energy effect refers to the 
difference between PDP-Gas (low) and PDP-Renewables. These two effects are 
compared to the overall effects, which is the difference between PDP-Gas and PDP-
Renewables as mainly discussed in this chapter, and converted into a percentage 
decomposition analysis. This decomposition analysis of the benefits of PDP-
Renewables’ will provide an insightful answer to whether both revising demand 
forecasting and renewable energy investment are required in PDP-Renewables and, 
consequently, in policy suggestion. 
6.11.1 Environmental and Health Impacts 
Table 6.12 provides a clear picture that, in environmental and health perspectives, 
PDP-Gas (low), or PDP-Gas with no over-investment, cannot provide the better 
results compared to PDP-Renewables in all environmental and health indicators. For 
example, in terms of environment, in 2015, PDP-Gas (low) still emits 18.2 million 
tons of CO2, 37,700 tons of SO2, and 271.8 kg of mercury more than PDP-
Renewables. In terms of health, PDP-Gas (low) still has 161.5 additional cases of 
chronic mortality and 23.8 additional cases of acute mortality compared to PDP-
Renewables, in 2015. At the same time, with PDP-Gas (low), the Thai population is 
still expected to loose 8,184 more healthy life years compared to PDP-Renewables. 
Therefore, it is quite obvious that revising the demand forecast is not enough to 
achieve the same level of benefits as with PDP-Renewables. The decomposition 
analysis provides the answer that, in terms of environmental benefits, the forecasting 
effect plays a major role in NOX and NMVOC emission reduction, and the renewable 
effect plays a more significant role in the emission reduction of SO2, TSP, and Hg. In 
the case of the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, both the revise of demand 
forecasting and the introduction of renewable energy play more or less equally 
important roles. 
In terms of health, the decomposition analysis in the eco-indicator approach shows 
that the forecasting and renewable effects play equally important roles in reducing the 
loss of healthy life years of the Thai population. In the ExternE approach, these two 
effects also have almost an equal share of saving people from chronic mortality, 
though the renewable energy effect will play a much more important role in reducing 
acute mortality. In overall, it is fair to say that both effects have equally important 
roles in protecting the health of Thai people.  
Thus, in both environmental and health perspectives, revising the demand forecasting 
and investing in renewable energy are both essential to promoting a healthier PDP 
option.  
6.11.2   Economic Impacts 
Eliminating the over-investment from PDP-Gas (i.e., change to PDP-Gas (low)) can 
reduce unnecessary costs, from investment to fuel costs, which finally results in the 
reduction of the generation costs of PDP-Gas. In this situation, the generation costs of 
PDP-Gas (low) become slightly lower than those of PDP-Renewables (around 7.8 
billion THB difference for the whole period). However, PDP-Renewables still 
maintains its advantages over PDP-Gas (low) in all other economic indicators. 
Compared to PDP-Gas (low), PDP-Renewables contributes with nearly 70 billion 
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THB more to the national economy and lowers the import burden by 62 billion THB 
for the whole period. It also reduces the external costs from power generation by 37.1 
billion THB a year in 2015.  
Based on these figures, the benefit of PDP-Gas (low) in terms of lower generation 
costs (around 0.3% lower) seems to be much smaller than its disadvantage in terms of 
lower GDP contribution and higher import burden. Therefore, PDP-Renewables is 
still the most preferable option, though its advantage in lower generation costs is lost 
if the existing PDP, or PDP-Gas, decides to follow the same assumption of lower 
future electricity demand growth. 
   
Table 6.12 Sensitivity Analysis of Environmental Impacts in a Low Demand Growth Scenario  
and Decomposition of the Effects of PDP-Renewables (Compare to PDP-Gas)  
2015 Difference 
Effect Decomposition
(percentage) 
Impact Indicators PDP-Gas 
PDP-Gas 
(low) 
PDP-
Renew 
Gas-
Gas(low)
Gas(low)-
Renew 
Gas-
Renew 
Gas-
Gas(low) 
Gas(low)-
Renew 
Demand Growth High Low Low           
Types of Effect       Forecast Renew. Overall Forecast Renew. 
Environmental Indicators 
              
Greenhouse gas 
(million Ton CO2) 143.63 124.60 106.42 19.02 18.18 37.20 51.13 48.87 
NOX (ton) 423,684 376,876 352,439 46,807.74 24,437.39 71,245.13 65.70 34.30 
SO2 (ton) 213,351 201,608 163,949 11,742.97 37,659.14 49,402.11 23.77 76.23 
TSP (ton) 17,872 17,442 16,172 430.32 1,269.68 1,700.00 25.31 74.69 
Hg (kg) 5,426 5,388 5,117 37.54 271.78 309.32 12.14 87.86 
NMVOC (ton) 36,976 30,730 28,834 6,245.70 1,896.12 8,141.82 76.71 23.29 
Health Impacts (Eco-indicator approach)      
Climate Change 
(DALY) 30,162 26,167 22,349 3,994.86 3,818.18 7,813.03 51.13 48.87 
Air Pollution 
(DALY) 51,243 46,395 42,029 4,848.34 4,365.88 9,214.22 52.62 47.38 
Total Impact 
(DALY) 81,405 72,562 64,377 8,843.20 8,184.06 17,027.25 51.94 48.06 
Health Impacts (ExternE approach)      
Acute Mortality 
(cases) 113.0 111.5 87.7 1.47 23.77 25.25 5.84 94.16 
Acute Mortality 
(YOLL) 84.7 83.6 65.8 1.11 17.78 18.88 5.85 94.15 
Chronic Mortality 
(cases) 1,428.7 1,298.3 1,136.7 130.45 161.53 291.98 44.68 55.32 
Chronic Mortality 
(YOLL) 14,282.4 12,977.9 11,369.0 1,304.55 1,608.85 2,913.40 44.78 55.22 
Source: Own Calculation 
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Table 6.13 Sensitivity Analysis of  Economic Impacts in Low Demand Growth and 
Decomposition of the Effects of PDP-Renewables (Compare to PDP-Gas) 
2015 Difference 
Effect 
Decomposition 
Impact Indicators PDP-Gas 
PDP-Gas 
(low) 
PDP-
Renew. 
Gas-
Gas(low)
Gas(low)-
Renew 
Gas-
Renew 
Gas-
Gas(low) 
Gas(low)-
Renew 
Demand Growth High Low Low      
Types of Effect    Forecast Renew. Overall Forecast Renew. 
Economic 
Indicators 2003-2015 (NPV in million THB)           
Generation Costs  2,583,545 2,453,809 2,461,623 129,736 (7,814) 121,922 106.41 (6.41) 
GDP Contribution  905,674 859,848 929,672 45,826 (69,824) (23,998) (190.96) 290.96 
BOP Effect  1,677,871 1,593,961 1,531,951 83,910 62,010 145,920 57.50 42.50 
Fuel Costs  1,756,419 1,668,727 1,573,750 87,691 94,977 182,668 48.01 51.99 
External Costs in 
2015 in nominal 283,722 254,259 217,178 29,463 37,081 66,544 44.28 55.72 
Source: Own Calculation 
 
Furthermore, the decomposition analysis in Table 6.13 provides an insightful notion 
of the significance of revising demand forecasting and applying renewable energy in 
order to lead PDP-Renewables to its better economic results. As the forecasting effect 
contributes with more than 100% to lower generation cost compared to PDP-Gas 
(which means that all benefits come from forecasting effects, including the 
compensation for the higher costs of renewable energy), it is clear that revising 
demand forecasting is a very important policy suggestion to lower the generation 
costs of PDP-Renewables. Oppositely, renewable energy is very essential to the 
increase in the GDP contribution, including the compensation for GDP loss caused by 
the scaling down of investment as a result of lower demand expectation. To reduce 
import costs, fuel costs, and external costs, both the revised demand forecast and 
renewable energy play almost equally important roles.  
Therefore, in short, the combination of revised demand forecasting and renewable 
energy makes it possible for PDP-Renewables to reach its economic advantage, as 
previously shown in this chapter.  
6.11.3 Social and Domestic Resource Impacts 
Table 6.14 indicates that, even with no over-investment effect in PDP-Gas (low), 
PDP-Renewables continues to yield the better results in all resource and social 
indicators. In fact, with lower investment in fossil-based power plants, PDP-Gas (low) 
achieves the most negative results in renewable share and domestic resource share. 
This is due to the fact that, in PDP-Gas, the renewable energy investment is based on 
a 5% share of the new fossil-based power plants, according to the renewable portfolio 
standard (RPS) scheme. In other words, based on PDP-Gas (low), the Thai 
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government’s target of achieving a 6% renewable share in 2011 cannot be reach. 
PDP-Gas (low) will also reduce the domestic employment from 80,323 person-years 
in the original PDP-Gas to 62,172 person-years, in 2015.   
In terms of the decomposition analysis, Table 6.14 also confirms that the renewable 
energy effect, with more than 100% contribution, takes all responsibility for 
increasing the domestic share, the renewable share, and the decentralization share of 
power generation, and also for creating employment, while the revise of the demand 
forecasting plays a major role only in maintaining the domestic gas reserve. 
   
Table 6.14 Sensitivity Analysis of  Resource and Social Impacts in Low Demand Growth 
and Decomposition of the Effects of PDP-Renewables (Compare to PDP-Gas) 
2015 Difference 
Effect 
Decomposition 
Impact Indicators PDP-Gas 
PDPGas 
(low) 
PDP-
Renew. 
Gas-
Gas(low) 
Gas(low)-
Renew 
Gas-
Renew 
Gas-
Gas(low) 
Gas(low)-
Renew 
Demand Growth High Low Low      
Types of Effect    Forecast Renew. Overall Forecast Renew.e 
Resource Indicators                 
Domestic Resource 
Share (%) 52.51 52.07 58.51 0.44 (6.44) (6.00) (7.36) 107.36 
Domestic Gas 
Reserve after 2015 
(tcf) 16.88 17.39 17.60 (0.50) (0.21) (0.72) 70.43 29.57 
Renewable Share (%) 1.95 1.04 9.87 0.91 (8.83) (7.92) (11.45) 111.45 
Social Indicator         
Domestic 
Employment 
 (person-year) 80,323 62,172 94,109 18,151 (31,937) (13,787) (131.66) 231.66 
Decentralization 
Ratio 2015(%) 6.98 6.96 23.32 0.02 (16.36) (16.34) (0.12) 100.12 
Source: Own Calculation 
 
In overall, the revised demand forecasting, as suggested in PDP-Gas (low), is still far 
from enough to provide better environmental, health, economic, resource, and social 
conditions as done in PDP-Renewables. In other words, just scaling down an 
investment plan is not an adequate healthier and attractive option. The shift from 
fossil-based technology to renewable energy is certainly required. However, revising 
the demand forecasting still plays a major role in creating several environmental and 
health benefits, as well as in lowering generation costs, which is a very important 
political issue in the Thai power sector. Therefore, in short, revising demand 
forecasting and investing in renewable energy contributes to making PDP-Renewables 
a healthier choice and an easier choice to make, at the same time.  
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6.12 Public Responses and Opinions 
The early version of the impact analysis together with the relevant experiences on 
sustainable energy development at regional and local levels have been presented to 
public forums from January to July 2005, as described in Chapter 1. The aims of 
providing information to the public and make the public participate in forums are a) to 
get public feedback on this impact analysis and its policy consequences, b) to achieve 
a broader understanding of the practical issues of sustainable energy in Thailand and 
c) to stimulate public discussions about the strategic directions of the Thai power 
sector.  
These following points summarize the issues which have been publicly discussed and 
treated during these public forums. 
• With recent experiences of negative health impacts of power generation (as 
shown in Chapters 1 and 4), Thai people are fully aware of the environmental 
and health consequences of power generation, including new power plant 
projects. Therefore, they are interested in learning more and discussing 
healthier policy alternatives. 
• The regional sustainable energy trips and fairs, which were organized as parts 
of the public forum, are very useful in bridging the more abstract strategic 
choices and technical impact assessment at the national level and the actual 
potential and reference cases at the regional and local levels. Thus, they 
stimulate more insightful public discussions during the forums. 
• In general, the PDP-Renewables is highly welcome, mainly due to its 
economic and environmental health benefits. The PDP-Coal is much less 
attractive for local people due to its limited local economic benefits and its 
negative environmental and health consequences.  
• Another important benefit of the PDP-Renewables in the local people’s 
viewpoint, which has not been included in this impact assessment, is the 
value-added creation and price stability of their agricultural by-products and 
wastes. This can be an important benefit to an agricultural society like 
Thailand. However, in order to distribute this value added more equally to 
Thai farmers, the organization of supply chain, pricing structure (both for 
biomass inputs and power outputs) and ownership structure needs to be 
discussed. Otherwise, all value-added benefits will be handed into the few 
hands of those who control the supply chain, the price, or the investment in 
new power plants. 
• The benefits of the decentralized power system have been confirmed during 
the forums. In the Mae Kam Pong case, this system means that local villagers, 
who rely on micro hydro power, need to take good care of their community 
and natural forest1. In biogas cases, the excess gas output, wasted heat, and 
organic residual materials can be organized and shared within the 
communities2. Even in conflict cases, local people also experience less 
difficulty in dealing with biomass power plants, compared to large fossil-based 
power plants, due to their smaller impacts and less power imbalances.            
• Although, in general, renewable energy provides significant benefits to health, 
several renewable projects have, in practice, damaged the local environment 
and people’s health, especially the dust from biomass power plants. Thus, an 
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environmental and health protection mechanism with the appropriate public 
participation process is certainly required, even in the case of distributed 
renewable energy power plant projects. 
• In some places (especially in the Northeast and the South of Thailand), local 
people are highly interested and already have some experiences in developing 
their own local and regional energy plans in order to exploit their own 
potentials for sustainable energy development. This idea and movement can be 
very useful if it can interlink with and integrate into the national power 
development plan and impact assessment. 
• During the sustainable energy trips and policy discussions, several unfavorable 
and unfair regulations of sustainable energy development have been identified. 
This includes the problems in connecting to the grid, the pricing system, the 
discrimination of import tax, and unclear policy directions and mechanisms. 
Therefore, to support PDP-Renewables, the forums suggested re-establishing 
the new policy mechanism and institutional arrangement. All these 
institutional and regulative issues will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Since all public discussions did not dig deeply into the technical details of impact 
analysis, this study will not claim for the full public agreement or public support to its 
results. What can be concluded so far is that this impact analysis and its general 
conclusions are in line with the concerns, experiences, and aspiration of the Thai 
public. In other words, it is now receiving more cognitive and normative support from 
the Thai public.  
Lastly, it is also important to note that this study has never received the direct 
feedback from the utilities and government institutions. However, in July 2005, after 
the public forums, EGAT publicly denied to revise its PDP3 as suggested in the study 
and forum. Nevertheless, in November 2005, MoEn and EGAT accepted the idea of 
lowering its power demand forecasting4 5. After the Interim regulator was set up in 
December 2005, the Interim regulator also planned to revise the demand forecasting 
and, consequently, the PDP and IPP bidding as planned in the existing PDP6.  
Concerning the renewable energy investment, as PDP-Renewables follows the Thai 
government target for renewable energy development, there is no counter-argument to 
this study presented in public. However, the unfavorable institutional frameworks, as 
mentioned earlier (and will be discussed in detail later), remained unchanged until the 
end of 2005. Implicitly, it seemed to become a “non-action policy”, especially when 
the EGAT privatization was on the top of the agenda for Thai power politics in 2005. 
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6.13 Conclusion  
As healthy public policy aims to create a supportive environment for healthy living 
and, at the same time, to make the healthier choice an easier choice to make for 
decision-makers, this study provides a wide range of impact assessments, ranging 
from health to economic perspectives, to create a basis for policy discussion in Thai 
society. The results show that 
• PDP-Renewables is the cleaner solution. Through the lower power 
consumption and renewable energy generation, the emission of greenhouse 
gas as well as main air pollutants will be significantly reduced. The levels 
of greenhouse gas, NOx and SO2 emission can almost be stabilized at the 
end of the planning period. 
• PDP-Renewables is the healthier option. It produces lower health risks 
and has lower health impacts in terms of mortality, chronic diseases, and 
loss of healthy life years. Through PDP-Renewables, annually around 300 
lives are expected to be saved and 3,000 people are able to avoid chronic 
diseases. It is also able to bring down the number of negative health 
impacts, despite its higher power generation and levels of service. 
• PDP-Renewables is a social benefit. Due to its higher domestic 
investment and fuel share, PDP-Renewables creates more jobs and 
provides more opportunities for society to take more control over the 
power system through decentralized power generation. 
• PDP-Renewables is a feasible choice. It requires only small additional 
investment, which consequently yields lower generation costs, lower 
import burden and higher GDP contribution to Thai economy. 
• PDP-Renewables is the more self-sufficient path. It depends less on 
imported fuels and depleting national natural gas resources. More 
importantly, with almost a 10% share of renewable energy in 2015, it 
paves the way for a renewable future. 
• PDP-Renewables is the more secure and flexible investment option. It 
involves less risk in dealing with higher fuel prices. It can also cope with 
both higher and lower demand growth and maintain its benefits over other 
PDP options. 
• PDP-Renewables is a way to for reach political targets. As shown in 
this chapter, within three PDP options, PDP-Renewables is the only option 
that enables the Thai power sector to reach the government’s goals of 6% 
renewable share and 1:1 energy intensity.  
• PDP-Renewables is a desirable direction, as shown through the public 
forums and media, to counteract various problems faced by the Thai power 
sector, including higher negative health impacts, higher generation costs, 
higher import burden, and higher social conflicts from power generation 
and power generation projects. 
Like other impact analysis and energy modeling, limitations and uncertainties will 
always accompany the assumptions used in the analysis (discussed in Chapter 5). 
However, the sensitivity analysis shows that the benefits of PDP-Renewables can be 
confirmed within the wide range of uncertain and contestable emission and health 
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impact factors for main fossil-based technologies. The results can also be firmly 
applied to both low and high demand growth scenarios as well as normal and high 
fuel price situations. 
Perhaps, the most sensitive uncertainty of PDP-Renewables is how to make it happen 
in reality. This is due to the fact that, although the Thai government has now realized 
that Thailand has a huge potential of renewable energy and has even set up targets to 
utilize this potential, nothing has changed much in relation to the creation of 
supportive institutions and regulations which would meet the target during the period 
of this study. It is quite obvious that if renewable energy cannot enter into the market, 
PDP-Renewables will not be a viable option for the Thai power sector. This is the 
reason why, in the next chapters, the focal point will be on supportive institutional 
frameworks and, more importantly, on how to make this plan come true.  
Although this analysis does not provide a long-term future perspective as usually done 
in sustainable energy planning, it still firmly shows that the next 10 years will be a 
critical period for the Thai power sector and Thai society. Within these 10 years, with 
nearly a 10% renewable energy share plus wise demand-side management, we, as 
Thai society, may stabilize and lower the negative health and environmental impacts 
as well as aim for a more renewable future. On the contrary, within these 10 years, we 
might also run out of our natural gas resources, depend more and more on imported 
fuels and put our economy into much riskier situations. Even worse, we may 
experience a future with much higher environmental and health impacts, which 
certainly end up with more social tensions and conflicts. Hopefully, this impact 
analysis may contribute with some informed perspectives to the public deliberation of 
our critical future choices.   
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Chapter 7 
Supportive Institutional Framework and Public Regulation 
The results presented in the previous chapter show several advantages of PDP-
Renewables compared to the other two PDP options in various aspects, especially in 
health and economic perspectives. The question, then, is how to implement PDP-
Renewables in reality. Apart from the availability of resources and technologies, as 
earlier discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the appropriate institutional framework and 
public regulations are certainly keys to transforming  PDP-Renewables into real 
actions. This chapter aims to provide recommendations on supportive institutional 
frameworks and public regulations, which are needed in order to pursue PDP-
Renewables in the Thai power sector. 
This chapter will begin with an analysis of the specific institutional reform needed in 
the Thai power sector to support the real implementation of PDP-Renewables. Then, 
the existing Thai power market and governance structure, as a main institutional 
framework, will be analyzed and followed by the analysis of present pricing 
regulations. Later, practical experiences in grid access and interconnection will be 
presented. After that, the existing planning practices will be investigated, before 
environmental and health protections will be discussed. 
In each aspect of the institutional framework and public regulations, the problems of 
the existing framework and regulations will be introduced. Then, the main 
contestation of different policy discourses will be analyzed to provide a better 
understanding on how and why they think differently about institutional frameworks. 
As the outcomes of these policy contestations, recent and foreseeable policy changes 
will be summarized. 
Based on the analyses of these main aspects of institutional framework and 
regulations, a recommendation for supportive institutions and regulations will be 
provided. However, the further question is still how to transfer these 
recommendations to reality. Therefore, the last section of this chapter will provide a 
suggestion to this question, by highlighting the importance of cognitive and normative 
contestations between different policy discourses and five main strategies to convince 
the actors of the Thai power sector that the recommended changes are based on 
appropriate cognitive and fair normative pillars, as well as on sound regulations and 
practices. 
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7.1 The Need for Institutional Reform 
From the analysis in the previous chapters, it is obvious that policy changes towards a 
healthier option in the Thai power sector do not only require technical solutions or 
fuel changes. They also involve new forms of organization, practices, and investing 
and earning profits in the power sector.  
Figure 7.1 provides a clear picture on how the investment scheme must be changed if 
PDP-Renewables is to be the most desirable option and real action plan for Thai 
society. While PDP-Gas and PDP-Coal basically require the investment from large 
power producers, like EGAT and IPPs, as usually done today, PDP-Renewables 
involves much more investment by Small and Very Small Power Producers (SPP and 
VSPP) and also demand-side management. The sensible questions are, “does this 
required investment scheme already exist?” or “how can we prepare this supportive 
investment scheme in order to put PDP-Renewables into practice?”. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The recent experiences from the historical analysis in Chapter 4 and the field studies 
cannot provide an optimistic answer. Although renewable energy increases its 
importance in the Thai power sector with a quite impressive growth in recent years, 
the Thai power sector in general is still under the control of the monopoly chain and a 
few big powerful investors. The recent practical experiences from the field visits and 
policy workshops, as partly presented in Box 7.1, still show that several institutional 
obstacles exist to increasing the influence of renewable energy producers in the Thai 
power sector. These obstacles relate to different aspects of the institutional framework 
and regulations, from market and governance structure to interconnection practices 
and from pricing to environmental regulations. Each of them requires further analysis, 
as will be shown throughout this chapter.  
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Box 7.1 Existing Problems for Renewable Power Producers Identified during  
Field Visits and Discussed at Policy Workshops 
 31% of renewable power producers (equal to 60% in terms of 
installed capacity) still sell electricity at rates lower than the EGAT 
avoided costs (EGAT marginal costs at the lower voltage). 
 Only 16% of renewable power producers received 5 years subsidy for 
their power sold to the grid  
 Only 17% of all Very Small Power Producers’ (VSPP) applications 
get the contract and their payment.  
 40 rooftop PV at houses in Bangkok have been forced to transmit 
their electricity for free due to a disagreement in the certification of 
the inverter used. 
 Renewable power producers have to pay their own costs of upgrading 
the grid for their interconnection. 
 Co-generation SPP have not been able to gain access to the grid since 
1999. This market now only gives access to utilities and their 
subsidiaries. 
 Several biomass projects cannot develop further because of local 
protests due to ineffective environmental regulations. 
  
More pessimistically, it is also hardly to imagine that the powerful big investors, like 
EGAT and IPPs, will easily accept the changes from PDP-Gas to PDP-Renewables. 
This transition is expected to reduce their investment opportunities (and consequently 
their profit earnings) to less than half of their status quo position. Moreover, apart 
from the power investment market, PDP-Renewables will also affectthe fuel market. 
As shown in figure 7.2, PDP-Renewables will lead to the reduction of PTT’s gas 
market (as a monopoly seller) in the power sector (the most important gas-consuming 
sector) by 24% in 2015. As PTT was the highest profitable company in Thailand’s 
stock exchange in 2005, it is expected to protect  its market.   
Therefore, only by stressing the previous conclusion that “PDP-Renewables is 
healthier, viable, and even more economically feasible”, a healthy public policy may 
be introduced  in the Thai power sector. To ensure that PDP-Renewables it put into 
action, huge efforts must be done to make the institutional framework and regulations 
support this PDP.   
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7.2 Market and Governance Structure 
Power market structure and governance structure are the major structures of the 
institutional framework. They, explicitly and implicitly, determine the choices and 
opportunities, the responsibilities and the authorities of, and interactions between 
different actors in the market or power system. However, both market and governance 
structure can also be changed and shaped by various factors; including political 
ideologies or ideas, new technologies, influences from power producers or consumers, 
international pressures, etc. As shown in Chapter 4, the power market structure in 
Thailand has gone through a process of changes for more than a decade. Some 
changes do provide more opportunities for renewable energy, but others do not. This 
section focuses on the existing market and governance structures and the problems 
related to these. As power structural changes will take place on a continuous basis, 
this section also provides an overview of the contestation of the power structure, 
though it was partly discussed in Chapter 4.  
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7.2.1 Present Market Structure 
The present market structure is characterized by the Enhanced Single Buyer (ESB) 
model, which allows EGAT to hold its monopoly power as transmission and system 
operator and, at the same time, still be the largest power producer1. The word “single 
buyer” means that all IPPs and SPPs must sell electricity through EGAT, except for 
VSPPs (who supply electricity directly to MEA or PEA) and their own consumption. 
In other words, EGAT is also a single provider to MEA and PEA. MEA and PEA are 
also single distributors in the Bangkok metropolitan and provincial areas, 
respectively. At the same time, EGAT is also obliged to buy natural gas, a main fuel 
source, only from PTT. Therefore, this model is really “a monopoly chain model”.  
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Source: NESAC, 20032.  
Although, the decision from the supreme administrative court in March 2006 stopped 
the EGAT privatization process, this market structure still remains. In other words, the 
“private monopoly” planned by the Thaksin government has returned to “state 
monopoly”. In fact, EGAT still holds its share in the two largest IPPs, which, apart 
from running their own power plants, also take part in several SPP shareholdings (as 
shown in Figure 4.3). During the negotiation on privatization in 2005, EGAT also 
fought for controlling a 50% share when constructing new power plants and keeping 
the rights for its subsidiaries to take part in the IPP bidding of the other 50% of new 
projects3. 
The Thaksin government also planned to privatize MEA and PEA and list them on the 
stock exchange market with the same monopoly model. Due to the court decision and 
political oppositions, this plan is now postponed, but the monopoly remains. 
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7.2.2 Present Governance Structure 
Apart from their superiority in the power market structure, the three enterprises, as 
state-owned enterprises, also play several crucial roles and have authorities in the 
power governance structure. Apart from their operational function, they still play 
important roles in policy and planning, especially in terms of the investment plan. 
Moreover, they still have authorities in the regulatory process, including in the 
approval of new power plants (held by EGAT), the approval of IPP, SPP, and VSPP 
purchasing agreements, and the technical standards of interconnecting with the grid4. 
In other words, they have the authorized power to decide who should gain access to 
the grid and how they should connect and operate within the grid system.  
Table 7.1 Roles and Authorities of Different Institutes in the Present Power 
Governance Structure 
Roles MoEn. EGAT PEA MEA Regulator 
Policy Roles      
   Fuel Mix     ? 
   Investment Plan     ? 
   Social Policy     ? 
Regulation Roles      
   Electricity tariff      
   Demand forecasting      
   Technical Standard      
   Approval     ? 
Operational Roles      
   Generation      
   Transmission      
   System Operator      
   Distribution      
Note:  represents the major roles and  represents the minor roles. 
Source: Adapted from NESAC, 20035. 
Although the Thaksin government decided to establish an interim regulator in 
December 2005, the roles of this interim regulator are still unclear and quite limited. 
At present, the clear role of the regulator is tariff setting. EGAT’s approval right (as a 
tool to control private power producers) is not transferred to the interim regulator and 
the regulator does not have the authority to control EGAT directly (but needs to pass 
through ministerial or cabinet authorities). In the early 2006, the interim regulator and 
the Ministry of Energy participated in a tense debate on the responsibility for 
establishing IPP bidding rules, since the regulator denied allowing EGAT’s 
subsidiaries to take part in the IPP bidding, as suggested by the Ministry. Certainly, 
the conditions are hard for the regulator, who does not  possess any real authorized 
power. Moreover, the regulator can be appointed and dissolved easily only by the 
minister’s decision.  
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7.2.3 Problems within the existing structure  
In short, with this existing market and governance structure, renewable energy 
producers have to run their business under marginalized conditions. They are 
competing on the monopoly market, where their strongest competitors (i.e, EGAT and 
its subsidiaries in the generation sub-sector) are their monopolistic buyers. Moreover, 
these monopolistic players, (i.e., EGAT, MEA, and PEA) possess the key authorized 
rights to conduct  business with renewable power producers. 
As all these enterprises run the same business (i.e., generation and distribution) in a 
profit-oriented way (under the national champion idea) and without a proper 
governance mechanism, these authorized powers can  protect their vested interests 
and may, consequently, constitute an institutional barrier for renewable energy 
producers, as later shown in this chapter. 
One of the mechanisms applied to avoid unfair regulation is the effective intervention 
from an independent regulator. However, at the moment, the regulator in Thailand is 
interim, has just been established, is not independent (can easily be dissolved by the 
Minister), and does not have a clear role or the full authority to regulate the market. 
Although the interim regulator may play a role in the development of a fair market for 
renewables, this opportunity is still highly uncertain and, therefore, less effective. 
 7.2.4 Contestation in the Market and Governance Structure 
As shown in Chapter 4, the contestation in the market and governance structure has 
been obvious and tense for more than a decade. In practice, as EGAT is the most 
important agent on the Thai power market, the privatization of EGAT has always 
been a center in the policy discussions. However, the achievement of  a better market 
and governance requires much more than an EGAT transformation. The summary of 
the contestation at different levels is presented in Table 7. 2. 
To maintain monopoly power, both state monopoly and private monopoly discourses 
try to maintain the roles and authorities of EGAT, as a system operator and the largest 
generator with a great transmission and some regulatory power (as earlier discussed). 
In other words, they both prefer the enhanced single buyer model. The difference 
between these two discourses relates to the ownership of EGAT. While the state 
monopoly discourse suggests preserving EGAT as a state-owned enterprise for 
reasons of national security and system reliability, the private monopoly discourse 
wishes to transform EGAT into a public company, which is listed on the stock 
exchange market, to expand the investment and make higher profitability according to 
the concept of the national champion. Although they share some similarity in market 
and governance structure, the differences in their cognitive and normative pillars, 
have always made the contestation between these two discourses tense and usually 
linked to a concept of economic nationalism. 
The power pool discourse, which dominated the policy discussion during the period of 
1997-2000, suggests a completely different model. Based on the neo-liberalistic 
concept of market efficiency, the policy recommendation of this discourse is to divide  
EGAT into three generation companies and one transmission company and set up the 
power pool as a new system operator. Then, these generators and other IPPs should 
compete on the power pool market6. However, the power pool discourse fails to 
recognize that these generators and IPPs are still in control of the overall generation 
capacity and, more importantly, have a dense business relationship with each other, 
including cross-shareholding, which will easily lead to the abuse of the oligopolistic 
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market power. After the electricity crisis in California and the election victory of the 
Thanksin government, this proposal has not been on the political agenda since 2001. 
The decentralization model wishes to improve participation and accountability in the 
Thai power system. This discourse aims to break down monopoly power, but it does 
not believe completely in the market mechanism, as suggested in the power pool 
model. The discourse emphasizes fairly access to the grid, reduced conflicts of roles 
and interests, and strong regulatory power by suggesting the separation of generation 
and transmission and the establishment of a new independent system operator and an 
independent regulator7. However, this discourse has never come to dominate the 
policy discussion in the Thai power sector. 
Table 7.2 Contestation in the Power Market and Governance Structure 
Market 
Model 
State Monopoly Power Pool Private 
Monopoly 
Decentralization 
Cognitive 
Pillar 
National security 
through state 
authorities  
Market 
Efficiency 
Being the 
“national 
champion” 
More 
participation and 
transparency 
Normative 
Pillar 
Higher system 
reliability  
Competitive-led 
improvement 
Market 
mechanism 
Higher 
profitability and 
business 
expansion 
Higher 
accountability 
and fairness 
Regulative 
Pillar 
EGAT=SO+G+T 
-EGAT= state-
owned enterprise 
with full 
authorities 
-No regulator 
- Power pool = 
ISO 
- Separation 
between G & T 
- Market decides
- Independent 
regulator 
- EGAT= 
SO+G+T 
- EGAT= Listed 
company with 
some state 
authorities 
- Interim 
regulator 
- Separation 
between G& T 
- New ISO 
- Independent 
regulator 
Main 
Criticism 
- Inefficiency 
- Unfair to  other 
producers 
- Higher risk 
- Oligopolistic 
market power 
- Unfair to other 
producers 
- More monopoly 
 
- Less system 
reliability 
- Fantasy idea 
Note: SO = System Operator, G = Generation, and T = Transmission 
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7.2.5 Recent and Foreseeable Outcomes 
After coming into power in 2001, the Thaksin government had a clear plan to change 
the Thai power structure into a private monopoly model as a way to create a “national 
champion” and stimulate investment on the stock exchange market. The master plan 
of power pool was postponed and finally cancelled in 2003. In 2004, the Thanksin 
government faced a strong opposition against the EGAT privatization plan, led by the 
EGAT labor union (i.e. state monopoly discourse). With the vast majority in 
parliament and new political tactics (as explained in Chapter 4), in June 2005, the 
Thanksin government succeeded in launching the EGAT privatization and planned to 
sell the EGAT share in November 2005.  
However, in November 2005, Thai consumer organizations (i.e., decentralization 
discourse) brought this case to the Supreme Administrative Court due to an unlawful 
decision-making process and the negative impacts this had on public interest. One day 
before distributing EGAT’s share in Thailand stock exchange, the administrative court 
ordered the temporary halt of the initial public offering of the share in order to 
reconsider the case. In response to the consumer organizations’ argument, the Thaksin 
government set up the interim regulator in December 2005. However, in March 2006, 
the administrative court declared that the EGAT privatization process was unlawful 
and, therefore, cancelled the privatization process. EGAT has now regained its state 
monopoly position. 
With the high political disturbance in Thailand in 2006, it is difficult to clearly foresee 
a change in the market and governance structure. The political influence of the private 
monopoly discourse is highly dependent on the political power of the Thaksin 
government. The state monopoly discourse now experiences a status quo position. 
With the won court case and the new interim regulator, the decentralization discourse 
has gained more public and institutional attention in its contestation. However, it 
seems that, in 2006, there is no clear sign that the market and governance structure 
will be either maintained or revised.  
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7.3 Pricing Regulation 
Pricing regulation is among the most important institutional factors determining the 
pace of renewable energy development, since it directly affects the returns of 
renewable power producers. With different pricing criteria and rules, it also 
determines how renewable energy is developed, operated and integrated into the 
power system. 
 7.3.1 Existing Pricing Schemes 
The most important pricing scheme for renewable energy in Thailand is the “firm and 
non-firm Small Power Producers (SPP)” pricing scheme, which was introduced in 
1992, when the electricity market was opened to private producers for the first time. 
In fact, it is rather a general scheme, since this pricing scheme is used for both 
renewable and non-renewable power producers and it does not categorize the power 
producers according to types of technology and fuels, but on the basis of their 
guaranteed generation availability (Table 7.3).  
Firm renewable SPPs have to a) generate electricity at least 4,670 hours/year, b) 
include March, April, May and June (the peak period in Thailand), c) have monthly 
capacity factors from 0.51 to 1.00, and d) shut down their maintenance during off-
peak months with the maximum of 35 days in a 12-month cycle. The payment to firm 
SPPs includes the monthly capacity or availability payment (in THB/kW/month) and 
energy payment (in THB/kWh), which are based on EGAT’s long-run avoided 
capacity and energy costs8.  
Non-firm SPPs are normally those who fail to meet the criteria for firm SPPs. 
Although, they have more flexible schedules for their power generation, they can only 
receive an energy payment based on EGAT’s short-run avoided energy costs9. 
Normally, the payment they receive is much lower than the one given to firm SPPs 
(showed in detail later). Unsurprisingly, with the seasonal characteristics of their 
biomass resources, most of the current and foreseeable renewable power producers 
(both in terms of number and installed capacity) are and will be non-firm SPPs (see 
Table 7.4).  
In 2002, the Thai government decided to use the Energy Conservation Fund (Encon 
Fund) for providing the first 5-year subsidy to renewable SPPs on the basis of  a 
single-round bidding program. Renewable SPPs candidates had to submit a bid for the 
required amount of subsidy and the lowest bids were accepted up to either the specific 
amount of sold capacity or the limited subsidy budget. In the case of the currently 
operational SPPs, 16 out of 44 renewable SPPs received this subsidy10. Since the 
bidding was only one round, new projects developed after this date had no chance to 
apply for subsidy. 
At the same time, the Thai government also set up another scheme for very small 
power producers (VSPP) with less than 1 MW capacity sold to the grid. Due to their 
smaller size, they have great difficulties in applying for firm or non-firm SPPs. The 
VSPP pricing scheme is similar to the net metering system in the USA, where the 
excess capacity generated by renewable producers will spin back the existing 
customer’s electricity meter and the customer can save it for future use. In Thailand, 
in the case of excess generation, the payment will be based on EGAT’s wholesale 
Time of Use (TOU) rate (including Ft or fuel adjustment tariff)11. Therefore, unlike 
the SPPs, the price of power generated by VSPPs is based on the on-peak and off-
peak basis rather than the availability of its generation. 
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Table 7.3 Overall Pricing Scheme for Renewable Power Producers in Thailand  
Pricing Schemes Implementation
year 
Capacity sold 
to the grid and 
other 
conditions 
Pricing Principles 
1. Non-firm SPPs 1992-present ≤ 90 MW 
≤ 4,670 Hours/yr. 
- Only Energy payment 
(previously based on fuel oil, 
now based on natural gas) 
2. Firm SPPs 1992-present ≤ 90 MW 
> 4,670 Hours/yr., 
incl. March-June 
- Capacity Payment  
(in 2001; 479 THB/kW/month) 
- Energy Payment 
3. Very SPPs 2002-present ≤ 1 MW - Net metering system 
- EGAT wholesale price 
- Time of day tariff  
   (On peak & off peak basis)  
4. 5 yrs. Subsidy 
Bidding for SPPs 
Only in 2002 ≤ 90 MW - Minimum requested subsidy 
for 5 yrs. 
5. Renewable 
Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) 
Planned to be in 
2006 
- - 5% of renewables in each IPP 
bidding proposal 
- Minimum aggregate price 
offer 
Table 7.4 presents the current situation of renewable power producers in Thailand. In 
total, the installed capacity of renewable energy in Thailand has reached 1,000 MW 
with almost 500 MW sold to the grid. In terms of installed capacity, more than 95% of 
renewable power generations are under the firm and non-firm SPP pricing scheme, 
both in the cases of existing and new-coming producers. It is clear that, for the 
existing SPPs, non-firm SPPs have the majority in terms of installed capacity, while 
firm SPPs are selling more electricity to the grid. But this observation may be changed 
soon, since the majority of the newcomers are non-firm SPPs, both in terms of 
installed and sold capacities. Although VSPPs are quite small in their overall installed 
capacity, in terms of the number of producers, they constitute a share of almost 60% 
of the total renewable power producers in Thailand (see Table 7.5).  
Figure 7.4 shows the development trend in cumulative installed capacity and power 
sold to the grid by renewable SPPs. It is obvious that the rapid growths in installed 
capacity and power sold to the grid have taken place after 2001. The new installed 
capacity and new power sold to the grid in these three years constitute more than 50% 
of the total cumulative installed capacity and power sold to the grid. 
In terms of the electricity purchasing price trend (Figure 7.5), in general, as EGAT’s 
avoided costs are based on increasing natural gas prices, renewable energy producers 
will now receive much higher prices compared to ten years ago. Since they receive 
both capacity and energy payment, the Firm SPPs can get the best price compared to 
non-firm SPPs and VSPPs. In general, non-firm SPPs receive much lower prices in 
these schemes, because they receive energy payment regardless of their generation 
time. Non-firm SPPs have always received the lowest price, except during the period 
of 2000-2001, when their energy payment was still based on fuel oil and the price of 
fuel oil was rapidly increasing (then government changed their reference of avoided 
costs to natural gas in 2001). In the case of VSPPs, as they received the EGAT 
wholesale price with on-peak and off-peak criteria, in general, their average prices are 
quite close to those of firm SPPs.   
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Table 7.4 Present Renewable Generation by Installed Capacity and Power Sold to the Grid 
(unit: MW) 
Installed Capacity Power Sold to the Grid 
Types of 
RE 
Project Biomass Biogas PV 
Micro-
hydro
Wind&
Geo 
All 
RES Biomass Biogas PV 
Micro-
hydro 
Wind
&Ge
o 
All 
RES 
Already Sold to the Grid or to Users 
Firm SPP 357.2 - - - - 357.2 244.2 - - - - 244.2 
Non-Firm 
SPP 571.2 - - - - 571.2 184.3 - - - - 184.3 
VSPP 10.1 5.4 0.5 - - 16.0 3.9 3.3 0.5 - - 7.7 
EGAT - - 0.5 - 0.5 1.0 - - 0.5 - 0.5 1.0 
Others - 7.0 22.2 43.6 - 72.9 - - - 43.6 - 43.6 
Total 938.5 12.4 23.3 43.6 0.5 1,018.3 432.4 3.3 1.0 43.6 0.5 480.7 
Only Contract Signed & In Process 
Firm SPP 81.3 - - - - 81.3 61.8 - - - - 61.8 
Non-Firm 
SPP 175.7 - - 6.7 - 182.4 104.3 - - - - 104.3 
VSPP 3.2 7.5 0.1 - - 10.8 1.8 5.5 0.1 - - 7.3 
EGAT - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Others - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total 260.2 7.5 0.1 6.7 - 274.5 167.9 5.5 0.1 - - 173.4 
Total RE Projects 
Firm SPP 438.5 - - - - 438.5 306.0 - - - - 306.0 
Non-Firm 
SPP 746.9 - - 6.7 - 753.6 288.6 - - - - 288.6 
VSPP 13.4 12.9 0.6 - - 26.9 5.6 8.8 0.6 - - 15.0 
EGAT - - 0.5 - 0.5 1.0 - - 0.5 - 0.5 1.0 
Others - 7.0 22.2 43.6 - 72.9 - - - 43.6 - 43.6 
Total 1,198.8 19.9 23.4 50.3 0.5 1,292.8 600.2 8.8 1.1 43.6 0.5 654.2 
Source: Compiled from EPPO, 200612. 
Note: Others include the renewable energy projects by DEDE, PEA, and other private 
projects that are not part of the SPP or VSPP programs. 
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7.3.2 Problems with the Existing Schemes 
In principle, the price of renewable power “should at least be equal to the avoided cost 
of electricity on the lower voltage grid of a distributor” (i.e. the wholesale price at 
which a municipal grid operator buys electricity from the transmission network) “plus 
a premium reflecting the renewables’ social and environmental benefits”15. 
However, in practice, this concept is not fully applied in Thailand. In the case of 
VSPP, the concept of avoided costs is fulfilled as theVSPPs sell their electricity to 
MEA and PEA and use the EGAT wholesale price as their reference. But, they do not 
receive any additional payment to reflect their positive contributions to environment 
and society.  
In the SPP scheme, based on the marginal cost of 1.93 THB/kWh at a 115 kV line 
(where most SPPs connect and sell their electricity to the grid)16, only firm SPPs (both 
with and without 5 years subsidy) can get more than EGAT’s avoided costs, as seen in 
Table 7.5. In the case of non-firm SPPs, all of them receive a much lower rate. In 
2005, the average purchasing price for non-firm SPPs without 5 years subsidy was 
only 1.76 THB/kWh. With the average 5 years subsidy, only few non-firm SPPs can 
receive  the exact amount corresponding to EGAT’s avoided costs for the first 5 years 
of their operation. In fact, it is fair to say there is no subsidy at all for non-firm SPPs 
and VSPPs in Thailand. 
Table7.5  Price Comparison between Different Power Purchasing Schemes 
RE Producers No.  
Installed 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Power 
Sold 
(MW) 
Power Sold 
with subsidy 
(MW) 
Average 
Price in 2005 
(THB/kWh)
Average 5 
yr. Subsidy 
(THB/kWh) 
Price + 
Subsidy 
(THB/kWh)
Time Of 
Day Tariff
Firm SPP with 5 
yrs Subsidy 9 250.60 201.40 144.70 2.32 0.17 2.49 No 
Firm SPP w/o 5 yr. 
subsidy 3 106.60 42.80 - 2.32 - 2.32 No 
Non-firm SPP 
with5yrs. Subsidy 7 157.00 70.00 59.60 1.76 0.17 1.93 No 
Non-firm SPP w/o 
5 yr. subsidy  25 414.20 114.30 - 1.76 - 1.76 No 
VSPP 59 16.02 7.65 - 2.19 - 2.19 Yes 
Total 103 944.42 436.15 204.30     
Source: Compiled from EPPO, 200617. 
As seen from the Table, the criteria of “firm and non-firm” SPPs is the main obstacle 
to achieving a fair renewable energy production. The critera block 42% of the 
renewable power sold by non-firm SPPs (equal to 60% of total renewable installed 
capacity) in order to get a fair rate of their power contributions (even without 
mentioning their positive externalities). The results of this unfair pricing scheme are 
the lower investment in the power generation of the renewable non-firm SPPs 
(compared to their potentials) and their lower electricity sales (compared to their 
installed capacity), as seen in many cases during the field visits.  
By taking into account the seasonal nature of biomass resources, this criterion can be 
biased against the renewable power generation. Compared to VSPPs, most of non-
firm biomass SPPs can easily shift their generation schedules to supply more power 
during the peak period, if they receive a  financial reward for doing so.  
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However, with the main criteria of 4,670 operation hours in total and without regard 
to the actual demand need in the system, this opportunity is blocked. This leads to a 
lose-lose situation in which the SPPs receive much lower prices and lose their 
investment incentive, while the power system loses the potential back-up capacity 
from non-firm SPPs, which could be used for both peak load management and grid 
stability, as most of them are located on the lower voltage part of the grid. Practically, 
EGAT considers the non-firm power sold a non-dependable capacity, meaning that 
EGAT still needs to  invests in (or purchases from) somewhere else for an amount 
equal to the value of the power capacity of non-firm SPPs, in order to fulfill their 
planning and operating criteria.   
As Table 7.6 shows, the majority of newcomers (with a signed contract and in a 
contracting process) under SPP schemes (in terms of installed and sold capacity) are 
the non-firm SPPs. Therefore, if this pricing problem continues, 60% of the power 
generated by the newcomers will face this unfavorable and unfair condition. Under 
these conditions, the full potential of biomass power will hardly be utilized. The 5-
year subsidy program, although it helped in stimulating biomass energy investment 
during the period of 2002-2005 as presented in Table 7.7, is only a one-round bidding 
without a clear future direction. Moreover, the scale of subsidy is relatively small, 
especially for non-firm SPPs, who receive an amount lower to or, at most, equal to 
EGAT’s avoided costs for their power generation. As shown in Table 7.5, firm SPPs 
turn out to be those who get more benefits from the subsidy schemes. Last, it is 
important to repeatedly note that this subsidy is only for five years of their operation. 
This subsidy is certainly not a premium “reflecting the renewables’ social and 
environmental benefits”. On the basis of this,  the 5-year subsidy contributes very 
little to the stimulation of renewable newcomers, as clearly shown in Table 7.7.  
Table 7.6 Classification of Renewable Power Producers by Purchasing Price compared 
to Wholesale Price 
Price Category 
Types of 
Producers
No. of 
producers
Installed 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Power 
Sold 
(MW) 
Share in 
No. (%) 
Share in 
Installed 
Capacity 
(%) 
Share in 
Power 
Sold (%)
Already Sold to the Grid 
Higher than Wholesale price Firm SPP 12 357.20 244.20 11.65 37.82 55.99 
Same level as Wholesale 
price VSPP 59 16.02 7.65 57.28 1.70 1.75 
Lower than Wholesale price 
Non-firm 
SPP 32 571.20 184.30 31.07 60.48 42.26 
Total  103 944.42 436.15 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Already Signed Contract and In Process 
Higher than Wholesale price Firm SPP 6 81.30 61.80 10.00 29.61 35.63 
Same level as Wholesale 
price VSPP 37 10.83 7.33 61.67 3.95 4.23 
Lower than Wholesale price 
Non-firm 
SPP 17 182.40 104.30 28.33 66.44 60.14 
 
Total  60 275 173 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Compiled from EPPO, 200618. 
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Table  7.7 Contribution of SPP Subsidy Program to New SPP Projects 
Share of Subsidized Projects (%) 
Item No. 
Installed 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Power Sold 
(MW) No. 
Installed 
Capacity  Power Sold 
Projects Sold to the Grid during 2002-2005 
     Project with 5 yrs subsidy 7 185.4 142.2 38.89 30.26 47.37 
    Total Projects 18 612.6 300.2    
Projects with Already Signed Contract and In Process 
     Project with 5 yrs subsidy 2 24.7 21.7 8.70 9.37 13.06 
    Total Projects 23 263.7 166.1    
Source: Compiled from EPPO, 200619. 
 
7.3.3 Proposed RPS Scheme and Its Foreseeable Problems 
In August 2003, the Ministry of Energy introduced the Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) as a main mechanism for renewable energy support without any prior public 
consultation. The RPS requires new fossil fuel power plants to procure renewable 
power; either by purchasing it from renewable energy producers and certificates or by 
investing in their own renewable projects, with an investment equal to 3-5% of their 
installed capacity20. 
Although, in principle, Thailand’s RPS is quite similar to the Tradable Certificate 
System (TCS) or the Green certificate or RPS in other countries, in detail, there are a 
number of significant differences which link to the effectiveness of this scheme. The 
main differences are the following; 
• Instead of defining renewable requirement in terms of energy outputs 
as usually done, the Thai RPS version refers to installed capacity. 
• The requirement only applies to new fossil fuel power plants, not the 
existing ones and not for new large hydro power plants. 
• Existing SPPs are not allowed to participate in the RPS scheme, but 
newcomers (or new projects) can register both for SPP (or VSPP) and 
RPS.  
• Instead of establishing the certificate market, it is an attempt to include 
the RPS proposal into an IPP bidding process, which means that, in the 
bidding, each potential IPP must offer both 95% fossil fuel-based 
capacity and 5% renewable capacity and the price competition will be 
based on the aggregate offer.  
In fact, the debates about the effectiveness of this RPS schemes (or TCS) are echoed 
internationally. Compared to the Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT), RPS 
provides less preferable and less certain conditions for innovation and investment. In 
the situation of fewer sellers and buyers on the certificate market (and in some cases 
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sellers and buyers are the same business enterprises or affiliates), its hypothesis on 
competition-led improvement is irrelevant and, therefore, ineffective in reducing the 
costs of renewable energy.  
In a European comparison, the countries that apply the REFIT scheme perform much 
better both in terms of promoting rapid growth of renewables and reducing the costs 
of renewable power, as well as fostering equipment and other upstream industries for 
renewable power. In total, three countries, which are pioneers and have implemented 
the REFIT scheme; namely Germany, Denmark, and Spain, have a share of 85% of 
the total installed wind capacity in Europe and control more than half of the wind 
turbine export in the world21. In the UK, which has the best wind resource in Europe 
and has created the TCS system, much less wind power has been installed compared 
to those three countries, the costs of wind energy are much higher, as seen in Table 
7.8, and most of the wind turbines are imported technology.  
 
Table 7.8 The Comparison of Newly Installed Capacity, Market Share (within EU15), 
and the Price of Wind Energy in Some EU countries in 2003. 
Country Newly 
Installed 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Market Share 
in EU-15 (%) 
Prices 
(Euro cent/kWh) 
With Feed-in Tariff System    
     Germany 2,645 49.1 6.6-8.6 
     Spain 1,377 25.6 6.4 
     Greece 276 5.1 7.8 
With Tradable Quota System    
     United Kingdom 103 1.9 9.6 
     Italy 116 2.2 13.0 
Source: Quoted by Greacen and Loy, 2006.22 
Apart from the international debates and experiences, the Thai version of RPS can 
even lead to more serious problems due to bad modifications. Its foreseeable problems 
include,  
• Higher Uncertainty. Since renewable energy producers are required 
to incorporate their projects into the IPP bidding proposal and the 
decision will be made on the basis of the aggregate bidding price 
(IPP+RPS) , renewable energy producers are forced to take risks in 
identifying the right IPP partners to combine the proposal. In the case 
of lower demand growth, the IPP bidding may be delayed, and, 
consequently, renewable energy producers cannot enter into the market 
through this scheme.  
• Wrong Incentive. Thailand’s RPS is defined in capacity (MW) not 
energy outputs (kWh), thus, it will lead to distorted incentives to inflate 
a nameplate capacity23. Consequently, in order to avoid this situation, 
the regulator needs to set up an arbitrary set of capacity factors, which 
can lead to a misallocation of resources among different renewable 
technologies.  
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• No Competition for EGAT’s RPS. Under the enhanced single buyer 
model of the power sector, there is no actual competitive mechanism 
for EGAT’s RPS, since EGAT maintains its right to develop 50% of 
the new generation capacity without competition. Moreover, within the 
existing tariff structure, EGAT can pass on all costs, including the RPS 
procurement, to consumers. Therefore, there is no accountability 
mechanism to ensure that the price of EGAT’s RPS will be 
appropriately determined, especially if EGAT or its subsidiaries will 
take part in these renewable projects as they do in IPPs and SPPs24.   
• Confusion with Other Pricing Schemes.  As new renewable energy 
producers are allowed to register to both SPP and RPS schemes, 
without a clear interaction between these two mechanisms, this can 
lead to a source of confusion and create uncertainty for potential 
investors (e.g. Can renewable power producers choose which 
mechanism is best for them or will the government choose for 
them?)25.  
Obviously, instead of promoting a free and fair market for renewable energy, the Thai 
RPS schemes will force renewable energy to be dependent on fossil fuel additions 
and, more importantly, to be dependent on fossil fuel power producers. This policy 
direction will probably even widen the power gap in the Thai power sector. 
Moreover, as PDP-Renewables aims to cut most of the fossil-fuel power plant 
projects, this RPS scheme cannot be used for promoting renewable energy 
development in this PDP option. Therefore, a better pricing scheme is required in 
order to implement PDP-renewables, as a healthier policy option. 
7.3.4 Contestation on Pricing Schemes 
The discussions and debates on pricing schemes began when the grid was opened to 
SPPs in 1992. However, it has never reached the top of the agenda in the policy 
process, especially compared to the debates on market structure. Three main proposals 
of pricing schemes have been presented; namely a) maintaining firm and non-firm 
SPP criteria, b) promoting RPS and bidding systems, and c) introducing feed-in tariff 
system. The public discussions and debates on this policy contestation clearly show 
the different cognitive and normative aspects of different policy discourses, as 
concluded in Table 7.8. 
In the state monopoly discourse, system reliability and cheap electricity are always 
highlighted. Utilities always insist on evaluating the SPPs’ reliability on an individual 
basis, using firm and non-firm criteria, rather than an integration basis (where the 
planned increase of power generation in one area can offset the lower generation in 
another at a particular time). In this view, renewable energy is a much less reliable 
power source and should thus receive smaller rewards. The emphasis on cheap 
electricity makes this discourse neglect the premium payment for the positive 
externalities of renewable energy generation. In 2003, EGAT also claimed that a 
higher purchasing price for SPPs increased electricity tariffs, and the EGAT suggested 
that new SPP contracts should not be made. However, it is important to notice that 
this SPP price was equal to the price of EGAT’s own IPP subsidiaries, while the 
purchasing amounts of the SPP were much smaller.  
In the power pool and private monopoly discourses, the positive externalities of 
renewable energy are acknowledged and subsidy is accepted as a means to stimulate 
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the development of renewable energy. However, both of them still emphasize cheap 
electricity. They also believe in applying market mechanisms for renewable energy 
development, even though, the private monopoly discourse will not apply market 
mechanisms to the overall power market. To these discourses, the competition within 
the subsidy scheme is the key to reducing the costs of renewable electricity. This is 
why the bidding mechanism and RPS are preferable according to these policy 
discourses. 
 
Table 7.9 Contestation of Different Policy Discourses in Pricing Regulation 
Regulative Pillar Firm & Non-firm 
SPP 
Bidding and RPS Feed-in Tariff 
Policy Discourse State Monopoly - Power Pool 
- Private Monopoly 
Decentralization 
Normative Pillar - System reliability 
in individual plant 
basis 
- Lower cost for 
consumers 
- Positive 
externality of RE 
- Lowest cost for 
RE support 
- Competition-led 
innovation 
- Positive 
externality of RE  
- Supportive 
environment for RE 
innovation 
  
Cognitive Pillar - Cheap electricity 
- RE = Less 
reliable 
- Cheap electricity 
- Market supportive 
mechanism 
- Cleaner electricity 
- Open market for 
RE innovation 
Main Criticism - Unfair price for 
RE (< avoided 
cost) 
- Under counting 
RE in planning 
- High uncertainties 
for RE (unclear 
tender offering and 
depending on IPP 
bidding scheme) 
- Higher costs of 
RE support 
- No competition 
between RE 
producers 
 
The decentralization discourse highlights both cleaner electricity and more open and 
stable market conditions for renewable energy development. According to this 
discourse, all renewable energy producers should be fairly paid for their positive 
contributions to environment and society. At the same time, the creation of a 
supportive environment in terms of open and stable market conditions is required to 
promote the development of renewable energy and associated industries. According to 
the decentralization discourse, the existing firm and non-firm SPP criteria are 
certainly unfair to renewable power producers, and RPS will create even higher 
uncertainties. Therefore, in this view, a feed-in tariff solution is much more 
appropriate for renewable energy development and certainly required if the 
contribution of renewable energy is expected to be expanded. 
 
7.3.5 Recent and Foreseeable Changes 
Since August 2003, when the government announced RPS as a main mechanism for 
supporting renewable energy development, there has been no significant change in the 
pricing scheme from the government side. The RPS regulation rule has been drafted, 
but important detail conditions, such as exact percentage of required renewable 
energy, the relationship between RPS and SPP, or how to combine RPS in IPP 
bidding etc, are still waiting for the interim regulator to decide. The IPP bidding 
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program was postponed from mid-2005 to 2006 and the final decision seems to be 
uncertain. 
In mid-2005, the Energy Planning and Policy Office (EPPO) presented the opinion 
that the Thai version of RPS may lead to serious regulation complications and 
suggested that feed-in tariff was a more appropriate solution, but there was no public 
response to this solution from the Ministry. On the other hand, the EPPO is also 
working on the expansion of the VSPP scheme to cover the maximum capacity of 6 
MW (and later expand to 10 MW) of power sold to the grid, but the final approval has 
not been given by the policy authorities. 
Civil society groups have strongly criticized the RPS mechanism and tried to 
publicize this issue in 2004 and 2005. Several forums and workshops were organized 
for discussing the RPS proposal, including one policy forum of this research. 
Although the media has reported some critiques and suggestions to implement the 
feed-in tariff mechanism, it is still considered a too “complicated” technical issue by 
Thai public and media. Therefore, so far, the debate cannot lead to more meaningful 
public actions and policy changes. 
In the field visit of this study, some SPPs suggested that an on-peak and off-peak 
basis should be applied rather than the firm and non-firm criteria, for the reasons 
already explained. In the policy forum of this research, some renewable power 
producers agreed with civic groups that a feed-in tariff would be more suitable for 
supporting renewable development in Thailand.  
This agreement led to interesting changes, when the Federation of Thai Industries 
(FTI) made a proposal to the Thai government to shift from RPS to feed-in tariff. In 
the FTI proposal, the specific rates of purchasing prices of different renewable energy 
technologies were also determined. Later, in March 2006, this proposal was also 
agreed on by the Department of Alternative Energy Development and Energy 
Efficiency (DEDE)26, but with some modification in the feed-in tariff rate, as shown 
in Table 7.10. Greacen and Loy made the comparison between proposed rates and 
actual rates in some selected countries, as also presented in Table 7.10 and found that 
these proposed rates are reasonable, except for the prices of municipal waste (too high 
compared to other countries) and solar PV (too high compared to other renewable 
technologies). However, this proposal has not yet passed through any political 
approval. 
 
Table 7.10 FTI and DEDE Proposed Prices for Feed-in Tariff and Feed in Tariff 
Rates in Some Selected Countries (Unit: THB/kWh) 
Type FTI 
Proposal 
DEDE 
Proposal 
Germany 
REFIT rate 
Spain 
REFIT rate 
Sri Lanka 
REFIT rate 
Biomass 2.6-2.8 3.2-3.8 3.9-6.4 3.15 3.42 
Biogas 3.4-3.5 - 3.9-5.4 3.15 3.42 
Municipal 
Waste 
3.9 5.0-6.0 3.1-3.6 3.15 3.42 
Micro-Hydro - 3.0 3.2-4.7 3.15 2.21 
Wind Energy 6.0 5.0 2.6-4.1 3.15 - 
Solar PV 16.0 15.0 19.7-25.2 20.11 - 
Source: Adapted from Greacen and Loy, 2006.27 
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Based on these facts, radical policy changes do not seem occur in Thailand at this 
point in time. However, civil society groups still plan a more effective public 
campaign against the RPS mechanism. With a sharp decline in the political popularity 
of the government, with a victory in court which stopped the EGAT privatization, as 
well as more empirical results from international experiences about the higher 
effectiveness of the feed-in tariff mechanism and the policy influences from the 
industrial side, opportunities are certainly better for achieving a change. 
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7.4 Grid Access and Interconnection Regulation 
Normally, grid access and interconnection issues are regarded in Thai society as more 
technical issues. However, in practice, not only technical rationality plays a role in 
regulating grid access and interconnection. In several cases, structural or institutional 
power within the electricity system, rather than technical rationality, determines the 
technical regulations. The analysis in this section will mainly be based on an 
institutional point of view. 
 7.4.1 Existing Problems 
During the field visits (or the sustainable energy trips) and the policy forums, SPPs 
and VSPPs raised the issue of practical problems of grid access and interconnection 
based on their own experiences, as presented in Table 7.11.  
For SPPs, the main issues are the unnecessary investment and unfair charges. 
According to the SPP scheme, SPPs are required to invest both in interconnection 
equipment and upgrading of the grid. Some SPPs do not understand why they are not 
allowed to connect to the grid at a lower voltage rather than EGAT’s 115kV. They 
also feel that the fact that they are forced to upgrade the grid  is unfair, since the 
utilities own the grid and can use it for any other purposes28. Some of them also 
mentioned problems related to high interconnection and back-up charge and, more 
interestingly, unsold supply penalty. The supply penalty is applied by PEA when PEA 
cannot sell electricity supplied by SPPs (through the EGAT transmission line) in some 
off-peak hours (in some specific areas) and requires SPPs to transfer their electricity 
payment (from EGAT) to PEA to compensate for PEA’s loss of income.   
Table 7.11 Practical Problems with Grid Access and Interconnection identified during 
Field Visit and Policy Forums 
Pricing schemes Practical Problems Found 
Firm SPPs & 
Non-firm SPPs 
- High interconnection and back-up charge 
- Unnecessarily expensive interconnection equipments 
- Unnecessarily expensive upgrading of the grid  
- Unsold supply penalty (when PEA cannot sell electricity 
provided by SPPs) 
VSPP - Bottleneck in registration process 
- Only 17% of applications can sell and get electricity 
payment 
- Disagreement in inverter certification forces 40 PV 
producers to deliver free electricity to the grid  
- Continuation of 6-month electricity charges after switching 
to VSPPs. 
Co-generation SPP 
(apart from biomass) 
- No access to the grid (or no new contract) since 1999 
- Now only allow for EGAT, PEA, MEA, and their 
subsidiaries to run new co-generation plants 
 
While all of these issues require case-by-case studies and discussions, amongst these 
identified problems, two major points are certainly lacking. The first point is the lack 
of space and mechanisms for SPPs to ask for reconsiderations, as all these regulations 
have been set up by utilities, which also take part in the same business. 
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 The second major point is the fact that the utilities do not recognize the benefits 
which SPPs would have in stabilizing the grid by providing the electricity and reactive 
power at low voltage (as most of biomass power plants are located outside the city 
district). In the case of the Mitr Phol Biomass power plant (Firm SPP) that can 
provide 8 MW power for the grid, the investment of one sub-station (for servicing 
around 6-8 districts) has been saved, while the quality of service can be maintained. 
For VSPP, the key problem is their experiences of bottlenecks in the registration 
process. Until now, only 17% of the applications from VSPP can sell and receive an 
electricity payment. 40 PV producers in the MEA area cannot get payment for the 
electricity they have sold to the grid due to a disagreement in the inverter certification. 
Because, for MEA, the grid stability issue is the main rationale for this disagreement, 
therefore, MEA refused to pay for these unsecured sources. In other words, due to this 
reason, MEA is now receiving electricity from these VSPPs for free. Moreover, in 
reality, MEA never has experience of system interruption from these VSPPs at all. 
One VSPP was furious about the rule that forced him to continue paying the 
electricity bill according to the highest consumption in the six-month record instead of 
his present consumption (which was close to zero after becoming VSPP). The 
application of this rule means that he (as well as other VSPPs) has to pay an 
electricity bill based on his previous consumption for around 6 months before being 
perceived as a real VSPP (in terms of income). Although the main argument of the 
utilities is that they have already invested in the services at their previous 
consumption level, the long application process (normally longer than 6 months) 
should provide enough time for utilities to prepare for a lower level of consumption, 
and, therefore, offset this argument. 
For non-renewable cogeneration SPPs, the major problem is inaccessibility to the 
grid, since the cabinet resolution in 1998 decided that electricity should no longer be 
bought from co-generation SPPs, due to a high reserve margin after the 1997 
economic crisis. The exception of this resolution has been made only for EGAT, 
MEA, PEA, and their subsidiaries. Although the reserve margin is now not as high as 
before, this rule has not been changed. As a result, there has only been one new co-
generation SPP contract since 1998, which is a PTT-EGAT-MEA joint venture for a 
cogeneration plant in the new Bangkok International Airport. As a consequence, the 
total installed capacity and the power sold by co-generation SPPs in Thailand have 
slowly increased after 2001, as shown in Figure 7.6. 
Certainly, all these problems are linked to the monopoly market structure and the 
conflicts of roles and interests, which allow utilities to set up their rules without any 
possibilities for renewable SPPs to appeal. 
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 7.4.2 Contestation in Accessing, Interconnection and Operations 
For the Thai utilities, both in the state monopoly and the private monopoly discourse, 
system reliability is always a cognitive and normative pillar of their previously 
mentioned regulations. It is their responsibility and authority to protect grid reliability. 
In their view, the SPP contribution has been considered as adding more risks and 
burdens to grid management. Therefore, SPPs should pay for all extra costs which are 
needed for interconnection and grid management. 
However, in the power pool and decentralization discourse, the fair access to the 
national grid and the benefits of distributed power constitute the key cognitive and 
normative pillar. In this view, several existing regulations are unfair and present clear 
cases of conflict of interests. Therefore, both discourses suggested that SPPs should 
have a fair access to the appeal mechanism, and an independent regulatory body. 
Concurrently, the concept of joint responsibility in interconnecting investment has 
also been suggested (for example, SPPs invest in interconnection and utilities invest in 
grid upgrading)29. However, the benefits of distributed power as mentioned above 
have not been explained to or recognized by the Thai public yet. 
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Table 7.12 Contestation of Different Policy Discourses in Grid Access and 
Interaction Regulation  
Policy Discourse - State Monopoly 
- Private Monopoly 
- Power pool 
- Decentralization 
Regulative Pillar - Whole responsibility for 
SPP in interconnection 
and grid upgrading 
investments 
- Charges & penalties for 
system load management 
- No access for non-
renewable co-generation 
SPPs  
- Joint-responsibility (SPP for 
interconnection and utilities for grid 
upgrading) 
- Fair access for co-generation SPPs 
- Appeal mechanism and independent 
regulatory body are needed. 
Normative Pillar - System reliability 
- Interconnection and load 
management for SPPs are 
extra risks and burdens to 
utilities 
- Fair access for all producers 
- Distributed power can help utilities 
in load management and grid stability 
Cognitive Pillar System reliability is a 
non-negotiable issue 
- Fairness for all producers 
- Benefits of distributed power  
 
 7.4.3 Recent and Foreseeable Outcomes 
These issues have not been discussed in the general public or policy discussions. As 
non-firm SPP contracts are on a year-by-year basis, some SPPs are generally not 
willing to discuss these issues publicly as they fear reprisals from utilities when 
purchasing their electricity30. These issues seem to be technical issues for Thai public, 
even though they are associated with a number of structural issues and general 
normative judgment. The absence of action from the main policy actors means that 
the situation is unchanged so far.  
In the future, changes may happen due to four main factors. First, the changes in the 
market structure (as discussed earlier) will certainly lead to changes in the normative 
and cognitive pillar, as well as in authoritative power. Second, with or without 
structural changes, the interim regulator (established in 2005) may also take more 
control or, at least, provide space for reconsideration of these issues. Third, the 
establishment of a renewable power producer group in the Federation of Thai 
Industries (FTI) in 2005 may have provided a platform for SPPs to take an active role 
in the policy process and contribute to institutional changes. Last, the general 
understanding among the Thai public of these issues may also make a difference in 
the policy process, especially if the policy discussions treat quality of services and 
fairness in more general terms (and not only in technical discussions).  
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7.5 Planning Practices 
Chapter 5 describes the existing power development planning as a long-term 
investment planning process. It also presents the criticisms of the PDP process. 
Therefore, in this section, only a summary of the existing problems will be presented. 
 7.5.1 Existing Problems  
In general, the power development planning process is recognized as a sectoral 
planning with limited objectives and targets. It is normally carried out to serve 
sectoral mandates and interests without considering other national development goals 
and targets. There is no public participation in the process, at all. The power 
development plan is totally under the control of the Ministry of Energy and EGAT 
without any clear corrective or public accountability mechanisms.  
Concerning other contributions of renewable energy, the existing planning process 
can also be quite problematic.  
First of all, the power development plan only considers conventional technologies as 
reliable options. Therefore, renewable energy is perceived as a policy requirement 
rather than a real option. In consequence, the contribution of renewable SPP (mainly 
Biomass power plants) is fixed at 426 MW until 2015 and other renewable energy 
generations are placed within the 5% RPS scheme.  
Second, in the present planning process, existing and potential non-firm SPPs are not 
recognized as dependable capacities of the power system. Thus, they do not form part 
of the planning process and EGAT is required to invest in other power plants (if this 
amount of dependable capacity is needed to secure system reliability).  
Third, in fact, the present planning process is not an actual least-cost analysis (as 
EGAT always claimed), since several choices have been predetermined earlier, 
including a 50% share of EGAT in the construction of new power plants, without any 
prior least-cost analysis. 
Last, the assumed future oil prices (which strongly link to the natural gas price) are 
extremely low. During the planning process of 2004, the price of oil in the 
governmental model was expected to be 27.5 USD/barrel in 2006, though this 
assumption was made in July 2004 when the world oil price had already increased. In 
the model, three scenarios of the world oil price are provided, but all of them show 
decreasing trends, down to 23-31 USD/barrel in 2015. This unrealistic price 
assumption will implicitly block the integration of renewable energy in the power 
system, since the costs of conventional power are expected to be extremely low. 
Therefore, with these existing problems, the present power development plan hardly 
supports the growth of renewable energy, as planned in PDP-Renewables. 
 7.5.2 Contestation in Planning Practices 
Planning practice is one of the most intense contestation areas, though it is not 
publicly well-known (when compared to market structure). In previous years, the 
power development plan was always based on EGAT’s least-cost utility planning in 
order to provide cheap and reliable electricity under the state monopoly discourse. It 
was the responsibility of experts and technocrats and did not involve any public 
participation. In this model, renewable energy was not considered an option and 
environmental, social, and health consequences did not form part of the analysis in the 
planning process. In Thailand, the consideration of all positive and negative 
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consequences, i.e. impact assessment, is always limited at the level of each project 
approval process. 
In the PDP 2004, when private monopoly became a dominant discourse in Thai power 
policy, the same process of power development was still used, but with some 
modifications. According to the private monopoly discourse, the cognitive pillar of 
planning has changed from cheap and reliable electricity to an expansion of business 
in order to become the national champion. This change has provided a great 
normative space for political visions and policy initiatives which are not limited by a 
least-cost analysis. However, system reliability is still a main norm in planning. While 
environmental aspects are not considered in the planning analysis, renewable energy 
has now become a part of the PDP, but as a politically determined option rather than a 
strategic option (as suggested in PDP-Renewables).  
According to the power pool discourse, governmental or sectoral planning is less 
important, since, in this view, the market can decide the best options both in the short 
and in the long run. According to this discourse, renewable energy and environmental 
considerations mainly belong in an occasional subsidy program. 
Table 7.13 Contestation of Different Policy Discourses in Planning Process and 
Practices  
Policy Discourse State Monopoly Power Pool Private Monopoly Decentralization 
Cognitive Pillar Cheap and 
reliable 
electricity 
Market 
Efficiency 
Visionary national 
champion 
- Cleaner power 
- Public 
accountability 
Normative Pillar - Reliability 
- Least-cost 
planning 
- Expert role 
- Market can 
decide 
- Political vision 
- System reliability 
- Sustainability 
- Participation 
- Accountability 
Regulative Pillar 
- Main Tool 
Least-cost utility 
planning 
- Market 
mechanism 
Policy-led planning Strategic impact 
assessment 
Regulative Pillar 
- Main Actor 
EGAT  Power Pool  Ministry of Energy - Stakeholder and 
public participation 
Regulative Pillar 
- Environmental 
and health 
aspects 
Only at project 
level 
Only at project 
level 
Only at project 
level 
As one of the goals 
in the power 
development plan 
Regulative Pillar 
- Renewables’ 
contribution 
RE is not an 
option 
RE can compete 
in the pool with 
special subsidy 
RE is a politically-
determined option  
RE is a strategic 
option to consider 
 
To support cleaner power, sustainable development, and more public participation and 
accountability, the decentralization discourse suggests a change in the planning 
process from political and expert domination to more stakeholder and public 
participation. Moreover, it should be a broad-based planning process with national 
sustainable development goals and targets as its main norms or points of 
consideration. To pursue this view, strategic environmental assessment is highly 
recommended in this discourse with environmental and health aspects as the main 
goals in the planning analysis. Last, to ensure the best possible future, all options 
should be considered and renewable energy should be highlighted as one of the 
strategic options of the Thai power sector. 
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 7.5.3 Recent and Foreseeable Outcomes 
The critiques of the PDP process have echoed since 1998, when the reserve margin 
was high and the conflict of two coal-fired power plant projects in Prachuab Kiri 
Khun was tense. In 1999, the Sustainable Energy Network proposed a PDP which 
aimed at integrating national development goals in the plan. However, no significant 
change has taken place yet. Although, in the PDP 2004, major modifications have 
been made and the general discourse has changed from state monopoly to private 
monopoly, this change is not clearly defined in the PDP document. It can be seen only 
through a detailed technical investigation. 
During January-July 2005, the results of this study were presented in the policy 
forums, which showed the weak points of the existing PDP process and its 
consequences. These results have been publicly reported through the mass media. 
Although, in several points, the authorities later seemed to accept the critiques from 
the study (for example, of demand forecasting and unrealistic oil price assumption), 
the revising of the PDP 2004 has still been carried out behind closed doors. As public 
participation is still absent in the planning process, without strong public action (such 
as in the EGAT privatization case) the desirable planning practices are less likely to 
take place in the foreseeable future. 
7.6 Environmental and Health Protection 
Environmental and health concerns in Thailand’s renewable development are mainly 
linked to biomass power plants, which represent more than 90% of the present 
renewable power generation. Concerns were raised after local villagers experienced a 
negative effect from the dust emission of one biomass power plant in the Chai-nat 
province in 2001. Later, during 2002-2003, several local protests against new biomass 
power plant projects emerged, when the government without notice introduced the 5 
years subsidy bidding program. As a result of intense protests, some biomass power 
plants, which had received an initial approval for subsidy, did not receive this subsidy 
and were not able to develop further and finally, cancelled their projects.  
 7.6.1 Existing Problems and Government Solutions 
During 2002-2003, Suphakij Nuntaworakarn31 studied two local protests in Singha 
Buri and Nakorn Sawan and it was found that the problems had arisen due to the 
following conditions,  
• Improper Decision-making Process. Detail decisions (including the type, 
fuel, capacity and location of the projects) were made through a bidding 
offer without public consultation. After the bidding process, the Energy 
Conservation Fund (En-Con Fund) required that each project should 
undergo public consultation, but all important designs (for example their 
locations and technologies) could not be changed due to the previous 
bidding commitment. Therefore, public participation in this case was less 
meaningful and pushed local people to fight for the cancellation of the 
projects. 
• Controversial Locations. The locations of both projects were considered 
by the local people as unsuitable, because they were located very close to 
the villages and had to use the local infrastructure for the heavy transport 
of rice husk. A proposal for new locations was made by the local people, 
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but later refused by both project owners and the En-Con Fund, because 
they were considered to be unfair to other bidding competitors. 
• Mistrust in Environmental Regulations. The local protests clearly stress 
the mistrust of the existing environmental regulations. The local 
populations also faced environmental problems arising from the existing 
industrial projects in their area and these problems were not solved by the 
present environmental regulation mechanism. In other words, there is no 
mechanism which can guarantee that, if negative impacts arise, the power 
plant operation can be stopped and controlled. 
• Unbalanced Share of Benefits. As rice husk is a by-product of rice 
milling, it belongs to the rice miller, not the local farmers. Therefore, the 
benefits of these projects to local people are quite limited. Although some 
development funds were proposed by project owners, they were 
considered to be compensation funds rather than profit sharing. 
• Lack of Deliberative Communication. Most of the formal 
communication is a one-way process, from project owners and officers to 
local people, which create more tensions and mistrust among the 
population.  
As part of the requirement for a final approval of the 5-year subsidy, the En-Con Fund 
and EPPO suggested the establishment of a tri-parties committee for each project, 
which should serve as the main mechanism for environmental and health regulation. 
The committee included members from the local communities, the power plant 
companies, and the related governmental institutions. The En-Con Fund and EPPO 
also offered an additional budget for environmental monitoring by the independent 
organization during the 5 years of subsidy. If environmental problems occur during 
these five years, the subsidy will be cut off. 
Recently, a number of biomass power plants have registered their installed capacities 
as 9.9 MW, in order to avoid the EIA requirement (which starts from 10 MW) for 
their approval process. These attempts may aggravate the situation since they create 
mistrust in the local communities, who may be affected by the power generation, as 
recently seen in the case of the biomass power plant project in the Surin province. 
 7.6.2 Recent Experiences from the Tri-parties Committee 
This study has looked closely into the recent experiences of the tri-parties committee 
in some selected cases in the collaboration with local researchers and the National 
Human Rights Commission. The results found that although the committee 
establishments provide more opportunities for a two-way communication, some 
important problems still remain and arise from the practical experiences, including; 
• Unbalanced capacities for accessing and analyzing environmental 
monitor information and for setting the agenda of the committee 
meeting. Mostly, the information is supplied and the agendas of the 
meetings are determined by the power plant company. The local people 
face difficulties in scrutinizing the technical environmental information 
and searching for alternative information apart from the information 
provided by the company. 
• Limited Contributions from Governmental Organizations. Since, to 
the government organizations, the three-part committee only represents an 
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extra work load without any specific mandates or additional resources, 
their participation is usually quite passive and, in some cases, the 
organizations are not represented at the regular committee meetings.  
• No Actual Legal Enforcement. The central question is whether the 
committee is able to make any legal decision, as is has been created 
without the authority of any specific law. Fortunately, during the period of 
this study, there has been no case which required legal enforcement. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of this mechanism has not been tested.  
• Unclear Future after the First Five Years. As one of main aims of the 
committee is to allow the biomass companies to achieve the subsidy 
support from the government, the future of the committee is certainly 
uncertain after the expiry of the 5-year subsidy period. 
• Only End-of-pipe Intervention. Although the three-part mechanism 
provides some possibilities for local communities to participate in 
environmental regulations, it is still placed at the end of the project 
decision-making process. In fact, local people need to involve much earlier 
in the process, especially in the project design (such as locations and sizes) 
as well as in the project approval process (such as in EIA process). 
7.6.3 Recent and Foreseeable Changes 
After the government’s cancellation of the EIA reform attempt in 2004, there has been 
no big change in the environmental regulation. The report of the study on the Tri-
parties committee was formally submitted to the National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC) in 2005 and later to the government. Although the NHRC and relating 
organizations, such as EPPO, have agreed upon the opportunities and limitations of 
tri-parties committee mechanism, the desired changes do not seem to take place. 
Basically, the changes (or improvements) are more likely to be implemented on a 
case-by-case basis. 
For example, this study also involved local communities in the Surin provinces, who 
publicly presented their concerns over the 9.9 MW Biomass power plant project 
located near their communities in the study and consultation process. This provided an 
opportunity for them to learn from the previous experiences and consequently to enter 
in a better discussion with the project owners. As a result, although this project did not 
require an EIA (due to its size below 10 MW), an Initial Environmental Effects (IEE) 
study was requested by local people and later commissioned by the project owner in 
order to support the public consultation process. After the consultation, the monitoring 
committee was set up with the five parties involved, instead of three parties. The main 
idea is to involve the local NGOs and local university in order to support the local 
communities in more technical issues and discussions. In this sense, apart from 
participation, capacity building is a key for local communities to take more control 
over their environmental concerns. 
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7.7 Recommendations for supportive institutional frameworks and regulations  
Based on the previous analysis, it is necessary to introduce supportive institutional 
framework and public regulations for the implementation of PDP-Renewables, as 
presented below. 
7.7.1 Decentralization Model 
To support the increase of the renewable energy contribution, fair market conditions 
are required. Although the power market structure does not exclusively determine the 
fairness on the power market, it does strongly affect the attempts to create fair market 
conditions. The field experiences of renewable energy producers show the difficulties 
in dealing with authorized monopoly powers. Hence, both the state and the private 
monopoly discourses are much less desirable in the renewable perspective. At the 
same time, market mechanisms may lead to an abuse of the oligopolistic market 
power and an uncertain future for renewable energy innovations. Therefore, in this 
viewpoint, the decentralization model is more preferable to the renewable energy 
development. 
Compared to the existing enhanced single buyer model, the decentralization promotes 
four main changes in the power market structure, as illustrated in Figure 7.7. 
• Separation of generation and transmission (or unbundling) with the clear 
intention to provide a fair grid access to all power producers, including 
EGAT.  
• The first suggestion leads to the establishment of a new public 
transmission authority, which takes full responsibility for transmission 
management, system operations, and hydro power operations, while EGAT 
will concentrate only on the generation business. 
• The introduction of retailing business, which gives local communities or 
administrative organizations or other green market initiatives the right to 
organize and conduct power retailing services for their communities, while 
PEA and MEA will provide a distribution system but not hold monopoly 
power (as they do now). This suggestion gives large consumers the 
possibility of collaborating directly with IPPs and SPPs to secure their 
electricity needs and the creation of green power retailers for some specific 
markets (like the tourist business and some offices). 
• The establishment of an independent regulatory body with the adequate 
authorities and capacities and an appropriate decision-making process 
(including public participation and transparency practices) is necessary to 
ensure the fairness of deals and operations on the power market and also 
provide an institutional space for public deliberation of institutional and 
public regulation issues. The most ambitious plan is to create local power 
markets, operating within the grid facilities and supports, and connected to 
the local energy plan. 
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Figure 7.7 Decentralization M odel
Electricity Transmission Authority
Transmission System Operator Hydropower 
Existing 
IPPs, SPPs
New SPPs, 
VSPPs
EGAT New 
IPPs
Existing 
Power 
Demand
New Demand 
for Small 
Customers
New Demand 
for Large 
Customers
Distribution Utility (MEA, PEA)
Distribution Retailing *
*Local communities/administrative org. and green market initiatives can have right for power retailing services, 
while PEA and M EA will provide distribution system but not hold the monopoly power in retailing (as they do now)
In
de
pe
nd
en
t R
eg
ul
at
or
y 
Bo
dy
Source: NESAC, 200432. 
7.7.2 New Governance Structure 
Apart from the market structure, the governance structure is also crucial, since it 
determines the roles and responsibilities of each actor and their interaction with each 
other. Although governance structure is a complicated issue, four main principles can 
be identified, as shown in Table 7.14; 
• The distinction of policy, regulation, and operation roles must be clearly 
made. The conflict of roles (which normally lead to conflicts of interest) 
should be avoided. 
• The Ministry of Energy must play a key role in policy and planning, while 
five state-owned enterprises must take part in formulating an investment 
plan to ensure the quality of service needed. However, the regulator is also 
required to play a main role in avoiding unnecessary investment which 
may lead to an economic burden for the consumers. 
• All regulation should principally be the responsibility of an independent 
regulator, including technical standard setting and approval or licensing 
mechanisms. Certainly, with their expertise and responsibilities for the 
grid, all state-owned enterprises and the Ministry of energy should take 
part in the regulatory process as main stakeholders. 
• All state-owned enterprises; namely EGAT, PEA, MEA, and the proposed 
Electricity Transmission Authority (ETA), should concentrate mainly on 
their operation roles. They should be monitored by the independent 
regulator, especially in system operating, in order to ensure fairness for all 
stakeholders.  
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Table 7.14 Recommended Governance Structure for the Thai Power Sector  
 MoEn. EGAT ETA PEA MEA Regulator 
Policy Roles       
   Fuel Mix       
   Investment Plan       
   Social Policy       
Regulation Roles       
   Electricity tariff       
   Demand forecasting       
   Technical Standard       
   Approval&Licensing       
Operational Roles       
   Generation       
   Transmission       
   System Operator       
   Distribution       
Note:  represents the major roles and  represents the minor roles. 
Source: Adapted from NESAC, 200433. 
7.7.3 Effective Pricing Schemes 
To support the development of renewable energy in PDP-Renewables, fair and certain 
market conditions are necessary. On the basis of the previous discussions of pricing 
regulation, Table 7.15 presents overall policy recommendations. 
For non-firm SPPs, the major issue is the change from firm and non-firm criteria to 
“on-peak and off-peak” basis. This change is implemented in order for the SPPs to 
better represent the contribution of renewable energy based on their capacities and 
responding to the actual demand. These “on-peak” and “off-peak” should be based on 
EGAT’s wholesale price, as they will sell electricity to the Electricity Transmission 
Authority (ETA) in the newly proposed structure. Specific contracts for load 
management in critical periods (like summer) and grid stability for some areas can be 
made with an additional reward. All these changes will provide the non-firm SPPs 
with incentives for higher investment and greater responsibility in load management 
and grid stability. 
The firm SPPs have two choices; namely the continuation of existing contracts (as 
they already receive higher prices) or the change to an “on-peak and off-peak” basis 
(as suggested for non-firm SPPs) with a specific agreement (and additional payment) 
for firm load availability in critical periods.  
Today, the energy payment to firm and non-firm SPPs is based on the natural gas 
price, which is sharply increasing during these years. Although, at this moment, this 
reference can provide windfall benefits to all SPPs, in the longer term, it may offset 
the benefit of renewable energy in reducing fossil-fuel price fluctuations. At the same 
time, it can be a risk for renewable energy producers if the situation changes. 
Therefore, the series of different fuel prices (including some biomass resources) is 
suggested to reduce the burden of price fluctuations both for SPPs and for Thai 
economy in general. 
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Table 7.15 Policy Recommendations for Pricing Regulations 
Schemes/ Principles Policy Recommendations 
Firm SPPs - Continuation of existing contracts or changing to “on-peak 
and off-peak” basis with specific agreement for firm load 
availability in critical periods 
- Change the reference energy payment from “gas” to the 
series of different fuel prices.  
Non-firm SPPs - Change to “on-peak and off-peak” basis 
- Based on the EGAT wholesale price (as they will sell to 
ETA) 
- Specific contract for load management in critical periods 
(like summer) and grid stability for some areas 
- Change the reference energy payment from “gas” and “fuel 
oil” to the series of different fuel prices. 
VSPPs - Scope expansion from 1 MW to 10 MW 
Feed-in tariff Feed-in tariffs for specific technologies (like PV, Wind) with 
varied rates based on technological development and 
resources 
Internalization of 
positive externalities 
- Reasonable subsidy based on externality values should be 
integrated or added into the above-mentioned pricing 
schemes 
- Reviewed and adjusted with appropriate timing 
For VSPPs, the existing pricing mechanism is quite appropriate. Therefore, the policy 
recommendation is to expand its scope to cover up to 10 MW of the capacity sold to 
the grid.  
Since the premium for positive externality in renewable generation is not provided for 
existing SPP and VSPP schemes, it is necessary to integrate reasonable subsidy based 
on externality values into the above-mentioned pricing schemes. 
For presently expensive technologies in Thailand, such as PV and Wind, a feed-in 
tariff (or REFIT) mechanism is highly suggested. In comparison to the RPS scheme, 
the REFIT provides more open and stable market conditions for renewable energy 
development. International experiences also confirm the superiority of REFIT in 
policy effectiveness. Last, in PDP-Renewables, in which most new fossil fuel power 
plants are planned to be avoided, the Thai RPS scheme cannot promote faster 
renewable energy contribution as planned in PDP-Renewables.  
7.7.4 Grid Access and Interconnection 
As previously analyzed, the problems of grid access and interconnection are related to 
inappropriate market and governance structures. The proposed changes in both 
structures, may, therefore, facilitate improvements of grid access and interconnection 
issues. Among the overall structural changes, the role of the interim regulator, the 
separation of transmission and the introduction of retailing distributors may provide 
better conditions for grid access and interconnection. More specifically, the following 
recommendations are made to improve access and interconnection;  
• The establishment of the Independent Technical Standard Organization 
(ITSO) for reviewing and revising rules, regulations, and technical 
standards, as well as facilitating the development of knowledge and 
technologies, regarding interconnections and grid stability  
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• The promotion of the principle of joint responsibility in the investment in 
interconnection and grid upgrading. 
• The introduction of an upward and downward regulatory market, instead 
of charges and penalty, to stimulate SPPs in supporting grid management 
and stability  
• The reopening of fair non-renewable co-generation access as one of the 
options in the power development plan. 
With the proposed pricing regulations, all these recommendations will stimulate more 
renewable energy generation and increase its contribution to the Thai power system. 
More specifically, they will also upgrade part of the non-firm SPPs to dependable 
capacity (as required in power development planning). At the same time, they will 
strengthen the load management and grid stability. 
7.7.5 New Planning Practices 
To support the increased contribution of renewable energy, as suggested in PDP-
Renewables, these following practices are highly recommended, 
• A broader focus on national development goals and targets is required 
in order to realize and internalize the benefits of renewable energy in 
the planning process, as well as to follow a future direction towards 
more sustainable energy. 
• All options must be opened and critically analyzed. Therefore, 
renewable energy has to be recognized as a strategic option in the long-
term power development plan rather than a marginalized option. 
• To understand the overall consequences of different policy options, 
strategic impact assessment should be applied to all important aspects 
of sustainable development together with national development goals 
and targets.  
• To ensure the validity and appropriateness of the PDP, more systematic 
public participation (consultation, option identification, technical and 
public reviews) is needed. 
• Since the future is uncertain, the proper planning process and practice 
should clearly specify corrective and accountable mechanisms, which 
will dynamically guide the planning into a sustainable future under 
realistic conditions. 
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7.7.6 Supporting DSM and green power retailing businesses 
Apart from renewable energy and revised demand forecasting, Demand Side 
Management also plays an important role in PDP-Renewables. Thailand has an 
impressive experience in implementing DSM after 1992, which can now claim for 
900 MW of the power demand reduction achieved. However, to reach a higher level 
of DSM potential, as suggested in PDP-Renewables, the following recommendations 
are useful,  
• Introducing the “Negawatt” market for energy efficiency service 
companies and organizations (ESCO), which allows them to earn 
profits by reducing the power peak demand.  
• Reinforcing the mechanisms under the 1992 Energy Conservation Law 
to ensure higher utilization of energy efficiency potentials. 
• Strengthening the ESCO capacities in order to provide better and 
broader services for power customers. 
7.7.7 Participatory Environmental and Health Protection Mechanism 
Although, PDP-Renewables is part of environmental and health protection in itself 
due to its lower negative impacts on health and environment, renewable energy 
generation can have some negative environmental and health impacts, especially in 
the case of biomass power plants. Therefore, a better protection mechanism is needed. 
This better protection mechanism will not only lead to healthier outcomes of 
renewable power generation but also better co-operation and trust-worthiness in local 
communities, which is an indispensable factor for sustainable energy development. 
Based on the experiences, analyses, and consultations during the study, five key areas 
must be discussed and improved in order to develop a better protection mechanism; 
• Public participation, especially in local communities, must be 
developed at the starting point and not at the end of the process. Thus, 
any future policy designs and interventions, such as RPS or Feed-in 
tariff mechanisms, should be aware of this principle in order to avoid 
the inappropriate policy process, as earlier seen in the 5-year subsidy 
program. 
• The EIA process must be changed in order to allow more public 
participation and inputs to play significant roles in the project approval 
process. It is also necessary for all biomass power plants to produce an 
Initial Environmental Effects report, before assessing the necessity of a 
full EIA study.  
• To ensure the tri-parties committee and other protection mechanisms, it 
is necessary to strengthen the capacity of local communities. In the 
short run, the active involvement of local NGOs and universities (or 
research institutes) may be useful, but, in the longer term, better public 
understanding, appropriate tools for local environmental regulations, 
and more systematic supports from governmental organization must be 
developed. 
• Apart from the local capacity, an effective legal enforcement is also 
required. If the tri-parties committee wishes to implement an effective 
environmental regulation, it must found its legal locations or concrete 
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connections on a strong legal basis. In other countries, licensing for 
power producers is an influential legal tool, but, in Thailand, the 
interim regulator does not have the authority to license, and the 
licensing criteria do normally not consider environmental aspects an 
important issue. 
• The attempt of the Ministry of Energy to develop local, provincial, and 
regional energy plans during 2004-2006 may also form a good 
platform for a better environmental protection mechanism. In principle, 
this participatory planning can be the first place, where local 
environmental concerns and renewable energy potentials can be 
matched, discussed, and become increasingly aware of each other. 
Concurrently, through this process, public awareness and 
understanding can be improved and, hopefully, capacity can be 
strengthened. 
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7.8 Cognitive and Normative Battlefield 
Unsurprisingly, to support the development of PDP-Renewables, most 
recommendations for institutional frameworks and regulations are principally based 
on the decentralization model, as PDP-Renewables itself also develops from this 
discourse.  
However, in practice, all these recommendations cannot easily lead to real 
institutional changes, due to the intense contestation of all policy discourses and the 
domination of other discourses. As already explained in this chapter, the contestation 
of the four policy discourses is based on different cognitive and normative pillars. In 
other words, the ways in which they realize and understand the problems and targets 
of the Thai power system, as well as the main criteria for decision-making with regard 
to institutions and regulations, differ from one another. As different objectives and 
criteria are applied to the policy discussions, it is hard to solve or provide final 
answers by conducting a single technical analysis. 
In the future, the contestation and argumentation of cognitive and normative pillars 
from different discourses will probably pave the way for institutional and regulation 
changes, supported by a sound regulative pillar and technical analysis. In other words, 
PDP-Renewables will hardly give rise to an effective policy solution with a 
supportive institutional ground, without implementing cognitive and normative 
changes towards fairer access, cleaner power, and higher accountability. 
Therefore, although we always discuss and debate the regulative pillar (such as 
REFIT vs. RPS), the real battlefield for future institutional directions is composed by 
the cognitive and normative contestations.   
7.8.1 Six Decisive Battlefields 
On the basis of the analysis in this and previous chapters, five decisive battlefields of 
cognitive and normative contestations can be identified. These battlefields are crucial 
to the establishment or the change of institutional and regulation frameworks required 
to support the further development of PDP-Renewables, as described below, 
• Renewable energy is a competitive option. To really put renewables on 
the planning agenda as one of the strategic options, stakeholders and 
the Thai public must be convinced that renewable energy with DSM is 
in fact a cheaper and viable option if take into consideration the over-
investment, the fuel price risks and the negative externalities of the 
existing system, as shown in Chapter 6. 
• Apart from the excessive costs of some renewable technologies, the 
main obstacle to renewable energy development in Thailand is an 
unfair market power. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that 
fairness is a necessary condition for efficiency and accountability and 
must be rooted in all aspects of institutional and public regulation in 
the Thai power sector. 
• Renewable energy can strengthen the system reliability and grid 
stability. With their resources and locations and proper mechanisms 
and incentives for better integration, renewable energy can help the 
ISO/utilities with load management and grid stability in critical times 
and areas, rather than constituting an extra burden to system 
management. 
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• Innovation requires supportive environments and investment co-
operation, not only competition. To facilitate domestic renewable 
energy innovation, firm and fair incentives and collaborations in 
research and development are needed. Competition alone cannot lead 
to innovation, as cheaper solutions and imported technologies can 
easily kill or prohibit future innovation. 
• Renewable energy is a long-term strategy for sustainable development. 
Apart from generating economic competitiveness, the investment in 
renewable energy will lead to better strategic impacts in all aspects of 
sustainable development, as shown in Chapter 6. Therefore, the formal 
planning practices in the Thai power sector must be changed in order 
to realize the broader and long-term benefits of renewable energy. 
• Renewable energy provides more space for public participation, 
control and accountability in the Thai power sector. To highlight the 
real advantage of the “decentralization” model, it is essential to show 
how this model reduces the “centralized” power relation and provides 
more opportunities and better mechanisms for the Thai public to gain 
more benefits from power generation and assume more control over 
power generation and the power sector at both local and national 
levels. 
If the evidence, experiences and understandings in these six areas can be developed, 
the cognitive and normative contestations, as well as the public deliberation in the 
Thai power sector, will gradually increase the support to the decentralization model 
and renewable energy development 
 7.8.2 Five Main Strategies  
Although cognitive and normative pillars are highlighted in this study, it does not 
mean that everything is based on the contestation of ideas, world views, and values. 
Certainly, all cognitive and normative contestations require concrete experiences, 
reference practices, or sound analysis back-up. At the same time, these concrete 
experiences and practices must be discussed with the public in a way that can lead to a 
new (or better) understanding of how different perspectives and different normative 
criteria can lead to new practices. Therefore, to convince or achieve the understanding 
and support from stakeholders and the Thai public, five main strategies are highly 
recommended;. 
• Development of concrete experiences, reference practices and 
sound analysis on these six decisive points. Certainly, this study 
mainly deals with the first and fifth of the battlefields mentioned 
above, through strategic impact analysis. Other areas still require more 
concrete or systematic studies and suggestions, especially in terms of 
fair access of renewable energy producers, the contributions to grid 
stability, and the governance system which allows Thai people to 
increasingly participate in and gain control of the Thai power sector.  
• Introduction of Effective Regulations. Although the battlefields are 
basically on the cognitive and normative side, the regulative pillars are 
always the more visible ones in public debates or discussions. 
Therefore, the formulation and introduction of effective regulations 
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must be carefully done, requiring, in some cases, detailed technical 
analysis. 
• Capacity Strengthening. The Thai power sector is continuously 
involving more actors; thus, good rules and norms are not sufficient to 
carry out the radical changes, though they can certainly trigger them. 
Knowledge, skills, and capacities need to be improved and developed 
in order to run this decentralization system. However, the absence of 
required knowledge, skills, and capacities should not be used for 
postponing the decision and direct it towards a better policy direction. 
Rather, the capacity strengthening should be strategically built into the 
policy package within the desired institutional and regulative changes. 
• Policy Communication. As already mentioned, a wider public 
understanding and support is crucial to the desired policy and 
institutional change. Therefore, it is important to make the cognitive, 
normative bases of the specific regulative pillars obvious to public 
deliberation. To enrich the deliberation, alternative practices, 
experiences, and references, as earlier discussed, are very useful. It is 
also essential to bring the communication and responses back into the 
formal policy process in order to influence policy changes 
• Political Opportunities. In highly controversial and conflicting issues, 
like those of the Thai power sector, we should not expect that every 
public deliberation process will end up with consensus. In many cases, 
it is also good for society to learn directly from the experiences. 
Therefore, it is also necessary to find political opportunities for 
desirable institutional changes in long-lasting disagreements in order to 
practice and test them in the real world. With the following careful 
evaluation, this can be one of the good steps to take in the long-term 
social learning process in the power policy arena. 
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7.9 Conclusion  
Obviously, the analysis in this chapter shows that most of the institutional frameworks 
required or recommended for developing PDP-Renewables are not yet present. In 
other words, PDP-Renewables cannot automatically develop into reality by itself, 
without significant institutional changes. This result should not lead to the conclusion 
that PDP-Renewables is not institutionally possible. From previous and recent 
experiences it can be seen that renewable energy development in Thailand has always 
looked for a small space to grow with an overall impressive rate, rather than waiting 
for the complete set of preferable institutions to develop.  
The analysis in this study suggests that, with the experiences of the impressive growth 
of renewable energy and the future potentials for a sustainable and healthier society in 
mind, PDP-Renewables and its decentralization discourse should be ready to 
challenge the existing cognitive and normative pillars of the previously dominated 
discourses. Furthermore, PDP-Renewables must challenge the existing framework in 
order to establish better an institutional framework and better regulations in the Thai 
power sector. Only by contesting these cognitive and normative battlefields with the 
support of a sound regulative pillar and firm practices and knowledge, the desirable 
long-term institutional changes can take place and ensure the future of PDP-
Renewables through better and broader public understanding and support.  
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Chapter 8 
Policy Results and Reflections  
This chapter will present the study’s results, reflections and perspective. First, the 
main analytical results from the previous chapters will be summarized. Then, as the 
outcomes of the three-year interaction between research and policy processes, the 
main policy results will be reported. As a result of changed and unchanged policy 
outcomes within these three years, reflections on healthy public policy through this 
study will be made.  
8.1 Main Policy Results 
As one of the objectives of this study is to participate directly in healthy policy and 
learn from this direct experience, it is very important to summarize the influences or 
impacts of this study on the policy changes during the three years of study. The main 
aim of this part is to identify the exclusive contributions of this research attempt, but 
rather to show how the study participates in the policy processes and how expected 
and unexpected changes have taken place, seen in relation to the promotion of healthy 
public policy in the Thai power sector. 
 8.1.1 Policy Actions in This Study 
Table 8.1 presents the timeline of research actions together with the actions and 
responses from governmental institutes and NGOs (or civil society groups). It is a 
detailed historical note of three years attempts to promote healthy public policy in the 
Thai power sector. 
Table 8.1 Timeline of Actions and Responses from Governmental and  
Non-governmental Organizations and from the Study Process 
Timeline Governmental Actions 
/Responses 
NGOs/Civil society 
Actions/Responses 
Actions from the Study 
August 2003 Launched the National 
Energy Strategy with the 
target of 6% renewables in 
power generation and 
introduced the RPS 
mechanism 
  
September 2003   The study began 
December 2003 Announced the Enhanced 
Single Buyer Model as the 
main structure of the power 
sector and privatization 
  
January 2004 Announced the EGAT 
privatization plan 
Publicly predicted that the 
government will increase 
the tariff before 
privatization 
The article on privatization policy 
was presented in Thai newspaper  
February 2004 Public hearing process for 
privatization 
Organized policy forums 
on the privatization process 
 
March 2004 Postponed the EGAT 
privatization process and 
called for option study 
Big protests organized 
against the EGAT 
privatization 
 
May 2004 EGAT sent the PDP2004 
for approval  
 The article on conflicts between 
EGAT’s PDP and the 
government’s renewable target 
presented 
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Table 8.1 (continued) 
Timeline Governmental Actions 
/Responses 
NGOs/Civil society 
Actions/Responses 
Actions from the Study 
June 2004 Senate call for public 
hearing on the EGAT 
privatization 
- NESAC presented 
alternative power structure 
- First criticism of the RPS 
mechanism 
Structure of Monopoly chain 
quoted by NESAC 
July 2004 The PDP was in the 
approval process 
NESAC presented the 
Alternative PDP 
The article on the end of cheap oil 
presented in Thai Magazine 
September 2004 The PDP 2004 was 
approved 
 The article on comparison between 
feed-in tariff and RPS presented in 
Thai Magazine 
December 2004 The EGAT privatization 
plan was discussed within 
EGAT 
 The article on 4 years policy 
evaluation presented to the public 
before an election 
January 2005 EGAT organized Coal –
trans Conference to support 
Coal technology 
Organized No-coal forums 
and campaign during Coal-
trans conference 
- The preliminary results of the 
strategic impact analysis of three 
PDP options presented in the No-
coal forum 
- Sustainable Energy trip in the 
North of Thailand 
February 2005 The Thaksin Government 
won landslide election 
 - Sustainable Energy trip and 
policy workshop in the North-
eastern Thailand 
- The preliminary results of the 
Strategic impact analysis of three 
PDP options were reported in Thai 
and English Newspapers 
March 2005 The EGAT Privatization 
plan started again with the 
same proposal plus a 50% 
share of EGAT of new 
power plants 
Organized forums to 
criticize the privatization 
plan  
- The analysis on the effect of the 
privatization plan on renewable 
energy was presented  
April 2005 The RPS Regulation was 
drafted by DEDE 
Sustainable Energy Fair 
organized by ATA 
- The study on the governance 
structure of renewable energy 
projects began with the 
consultation process with local 
communities and researchers 
May 2005 EPPO comments on the 
RPS mechanism and 
suggest for feed-in tariff 
 - Joint research on electricity 
governance in Thailand with other 
NGOs and research organizations 
was planned. 
June 2005 - Final Cabinet approval of 
the EGAT Privatization  
- Local communities in 
Surin reached an 
agreement with new 
biomass power plants to set 
up the three-part committee 
in environmental 
regulation. 
- Sustainable energy fair in Chiang 
Mai 
- Sustainable Energy trip and 
policy workshop in the Southern 
Thailand  
- Study on the governance 
structure of renewable energy 
projects was presented to NHRC 
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Table 8.1 (continued) 
Timeline Governmental Actions 
/Responses 
NGOs/Civil society 
Actions/Responses 
Actions from the Study 
July 2005 - EGAT denied to revise 
the PDP2004 and request 
the regulator to take 
responsibility in the PDP 
revising  
- NESAC called for the 
revision of the PDP 2004 
- NESAC called for the 
reconsideration of the RPS 
mechanism  
- FTI presented the 
common concerns on the 
single buyer model and the 
RPS mechanism. 
- NGOs called for feed-in 
tariff rather than RPS. 
- The preliminary results of the 
Strategic impact analysis of three 
PDP options were presented in the 
National Health Assembly 
- Organized three policy 
workshops on the Power 
Development Plan in Energy 
Crisis, Renewable Energy Policy 
Strategy, and Governance structure
- Outcomes of policy workshops 
were widely reported by Thai 
newspapers 
- Publicly launched the joint 
research on electricity governance 
in Thailand, focus on the EGAT 
privatization process 
August 2005 MoEn announced the 
postponement of the IPP 
bidding due to lower 
demand growth  
-Predicted that government 
would raise the tariff 
before selling the EGAT 
share on the stock market 
- Public seminar on regulatory 
body and process 
September 2005 - Proposal for tariff raising 
was sent for approval 
 
- Protests against tariff 
raising started 
- FTI set up the renewable 
energy industrial group  
 
October 2005 - The government declined 
the tariff raising proposal  
- MoEn announced for the 
revising of the PDP due to 
lower demand growth 
Protests against the EGAT 
privatization started 
 
November 2005 The Administrative court 
accepted the case and 
called for the 
postponement of the EGAT 
share distribution in SET 
during court consideration 
CCO brought the EGAT 
privatization case to 
Administrative Court and 
asked for cancellation due 
to unlawful process 
- Preliminary results of Electricity 
Governance research show the 
poor governance in the EGAT 
privatization process 
- Cases from sustainable energy 
trips reported in Thai Magazine 
December 2005 MoEn set up the first 
interim regulator 
  
January 2006 The interim regulator 
announced the revision of 
PDP  
- Public inputs to the court 
consideration process 
 
February 2006 - The government 
dissolved the parliament 
and called for early 
election  
- EGAT organized the 
APEC clean coal 
conference 
- Big protests against PM 
Thaksin  
- The final results of the Electricity 
Governance research were publicly 
presented to show the poor 
governance in the EGAT 
privatization process 
- The final results of the strategic 
impact analysis of three PDP 
options were presented in Thai 
news 
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Table 8.1 (continued) 
Timeline Governmental Actions 
/Responses 
NGOs/Civil society 
Actions/Responses 
Actions from the Study 
March 2006 - EGAT announced the 
plan to buy more electricity 
from biomass and launched 
the DSM campaign during 
the peak period 
- Administrative court 
made the decision to cancel 
the EGAT privatization 
process due to its unlawful 
process 
- EGAT announced the 
revising of the investment 
plan due to the cancellation 
of the EGAT privatization 
 - The final results of the Strategic 
impact analysis of three PDP 
options were presented in Thai 
Magazine 
April 2006 - DEDE announced the 
feed-in tariff mechanism in 
collaboration with FTI 
- New load forecast was 
announced with lower 
demand prediction 
  
May 2006 - EGAT started the 
PDP2006 process 
  
July 2006 - IAEA and the Office for 
Atomic Energy for Peace 
organized public seminars 
to promote nuclear energy 
- MoEn advertised coal-
fired power plants as an 
alternative energy  
 Overall policy recommendations 
from the study were publicly 
announced 
August 2006 The Democrats, i.e. the 
largest opponent party, 
announced an energy 
policy for the new election 
which was similar to the 
policy recommendations 
presented in this study 
 Final study results and policy 
recommendations were presented 
to NESAC, the interim regulator, 
Public Forums, and TV 
broadcasting programs 
September 2006   The study was finished 
 
From the table, it can be seen that the relationship between most of the policy 
participations is not linear. Several policy issues have been interrelated and have 
required time for changes. The main policy strategy of this research study is to pass 
through the more influential voices of NGOs and civil society, rather than only 
submitting or presenting the results to government authorities.  
The research actions took place more often during January-July 2005, when the 
preliminary results of the study were published and the research works were still 
based in Thailand. Especially in July 2005, three policy workshops were organized 
and widely reported in Thai mass media. Then, from the end of 2005 until the middle 
of 2006, policy changes were gradually seen. Many of them did not occur due to 
consensus in Thai society, but rather on the basis of decisions made by other supreme 
organizations, strong public actions, and inevitable facts. 
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8.1.2 Recent Policy Changes 
Table 8.2 summarizes the latest policy situation in the Thai power sector. From the 
table, it is clear that some desirable changes, according to a healthy public policy 
standpoint, are now taking place. For example, the revising of the PDP with lower 
demand growth, as suggested in Chapter 6, is now taking place. The privatization of 
EGAT under the Enhanced Single Buyer model has been cancelled, since March 
2006. The Thai government also tends to agree in the effectiveness of the feed-in 
tariff mechanism in supporting renewable energy development. 
However, within these three years, some policy issues do not support PDP-
Renewables as a healthy public policy option. Obviously, although the existing 
PDP2004 is now revised, the new PDP2006 process is not yet publicly opened and 
integrated with broader national sustainable development goals, as suggested in this 
study. Concurrently, though the privatization process is stopped, the monopoly chain 
of power still remains. Although PDP-Renewables does not yet receive any strong 
objection or criticism, PDP-Renewables is less likely to become the mainstream (or 
formal) power development plan in the near future. Therefore, both PDP-Renewables 
and the supportive institutional framework as suggested in Chapter 7 are still 
uncertain aims for the future. 
 8.1.3 Case Studies of Policy Changes 
To elaborate on these changed (and unchanged) processes, three policy case studies 
will be summarized. These cases include three main policy decisions related to this 
study; namely the EGAT privatization, the PDP revision, and the introduction of the 
feed-in tariff instead of the RPS mechanism. 
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Table 8.2 Summary of Policy Recommendations from the Study, Initial Responses 
from the Authorities and Latest Policy Situations in the Thai Power Sector until 
September 2006  
Recommendations Initial Responses  
from the Authorities 
Latest Situations 
On Strategic Impact Assessment Results  
1. Revising demand forecasting 
(January 2005) 
EGAT denied to revise the 
PDP2004 (July 2005) 
MoEn and the interim regulator revised 
demand forecasting due to lower 
demand growth (April 2006) 
2. More DSM investment No direct response EGAT announced the plan for more 
DSM during peak period in summer  
(March 2006) 
3. More renewable energy 
investment  
No direct response No positive or negative signs 
4. PDP-Renewables is a healthier 
option 
No direct response No positive or negative signs 
5. PDP-Renewables is an 
economically viable option 
The government asserted that 
Renewables are still expensive 
(August 2005, July 2006) 
No positive or negative signs 
6. PDP-Coal has the most 
negative impacts in a health 
perspective 
EGAT organized the APEC clean 
coal conference (February 2006) 
EGAT introduced more coal-fired 
power plants in the PDP2006 (May 
2006) 
On Purposed Institutional Framework and Regulations  
7. The Enhanced Single Buyer 
Model and the EGAT 
privatization are not compatible 
with PDP-Renewables 
The government was strict with 
the ESB model and the EGAT 
privatization plan 
Administrative Court cancelled the 
EGAT privatization due to unlawful 
process (March 2006) 
8. Introduction of the 
Decentralization model 
The government was strict with 
the ESB model 
No positive signs, the government still 
worked with the ESB model (March 
2006) 
9. Clear division of roles in 
governance structure 
No direct response Interim regulator was set up in 
December 2005 but without clear 
authorities or autonomy 
10. Changes from Firm and Non-
firm SPPs to on-peak and off-
peak basis 
No direct response No positive signs 
11. Expanding scope for VSPPs 
from 1 MW to 6 or 10 MW 
EPPO took earlier action in 
expanding the scope for VSPPs 
Expanding the scope for VSPPs is still 
in the process (August 2006) 
12. Changes from RPS to feed-in 
tariff 
No direct response DEDE announced the introduction of 
the feed-in tariff mechanism in 
collaboration with FTI (April 2006) 
13. Improvement in Grid Access 
and Interconnection 
No direct response - No positive signs 
- The interim regulator will take it into 
consideration soon (August 2006) 
14. New practices in the PDP 
process with broader national 
objectives and more public 
participation 
No direct response The PDP2006 is on-going without 
clear changes or public participation 
(August 2006) 
15. Participatory process in 
environmental regulation and the 
governance structure of 
renewable energy development 
-EPPO agreed and continued the 
work on the Three-part 
committee 
- The EIA reform has been 
stopped since 2003 
No positive or negative signs 
Note: Timing in parenthesis is the latest information updated in each point.  
 
 305
a) Case I: the EGAT Privatization Process 
The EGAT privatization has been one of the most controversial issues in the Thai 
power sector for almost two decades. The EGAT privatization policy has passed 
through different political and economic conditions with different privatization 
models, as presented in Chapter 4. The last attempt by the Thaksin government was 
based on the private monopoly discourse or the so-called Enhanced Single Buyer 
model. 
The EGAT privatization process is very important to this study, since the monopoly 
power already leads to unfair market conditions and regulations for renewable power 
generation, as shown in Chapter 7. Moving towards a private monopoly model with 
state authority power will certainly worsen the situation and make it more difficult to 
change it, due to its conflicts of roles and interests. 
In January 2004, this study presented an article in a Thai newspaper on the problems 
of the EGAT privatization in the private monopoly model. Later, during February-
March 2004, public forums and protests against the EGAT privatization plan were 
organized and expanded. In March 2004, the Thaksin government decided to postpone 
the privatization plan until the new general election in 2005. 
After the postponement, the National Economic and Social Advisory Council 
(NESAC) tried to present an alternative model for the Thai power sector. In May 
2004, the study presented the foreseeable conflicts between EGAT’s PDP (based on 
the private monopoly discourse) and the government’s target of promoting renewable 
energy. This contradiction between centralized monopoly power and distributed 
power generation led to the introduction of the decentralization model by NESAC and 
this study. 
However, in the beginning of 2005, due to the election season and the landslide 
election victory of the Thaksin government, the EGAT privatization was out of public 
attention. While public attention was rather weak, the Thaksin government succeeded 
in reaching an agreement with EGAT executives in protecting the EGAT 50% market 
share (not including EGAT subsidiaries) and with EGAT employees in providing 
salary increases and special quota for the EGAT share at a low price. Without any 
public consultations or hearings, in June 2005, the Thai government announced the 
completion of the EGAT privatization process. 
The study used the EGAT privatization process as a case in analyzing the governance 
structure of the Thai power sector in May 2005. The electricity governance 
assessment was carried out in collaboration between Thai research institutes and 
NGOs (namely the Health Systems Research Institute, the Thai Environment Institute, 
King Prachadhipok’s Institute, Palangthai, and the Confederation for Consumer 
Organizations) and the World Resource Institute and Prayas Energy Group. The study 
was publicly launched in July 2005 and the preliminary results were presented in 
November 2005. The study clearly showed problematic governance structures and 
practices in the privatization process, especially in terms of the decision-making and  
the regulatory processes. 
Concurrently, in August 2005, Palangthai and other civic groups predicted that the 
government’s decision of raising tariffs would be made before EGAT’s listing on the 
stock market in order to make EGAT’s stock more attractive to investors. Later, in 
September-October 2005, CCO and other civic organizations initiated a strong protest 
against the tariff raising and the EGAT privatization. After the preliminary results of 
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the study were publicly presented, FCO brought this case to the supreme 
administrative court and asked for urgent protection. 
In November 2005, the supreme administrative court had made the decision to 
postpone the EGAT privatization for court consideration, just one day before EGAT’s 
offering in the stock exchange.  
To offset one of the main critiques from the study and the civic protests, the Thaksin 
government set up an interim regulator in December 2005. Although the role and 
authority of the interim regulator is unclear and quite limited, it can be recognized as 
the first step in reducing the unbalanced power in the Thai power sector. 
In February 2006, the final electricity governance assessment was publicly presented 
and confirmed the poor governance in the EGAT privatization process. Later, in 
March 2006, the supreme administrative court announced that the EGAT privatization 
process was unlawful and, therefore, had to be cancelled. EGAT is now back in the 
state monopoly model. 
b) Case II: The Revision of EGAT’s PDP 2004 
In promoting healthy public policy, the revision or reformulation of EGAT’s 
PDP2004 towards a more realistic demand forecasting, more energy efficiency and 
increased renewable energy constitute the core of the analysis and policy 
recommendations of this study. This analysis applies strategic impact assessment to 
the comparison of ongoing competing policy options; namely the formal PDP option 
(PDP-Gas), the option preferred by EGAT (PDP-Coal), and the alternative PDP 
option suggested for the first time by NESAC (PDP-Renewables). 
The first preliminary results of this assessment were firstly presented at the People’s 
“No Coal Forum” in January 2005. Then, they were presented at three other regional 
policy workshops, in connection with sustainable energy trips and the sustainable 
energy fair (in Chiang Mai) during February-June 2005. The workshops and trips 
were helpful in assisting local participants and mass media to realize and analyze 
renewable energy potentials and their positive impacts in comparison with other PDP 
options. Later, three policy workshops were organized for national policy discussions 
in July 2005. One of these three workshops dealt directly with the PDP planning 
process and issues. The preliminary results of this study together with the case 
findings from sustainable energy trips were well reported in the mass media. 
Although several weak points in the existing PDP were clearly pointed out (e.g. the 
overestimation of demand or the extreme low oil price assumption) and the 
advantages of PDP-Renewables were highlighted, the first response from the 
authorities shortly after the workshop was that EGAT denied to revise its PDP since it 
was implemented for a period of two years and suggested the interim regulator, which 
was not established at that time, to take care of this job. However, in August 2005, the 
Ministry of Energy announced the postponement of the IPP bidding round (which was 
mentioned in the PDP2004) and, later, declared the need for PDP-revising due to 
slower national economic growth and lower electricity demand growth than 
previously assumed and expected. After the establishment in December 2005, the 
interim regulator also announced the revision of the PDP for the same reason. In April 
2006, the interim regulator announced the new demand forecast of 38,241 MW in 
2016, or a reduction of 5,317 MW compared to the previous demand forecasting. This 
was quite close to the suggestion of PDP-Renewables of reducing the peak demand by 
6,421 MW.  
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In May 2006, EGAT began its PDP process again, now referred to as the PDP2006, 
after the revision of the demand forecasting. Today, it seems that the PDP2006 
process is still not open to public participation and discussion. The recommendations 
for a broader focus on national sustainable development goals and targets and more 
strategic environmental impact considerations are also less likely to be incorporated in 
the PDP2006. 
Therefore, although the PDP2004 with its fault assumptions was not prolonged, as 
pointed out by this study, the new planning practices, as suggested in the previous 
chapter, are not likely to be implemented in the new PDP process. 
c) Case III: Moving Towards Feed-in Tariff 
As mentioned earlier, among other things, pricing regulation is one of the most crucial 
institutional factors for the success of renewable development. In Thailand, the most 
controversial issue in pricing regulation during the study period is the contest between 
the Thai Renewable Portfolio Standard and the feed-in tariff mechanisms. 
In August 2003, one month before this study began, the Thai government announced 
the decision to use the RPS mechanism as a main policy instrument in reaching the 
6% renewable energy target in 2011, without any public consultation. As explained in 
Chapter 7, some modifications were later made to the Thai RPS version, which gave 
rise to an increased uncertainty among the renewable energy producers, who were 
placed in a subordinated position. Great concerns over the inferiority of the RPS 
mechanism have been raised in academic forums since 2004, though these concerns 
have never been widely reported to the Thai public. 
In May 2004, for the first time, this study stated that the Thai RPS mechanism would, 
at most, only lead to a renewable contribution of 2% and not 6% as targeted. Later, in 
September 2004, the comparison between the RPS mechanism and the feed-in tariff, 
including the extra problems with the Thai RPS version, was presented in the Thai 
Magazine. During the policy workshops in 2005, both at regional and national levels, 
this pricing regulation was seriously discussed. Almost all participants agreed that the 
feed-in tariff is much more suitable for supporting renewable development. In July 
2005, the Federation of Thai Industry also stressed in the workshops that they 
preferred the feed-in tariff mechanism.  
Apart from the effort of this study, several academic attempts have been made to 
support the feed-in tariff. The Energy for Environment Foundation (in 2004) and the 
Joint Graduated School on Energy and Environment (in 2005) presented a review 
study and a detailed analysis on pricing regulations. Both of them recommended the 
feed-in tariff instead of the RPS. In the first half of 2005, the Energy Policy and 
Planning Office also recommended the feed-in tariff and, at the same time, pointed 
out the serious problems related to the Thai RPS version. Later, in 2005, FTI also 
conducted an in-depth study to identify the suitable level of the feed-in tariff rate and 
presented a policy proposal based on the feed-in tariff. However, in general, the Thai 
public has not received much information on this policy issue. 
Thus, it is quite clear that all academic forums have reached an agreement in favor of 
the feed-in tariff and this study is just a small part of this academic movement. In 
April 2006, the Department of Alternative Energy Development and Energy 
Efficiency (DEDE) also announced the introduction of the feed-in tariff and planned 
to introduce the feed-in tariff system by September 2006, though this statement was 
not politically confirmed.  
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8.2 Reflections on Policy Changes and Impacts 
From the experiences of the three years of study and the results of these case studies, 
the desirable policy changes in a health perspective can take place when; 
1. Policy information is available for public deliberation and, more importantly, 
the Thai public takes the case seriously. This will lead to meaningful public 
actions and finally desirable policy changes, as seen in the following, 
• The effort of consumer organizations in demonstrating against the EGAT 
privatization with the private monopoly model, which finally led to the 
cancellation of the EGAT privatization by the Supreme administrative 
court. 
• The pressure on tariff raising that forced EGAT to reduce the power 
generation from fuel oil, buy more power from biomass, and strengthen the 
DSM program during the peak period in 2006. 
2. Concrete or inevitable facts are publicly presented, which force the authorities 
to change the assumptions and plans, as seen in the following, 
• The lower demand growth that forces the government to revise the 
PDP2004 with much lower demand prediction. 
• Much higher oil prices (compared to the government’s assumption) 
leading to high natural gas prices and forcing EGAT to invest more in 
DSM and buy more power from biomass SPPs and also forcing the MoEn 
to redesign an appropriate fuel mix. 
3. Academic agreements can be reached at least at some levels (not necessarily 
through this study process) and some policy networks and actors use this 
consensus for adjusting and changing the policy proposal, as seen in the 
following,  
• The latest change from the RPS to the feed-in tariff mechanism caused by 
the clear criticism of the Thai version of the RPS from all policy 
workshops including international experts’ opinions and studies. Later the 
FTI took this suggestion into its policy proposal. 
4. New policy institutions and actors (or networks) emerge and participate 
actively in the policy process, as seen in the following,  
• The effort of FTI’s renewable energy group in calling for the feed-in tariff, 
instead of the RPS mechanism. 
• The establishment of an interim regulator leading to the revision of the 
demand forecasting and the PDP. 
Oppositely, the positive changes are not likely to take place when, 
• The public has not been well informed, mostly due to a sophisticated technical 
style of information or a case-specific information (for example in grid-access 
and interconnection issues). 
• Academic studies and forums are not sufficient in order to understand the 
issue systematically (as in grid-access and interconnection issues), to raise the 
issue publicly, and to reach certain levels of academic agreement. 
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• The government applies a non-action policy strategy, meaning that the 
government does not explicitly decline a policy proposal but delays its 
progress (as seen in the call for more renewable energy investment and the 
VSPP approval process) or does not take it into consideration at all (as seen in 
the call for broader focus, wider options and more public participation in the 
PDP process). 
• The access to the formal decision-making process is limited (as seen in the 
PDP process and earlier the EGAT privatization process). Therefore, public 
inputs do not contribute to the consideration process and, at the same time, the 
logics and rationalities of the decision (or the options) are never reported to 
and scrutinized by the public in time. 
Therefore, on the basis of these recent experiences, the complete formal change 
towards PDP-Renewables is hardly taking place, nor is the whole recommended 
institutional framework suggested by decentralization discourse. It is more likely that 
the formal policy process will make each decision on a separate basis, but within a 
full range of implicit influences from different policy discourses. In the near future, 
some of these following changes may happen;  
• The introduction of the feed-in tariff mechanism to support the 
contribution of renewable energy. 
• The interim regulator may consider the grid access and interconnection 
regulations more seriously and introduce better regulations. 
• EGAT may invest more in DSM and biomass power purchasing in order to 
reduce the investment and generation costs during peak hours, as the 
public will continuously try to avoid tariff rising. 
• Oppositely, EGAT may successfully introduce new coal-fired power plants 
in the PDP 2006 to reduce the dependency on natural gas. 
• To avoid a strong domestic protest against new fossil-fuelled power plants 
as well as to expand their investment business, EGAT and its subsidiaries 
may also increasingly invest in neighboring countries. 
Interestingly, since the Democrat Party is now supporting the policy direction towards 
more renewable energy, it is very difficult to predict the policy changes taking place if 
they come to power in 2007.  
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8.3 Policy as a Social Learning Process 
These reflections from the direct participation in the policy process and the policy 
analysis in Chapter 4 provide an insight that public deliberations lead to effective 
public actions and better understanding, and we can thus view the policy processes in 
the Thai power sector as a social learning process.  
Obviously, the policy arena of the Thai power sector has expanded beyond the limited 
scope of the formal policy process through more than a decade. Although the formal 
policy process is still very important, no policy decision can be totally ensured by the 
absolute power of the formal policy process. 
Therefore, networks and actors in the policy domain play an important role both in the 
formal policy process and in framing the issues for wider public discussion and 
support. This is especially the case after the economic crisis and the adoption of the 
new constitution in 1997, when different policy discourses and networks have been 
strongly formed, as explained in Chapter 4. 
However, the degree of accessibility to and influence on the formal policy process 
vary among different policy networks and actors. This variation affects the needs to 
bring policy issues into public deliberation, especially among those who cannot 
adequately gain access to the formal policy process. Through public deliberations and 
actions, the societal domain becomes more important in the policy process, as seen in 
the protest against the EGAT privatization during the study period. 
Traditionally, the Thai public (or societal domain) did not recognize themselves as 
part of the policy domain. However, they have involved in the Thai power policy 
process because they are struggling against any form of exploitation, domination, and 
subjection. In other words, they involve mainly to protect their interests rather than to 
exert influence on the contents of the policy solutions. 
However, public actions cannot easily gain access to the policy process. They require 
a sharp policy framing (i.e. policy meaning) for broader understanding, an appropriate 
timing, public space for policy communication (including the mass media), and a 
policy window (or institutional space) for changes. Even in the case of the EGAT 
privatization, the “last minute action” was almost too late. 
If public action can involve in the policy process, this would be a good opportunity 
for Thai society to scrutinize and learn about formal policy decisions, assumptions, 
and alternative proposals. In various cases, public action can lead to a better 
understanding of “the inconsistency of logic” to be found in policy proposals and 
decisions, as seen in the EGAT privatization case. More importantly, a deeper public 
involvement will help Thai society in understanding “the logic of inconsistency”, 
which is normally the outcome of the powerful influences from some policy actors 
which aim to protect and expand their benefits. For example, the reason of using 
extremely low oil price assumptions in the formal PDP process is logically linked to 
the attempt to protect and promote the natural gas market in the Thai power sector. 
Therefore, the public understanding of “the inconsistency of logic” and “the logic of 
inconsistency” in policy proposals and processes and the recognition of public action 
are the main elements of the social learning process in the policy arena. They can also 
be social validity tests of each policy contestation and proposal. 
Lastly, the changes of the formal policy process and policy decisions and, at the same 
time, the changes of policy strategies by different policy networks and actors are the 
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effects of efficient public actions. Public action may also force different policy 
networks into involving in cross-network policy learning in order to provide better 
solutions to public needs. It even may lead to the emerging of new policy proposals 
and discourses. 
Figure 8.1 summarizes the overall learning process in the policy arena by emphasizing 
the interactions between three layers of policy-making and the importance of public 
deliberations and actions. 
 
Figure 8.1 Policy as a Social Learning Process
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8.4 Limitation of Public Deliberation  
However, this explanation should not lead to the misunderstanding that a social 
learning and public deliberation process is easily taking place in all policy issues or 
processes. The previous reflections also present several main obstacles to public 
deliberation, public action and social learning process in Thai power policy, 
including; 
• Several formal policy processes are still closed in their nature, as recently 
seen in the PDP revision process. Public participation is defined as the 
hearing of the final proposal, which is far from being enough to introduce 
new cognitive and normative pillars as well as new planning practices in 
the formal policy process. 
• The government still heavily controls the tempo of the policy process, 
which is crucial to the way in which some policy proposals are pushed into 
final decision without adequate public deliberation and, at the same time, 
to the labeling of some policy proposals as “non-action” policies, without 
any need for formal announcement. 
• Unbalanced opportunities and influences between different policy actors 
and networks still remain. Some policy actors, like EGAT, are themselves 
part of the formal policy process. 
• Public deliberations and actions cannot be ensured, as public attention and 
public communication channels (especially the mass media) are highly 
competitive in relation to different societal issues. Since public actions 
may not last long, timing and policy window are certainly crucial factors 
of an efficient attempt. 
• Obviously, the policy network and actors supporting PDP-Renewables and 
the decentralization discourse have limited opportunities in accessing the 
formal policy process. Their strength relies on their ability to bring issues 
to public deliberation and action. But, to urge for public deliberation, a 
sharp policy framing is required. The question is to which extent this 
policy network will be able to develop the policy framing and raise public 
awareness. 
It is fair to say that viewing policy as a social learning process provides a framework 
for identifying opportunities and obstacles to policy changes. More importantly, it 
highlights the actual role of the Thai public in the policy process. Due to public 
deliberation and action, different policy discourses will be forced to avoid 
inappropriate (or socially unacceptable) policy choices and, consequently, provide 
more space for the better policy options to be nurtured and expanded. 
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8.5 The Future of Healthy Public Policy in the Thai Power Sector 
Based on the concept of the social learning process, two basic elements which are 
required in the policy process are communication and interaction (especially public 
actions) across the three layers of the policy arena. In this viewpoint, developing a 
healthy public policy can be seen as an attempt to facilitate or stimulate policy 
deliberations and policy actions in supporting healthier policy directions across these 
three layers (also presented in Figure 8.2).  
 
Figure 8.2 Facilitating Healthy Public Policy Process
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Therefore, the future of healthy public policy basically depends on four main 
progresses in;
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 a) Deliberative Policy Analysis and Communication  
As recently experienced, not all policy communication leads to public deliberation, 
public actions and desirable policy changes. Hence, it is necessary to identify and 
develop the effective ways of communication in terms of supporting healthy public 
policy. 
Deliberative policy analysis, as an approach to this study, is one of the main attempts 
to develop more effective policy communications with the aim to promote public 
deliberations and actions. From this study, three components of policy communication 
are highly recommended in the development of a healthy public policy in the Thai 
power sector; namely 
• Policy Background, which represents the basic values and rationalities 
of each policy discourse and proposal, is an essential aspect in order to 
understand the fundamental differences in different policy 
contestations. The understanding of different basic values and 
rationalities can help the public to analyze policy options and, more 
importantly, to justify their own policy actions. In this study, the 
attempts to provide a better understanding of the policy background 
can be seen in Chapter 4 (historical and policy discourse analysis) and 
Chapter 7 (cognitive and normative pillar of institutional framework). 
• Policy On Ground, which is the policy issue debated or discussed 
publicly at present, such as different PDP options or pricing 
regulations. Although, normally, policy on ground dominates the 
policy communication, it can be further improved through better policy 
analyses, including the implementation of strategic impact assessment, 
sustainable energy planning and institutional analysis, as shown in this 
study. It is also helpful in connecting policy on ground with its policy 
background(s) in order to ensure the desirable policy directions. 
• Policy Foreground, which represents the understanding of common 
and different views of the future. As all policies in today’s discussion 
are created for implementation tomorrow, the future perspectives are 
certainly crucial for public deliberation. When we look into the future 
from different points of view, we will propose different policy 
directions. However, sooner or later, we usually face a common future, 
both in terms of opportunities and threats. Unfortunately, very few 
attempts have been made to provide a better understanding of different 
and common policy foregrounds. In this study, the sensitivity analysis 
in Chapter 6 has been conducted in order to analyze the flexibility of 
different policy options within different future scenarios. However, 
there is still much to accomplish in order to achieve a full 
understanding of policy foreground(s) for the Thai power sector. 
In other words, better policy analysis and communications for healthy public policy 
require the connection of understanding normative values and rationalities, policy 
proposals and impacts, and future risks and opportunities. Apart from deliberative 
policy analysis, strategic impact assessment, sustainable energy planning, and the 
creation of a sharp policy framing are certainly crucial to reaching public attention, 
stimulating public deliberation, and encouraging public action. 
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b) Better Governance System 
While more effective policy communications aim to provide a better understanding 
and facilitate the involvement of public actions from the societal domain in the formal 
policy process, the urge for a better governance system works in the opposite way. An 
improved governance system requires transparent and participatory policy processes; 
in other words, that they take into account different perspectives, values, and interests 
with fair judgment in the policy-making process. This means that the formal policy 
process must be open to public interactions. 
Through this study, the attempt to assess the governance system in the Thai power 
structure, using the recent EGAT privatization policy as a main case study, has been 
developed into a comprehensive report and, consequently, an impressive policy result. 
This successful experience should pave the way for establishing common 
understanding, guiding principles, and tools for improving governance structures or 
systems in Thailand. To support PDP-Renewables as a healthier choice, the main 
priority in the development of better governance should be given to PDP planning 
practices, regulatory processes, and environmental regulations. 
c) The Roles of Policy Networks/Actors 
Since the formal policy processes in the Thai power sector are not widely open and 
also involve a lot of technical discussions, it is not easy for the Thai public to follow 
and participate directly in the formal policy processes. To fill this gap, the role of 
policy networks is crucial. This role includes a) policy monitors or watchdogs, b) 
policy analysis (including option and impact analysis), c) policy communications, 
which provide meanings or interpretations of different policy issues and options, d) 
participation in formal policy processes when opportunities appear, and e) support to 
public actions, especially the identification of appropriate timing and policy windows. 
The capacity of each policy network for implementing all these functions is a key to 
promote healthy public policy in the Thai power sector. 
It is also good for Thai society to have more than one policy discourse and network, 
since they normally provide different viewpoints on the same problem. Thus, having 
more than one policy discourses provides the opportunity to see and solve (or prevent) 
problems in different and more creative ways. 
However, the more challenging issue is how to use the variety of viewpoints 
creatively in the policy process. Apart from better policy communications and 
governance systems, another possibility is to promote policy-oriented learning across 
the policy networks, instead of perceiving the interactions with other networks as a 
contestation and political negotiation. The policy-oriented learning across the policy 
networks can be developed in several forms of policy workshops, working groups for 
specific issues, and research works. 
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 d) Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) 
As elaborated in Chapters 4 and 7, the policy discourse of the Thai power sector has 
been developed from different perspectives and values, and applied to different 
rationalities when proposing their policy directions and mechanisms. Hence, to 
understand different policy discourses and especially to develop a healthy public 
policy, value judgment is needed in order to identify the desirable aims (or directions) 
for society. The power analysis is also required to allow and lead the value judgment 
to be an effective policy decision and action. 
This refers to the concept of “phronesis” or practical wisdom, introduced by Aristotle. 
According to Aristotle, phronesis is an intellectual virtue that is “reasoned, and 
capable of actions with regard to things that are good or bad for man”1. Phronesis is 
very important since it concerns values and goes beyond scientific and technical 
knowledge. Therefore, phronesis is an intellectual deliberation by which instrumental 
rationality is balanced by value-rationality2.  
Phronesis must involve both a true understanding of an end and also identify means to 
an end determined by moral virtue. As mentioned by Aristotle, “virtue makes us aim 
at the right mark and practical wisdom makes us take the right means”3. Practical 
wisdom comprehends the various powers and qualities in its deliberations over means 
and ends, which are highly context-dependent. Therefore, practical wisdom is more 
likely to be “a sense or a tacit skill for doing the ethically practical rather than a kind 
of science”4. 
As earlier mentioned in this chapter, the right means towards the healthier end (i.e. 
PDP-Renewables) are hardly systematically determined through specific policy 
processes, but rather emerged as outcomes of the struggle between different aspects of 
policy contestation, thus the ability to deliberate what is good and advantageous for 
Thai society is crucial to the development of a healthy public policy in the Thai power 
sector. 
Combined with deliberative policy analysis, practical wisdom should allow different 
policy values and rationalities to play more creative roles together through public 
deliberation in their contested policy arena. This refers to the concept of trans-
rationality, according to which different rationalities are deliberatively analyzed and 
meaningfully contributed to the following decisions and actions. 
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8.6 Continued Works 
Certainly, in reality, healthy public policy work is an endless project. Due to its 
dynamics and complexities, policy will change continuously, sometimes in desirable 
directions and sometimes not. What can be achieved with these three years of study 
are more likely to be the understandings of a) possibilities and potential benefits of 
alternative healthier policy directions, b) how policy changes have taken place 
historically and recently, and c) analytical and operational frameworks for future 
policy changes. A series of policy works needs to be done in order to develop these 
understandings and put them into practice, while, at the same time, testing these 
understandings in real-life situations. 
Based on the analysis of this study and the actual development of the future works 
during April-August 2006, eight research and policy works have been planned for 
Thailand for 2006 and 2007. 
• Electricity Governance Assessment, which follows the success of the 
first governance assessment of the EGAT privatization. The main aim is to 
provide a common understanding for establishing a better governance 
system, as suggested in the previous section. In 2006-2007, the focus of 
the assessment will be on the PDP planning process, the regulatory 
process, and present environmental regulations. 
• Integration Analysis of PDP-Renewables, to provide a better 
understanding of the suggested development of PDP-Renewables and the 
decentralization model in the existing national grid and how it will 
contribute to the reduction of costs in load management and grid stability. 
The idea is not only to contest other policy discourses in cognitive and 
normative battlefields, as suggested in chapter 7, but also to identify the 
better pricing regulation for renewable energy in doing so. The Energy-
PLAN model is certainly useful for this purpose. 
• Strategic Impact Assessment across the Border. Since the latest 
measure of the Thai power industry is to expand its investments to 
neighboring countries, especially Laos, China, and Myanmar, the strategic 
impact assessment in this study may have a too narrow scope in terms of 
geographical area. The new attempt will involve an assessment of health 
and other impacts of investment options in other countries on their 
populations and environments, as well as on the Thai population and 
environment. The possible starting point will be the research collaboration 
between Thailand and one or two research institutes in these selected 
countries. 
• A Citizen’s Primer in the Thai Power Sector, As public deliberations 
and actions become more important in Thai power policy, it is useful and 
essential to produce a comprehensive handbook for public understanding 
and analyzing different policy and planning issues. This work has been 
inspired by the early impressive book of Prayas Energy Group in India5.  
• Sustainable Energy Fair and Trips for Journalists, which follow the 
good experiences of this study. Both the sustainable energy fair and trips 
provide opportunities for the Thai public to learn about renewable energy 
potentials, their better strategic impacts, and relating policy issues. The fair 
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has been planned in relation to the fact that renewable power generation in 
Thailand has now reached 1,000 MW of installed capacity, showing that 
PDP-Renewables is a viable option which has better impacts, in several 
perspectives. 
• Implementation of Feed-in Tariff Pricing Scheme. Among different 
public regulations, proper pricing regulation is one of the most important 
issues in promoting renewable energy. Allowing the Thai RPS to be the 
main pricing scheme does not only entail more uncertainties to renewable 
energy producers, but also implies more control over renewable energy 
development from fossil-fuel power producers. To provide a good and fair 
ground for renewable energy to grow in this country, the clear target is to 
shift from RPS to feed-in tariff and to bring the feed-in tariff into force not 
later than 2007, according to the PDP-Renewables suggested in this study. 
• Regular Series of Policy Workshops, as partly done in this study, in 
order to provide a basis for cross-network and policy-oriented learning and 
public deliberation. The workshop can be part of the above-mentioned 
future activities or separate activities for other emerging issues in the Thai 
power sector.  
• Higher Educational Program on Sustainable Energy Planning and 
Political Economy of Sustainable Energy, which will be the firm 
academic basis for future policy works in Thailand, both in terms of policy 
analysis and capacity strengthening. The academic setting can be both a 
university (e.g. Kasetsart University) and the Joint-Graduated Schools for 
Energy and Environment. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion and Perspective 
This study has been inspired by the growing concern on human health impacts of 
power generation in Thailand and the societal need for healthy public policy or, in this 
case, “the better power for health”. For more than a decade, the human health concern 
has emerged mainly from the real suffering of several communities located near 
power plants and large hydro power dams throughout the country. Obviously, the 
growing concern has led to the strong objection against new power plants by several 
local communities, which, in many cases, leads to societal conflicts and even 
violation. 
The concept of healthy public policy, introduced through the national health system 
reform in 2000, aims to address this problem and conflict by placing health on the 
agenda of policy-making, suggesting better policy directions for health, and making 
the healthier option an easier option to make. The objective of this study is to 
elucidate the idea of healthy public policy in the Thai power sector by analyzing the 
public policy process in the sector, identifying the possible solutions for health, 
analyzing the impacts of different policy alternatives, recommending the supportive 
institutional framework for a healthier solution, and reflecting on the actual policy 
changes which have moved in a healthier direction during the three years of study. 
The study has been organized into four main parts. First, the existing public policy 
process and policy discourses have been analyzed on the basis of historical and 
deliberative policy analysis. Second, the strategic impacts of three main policy options 
have been assessed in environmental, economic, and health perspectives. Then, the 
existing institutional framework has been reviewed in the light of different 
interpretations from different policy discourses. The aim of this part is to identify the 
supportive institutional framework for the healthier solutions and how to convert it 
into reality. Last, all of the attempts of this study and the actual policy changes taking 
place within the study period have been reviewed and examined, in order to reflect the 
actual meaning of healthy public policy, or better power for health, in the real politics 
of Thai society. 
9.1 The alternative is technically possible 
The result of the review of sustainable energy potentials in Chapter 3 shows that 
Thailand has great resources for renewable energy development, especially in terms 
of biomass and solar energy. More importantly, in recent years, the growth of 
renewable power generation in Thailand has been impressive. In 2006, Thailand has 
reached 1,000 MW of renewable power generation and half of this capacity has been 
installed within the last three years. In terms of costs, several technologies, namely 
biomass, biogas, and micro-hydro power, are now able to compete with fossil-based 
and large hydro power plants.  
However, in total, renewable power generation only accounts for around 2% of the 
total energy generation in the power sector and less than 10% of the overall predicted 
renewable energy potential (around 15,000 MW). Generally, it is well accepted that 
renewable energy has much better impacts on environment and health. Therefore, it is 
indeed possible for Thailand to use renewable energy as a healthier alternative. 
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Apart from renewable technologies, Demand Side Management and energy efficiency 
constitute one of the best alternatives in sustainable energy development, also in terms 
of economy. In Thailand, the estimated potential of DSM is nearly 3,000 MW. 
Moreover, the Thai power sector has always been criticized for overestimation of the 
demand prediction, leading to over-investment and unnecessary negative impacts. 
Evidently, within the study period, the demand prediction made in 2004 is 900 MW 
higher than the actual peak demand in 2006. The realistic demand prediction will lead 
to lower installed capacities by nearly 7,000 MW. 
This study takes these three sustainable energy possibilities, namely renewable 
energy, DSM, and the revision of demand forecasting into consideration in when 
identifying the possible option for a healthy public policy. In the study, this policy 
option is referred to as PDP-Renewables. 
9.2 The alternative has not been considered in the existing policy process 
From the reviews in Chapters 4 and 7, it is clear that the Thai power sector has been 
developed as a centralized and monopolized system, which pushes renewable energy 
as a decentralized or distributed power into a marginalized situation. Up to 2004, 
renewable energy has never been recognized as an alternative when formulating the 
power development plan. This is why most of the renewable potential has not yet been 
exploited in the Thai power sector. 
At the same time, due to the monopoly structure of the Thai power sector, the 
expansionist investment strategy is preferable for the authorities, leading to a 
systematic over-estimation of the future demand and, consequently, over-investment. 
This expansionist strategy has also undermined the potential of DSM implementation 
in this country. 
With the clear insight that the “cause of the cause” is rooted in the power structure 
and the policy process, rather than based on technology, the study also digs deeply to 
understand the policy process and the dynamics within the power sector. 
9.3 Different policy discourses lead to different policy directions 
Although the Thai power sector was first developed in the 1960s as an absolute 
government-controlled policy arena within the state monopoly model, societal 
conditions have gradually forced it to open its policy process. On the one hand, the 
high economic growth during 1987-1995 produced more private participation in the 
sector. On the other hand, due to the negative environmental and health impacts, since 
the 1990s, civil society has also urged for more public participation in the policy 
process. After the economic crisis in 1997, while the pressures for privatization had 
continued, the influences of consumer organizations and local protestors had also 
become stronger. More importantly, the Thai public also pays more attention to the 
policy debates in the power sector, which, in some case, lead to meaningful public 
action against the policy directions of the government. It is quite clear that the policy 
border has now expanded from the full control of government authorities into the area 
of policy network negotiation and, to some extent, into the societal domain of public 
deliberations and actions. 
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Within this expanding scope of the Thai power policy arena, the four main policy 
discourses of state monopoly, power pool, private monopoly, and decentralization 
have played crucial roles in determining the policy directions. They suggest different 
market models, different governance structures, different fuel mixes in power 
generation, and different levels of environmental and health consideration. In their 
contestation, all these policy discourses try to provide their own explanation of the 
situations and problems, to introduce their policy solutions based on their explanation 
and normative principles, and to highlight their policy interpretations by use of 
cognitive frameworks. The domination of policy discourses in different periods highly 
depends on the economic and political conditions, including the external forces, like 
the world oil price. 
The concept of healthy public policy is well integrated into the decentralization policy 
discourse, which supports a) strong public control and the reduction of monopoly 
power both in terms of state and private monopoly players, b) a realistic investment 
strategy to alleviate economic and environmental burdens from over-investment in 
power plants, c) more contribution of renewable energy and energy efficiency in the 
Thai power systems, and d) the full integration of environmental considerations at all 
levels of decision-making.  
Although this policy discourse has never dominated Thai power policy, its influential 
power has been expanded considerably after the economic crisis in 1997. In the 
situation of high oil prices, strong needs for public accountability, local concerns over 
environmental and health impacts, and potential renewable energy resources, this 
decentralization policy discourse is likely to play a more crucial role on the Thai 
power policy stage. 
With this wider policy opportunity, it is important to present a concrete plan for a 
better and healthier policy direction in Thai society and, at the same time, to compare 
it with other policy alternatives, especially the existing policy direction. 
9.4 PDP-Renewables is a better and healthier option 
To analyze the impacts of the different policy options based on these policy 
discourses, strategic environmental assessment (SEA) is applied to the study. Three 
power development plan (PDP) options were developed with differences in terms of 
demand forecasting (representing different expansion strategies), power technologies, 
and fuel mixes. 
PDP-Renewables is an investment option derived from the decentralization discourse. 
Based on the resource potentials and present available technologies, PDP-Renewables 
is a viable option according to the existing planning criteria. To compete with PDP-
Gas (from the private monopoly discourse) and PDP-Coal (from the state monopoly 
discourse) in economic terms, PDP-Renewables combines the cheaper solutions (e.g., 
revision of demand forecasting and DSM) and the competitive solutions (such as, 
biomass, biogas, industrial CHP, micro-hydro) with the more expensive solutions 
(like solar PV and wind). 
The results show that, compared with the other two PDP options, PDP-Renewable is 
the cleanest option, due to its lower negative environmental impacts. As a result, it is 
also a healthier option in relation to the concept of healthy public policy. Through 
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PDP-Renewables, in 2015, annually 300 lives are expected to be saved and 3,000 
people are expected to avoid chronic diseases. With the lower negative impacts on 
environment and health and its much smaller size, PDP-Renewables is highly 
expected to reduce the social conflicts over power investment projects. As it depends 
much more on domestic and renewable resources, PDP-Renewables also provides 
much better results in terms of employment effect, resource conservation and national 
energy self-sufficiency.  
PDP-Renewables also has good economic outcomes. Compared to the existing PDP 
(or PDP-Gas), it is expected to decrease fuel costs by 10.4%, to decrease generation 
costs by 4.7% and to decrease foreign import by 8.7% during the planning period 
(2003-2015). At the same time, it can contribute with 2.7% more to the National 
GDP. Since the analysis applies the fuel price of 2003, these economic advantages 
will increase further if the world oil price remains at the present level. These 
advantages can be maintained if the power plant investment is needed in the case of 
higher demand growth. In other words, PDP-Renewables is both a feasible and a 
flexible choice for long-term investment in the Thai power sector. 
9.5 Supportive institutional framework is needed 
However, since PDP-Renewables essentially requires different investment schemes 
(i.e., small and very small power producers rather than EGAT or large private 
investment or IPPs), it can only become reality if a supportive institutional framework 
and public regulations have been established. Logically, this supportive framework 
may not be easily introduced, since both the implementation of PDP-Renewables and 
this framework can lead to a significant reduction in the investment and fuel markets 
of the largest players in the Thai power sector and energy market, like EGAT, PTT, 
and IPPs. 
The analytical results show that most of the required supportive framework and 
regulations for PDP-Renewables have not yet been established. Very small renewable 
power producers still have a great difficulty in gaining access to the grid, while 
several renewable SPPs still receive electricity prices lower than EGAT’s avoided 
costs. Very few renewable power producers can get the government subsidy and the 
subsidy is only granted for the first five years of operation. They also face unfair 
requirements of interconnection, unfair charges and penalties and delays in their 
approval process. 
 a) Market and Governance Structure 
All of these problems are deeply rooted in a monopoly market structure and 
unbalanced governance system, in which the utilities can utilize their authority and 
market power for protecting their business interests. Therefore, to develop PDP-
Renewables, supportive institutional changes must take place on the power market 
and at the governance structure level. Openness towards the decentralization model, a 
strong independent regulator, and a clear division of roles and interests among actors 
are highly recommended. 
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 b) Pricing and Interconnecting Regulations 
Obviously, the existing pricing regulations are not attractive or fair to renewable 
energy investment. In supporting a fair pricing system, the firm and non-firm basis 
must be, at least, replaced by on-peak and off-peak tariffs. Moreover, to stimulate 
renewable energy development and innovation in the near future, the feed-in tariff is 
clearly much more preferable than the Thai version of the RPS. In terms of 
interconnection regulations, the concept of co-responsibility between utilities and 
renewable power producers must be applied with fair regulation by an independent 
regulatory body. 
 c) Planning Process 
Certainly, renewable energy, energy efficiency, and their environmental and health 
benefits are not the scope of the existing planning practices, leading to the low 
utilization of the renewable energy potential in Thailand. Therefore, the new planning 
practices with more open strategic options and a broader focus on environmental and 
health benefits and national development goals are necessary in order to exploit the 
potentials and benefits of PDP-Renewables. 
 d) Policy Process 
However, all these unfavorable conditions, like firm and non-firm SPPs or unfair 
interconnection burdens, derive from the cognitive and normative criteria of their 
policy discourses (either state monopoly or private monopoly). Therefore, these 
recommended changes cannot be easily made, since they imply different cognitive 
and normative pillars, compared to the existing dominating policy discourses. Thus, 
within the policy contestation, future changes are more likely to be outcomes of 
cognitive and normative battles. The results of these battles depend very much on the 
interconnections between concrete experiences and references, sound policy analysis, 
constructive policy communications, good proposals for effective regulations, and 
political opportunities. In other words, the policy process in the Thai power sector 
must be opened to different policy interpretations and discourses. 
9.6 Policy changes are also possible but still uncertain 
Since one of the objectives of this study is to participate directly in healthier policy 
changes and learn from this direct experience, it is essential to reflect on the lessons 
learnt about the influences or impacts of this study on the actual policy changes 
during the three years of study. 
Some desired changes are now taking place. The revision of the PDP with lower 
demand growth, as suggested in Chapter 6, is now taking place. The privatization of 
EGAT under the private monopoly discourse or the Enhanced Single Buyer model has 
been cancelled by the Supreme Administrative Court, after a strong consumer 
organization movement. With the strong academic backup, the Thai government also 
tends to agree in the effectiveness of the feed-in tariff mechanism in supporting 
renewable energy development.  
Observably, the desired changes are more likely to occur in situations when a) policy 
information is available to public deliberation and, more importantly, the Thai public 
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takes the case seriously, as shown in the attempts to stop the EGAT privatization 
process, b) concrete or inevitable facts emerge and are publicly presented, forcing the 
authorities to change their assumptions and plans, as seen in the revision of the 
demand prediction and consequently the new PDP, c) academic agreements can be 
reached, as shown in the case of the feed-in tariff, and d) new policy institutions or 
networks emerge and participate actively in the policy process, as seen in the 
establishment of an interim regulator.  
However, within these three years, some policy issues have not been successfully 
changed. Although the existing PDP2004 is now revised, the new PDP2006 process is 
not yet publicly open or integrated with broader national sustainable development 
goals, as suggested in this study. Concurrently, though the privatization process is 
stopped, the monopoly power still remains. Although PDP-Renewables does not yet 
receive any strong criticism, PDP-Renewables is less likely to become the formal 
power development plan in the near future. Therefore, both PDP-Renewables and its 
supportive institutional framework are still facing an uncertain future. 
9.7 Social learning process and policy works must be continued 
The reflections from this study show that one specific study cannot by itself make the 
differences in policy changes. To promote healthier policy changes, it is essential to 
concentrate on public interactions and deliberations in the policy arena.  
From the three years of study, it is clear that meaningful public action is a good 
opportunity for Thai society to scrutinize and learn about formal policy decisions, 
their assumptions, and alternative proposals. In various cases, public action can lead 
to a better understanding of “the inconsistency of logic” to be found in policy 
proposals and decisions. More importantly, a deeper analysis public involvement will 
help Thai society in understanding “the logic of inconsistency”, which is normally the 
outcome of the powerful influences from some policy actors who aim to protect and 
expand their interests. Therefore, the public understanding of “the inconsistency of 
logic” and “the logic of inconsistency” in policy proposals and processes are the main 
elements of the social learning process of developing healthy public policy in the Thai 
power sector. 
However, future public deliberations and actions cannot always be ensured, especially 
when the formal policy process is not open to public participation, the government 
still controls the tempo of the policy process, and the resources and opportunities of 
different policy discourse coalitions are highly unequal.  
Therefore, to promote more public deliberation towards healthy public policy, several 
policy works must be implemented in the near future. These policy works include a) 
the urge for a better governance system in the Thai power sector, b) integration 
analysis of PDP-Renewables in supporting power system reliability, c) strategic 
impact assessment across the national border, d) implementation of the feed-in tariff 
mechanism, and e) continuous public education and policy communications 
(including successful sustainable energy trips, sustainable energy fair, and policy 
workshops). 
 
 
 325
9.8 The Limitation of This Research 
This research has three main limitations. First, like other impact assessment studies, 
this research is limited by future uncertainties and the assumption used in the impact 
analysis. Although the study tries to cope with this limitation by providing reviews, 
sensitivity analysis, and policy workshops, it is still difficult to predict tomorrow’s 
uncertainties today. 
Therefore, the research does not aim to provide the “final answer” to Thai society. 
Although it is shown from the strategic impact assessment and sensitivity analysis that 
PDP-Renewables is more suitable for promoting health, this PDP-Renewables is still 
not the best possible answer to Thai society. Concurrently, with this limitation, the 
impacts mentioned in the study are more likely to be the quantifiable “potential 
impacts” rather than actual amounts. In fact, PDP-Renewables and its potential 
benefits in different perspectives represent the idea that the healthier choice is 
possible in the case of the Thai power sector, rather than being a final policy solution 
in its own sense.  
The second limitation links to the study of policy changes in the Thai power sector. 
As announced in Chapter 1, the core idea of this research is to promote healthier 
policy changes. Therefore, the value of health in this research is highly acknowledged 
and identified, including in policy recommendations. In other words, this research 
takes health as a standpoint for the policy suggestions. However, in the actual policy 
process, the value of health may not be high, due to the competitive societal values 
and uncontrollable socio-political conditions, which may affect the policy changes or 
the actual policy interactions. 
Last, since policy changes may take place in the long run, the analysis of policy 
changes within three years as conducted in this study cannot represent the whole 
story. The desirable and undesirable policy changes can emerge in every moment due 
to predictable and unpredictable reasons and influences. Therefore, the reflections of 
this study are not adequate to provide a complete understanding of policy complexity 
and to promote desirable policy changes in the long term. The continuation of the 
policy analysis and interactions is essential in order to cope with this limitation and 
pursue healthier policy changes in the Thai power sector.  
9.9 Perspective on Better Power For Health 
Both analytical and political results confirm that healthy public policy and sustainable 
energy development have their own past, present and future in Thai power policy.  
Conceptually and historically, healthy public policy has been well integrated into the 
policy discourse that supports decentralization and sustainable development through 
the contribution of renewable energy and energy efficiency. Technically and 
strategically, a healthy public policy option, like PDP-Renewables, is highly viable, 
economically feasible and socially desirable in terms of health, environment, and 
social impacts. Institutionally, the supportive framework and regulations are not yet 
fully developed due to the domination of conventional views of power sector 
management. However, with all these potentials and benefits, healthy public policy is 
now ready to challenge and compete with these dominant cognitive and normative 
views in developing “better power for health”. 
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Towards the end of this study, it must be concluded that, in the Thai power sector, 
the success of healthy public policy in promoting “better power for health” 
depends on three dimensions of its better “power”. 
In physical terms, “sustainable power”, with renewable power, energy efficiency and 
effective demand management, is required in order to reduce the negative 
environmental and health impacts and to promote the economic and social benefits of 
power generation and investment plans. 
In political terms, “more equal or balanced power” among different actors in the 
Thai power sector is essential to ensure that all policy solutions (especially the 
healthier options) are fairly assessed in the policy process; that all power producers 
gain access to the grid and achieve a fair price for their electricity and also 
externalities, and that all public interest is deliberatively protected in all policy 
decision-making. 
Last, in philosophical terms, “society’s wisdom power”, which focuses on the 
desirable end and the ethically right means, is crucial to the implementation and 
expansion of the first two dimensions of better “power”. In a health perspective, the 
question of what is good or bad for human beings and society is always relevant and 
significant. Without this ethical consideration, both sustainable power and more 
balanced political power will loose their values and ability to change policy directions 
in the policy process. Together with technical and political solutions, the ethic policy 
deliberation of society is likely to ultimately determine the success of healthy public 
policy and the future of sustainable energy in the Thai power sector. 
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